IR 05000280/1988038
| ML18152B297 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 11/23/1988 |
| From: | Jape F, Lenahan J, Taylor P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18152B296 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-88-38, 50-281-88-38, NUDOCS 8812080165 | |
| Download: ML18152B297 (10) | |
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{{#Wiki_filter:* ' ~'. ~*". UNITED ST A TES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 290 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 . Report Nos.: 50-280/88-38 and 50-281/88-38 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company Richmond, VA 23261 Docket Nos.: 50-280 and 50-281 License Nos.: DPR-32 and DPR-37 Facility Name: Surry 1 and 2 Inspectiori Conducted: October 3-7 and.October 9-14, 1988 Inspectors: Pa. / ~;::_ P. A. ~er 3-7) J,7t Lenahan (October 9-14) Approved by: ___ ~~-~~.....,*,.,,/c-.--l,--,,aC:~~---=--'-{z--'-~~-__,..,,'--=* =-* +-. ~~~ F. Jape, Chief Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY I/,ll?/rf-' Oat.:, Signed 11/t,ftr Date Signed f//.JJ/cP~ Date Signed Scope: This special, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of the reactor cavity water seal assembly modifications, control room envelope air conditioning system test, pipe supports, and upgrading of the roadway used for transportation of spent fuel casks to independent spent fuel storage are ' Results: In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identi-fie The licensee's actions in areas of design and testing, procedure upgrading and training were adequate to ensure that the cavity seal assembly would perform its intended functio gg55~iao ~DR ADOCK PNU
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- D. L. Benson, Station Manager
- R. C. Bilyen, licensing Specialist
- R.H. Blount, Superintendent Technical Services P. Doody, Project Engineer, Reactor Cavity Seal Repair B. Foster, Project Engineer, Control Room Ventilation
- E. S. Grecheck, Assistant Station Manager Nuclear Safety & Licensing
- G. D. Miller, Licensing Coordinator
- H. L. Miller, Assistant Station Manager Operations & Maintenance H. F. Mccallum, Training Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, and operator NRC Resident Inspectors
- W. E. Holl and L. Nichol son
- Attended October 7 and 14 exit interviews Reactor Cavity Seal Assembly Modification "" Unit 1 (86700) Background On May 17, 1988, with Unit 1 in a refueling and maintenance shutdown, the refueling cavity seal ring depressurized resulting in leakage of approximately 25,000 to 30,000 gallons of water from the refueling cavit The water 1 eve 1 in the refueling cavity dropped approxi-mately one foo The prompt actions of an operator caused the cavity seal ring to be repressurized and stopped the leakage from the refueling cavit The NRC became aware of this event on August 30, 198 An Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) was dispatched to t Surry site on September 1, 1988, to.followup on this even The results of the AIT, conducted September 1-3, 1988, are documented in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-280/88-34 and 50-281/88-3 On September 6, 1988, A Confirmation of Action Letter was issued by NRC Region I I confirming the 1 i censee commitments to meet with* NRC personnel in the Region II offices and discuss the event and correc-tive actions prior to movement of fuel during the Fall, 1988 Surry 2 refueling outag The management meetinQ was held in the NRC offices
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on September 16, 198 The meeting is documented in an October 20, 1988 letter to Virginia Electric and Power Company, Subject: Management Meeting,Summar Subsequent to the meeting, the 1 i censee shut down Surry Unit I for corrective modifications to the emergency power distribution syste Following that shutdown, the licensee decided to defuel the Unit 1 reactor to inspect fuel assemblie At t~e request of NRC Region II, the licensee documented their planned corrective actions for the Unit 1 cavity seal in a letter to NRC Region II dated October 3, 1988, Serial No. 88-362, Subject: Surry Power Station Units I and *2 Reactor Cavity Seal - Action Pla The action plan encom~assed four. areas: design, testing, protedures and trainin The inspectors conducted a followup inspection to determine if the licensee implemented the commitments contained in the action pla Details of the inspection are discussed in para-graphs b. through e; belo Reactor Cavity Seal Ring Design Improvements ( 1) Commitment Review the instrument air and backup nitrogen bottl~ systems for the inflatable seal The backup nitrogen system wi 11 be installed in accordance with an approved design documen Inspection Effort The inspectors examined Engineering Work Request (EWR) 88-369, Backup Air Supply for Reactor Cavity Seal Ring/Surry 1, which specifies the installation of two nitrogen cylinders, pressure regulator valves, check valves and instrument tubing to provide a backup air supply for the pneumatic reactor cavity seal. The inspector examined the completed backup air installation and verified that the nitrogen cylinders and supports, check valves, regulators, tubing, relief valves and test connections had been installed per the details provided by the EWR and sketch numbers EWR-88369-1-M-400, 700, and 70 The inspector verified that all valves had been tagged for easy identification to preclude any confusion regarding valve line up ( 2) Corrmitment Upgrade the applicable sections of the Instrument Air drawings for the inflatable seal Inspection Efforts The inspector examined Stone and Webster drawing numbers 11448-FM-25E, Flow *Diagram, Compressed Air System - Sh.5, and 11448-FM-75E, Valve Operating Numbers, Compressed Air System - Sh.5, and verified that they had been upgraded to incorporate
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design changes implemented by EWR 88-369 and to clarify the valve lineup for the normal air supply to the pneumatic seal (3) Commitment Inspect the cavity seal assembly, including the inflatable seals, J-seals, the reactor vessel and diaphragm ring sealing surface A load test to determine the effect of hydrostatic heap on deflection of the diaphragm ring wi 11 be performe Based on this inspection, modifications will be made to the diaphragm ring and J-seals to further ensure sealin Installa-tion of the modified seal assembly will be in accordance with appropriate procedure Inspection Effort The inspectors examined Stone and Webster procedure titled Refueling Cavity Water Seal, Inspection and Temporary Fixes for 1988 Outage This procedure contains instructions for inspec-tion of the cavity seal assembly, evaluation of tolerances, the diaphragm plate load te~t, corrective actions, and the hydro-test. The result of the cavity seal assembly tolerance inspections are documented in calculation number 351, Data Reduction for Reactor Cavity Water Sea As a result of these measurements, the licensee concluded that horizontal tolerances were unacceptable in some locations, and that vertical tolerances measured around the seating surface indicated that the seal ring would not be co-plana The inspectors examined Procedure Number 2-ST-221, Special Test - Diaphragm Plate Load Test, which specifies that methods to establish the stiffness of the diaphragm plat The inspector reviewed calculation number 347, Reactor Cavity Water Seal Diaphragm Analysis for Field Test, Hydrostatic and Seismic Loading As a result of the load test and subsequent calcula-t i ans, the licensee concluded that the diaphragm ring would - deflect 0.53 inches, which was *outside the bounds of the seal desig The lic-ensee designed a system of strong backs to be attached between the diaphragm plate and reactor flange which reduced the deflection to 0.0135 inches, which is within cavity seal ring tolerance The inspectors examined calculation numbers 350, Reactor Cavity J-Seal Redesign, and 348, Strong Back Desig The inspector also reviewed calculation number 352, Reactor Cavity Water Seal Diaphragm Analysis for Fuel Drop Loa This analysis was performed to verify that the redesigned seal with installed strong backs would maintain its leak tight integrity if a single fuel assembly was inadvertently dropped on the seal assembl *---=--=-,. -~'-..
The inspectors examined the following EWRs which implemented the modifications to the seal assemblies specified by the design calculations: EWR-88-367 for ins ta 11 at ion of backing rings to the lower face of the seal ring upper flange; EWR 88-368 for* installation of the strong backs; and EWR 88-370 for installa-tion of a neoprene gasket on the upper surface of the diaphragm plate The inspector examined the diaphragm plate.and the reactor flange and verified that the neqprene materials had been installed in accordance with the requirements of the appropriate* EWR The inspectors a 1 so examined maintenance procedure numbers MMP-C-RC-037, Installation, Inflation, and Removal of Reactor Cavity Seal Ring and MMP-C-RC-0371 Cavity Seal Ring Reassembl The latter procedure specifies methodology for* installation of new J-seals on the seal rin The inspectors witnessed installation of portions of the new J-seals ( 4) Commitment Provide a remote method to monitor reactor cavity leve Inspection Effort The inspectors examined EWR 88-402, Level Indication of Reactor Cavity During Refueling. This EWR provides a method to remotely monitor the reactor cavity in the control room using pressurizer 1 eve 1. Reactor Cavity Seal Assembly Testing Commitment The cavity seal assembly will be tested to demonstrate its ability to function as designe Testing will include a pressure drop test on the inflatable seals, as well as a functional *test of the passive seals with the inflatable seals deflate Acceptance criteria for the functional test will be developed to address allowable leakag Inspector Effort The inspector reexamined the portions of procedure MMP-C-RC-037 which specify requirements for the pressure drop test on the inflatable seal The inspector witnessed the pressure drop test which was performed in accordance with steps 5.27 through 5.34 of the procedur ** ,. r
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The inspectors examined special test procedure number ST-224, Operability Reactor Cavity J-Seals which was written to verify the operability of the J-Seal ST-224 specified performance of the leak tests on the J-Seals with the pneumatic seal deflated for water levels of 11611, 16 1, and 26 1611 in the refueling cavit The licensee established the acceptance criteria specified in the table belo The change in cavity water level was specified to monitor cavity leakage during the special tes Cavity Water Level l 1 - 6" 16 1 - O" 26 1 - 611 TABLE Maximum Acceptable Leakage 37.5 gpm 118 gpm 150 gpm Cavity Water Level Change/Rate 0.05 in/min 0.17 in/min 0. 21 in/min The testing, which was performed subsequent to completion of this inspection, was witnessed by the senior resident inspector at the 1'6" and 16 1 level The maximum leakage measured was determined to be 0.30 gpm when the cavity level was 26 1611 * The results of this test demonstrated the capability of the backup seals (J-Seals) to perform their intended functio Revisions to Procedures Corrmitment Procedures will be enhanced to correct the weaknesses noted, as well as address any modifications being performed to the cavity sea These procedure revisions include: (1) An operating procedure that will provide specific instructions for operation of the cavity seal system, including the backup air bottles, valves and regul~tor (2) A checklist has been developed to provide instructions for periodic verification of cavity level, cavity seal drain status~ and status of air pressure supplied to the inflatable seal (3) The abnormal procedure for loss of cavity level has been revi'sed to pro vi de more explicit guidance regarding makeup sources, evacuation of containment and notifications to Health Physic Further definition of potential radiological hazards of a loss of cavity level is also being developed, and will be included in the procedure prior to conducting the functional test of the passive sea **
Inspection Effort The inspectors reviewed the plant procedures listed below which have been changed to provide more detailed instructions for the operators concerning the installation and operational aspects of the reactor cavity seal assembl Procedures reviewed were as follows: (lY Operating Procedure OP-4.1, Refueling Operation approved
- September 30, 1988, and a procedure deviation approved October 11, 1988, provided specific instructions for operation of the refueling cavity seal system, including the valve lineup and pressure requirements for the backup nitrogen bottle supply syste *
(2) Operational Check (OC)-27, Containment Walkdown Checks, approved September 28, 1988, provides instructions to the operators during walkdown of containment areas when the plant is in cold shutdown or refuelin The procedure requires that backup nitrogen cylinder pressure supplying the reactor cavity inflatable seal be recorded, nitrogen and instrument air system valve lineup is verified, and reactor cavity seal leakage if any is determined and recorde The inspectors noted that a minimum nitrogen cylinder pressure was not specifi~d to initiate action to replace the nitrogen cylinder(s). Valve numbers assigned to the instrument air and backup nitrogen supply were not listed in the. O These observations were discussed with the Superintendent of Operations who indicated that these weaknesses would be corrected by a revision to OC-2 The inspector reviewed revised procedure OC-27, approved October 13, 1988, and verified that these changes had been included in the procedur The containment walkdown checks are performed on a daily basis during cold shutdown or refueling on the mid-shift in conjunciton with other walkdown (3) Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOP) 22.1, Loss of Refueling Cavity Level, approved September 23, 1988, provides operator action in the event of a decrease in refueling cavity leve The procedure identifies the sources of makeup water, require-ments to evacuate containment, notify health physics, identify and terminate cause for cavjty level decrease. Further defini-tion of potential radiological hazards for loss of cavity level are included in an attachment to the refueling Radiation Work Permi Training Commitment Operators will be trained, prior to use of the cavity seal, on: the loss of cavity level experienced on Unit 1 in May; modifications made for this outage; and, procedural change This training will also
- include discussions of the need of increased sensitivity to abnormal event Inspector Effort The inspector he*ld discussions with the training supervisor in regards to operator training on the reactor cavity seal leakage even The training group assembled a lesson plan (RQ-88.7-LP:-1)
which addresses modifications to the cavity seal assembly and procedure change Classroom instruction was provided on the material noted in the lesson plan and attendance records were available for the inspectors examinatio The training supervisor was informed that the following material had not been part of the present lesson plan: Engineering Work Request (EWR) 88-367, Backing Ring Seals, EWR 88-369, Backup nitrogen Supply and ST224, Functional Test Passive Seal Training on these subjects is being planned by the Training Grou The inspector discussed the training with several operator These discussions disclosed that the operators had received the training, and were knowledgeable of the May 17, 1988 event, and required responses to any abnormal event resulting in loss of the cavity seal. Conclusions Based on the results of the inspection, the inspector concluded that the licensee had completed testing and modifications to* the seal assembly, revisions to procedures, and training in accordance with their commitment The inspectors concluded that the modified seal assembly was capable of retaining the required refueling cavity water level. - Within the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identifie * Inspection Of Pipe Support/Restraint Systems (70370) The inspector examined pipe supports on various piping systems during a walkdown inspection of the Unit 1 containment buildin During the walkdown the inspector noted that a hanger rod was bent on a spring can support on the Loop "C 11 Safety injection pipin The damaged support was located adjacent to the penetration of the safety injection piping into the reactor coolant Loop 11C11 hot le The licensee issued a maintenance work request to replace the damaged hanger rod on the spring can suppor The inspector also witnessed performance of a special surveillance test to inspect the tubing connecting the remote reservoir to the valve block on Loop "A" steam generator snubber number RC-HSS-140 after the remote reservoir was found to be empty during performance of the Technical Specification (TS) surveillance inspectio The purpose of the special
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surveillance was to determine ff sufficient fluid was available in the valve block and tubing so that the snubber would be operabl The special surveillance was performed by disconnecting the tubing starting at the remote reservoir and continuing toward the valve bloc It was determined that no fluid was -present in either the tubing or the valve block by * performance of the special test. This snubber will be considered visually inoperable per TS 4.1 Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie. Special Test Of Control Room Envelope Air Conditioning System (72701) The inspector witnessed portions of the performance of a special test of the Units 1 and 2 control room envelope air conditioning syste The purpose of the *test _was to provide data to evaluate the adequacy of the air conditioning system design to maintain the control room and emergency switchgear room (ESR) environmental conditions per the requirements stated . in UFSAR Section 9.1 The specific purpose of the test was to determine if one train of the air conditioning units (Train 1, 1-VS-AC~l, 2, 6, 7, Train 2,2-VS-AC-6, 7, 8, & 9) were capable of maintaining the control room and ESR environment within specific temperature limits for removal of heat from electrical equipment during design basis accident (OBA) condition The design of the system was questioned by licensee engineers and the NRC resident inspectors because additional switchgear had been installed since completion of construction which had not been considered in design of the original air conditioning syste The inspector examined Special Test Procedure No. 220, Control Room Envelope Air Conditioning System, which provides instructions for collecting data on air and water flow and temperature measurements for various components in the main control room and ESR air conditioning .subsystem The inspector verified system alignment and initial conditions at start of the special test, including verification that non-safety air conditioning systems were shut dowri during the tes The inspector witnessed data collection including air flow and temperature measurements in air conditioning units located in the ESR, measurement of pump suction and discharge pressure from chiller units into air conditioning units, and measurement of ambient air temperatures in the control room and ES Subsequent to completion of the inspection, the licensee evaluated the data and determined that a single train of air conditioning was incapable of maintaining specified environmental conditions in the control room and ESR followin~ a OB The licensee will report this determination in an LE Followup will be performed by the resident inspector Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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9 Repairs To Spent Fuel Cask Haul Road (01102) On August 26, 1988, Surry personnel were transporting a loaded spent fuel cask to the storage pad when the transport-er began to sink into the road on the south sid The transporter 1s tire dug into the gravel road eight to ten inches on the right (south) side with the cask resting on the ground and the entire 150-ton cask/transporter listing approximately 6 degree The cask was loaded with 21 spent fuel assemblie The bottom of the cask normally rides approximately 6 inches off the groun The licensee used hydraulic jacks and steel bed plates to level the transporter and then moved it to its storage location under normal powe The road was dry and had been used for transportation of the preceding seven cask This problem was documented on Deviatfon Report No. SI-88-087 The cause of the problem was determined to be erosion of the shoulder area of the cask haul road, ponding of water along portions of the haul road, and the fact that the edge of the cask haul road was not clearly marke The licensee issued EWR 88-335 to implement the repairs to the roa The inspector reviewed the EWR which included construction specifications, drawings, and engineering and inspection requirement Drawings reviewed included drawing numbers S-88335-3-C-100, Sheets 1 through 5, S-88335-3-C-002, Sheet 1 of 1, S-88335-3-C-003, Sheet 1 of 1, and S-88335-3-C-004, Sheet 1 of The inspector discussed the roadway improvements with licensee engineers and walked down the road to observe work-in progres The work observed included cleaning of existing cul~erts, grading of the road surface, cleaning of drainage ditches, placement of riprap in the ditches, and reconstruction of the road way shoulder where required. The licensee plans to install posts to mark the edges of the 24 foot wide specially constructed cask haul road under this EWR after the drainage improvements have been complete Within the areas inspected, no deviations or violations were identifie. Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on. October 7 and 14, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection result Proprietary information is not contained in this repor Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee. }}