IR 05000280/1988033
| ML18152B244 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 10/03/1988 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Holland W, Larry Nicholson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18152B243 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-88-33, 50-281-88-33, IEB-84-02, IEB-84-2, NUDOCS 8810240405 | |
| Download: ML18152B244 (14) | |
Text
Report Nos.:
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 50-280/88-33 and 50-281/88-33 Licensee:
Vifginia Electric and Power Company Rich~ond, Virginia 23261 Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281 License Nos.:
DPR-32 and DPR-37 Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: July 31th ugh September 3, 198 Inspectors:,-,--=-~'--=":::-"---+---:----':----=-;.__~---,--H""----,------,----
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Date Signed-(? /4)
/g-5-~
Date Signed Approved
/d/.;:;/(j DafeSigned SUMMARY Scope:
This routine resident inspection was conducted on site in the areas of licensee action on previous enforcement matters, plant operations, plant maintenance, plant surveillance, licensee event report review, followup on inspector identified items, and followup on bulletin Results:
No violations or deviations were identified in this inspection repor The following new items were iden~ified in this inspection repor Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 280; 281/ 88-33-01, Followup on sequence of data collection for testing AFW pumps~ paragraph P~R ADOCK 05000280 Q F'DC
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-280/88-33 and 50-281/88-33 Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company Richmond, Virginia 23261 Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281 Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2 License Nos.:
/o-3~sp Date Signed- (I,A)
/ctJ-s -d2f'
Date Signed Approved by: =---:1,.4 ~:::::~~~~M~-¢~~-------
F. S. Cantrell, Section ie
/cf />/rl DateSigned Scope:
Res*u1 ts:
Division of Reactor Projec SUMMARY This routine resident inspection was conducted on site in the areas of licensee action on previous enforcement matters, plant operations, plant maintenance, plant surveillance, licensee event report review, followup on inspector identified items, and followup on bulletin No violations or deviations were identified in this inspection repor The following new items were identified in this inspection repor Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 280; 281/ 88-33-01, Followup on sequence of data collection for testing AFW pumps, paragraph *
- Persons Contacted Licensee Emp-1 oyees REPORT DETAILS
- J. Bailey, Superintendent of Operations
- D. Benson, Station Manager
- R. Bilyeu, Licensing Engineer H. Blake, Superintendent of Site Services
- R. Blount, Superintendent of Technical Services
- E. Grecheck, Assistant Station Manager
- D. Hart, Supervisor, Quality Assurance R. MacManus, Supervisor, Surveillance and Test Engineering
- G. Miller, Licensing Coordinator, Surry
- H. Miller, Assistant Station Manager
- J. Ogren, Superintendent of Maintenance J. Price, Site Quality Assurance Manager S. Sarver, Superintendent of Health Physics
- Attended exit meetin Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators, shift technical advisors, shift supervisors and other plant personne The NRC Region II Project Engineer for the Virginia Power plants, Scott, attended the exit meeting on September 7, 1988.
NRC Region II Section Chief, F. S. Cantrell, visited the Surry Power Station August 23-24, 1988, to meet with the inspectors and tour the faci 1 it.
Plant Status Unit 1 Unit 1 began the reporting period at powe On August 15, 0927 hours0.0107 days <br />0.258 hours <br />0.00153 weeks <br />3.527235e-4 months <br />, the unit automatically tripped from 100% power due to a failed relay in the consequence_ 1 imi ting system cabinet that resulted in a train I A I safety injection actuatio This event occured as the instrument technicians were returning the system to normal following surveillance testin The relay was replaced and the unit resumed power operations at 1733 hours0.0201 days <br />0.481 hours <br />0.00287 weeks <br />6.594065e-4 months <br /> on August 1 Specific details are g1ven in paragraph 5 of this report. The unit operated at power for the remainder of the inspection perio Unit 2 Unit 2 began the reporting period at powe The unit operated at power for the duration of the inspection perio.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
(Closed) Unresolved Item 280; 281/87-21-03, Review Licensee Response to IE Bulletin 84-0 This unresolved item involved the review of the licensee omission of certain relays required to be identified by the above bulletin. The inspector reviewed the circumstances surrounding this event as discussed in paragraph 10 of this report. This item is close (Closed) Unresolved Item 280; 281/88-04-03, Review of Licensee Clarification -0f the Requirements of ASME,Section XI, IWV-3417 for Valves Failing to Meet Acceptance Criteria during Testing. The subject item was identified in inspection report 280; 281/88-04 and further discussed in report 280; 281/88-1 In the latter report the inspector noted that the licensee response to this issue had been forwarded to NRC Region II technical personnel and management for revie During this inspection period, the inspector was informed by a regional based inspector from the
. appropriate technical section that the licensee's response to this item was in accordance with the requirements of the ASME code and that their implementation of the safety committee approved po 1 icy was adequat Therefore, this item is close (Closed)
Unresolved 280/88-28-04; Review the Modification Package for Test Wiring in the Reactor Trip Breaker This unresolved item followed the incorrect reinstallation of test wiring in the reactor trip breakers following their removal and reinstallation in the breaker cubicle The mechanic involved lifted and relanded the wiring in the correct location without a detailed procedure or work orde The inspector continued the inspection with a review of Design Change 83-26 that installed the test wiring in the breaker cubicle No dis~repancies were noted in the design change packag The fact that the mechanic performed work on a safety-related component Without a detailed prpcedure constitutes an additional example of a failure to provide and follow a procedure as discussed in several previous inspection reports and identified as a violation in inspection reports 280; 281/88-01 and 280; 281/88-1 The inspectors discussed this situatioh with sta~on management and continue to monitor the licensee corrective actions regarding the overall problem as detailed to regional management in the enforcement conference dated July 6, 198 As such, the inspectors consider the above event a further example of the previously identified problem and therefore no new violation will be issued. 1his item is close.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information* is required* to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or
. deviation No new unresolved items are identified in this inspection repor I * **
Plant Operations Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors conducted daily inspections in the following areas:
control room staffing, access, and operator behavior; operator adherence to approved procedures, technical specifications, and limiting conditions for operations; examination of panels containing instrumentation and other reactor protection system elements to determine that required channels are operable; and review of control room operator 1 ogs, operating orders, plant deviation reports, tagout logs, jumper logs, and tags on components to verify compliance with approved procedure The inspectors conducted weekly inspections in the following areas:
verification of operability of selected ESF systems by valve alignment, breaker positions, condition of equipment or component(s), and operability of instrumentation and support items essential to system actuation or performanc Plant tours were made which included observation of general plant/equipment conditions, fire protection and preventative measures, control of activities in progress, radiation protection controls, physical security controls, plant housekeeping conditions/cleanliness, and missile hazard The inspectors routinely monitor the temperature of the auxiliary feedwater pump discharge piping to ensure steam binding is prevented.*
The inspectors conducted biweekly inspections in the following areas:
verification review and walkdown of safety-related tagout(s) in effect; review of sampling program (e.g., primary and secondary coolant samples, boric acid tank samples, plant liquid and gaseous samples); observation of control room shift turnover; review of implementation of the plant problem identification system; verification of selected portions of containment isolation lineup(s); and verification that notices to workers are posted as required by 10 CFR 1 *
Certain tours were conducted on backshifts or weekend Backshift or weekend tours were conducted on August 15, 16, September 1, 2, and Inspections included areas in the Units 1 and 2 cable vaults, vital battery rooms, steam safeguards areas, emergency switchgear rooms,. diesel generator rooms, control room, auxiliary bui 1 ding, cable penetration areas, independent spent fuel storage facility, low level intake structure, and the safeguards valve pit and pump pit areas. Reactor coolant system leak rates were reviewed to ensure that detected or suspected leakage from the system was recorded, investigated, and evaluated; and that appropriate actions were taken, if required.* The inspectors routinely independently calculated RCS leak rates using the NRC Independent Measurements Leak Rate Program (RCSLK9).. On a regular basis, radiation work permits (RWPs) were reviewed and specific work activiti~s
were monitored to assure they were being conducted per the RWP Selected radiation protection instruments were periodically checked, and equipment operability and calibration frequency were verifie In the course of monthly activities, the inspectors included a review of the licensee I s physical security progra The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include: protected and vital areas access controls; searching of personnel, packages and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; and patrols and compensatory post The inspector monitored the licensee actions regarding the Unit 1 reactor trip from 100 percent power on August 15, 1988. _ This trip was due to the spurious actuation of the "A 11 train of Hi Consequence Limiting Safeguards (CLS) during the performance of a normal surveillance test procedur The licensee suspects that the Hi CLS signal was generated when a single relay contact failed to close (or remain closed) during the test. The affected BFD (vendor name) relay was replaced and the test repeated with satis-factory resu_l t An i nvesti gati on to determine the exact cause of the relay failure is ongoin A post-trip review board was convened with the plant personnel involved in the transien The inspector witnessed this board meeting as well as reviewing the post-trip report and SNSOC (Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee) approval for unit restart. Concern was expressed to station management regarding an alarm that was received during the event indicating that the #3 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) had a high crankcase pressure conditio The local alarm activated during the EDG run and could not be cleared for ~everal hours aftei the EDG was secure This particular EDG does not have indicated actual crankcase pressur The engineering memorandum addressing the condition, dated August 15, 1988, states that the alarm does not affect the operation of the engine, and will not prevent the EDG from starting and accepting the load during an emergenc It further states that the crankcase pressure is of concern when the engine is required to run for very long periods of time ( weeks).
The SNSOC approved this resolution for unit restar The inspector noted that the EDG is not instrumented to determine actual crankcase pressure. The pressure switch was removed and determined.to be functioning properly; however, the licensee was making preparations to replace the switch and continue troubleshooting when the inspection period ende The inspector discussed the situation with the Regional Plant Systems Section Chief who agreed that the licensee actions were appropriate with regards to operability concerns o_f the _ED On August 26, 1988, Surry personnel. were transporting a loaded spent fuel cask to the storage pad when the transporter*began to sink into the road on the south sid The transporter 1s tire dug into the gravel road eight to ten inches on the right (on south) side with the cask resting on the ground and the entire 150-ton cask/transporter listing approximately 6
'
- degree The cask was loaded with 21 spent fuel assemblies with t'he bottom of the cask normally riding approximately 6 inches off the groun The licensee used hydraulic jacks and steel bed plates to level the transporter and then move it to its storage location under normal powe The road was dry and had been used for the preceding s'even cask The resident inspectors observed the transporter in the stuck position and noted that at no time was the cask in danger of turning ove During a control room monitoring watch on August 29, the inspectors observed licensee response to a fire in the Unit 1 turbine buildin The fire was due to overheating of ground straps on the 11 C-11 phase isolated bus cooling duct resulting in the cable insulation catching on fir The fire was extinguished in a matter of minutes with no damage to the bus duc The inspector observed the licensee fire brigade response to the fire and reviewed immediate corrective actions to resolve the ground strap overheating proble The inspector considers that all actions were adequat On August 26, the inspectors were advised of a potential design problem with the Unit 1 reactor cavity seal. Additional information was obtained by the inspectors on August 3 At that time it was concluded that a significant event occurred on May 17, 1988, in which a large quantity of water leaked through the Unit 1 reactor cavity seal in a short period of time. This information was provided to regional management and a decision was made to send an Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) to the station. The team arrived on site the morning of September 1 and exited on September The inspection effort of the AIT is addressed in inspection report 280; 281/88-3 Engineered Safety Feature System Walkdown (71710)
The inspector performed a walkdown of the Emergency Diesel Generator (EOG)
Syste This inspection also included the EOG starting air and fuel oil systems. This verification also included the following:
confirmation that the licensee's system lineup procedure matches plant drawings and actual plant configuration; hangers and supports are operable; housekeeping is adequate; valves and/or breakers in the system are installed correctly and appear to be operable; fire protection/prevention is adequate; major system components are properly labeled and appear to be operable; instrumentation is properly installed, calibrated, and functioning; and valves and/or breakers are in correct position as required by plant procedure and unit statu Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were, identifie.
Maintenance Inspections (62703)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed maintenance activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedure *
Service Water Motor Operated Valves On August 4~ the inspectors witnessed testing of motor operated butterfly valve SW-MOV-205D in accordance with work order 3800069375 and maintenance procedure EMP-C-MOV-198, Testing Butterfly MOV I s Using MOVATS (motor operated valve actuator testing system) Bart Syste This valve is the service water return valve from a recirculation spray heat exchariger that failed to travel full open when attempted from the main control room on July 30, 198 This discrepancy was documented on station deviation report S2-88-35 The field testing to determine the failure mechanism involved motor current readings and spring pack deflection as prescribed by the MOVATS valve progra The inspector reviewed the results listed below and discussed them with the MOVATS engineer and station electricians:
Slight movement was noted between the Limitorque actuator and the valve bod A small gap was evident between the limit stop and the spring pac This was noted from worm gear movement without thrust being applied to the spring pac *
A very small bypass torque switch setting-was detecte This is to be expected for this valve since it has a two train 1imit switch with the torque switch bypass on the same rotor as the close limit switc The station concluded that the failure mechanism was due to the motor operator torque switch actuating prior to the disc moving clear of the sea The fact that the torque switch bypass is located on the same rotor as the limit switch does not allow for adjustment of the torque switch bypass time independent of the valve open and close limits. The temporary fix was to bypass the torque.switch function in the opening direction on all recirculating spray service water supply and return valves on bot unit The long range plan is to install four-train limit switches on these valve The licensee reported this event via LER 281/88-017, dated*
July 30, 198 No discrepancies were note Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie.
Surveillan~~ Inspections (61726)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed various surveillance activities to assure compliance with the appropriate
.procedures as follows:
Test prerequisites were me Tests were performed in accordance with approved procedure Test procedures appeared to perform their intended functio Adequate coordination existed among personnel involved in the tes Test data was properly collected and recorde Inspection areas included the following:
On August 4, the inspector witnessed portions of periodic test 1-PT-18.8, Charging Pump Component Cooling And Service Water Performance, dated May 26, 198 This monthly surveillance test demonstrates the operability of the charging pump component cooling pumps, 1-CC-P-2A & B, and the charging pump service water pumps, 1-SW-P-lOA & The inspector also r~viewed all of the completed monthly test procedure performed during this year on both unit No discrepancies were note On August 18, the inspector witnessed portions of test procedure 2-PT-17.3, Containment Outside Recirculating Spray Pump The specific portion of this test that was witnessed tested the outside recirculating spray pump 2-RS-P-2B for operability as required monthly by technical specification The pump performed as required with no discrepancies note On August 19, the inspector witnessed testtn~ of the Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump*2-FW-P-2 in accordance with periodic test 2-PT-15.lC, dated March 15, 198 This test also records the stroke time of the steam admission valve that opens on a start signa The inspector witnessed the test both from the control room and the pump room, and reviewed the results with the operators involve Although the test results were determined to meet the acceptance criteria, the inspector noted that the pump data was taken after adjustments were made to the turbine spee Step 5.23 of the above procedure measures and records the as-found shaft speed, and the next step adjusts the shaft speed to within 4200 + or - 50 rp The as-found speed of the shaft was in this case measured as 4080 rpm, and adjusted *to 4160 *rp The remainder of the test measures the pump vi bra ti ans, pressures, and temperatures as required to determine operability. The inspector expressed concern that the test procedure allows adjustment prior to measuring as-found data for pump operabilit The Superintendent of Technical Services agreed to evatuate the practice and determine if a test change is needed.* Thi item-*is identified as inspector followup item (IF!) 289; 281/
88-33-01, Followup on Sequence of Data Collection for Testing AFW Pump * *
The inspector reviewed surveillance procedure 1 & 2-PT-22.2, Emergency Fuel Supplies. This monthly surveillance test verifies the operability of the fuel oil transfer pumps and system that is required to provide fuel to the emeregency diesel generatoi No discrepancies were note Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations _were identifie.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Review (92700)
The inspectors reviewed the LERs listed below to ascertain whether NRC reporting requirements were being met and to determine appropriateness of the corrective action(s).
The inspector's review also included followup on implementation of corrective action(s) and review of licensee documentation that all required corrective action(s) were complet LERs that identify violation(s) of regulation(s) and that meet the criteria of 10 CFR, Part 2, Appendix C,Section V are identified as Licensee Identified Violations (LIV) in the following close*out paragraph LIVs are considered first-time occurrence violations which meet the NRC Enforcement Policy criteria for exemption from issuance of a Notice of Violatio These items are identified to allow for proper evaluations of corrective actions in the event that similar events occur in the futur (Closed) LER 280/88-03, Reactor Trip Due To Personnel Failing Tb Follow Procedure. This event involved a Unit 1 reactor trip from 100% power as a result of a loss of the P-10 block (block of low power trips) in the 'B'
train of reactor protectio This caused the power range low setpoint high flux trip, and the intermediate range high flux trip signals to actuate, thus tripping the uni The trip was caused by instrument technicians performing a periodic surveillance test (PT-8.1) on the wrong train of the reactor protection system logic. The inspector reviewed the licensee Human Performance Evaluation System (HPES) report performed on this event, and verified that a step was added to test procedure 1-PT-that ensures through cabinet door annunciators, that the instrument technician is in the correct cabine This item is identified as a LIV (280/88-33-02) for failure to follow procedures. This LER is close (Closed) LER 280/88-08, Low Head Safety Injection Pump Inoperable Due To Failed Motor Lead This report, dated April 8, 1988, and a subsequent Revision 1 to this report, dated August 16, 1988, identified a failure of low head safety injection pump motor 1-SI-P-18 due to an improper splice of the motor lead The licensee _concluded that the failure occurred because the splice connectors on the motor leads overheated, causing the insulation to degrade and eventually go to groun The splice used a connector one size too large, crimping of the connector" was done incorrectly and insulation was not stripped sufficiently; The splice was believed to be done prior to the implementation of strict EQ requirements and procedure The inspector reviewed the 1 i censee fa i 1 ure report FAL-N-00112, dated April 18, 1988, and discussed the results with both station and corporate engineers. The motor leads of the redundant lA pump were inspected and found to be satisfactory. This LER is close *
(Closed) LER 280/88-09, Iodine Spike Due To Defective Fuel Element.*
On March 11, 1988, at 0630 hours0.00729 days <br />0.175 hours <br />0.00104 weeks <br />2.39715e-4 months <br />, the Unit 1 reactor coolant sample indicated 1.50 uCi/ml of dose.equivalant Iodine-131, which exceeded Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.2.d (Limit LO uCi/ml).
This event followed a reactor shutdown to repair out of service equipment and was similar to the previous spike identified in *LER 280/88-0 Corrective action was to
I I
L_
implement actions of T.S. Table 4.1.2.B, calling for four-hour interval sampling until dose equivalent iodine-131 level dropped below 1 uCi/m Actual samples were taken-~t two hour intervals with the 1230 hour0.0142 days <br />0.342 hours <br />0.00203 weeks <br />4.68015e-4 months <br /> sample reading 0.902 uCi/m The event duration was considered to be approximately 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> During the subsequent refueling outage, the licensse performed testing of all.the fuel to be reused and identified a defective fuel assembl This assembly was not returned to the cor The licensee's actions upon detection of the iodine spike and efforts to locate the defective fuel were considered adequat This LER is considered close (Closed) LER 280/88-14, Failure To Comply With-Technical Specification Due To Administrative Oversigh This report identified a failure to comply with Technical Specification 3.21.B.1 that requires a minimum of one containment smoke detector be operable or a fire patrol inspect the area hourl On April 21, 1988 at 1700 hours0.0197 days <br />0.472 hours <br />0.00281 weeks <br />6.4685e-4 months <br />, with Unit 1 in a refueling shutdown, the three containment smoke detectors located in the air recirculation duct work were determined to be inoperable. A specific fire watch was not posted until 1615 hours0.0187 days <br />0.449 hours <br />0.00267 weeks <br />6.145075e-4 months <br /> on April 25, 198 The inspector discussed this event with the Operations Superintendent and concluded the cause was an incorrect interpretation of technical specification requirements by the Senior Reactor Operator involved. This individ~al has been rei nstructed and the issue discussed with a 11 licensed operator This item is identified as a LIV (280/88-33-03) for failure to establish a fire watc This LER is close (Closed) LER 280/$8-15, Emergency Bus Transformer Cooling Fans Powered From Non-Safety Related Power Supply Due To Design Deficienc The licensee identified that the cooling fans of both trains of 4160 and 480 volt emergency bus transformers were powered from non-safety related power supplie The power supplies to these fans would be lost in the event of a loss of offsite powe The inspector reviewed the Engineering Work Request (EWR 88-261) that evaluated this situation and concluded that the transformers would experience a 20% overload without the fans following intial loading during a station blackou The EWR stated that the fans should be supplied from a diesel backed source of power to*assure reliable operation of the trahsformers during a station blackout. The transformer fans for both units are now powered from a diesel ge.nerator backed bu The licensee reported this item to the NRC at 1150 hours0.0133 days <br />0.319 hours <br />0.0019 weeks <br />4.37575e-4 months <br /> on May 31, 1988, pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i).
The cause of this discrepancy was given as an original design deficiency that has been corrected by subsequent enhancements to the design change progra The inspectors routinely monitor the present design change program and co_ncur that the present level of review should be adequate to prevent recurrenc This LER is close (Closed) LER 280/88-19, "Start Of Emergency Diesel Generator Due To Personnel Error".
This report detailed the unintentional start of the number 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EOG) during preparation for performance of a periodic test of the voltage and speed permissive relay An electrician was placing a jumper around one of the EOG fast start relays when he accidentally hit a third contact to complete a start matrix and cause the EOG to star All equipment performed as require The electrician involved has been counseled on the event. This LER is close (Closed) LER 280/88-27, Missed Surveillance Due To Personnel Error. This report identified a failure to sample for radioactive contamination the service* water side of the component cooling water heat exchanger Technical Specification Table 3.7-5(a) requires that a sample and analysis be performed every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> as an action statement when the radioactivity monitors on the component cooling water service witer side are out of servic The 1 i censee has implemented this action statement and maintained these monitors out of service for several year This *issue was adressed in Inspection Report 280; 281/87-0 The failure to perform the sample was a result of a technician not properly perfotming a complete analysis of the sample Subsequent samples were 'taken and found to be within acceptable limits. This item is identified as a LIV (280/88-33-04)
for failure to sample for contamination. This LER is close (Closed) LER 281/87-05, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Due To Personnel Error_
The issue involved initiation of automatic closure of two of the four condenser circulating water inlet valves (MOV-CW-206A and C).
Operations personnel, responding to the decreasing condenser vacuum, identified the condition, verified that the actuation was spurious, and fully reopened the affected valve The cause of the spurious actuation was personnel error in troubleshooting of the flood sensor alar Corrective action included repairing of a leak in the level sensing line of the flood sensor probe which was in alarm; and returning the flood control system to normal statu Additional corrective action included development of a procedure to provide guidance to maintenance personnel when working/troubleshooting this syste The inspector verified that the new procedure (EMP-C-FC-219) was written and approved by the station safety committe This item is identified as a LIV (281/88-33-02) for failure to provide adequate procedure for a maintenance activit This LER is close (Closed) LER 281/88-01, Improper Administrative Control Of Containment IsoJation Valves Due to Personnel Erro The issue involved improper lifting of leads in establishing administrative control of containment isolation valve TV-SS-201A as required by technical specification Corrective action* included proper lifting of the required leads and reinstruction of the craft personnel involved with regards to identification of the correct leads to be lifted. The inspector reviewed the LE This item is identified as a LIV (281/88-33-03) for failure to provide for proper administrative control of a containment isolation valve. This LER is close (Closed) LER 281/88-02, Inoperable Containment Isolation Valves Due To Excessive Leakag The issue involved leakage through containment isolation valves greater than the ASME Section XI specificatio Immediate corrective actions included proper administrative control of the
subject valves and verification that remaining leakage was within the total allowable leakage as required by technical specification The subject valves will be repaired during the next unit outage of appropriate duratio The inspector reviewed the LE This LER is close (Closed) LER 281/88-04, Manual Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Vital Bus Caused By Failed Inverte The issue involved a manual reactor trip when the vital bus III power supply faile The trip was required because the 11A 11 reactor cool ant pump cooling water supply automatically isolated when the vital bus lost powe In addition, an automatic safety injection occurred due to a high steam flow/low reactor coolant system Tave conditio Immediate actions included stabilization of the Unit in hot standby and verification that automatic actions occurred in accordance with* procedur The failed vital power supply was repaired and tested satisfactorily and the Unit returned to power operation approximately one week late The inspectors reviewed the post trip report, monitored corrective actions for the vital power supply and other failed components, and monitored the restart of the unit. This LER is close (Closed)
LER 281/88-17, Failure of Recirculation Spray Service Water MOVs Due to Premature Actuation Of Torque Switch. This event involved the failure of two recirculating spray ser~ice water valves to open on the initial attemp The resident inspector followed this event and the maintenance involved as part of the monthly inspection effort, _and is discussed in paragraph The inspector reviewed the licensee report of this event and considers it-adequate. This LER is close.
Followup on Inspector Identified Items (92701)
(Closed)
Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 280/88-09-01, Review the failure mechanism and corrective actions for the failure of low head safety injection motor 1-SI-P-1 The _licensee submitted a revision to the LER (280/88-08) that identified the failure mechanism of the motor as bad motor lead splice Specffic details of this review are addressed in paragraph 8 of this report. Th1s item is close.
Followup on IE Bulletins (92703)
(Open)
IE Bulletin 84-02: Failure of General Electric Type HFA Relays In Use In Class lE Safety System The inspection effort during this reporting period reviewed the circumstances involving the -licensee original response to this bulletin, dated July 31,. 1984, and a subsequent revision to the response, dated September 4, 198 The-latter response identified additional safety related HFA relays that were not included in the original bulletin respons The licensee stated that the input fo the original response involved parallel efforts at the station and corporate offices, with the response being generated from the results of both of these effort For some unexplainable reason, it appears that the input from the station engineering staff was not incorporated into the original bulletin respons This discrepancy went undetected until the
.*
licensee responsed to a General Electric Service Advisory Letter, dated November 14, 1986, involving the same relays. A similar search discov~red the additional relays. _This error was officially identified via internal memorandu~ dated June 30, 1987, at which time station management directed a full drawing and field walkdown be performed to understand the extent of the omissio This search did not identify any additional* relays, and*
an amended response to the bulletin, dated September 4, 1987, was iisue The inspector discussed this situation with station management and recommended that staff members providing input to such efforts should also be given the opportunity to concur on the final product. Station manage-ment agreed with this commen This bulletin remains ope.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 7, 1988, with those individuals identified by an asterisk in paragraph The following new items were identified by the inspectors during this exi Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 280; 281/ 88-33-01, Followup on sequence of data collection for testing AFW pumps, paragraph The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings with no <;iissenting comment The licensee did not i den ti fy as proprietary any of the
- materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.