IR 05000280/1988009
| ML18152A891 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 04/14/1988 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Holland W, Larry Nicholson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18152A889 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-88-09, 50-280-88-9, 50-281-88-09, 50-281-88-9, NUDOCS 8804260232 | |
| Download: ML18152A891 (8) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-280/88-09 and 50-281/88-09 Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company Richmond, VA 23261 Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281 Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2 License Nos.: DPR-32 and DPR-37 Inspection Conducted:
February 28 through April 2, 1988 Inspectors:
2z:
.. Holland, 1d ht Inspector
~~~rn L. E~hol son, Res~ n?,>nspector Approved by:F. ~~hief Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, resident inspection was conducted on site in the areas of plant operations, plant maintenance, plant surveillance, and licensee event report revie Results:
No violations or deviations were identified in this inspection report.
. :.;8804.260232 880415
.. 'PDR ADOCK 05000280 Q
- Persons Contacted Licensee Employees REPORT DETAILS
- D. L. Benson, Station Manager H. L. Miller, Assistant Station Manager
- E. S. Grecheck, Assistant Station Manager J. A. Bailey, Superintendent of Operations D. J; Burke, Superintendent of Maintenance S. P. Sarver, Superintendent of Health Physics R. H. Blount, Superintendent of Technical Services R. L. Johnson, Operations Supervisor J. A. Price, Site Quality Assurance Manager
- G. D. Miller, Licensing Coordinator, Surry Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators, shift technical advisors, shift supervisors and other plant personne On March 16, the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Lando W. Zech, Jr., visited the Surry Power Station for a familiarization tour and to meet with licensee management and staf Chairman Zech was accompanied by the following NRC personnel:
L.A. Reyes, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Region I T. P. Gwynn, Technical Assistant to the Chairman F. S. Cantrell, Section Chief, DRP, Region II C. Patel, Surry Project Manager, NRR NRC Resident Inspectors
The Chairman met with the NRC Senior Resident Inspector, met with licensee management, was given a tour of the station by the plant manager, and provided constructive comments to station management and staff prior to departur *Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summa~ized on April 4, 1988, with those individuals identified by an asterisk in paragraph 1. The following new items were identified by the inspectors during this exi One inspector followup item (paragraph 7) was identified for followup on determination of the failure mechanism and additional corrective actions required for 1-SI-P-lB (280/88-09-01).
The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings with no dissenting comment The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or revi~wed by the inspectors during this inspectio.
Plant Status Unit 1 Unit 1 began the reporting period at powe The unit operated at power until March 10, when the unit was brought to hot shutdown in accordance with Technical Specifications in order to complete repairs on the B low head safety injection pump motor (see paragraph 7 for additional repair information).
Repairs were completed and the pump was satisfactorily tested on March 1 The unit returned to power operation on March 13 and operated at power for the duration of the inspection perio Unit 2 Unit 2 began the reporting period at powe The unit operated at power until March 27 when the unit was manually tripped from 100% powe The trip was required due to a loss of power to vital Bus III which caused a loss of component cooling water flow to 11A
reactor coolant pum Approximately one minute after the trip, the unit experienced an automatic safety injection due to an indicated high steam flow in coincidence with low Tav During recovery operations, the operators observed that Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) flow to the 11A 11 steam generator was lower than expecte Additional troubleshooting of the AFW flow indicated that a flow blockage existed. The unit was placed in cold shutdown and work on the AFW system to resolve the blockage issue commenced on March 2 The unit remained in cold shutdown through the end of the inspection perio Additional di-scussion of repairs to the vital Bus III power supply and AFW system work is addressed in paragraph.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
(Closed) Unresolved Item (URI) 280, 281/86-12-01, Unqualified Limitorque Wirin This issue was initially identified during the Environmental Qualification-(EQ)
Inspection documented in Inspection Report 280, 281/86-1 The issue concerned the use of unqualified wiring in Limitorque valve actuators which were found during the inspectio The existence of vendor installed unqualified wire in Limitorque operators was addressed in IEN 86-0 As a result of this notice, the licensee took timely corrective actions and replaced unqualified vendor installed wiring in Limitorque operator This item is close (Closed) URI 280, 281/86-12-04, Low Head Safety Injection Pump (LHSI)
Motor Winding This issue was initially identified during the Environmental Qualification (EQ)
Inspection documented in Inspection
Report 280, 281/86-1 The issue concerned rewinding of the LHSI pu~p motors with out proper documentation of EQ qua 1 ifi cation of the new winding During an enforcement conference which was held on January 21, 1988, the licensee presented information to show that the required documentation was provided for in the EQ package Subsequent review of the documentation verified that the information was acceptable. This item is close.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are. acceptable or may involve violations or deviation No new unresolved items are addressed *in this inspection repor Plant Operations Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors conducted daily inspections in the following areas:
Control room staffing, access, and operator behavior; operator adherence to approved procedures, technical specifications, and limiting conditions for operations; examination of panels containing instrumentation and other reactor protection system elements to determine that required channels are operable;.and review of control room operator logs, operating orders, plant deviation reports, tagout logs, jumper logs, and tags on components to verify compliance with approved procedure The inspectors conducted weekly inspections in the following areas:
Verification of operability of selected ESF systems by valve alignment, breaker positions, condition of equipment or component(s), and operability of instrumentation and support items essential to system actuation or performanc *
Plant tours included observation of general plant/equipment conditions.,
fire protection and preventive measures, control of activities in progress, radiation* protection controls, physical security controls, plant housekeeping conditions/cleanliness, and.missiJe hazards. The inspectors routinely monitor the temperature of the auxiliary feedwater pump discharge piping to ensure steam binding is prevente The inspectors conducted biweekly inspections in the following areas:
Verification review and walkdown of safety-related tagout(s) in effect; review of sampling program (e.g., primary and secondary coolant samples, boric acid tank samples, plant liquid and gaseous samples); observation of control room shift turnover; review of implementation of the plant problem identification system; verification of ielected portions of containment isolation lineup(s); and verification th~t notices to workers are*posted as required by 10 CFR 1 *
Certain tours were conducted on backshifts or weekend Backshift or weekend tours were conducted on March 1, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 27, 28, 29, 30, April 1 and Inspections included areas in the Units 1 and 2 cable vaults, vital battery rooms, steam safeguards areas, emergency switchgear rooms, diesel generator rooms, control room, auxiliary building, cable penetration areas, independent spent fuel storage facility, low level intake structure, and the safeguards valve pit and pump pit area Reactor coolant system leak rates were reviewed to ensure that detected or suspected leakage from the system was recorded, investigated, and evaluated; and that appropriate actions were taken, if require The inspectors routinely independently calculated RCS leak rates using the NRC Independent Measurements Leak Rate Program (RCSLK9).
On a regular basis, radiation work permits (RWPs) were reviewed and specific work activit~es were monitored to assure they were being conducted per the RWP Selected radiation protection instruments were periodically checked, and equipment operability and calibration frequency was verifie In the course of monthly activities, the inspectors included a review of the 1 icensee' s physical security progra The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include:
protected and vital areas access controls; searching of personnel, packages and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; and patrols and compensatory posts.
During a routine control room tour on March 3, the inspector noted that the radiation monitor for the Unit 2 incore room (RI-RMS264) was in alar Additional discussion with the licensed operators identified a condition where an entry to containment had been made earlier in order to free up a stuck detector in the incore flux mapping syste The technicians which were doing the work in containment stopped the job and exited the work areas after high radiation levels were detected by the health physics technician monitoring the jo The inspector then received a briefing from station management which provided information i ndi cat i ng that the incore detector for the A drive mechanism may have been pulled far enough into the maintenance area to justify job stoppage and appropriate review of the *a-ctivity prior to continuing wor Further discussion indicated that the individuals involved in the activity received several hundred millirem exposure each in a very short period of tirn The resident reviewed the information provided and discussed the event with Region II management on March 4, 198 Region II management decided to send a Health Physics Inspector to the station that evenin The inspector arrived on site the morning of March 5, and was briefed by the residen This issue is further addressed in the Health Physics Inspector's Report (280, 281/88-10).
Engineered Safety Feature System Walkdown (71710)
The inspector performed a walkdown of the accessible areas of *the safety-related portions of the main steam system for both unit This verification included the following:
confirmation-that the licensee's system lineup procedure matches plant drawings and actual plant
*"- -~--~*-
- configuration; hangers and supports are operable; housekeeping is adequate; valves and/or breakers in the system are installed correctly and appear to be operable; fire protection/prevention is adequate; major system components are properly labeled and appear to be operable; instrumentation is properly installed, calibrated, and functioning; and valves and/or breakers are in correct position as required by plant procedure and unit statu Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie.
Maintenance Inspections (62703)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed activities to assure compliance with the appropriate Inspection areas included the following:
maintenance procedure The inspector reviewed work being performed to repair the suet ion isolation valves, 1-BR-27 and 30, to the Unit 1 primary drain tank pump This repair consisted of rep 1 acing the defective Gri nne 11 bonnet and piaphragrn assemblies and required a freeze seal be established for isolation of the primary drain tank. The inspector reviewed the procedure that installed and initiated the freeze seal and witnessed portions of the wor No discrepancies were note *
The inspector witnessed portions of the maintenance and reviewed documentation for the replacement of 1-SW-E-lA intermediate seal coole This cooler provides a heat sink for cooling water that is circulated to the high head safety injection pump mechanical seal cooler Station Deviation Sl-88-0170, dated February 26, 1988, identified a tube leak in the 11A
intermediate seal cooler by noting an increase in sodium concentration in the closed component cooling loop and a steady increase in the applicable cooling loop head tan Work Order 3000062106 was generated to replace the cooler and work was completed on March 9, 198 No discrepancies were note The inspector reviewed the work package involving the repair of the Unit 1 low head safety injection pump 1-SI-P-1 During routine performance of the monthly operability test of pump 1-SI-P-18 on March. 9, 1988, the motor tripped and smoke was observed corning from the motor cohnection bo The failure was initially determined to be due to a phase to phase short between motor leads inside the motor connection bo A decision was made to splice and reterrninate the cables using fiberglass tape and Raychem heat shrink materia The motor was then run and it was observed that the motor housing was hotter than expected and the conductor on one phase exceeded its 70 degrees C rating in approximately one hour.. Station engineering stated at that time that the problem was a *motor problem rather than a lead or splice problem and the motor was replaced.
A 300 HP Westinghouse motor was purchased and installed to replace the existing 250 HP moto Engineering Work Request (EWR)88-072 provided an evaluation and justification *for use of the replacement moto The
- inspectof reviewed th~s EWR and discussed the justification with licensee engi rieers at the station and at the corporate 1 eve The fi na 1 determination of the failure mechanism and additional corre_£tive actions required will be the subject of further inspection and is identified as an inspector followup item (280/88-09-01).
'-
The inspectors followed the effort to locate a blockage in the Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pipe that was observed following the reactor trip on March 27, 198 The control room operator noticed that the AFW fl ow to the 11A
steam generator was 1 ower than expected and performed various valve lineups that indicated that a substantial blockage existed -
in the AFW line to the 11A
SG onl The inspector witnessed the fibroscopic*examination of the entire length of pipe from the AFW headers up to the point that AFW ties into the 11A 11 main feed lin No evidence of blockage was detecte The licensee was continuing a search by disassembling and examining all the motor operated valves downstream of the AFW headers when the inspection period ende The inspectors will continue to monitor all activities regarding this ite The inspectors followed the effort involved in troubleshooting and repair of the vital Bus III power supply (inverter). The troubleshooting of the inverter indicated that a fuse had blown on the DC input to the inverter and also that a rectifier in the inverter was defectiv Additional evaluations and inspections led to replacement of two inductor coils in the inverter circuitr The inspector reviewed the troubleshooting evolutions, was present at meetings which addressed the failure mechanism and witnessed repair activities and testing of the inverter prior to placing vital Bus III back on the inverter power supply on March 31, 198 The in specter reviewed work packages 3800063307 and 3800063333 which documented repair and testing of the inverte No discrepancies were note Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie.
Surveillance Inspections (61726)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed various surveillance activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedures as follows:
Test prerequisites were me Tests were performed in accordance with approved procedure Test procedures appeared to perform their intended functio Adequate coordination existed among personnel involved in the test.
Test data was properly collected and recorde Inspection areas included the following:
On March 18, the inspector witnessed the performance of 2,;,.PT-15.lC, 11 Peri odi c Test - Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (2-FW-P-2)
11 *
The test verifies operability as required by Technical Specification No discrepancies were note On March 18, the inspector witnessed performance of portions of 1-PT-8.1, 11 Periodic Test - Reactor Protection Logic (Normal Operating Conditions)".
The test verifies operability of the reactor trip portion of the reactor protection system as required by Technical Specification 4.1. No discrepancies were note Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Review (92700)
The inspector reviewed the LE Rs 1 i sted be 1 ow to ascertain. whether NRC reporting requirements were being met and to determine appropriateness of the corrective action(s).
The inspector's review also included foll6wup on implementation of corrective action and review of licensee documentation that all required corrective action(s) were complete.*
LERs that identify violation(s) of regulation(s) and that meet the criteria of 10 CFR, Part 2, Appendix C,Section V shall be identified as License Identified Violations (LIV) in the following closeout paragraph LIVs are considered first-time occurrence violations which meet the NRC Enforcement Policy criteria for exemption from issuanc~ of a Notice of Violation. These items are *identified to allow for proper evaluation of corrective actions in the event that similar events occur in the futur (Closed) LER 280/87-36, Containment Air Lock Leakage Due to Inadequate Seal. The issue involved violation, an LIV, of containment integrity as specified in Technical Specification 1.0.H.4. The violation was a fesult of a failure of the surveillance test -0f the in~er hatch door sea In order to make repairs,*the outer door was opened in violation of Technical Specification for maintenance and operations personne Repairs were completed, and the inner door seal was satisfactorily t~sted as require Additional corrective actioh included submittal of a Technical Specifica-tion change to allow for relief when repairs are required to the inner hatch seal when the unit(s) are not in cold shutdow The inspector reviewed the. event and also ~eviewed the North Anna Technical Specifica-tion which has appropriate relief authorized for the same type of occur-renc This item is identified as a LIV (280/88-09-02) for *failure to maintain containment integrity. This LER is closed.