IR 05000280/1988045
| ML18153B591 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 01/17/1989 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Holland W, Larry Nicholson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18153B590 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-88-45, 50-281-88-45, NUDOCS 8901300010 | |
| Download: ML18153B591 (10) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-280/88-45 and 50-281/88-45 Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company
"Richmond, Virginia 23261 Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281 Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2 License Nos.:
DPR-32 and DPR-37 December 17, 198 L. E. Nicholson, Resident Ins e'ctor Approved by: -~~L1ft:~ /
F. S. Cantrell, 2A ~on Chief Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY
/-/7~ <Ji Date Signed 1~17~ {Z_
Date Signd
- /("?/57 Da'.te 'Signed Scope
This routine resident inspection was conducted on site in the areas of. plant operations, plant maintenance, plant surveillance, licensee event report review, and design, design changes and modification Results:
One apparent violation was identified in paragraph 4 with regard to the reversed power supp*ly for the low head safety injection discharge valves t_o the suction of the high head safety injection pump This is another example of 280,281/88-32-0l identified in Inspection Report 280,281/88-32, Unit 2 onl One inspector followup item was identified in paragraph 4 for followup on discrepancies* and corrective actions regarding motor operated valves (280; 281/88-45-01).
A weakness was noted pertaining to the apparent lack of aggressive action in correcting problems such that recurrence is prevented (paragraph 4).
In specific, the recurrent problem wi~h rain water leaking into the safeguards room and wetting of the auxiliary feedwater pump motors was discussed as a significant exampl In addition, an example of a weakness in the root cause determination program was identified during the followup of the LER discussed in paragraph Although the licensee stated in the LER that a root cause analysis would be performed, the appropriate maintenance engineers were not cognizant of the repair activities and the defec-tive parts were discarded prior to any examination for cause of failur (IFI 280; 281/88-45-02)
8901300010 890117
~DR AD0CK 05000280 PNU
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REPORT DETAILS PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee Employees J. Bailey, Superintendent of Operations
- R. Bilyeu, Licensing Engineer H. Blake, Superintendent of Site Services
- R. Blount, Superintendent of Technical Services D. Erickson, Superintendent of Health Physics
- E. Grecheck, Assistant Station Manager
- M. Kansler, Station Manager
- G. Miller, Licensing Coordinator, Surry
- H. Miller, Assistant Station Manager
- J. Ogren, Superintendent of Maintenance
- J. Price, Site Quality Assurance Manager
- Attended exit meetin Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators; shift technical advisors, shift supervisors and other plant personnel.
The NRC Region II Section Chief, F. Cantrel 1, vi sited the Surry Power Station on November 17 and 18, 198 During his visit, Mr. Cantrell attended a management meeting on November 17 -at which a discussion of the status of the radiation protection upgrade program was conducted (Report No. 280, 281/88-46,* Management Meeting, dated December 2, 1988).
Mr. Cantrell also attended a Surry County Board of Supervisors meeting with the Surry Senior Resident Inspector during the evenfng of November 1 The new Surry Station Manager, M. Kansler, provided the board with an update on the status of outstanding work ongoing at the Surry Power Statio On November 18, Mr Cantrell attended the NRC Safety System Function Inspection (SSFI) team exit at which time the team 1 s findings were presente The findings of the SSFI inspection of the service water system are discussed in Report Number 280, 281/88-32..
On November 17 and 18, 1988, the current NRC Surry Project Manager, C. Patel, and the oncoming NRC Project Manager, B. Buckley, visited the Surry Power Station to attend the radiation protection upgrade program management meeting and the SSFI inspection team exi.
Pl ant Status Unit 1 Unit 1 began the reporting period in a maintenance/modification shutdown with efforts continuing to free the manipulator crane gripper from the assembly in location G-The crane gripper was freed in accordance with a special procedure, the gripper was repaired, and all fuel was offloaded
from the core by November 1 Inspections were performed on each fuel assembly and one leaking assembly was identifie After replacement of the leaking assembly and completion of foreign material inspections of the vessel internals, core onload commence The core onload was completed on December 8, and the reactor vessel head was reinstalled on December 1 The head studs were being installed as the inspection period ende Unit 2 Unit 2 began the reporting period in day 54 of a refueling/maintenance outag During this period, the cavity seal ring was modified and tested satisfactoril Fuel offload commenced on December 14, 198 The offload of fuel was in progress when the inspection period ende.
Unresolved Items No unresolved items were identifie Plant Operations Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors conducted daily inspections in the following areas:
control room staffing, access, and operator behavior; operator adherence to approved procedures, technical specjfications, and limiting conditions for operations; examination of panels containing instrumentation and other reactor protection system elements to determine that required channels are operable; and review of control room operator logs, operating orders, plant deviation reports, tagout logs, jumper logs, and tags on components to verify compliance with approved procedure The inspectors conducted weekly inspections in the following areas:
verification of operability of selected Emergency Safety Feature (ESF)
systems by valve alignment, breaker positions, condition of equipment or component(s),
and operability of instrumentation and support items essential to system actuation or performanc Plant tours included observation of gen~ral plant/equipment conditions, fire protection and preventative measures, contra 1 of activities in progress, radiation protection controls, physical security controls, plant housekeeping conditions/cleanliness, and missile hazard The inspectors routinely monitor the ternperature of the auxiliary feedwater pump discharge piping to. ensure steam binding is prevente The inspectors conducted biweekly inspections in the following areas:
verification review and walkdown of safety-related tagout(s) in effect; review of sampling program (e.g., primary and secondary coolant samples, boric acid tarik samples, plant liq~id and gaseous samples); observation of control room shift turnover; review of implementation of the plant problem identification system; verification of selected portions of containment
isolation lineup(s); and verification that notices to workers are posted as required by 10 CFR 1 Certain * tours were conducted on backs hi fts or weekend Backs hi ft or weekend tours were conducted on November~, 7, 8, 17, 20; December 4, 11, and 1 Inspections included areas in the Units 1 and 2 cable vaults, vi ta 1 battery rooms, steam safeguards areas, emergency switchgear rooms, diesel generator rooms, control rooms, auxiliary building, Units 1 and 2 containments, cable penetration areas, independent spent fuel storage facility, low level intake structure, and the safeguards valve pit and pump pit areas. Reactor coolant system leak rates were reviewed to ensure that detected or suspected leakage from the system was recorded, investigated, and evaluated;* and that appropriate actions were taken, if require The inspectors routinely independently calculated RCS leak rates using the NRC Independent Measurements Leak Rate Program (RCSLK9).
On a regular basis, radiation work permits (RWPs) were reviewed and specific work activities were monitored to assure they were being conducted per the RWP *selected radiation protection instruments were periodically-checked, and equipment operability and calibration frequency were verifie In the course of monthly activities, the inspectors included a review of the l ic:ensee 1 s physical security progra The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of. daily activities to include: protected and vital areas access controls; searching of personnel, packages and* vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; and patrols and compensatory post On November 11, 1988, the licensee made a notification to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 regarding *the operability of certain Limitorque motor operated valves (MDV).
The specific problems identified included undersized motors, non-environmentally qualified torque switches, and va 1 ve operators that were incorrectly assemb 1 e The 1 i cen see initiated a field verification of wiring and torque switches on approximately 85 valves per unit. This inspection effort was performed in accordance with Engineering Work Request 88-485 and was ongoing as the inspection period ende Preliminary problems identified during this inspection included the following:
White me 1 amine torque switches were found in 16 of 85 va 1 ves inspected in Unit 1 and 9 of 75 valves in Unit This style torque switch was determined to be suseptible to failure as identified in a Limitorque 10 CFR Part 21 notification dated November 3, 198 The licensee has experienced difficulty in obtaining replacement torque switche Limitorque type SMA torque switches were found in 9 of 85 valves in Units 1 and 3 of 75 valves in Unit These particular switches were identified as a problem in Limitorque 11Maintenance Update 11 to the licensee concerning SMA type switch found at another plan (The -
- ~Maintenance Update 11 was dated August 1988.)
Incorrect assembly of Limitorque operators - these problems include installing pinion gears backwards and incorrectly installed tripper finger Inadequate sizing of the motors and operator Incorrect grease and grease separation in the Limitorque operator The inspectors are attending the weekly licensee meetings that address MDV problems and routinely monitoring activities in the field. This increased inspection emphasis will continue and is identified as an inspector followup item (280; 281/ 88-45-01).
On November 19, 1988, the licensee made a notification to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 regarding an ESF actuation on valve S0V-VS-l01A which resulted in realignment of a portion of the safeguards ventilation syste No other ESF subsystem actuations occurred nor did it appear that any actual safety injection relays changed states (i.e., the spurious signal affected only this small portion of the ventilation system)
The licensee documented this event on station deviation Sl-88-1371, and an investigation into the cause is ongoin On December 8, 1988, the licensee made a notification to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50. 72 regarding an e 1 ectri ca 1 cross connection *
of two safety-related valves (2863A and B). These valves open to provide a fl ow path from the LHSI pumps to the suet ion of the HHSI pumps (piggy-back mode).
This mode of safety injection is used to recirculate water from the containment sump to the vessel using the HHSI pumps when RCS pressure remains above the LHSI pump shut off head. The consequence of this condition would have been that a loss of either vital bus would have disabled both trains when operating in the 1~piggy-back
mod Operator recovery from this condition would have been complicated due to the fact that contra 1 room i ndi cation would falsely have confirmed that the valve lineups were correc This-condition was only applicable
- to Unit The licensee is continuing with their evaluations and _on December 13, 1988, a significant event review team (SERT) was designated to study the event to determine the implications of the error(s) with regard to all other engineered safeguards system The residents have monitored the licensee's actions from the time that the condition*was identified up to the formation of the SER The inspection period ended prior to the SERT reporting any results, conclusions, and/or making any recommendation The residents will continue to monitor licensee actions during the next inspection perio The wiring error that would allow a single failure to disable both trains of ECCS in the 11 piggy-back 11 mode is ide-ntified as another example of an apparent violation of 280,281/88-32-01 ident'ified in the SSFI Inspection Report 280,281/88-32.
Cold Weather Preparations (71714)
During this inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the licensee 1 s program for implementation of protective measures for extreme cold weatHe This program is implemented by performance of monthly (November through March) periodic test PT-52, Cold Weather Protection, dated May 21, 1987, which was detailed in the licensee response to IE Bulletin 79-24, Frozen Line The inspector reviewed the liceflsee response to this Bulletin, the periodic test, and a recent quality control (QC) audit which was performed on the subject. The inspectors findings agreed with the QC review that this program has weaknesses that need to be addresse Station management agreed with this comment and stated that corrective actions are being developed in this are In addition, the inspectors expressed concern over a continuing problem with rain water leaking into the safeguards room and wetting the auxiliary feedwater pump (AFW) motor It appears that heavy rainfall cau~es water to run in around access plugs in the-safeguards bu{lding roof where the pumps are located. This water intrusion has occured a number of times during the past couple of years and has sometimes resulted in the licensee declaring an AFW pump inoperabl The licensee has traditionally draped plastic over these areas to divert rainwater away from the AFW motor This item was discussed with the licensee at the exit and the station manager stated that corrective actions were being evaluate The inspector commented that this item was an example of a weakness in aggressively pursuing comprehensive solutions that will prevent recurrenc (IFI 280; 281/88-45-02)
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie.
Maintenance Inspections (62703)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed maintenance activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedure Inspection areas are discussed belo TROUBLESHOOTING 480 VOLT SWITCHGEAR The inspector reviewed the licensee evaluation and correctfve actions regarding a failure of 480 volt switchgear l-SI-BKR-123 that occurred on October 28, 198 During performance of speci a 1 t_est ST-227, LHSI pump 1-SI-P-lB would not start on deman It was noted that the pump 1 s breaker charging spring would not charg The breaker worked after operators racked the breaker out approximately one-eighth inch and racked it back i Follo~ing testing, the breaker was observed to again not recharg This condition was documented on station deviation report Sl-88-123 Maintenance engineering troubleshooting of the breaker, which was performed under work order 74050 in accordance with procedure EMP-C-EPL-61, Corrective Maintenance Procedure For Safety Related 480 Volt Switchgear,
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revealed dirty breaker compartment secondary disconnect These disconnects supply the 125 VDC control power for the charging spring moto The contacts were cleaned and the breaker tested satisfactoril These contacts normally remain energized during breaker maintenance and consequently are not included in a general, preventive maintenance schedul The inspector discussed this failure mechanism with the maintenance engineering staff, and reviewed their preliminary recommendations to implement additional secondary contact cleaning for other breakers into the preventive maintenance schedul No discrepancies were note FREEZE SEALING PIPE FOR MAINTENANCE On November 22, the inspector performed a wa 1 kdown and review of the freeze seal being used to isolate the maintenance area for valves 2-SI-24 and 153. This freeze seal was installed on a 10-inch pipe (10-SI-206-153)
by work order 74750 in accordance with corrective maintenance procedure MMP-C-FS-26 The inspector verified the work order and procedure were at the job site and being use In addition, the inspector verified through observation the following:
Adequate communications between the freeze seal operator located in the safeguards area basement and the maintenance personnel in the auxiliary building basemen That adequate piping existed between the freeze plug and the nearest piping obstruction (i.e. closed valve).
Adequate liquid nitrogen was staged to perform the intended tas Adequate pre-freeze seal nondestructive testing had been performed on the pipin Adequate temperature monitoring equipment was i nsta 11 ed and being used to record dat That the liquid nitrogen p1p1ng did not contact adjacent pi~ing to cause inadvertant freezin The inspector discussed the above items with the techni~ians involved and considers the precautions taken to be adequat No discrepancies were note CLEANING THE REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK (RWST)
The inspectors monitored the activities r~lating to the draining, inspection and cleaning of the Unit 1 RWST (l-CS-TK-1).
Radiation levels around the RWST have traditionally been high with resin bead intrusion being the primary suspec A previous failure of a containment spray valve to seat due to resin bead blockage caused the inspectors to question
I - the licensee regarding the effects of this foreign material in the RWS The licensee drained the tank, opened the top manway, and discovered approximately four cubic feet of resin beads in the tan This discrepancy was identified on station deviation report Sl-88-137 The resin was removed, and the tank and piping were cleaned and flushe It is surmised by the licensee that the resin entered the RWST during the previously used operational practice of dewatering the refueling cavity to the RWST across the top of the. spent fuel pool ion exchanger The-1 i cen see did not violate any requirements during this occurrence but no longer use this flow path during dewaterin The inspector r~viewed the work order (WO 74527), cleanliness inspection results, and the special test that flushed the containment spray lines connected to the RWS No discrepancies were note Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie Surveillance Inspections (61726)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed various surveillance activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedures as follows: _
Test prerequisites were me Tests were performed in accordance with approved procedure Test procedures appeared to perform their intended functio Adequate coordination existed among personnel involved in the tes Test data was *properly collected and recorde lnspection areas are discussed belo TESTING OF UNIT 2 REACTOR CAVITY J-SEAL On November 6, the inspectors monitored the partial performance of special test ST-224, OPERABILITY REACTOR CAVITY J-SEALS, for Unit The cavity level was raised to approximately 18 inches and the J-seal leakage was measure The leakage was determined to b~ ~ess than 0.05 gallons per minut Subsequently, the test was repeated with satisfactory results by deflating the inflatable seal with the water level at 26 feet 6 inche The inspector reviewed the official copy of the special test procedure after the above portion of the.test was complete No discrepancies were note On December 9, the inspector witnessed leak testing of the reactor cavity J-seal for Unit 2 from inside the Unit 2 containmen Special test 224 was being used t6 control testing evolutions.. The inspector attended the pre-test briefing held in the health physics conference room and monitored all actions in preparation for deflation of the inflatable sea The inspector independently witnessed the amount of leakage past the J-seal when the inflatable seal was deflated and considers that leakage was similar to the results of the Unit 1 test results (approximately gallons per minute).
The inspectors consider that the test results for the Unit 2 cavity seal adequately demonstrate satisfactory performance of the sea No discrepancies were note COMPONENT COOLING (CC) HEAT EXCHANGER THROTTLED FLOW TES The inspectors witnessed selected portions of field testing and reviewed the completed results of special test l-ST-233, CC Heat Exchanger Throttled Flow Test, Revision The purpose of this test was to demonstrate the capability of the service water (SW) *system to accept current heat loads from the CC system through the CC heat exchangers while the intake canal level is lowered to approximately 20 fee Further, this temporary reduction in canal level was necessary for the installation of passive vacuum breakers on each of eight circulating water supply lines located at the *1 ower intake structure to remedy a design deficiency identified by the previously mentioned SSF A review of the completed data sheets and evaluations indicates that the test objectives were me At this level the service water flow has adequate margin to reject the current plant heat loads and at the same time maintain intake canal levels during a postulated loss_ of offsite powe No discrepancies were noted during this inspection effor Within the areas* inspected, no violations or deviatio-ns were identifie Licensee Event Report (LER) Review*. (92700)
The inspectors reviewed the LER's listed below to ascertain whether NRC reporting requirements were being met and to determine appropriateness o the corrective action(s). The inspector's review also included followup on implementation of corrective action ~nd review of licensee documentation that all required corrective action(s) were complet (Closed) LER 281-88-01,. Improper Administrative Control of Containment Isolation Valves Due to Personnel Error.* This report identified a failure to properly control inoperable containment isolation valves by lifting the wrong lead The cause was given as a misinterpretation* of drawings by electrical maintenance personne The inspector reviewed the failure analysis performed on valve 2-SS-TV-2018 that caused the original failure and discussed the findings with the station staf A comprehensive failure analysis was hampered by the failure to notify the appropriate engineers during disassembly and repair of this valv In addition, the replaced parts were discarded prior to any examinatio This situation was documented via a station deviation (written by engineering) and serves as an additional example of weaknesses with the licensee's root cause
- evaluation progra The licensee is aware of these weaknesses in their root cause development, and they are actively working on the progra This LER is close Within this area, no violations or deviations were identifie Design, Design Changes, and Modifications (37700)
During this inspection period, the inspectors selected several design change packages which were being implemented or which had been implemented in the recent past for review.* One of the reviewed changes was:
Spent Resin Catch Tank Modification/Installation, DC-85-16B-This change replaced the old resin catch system to allow for an enhanced capability to collect and properly dispose of spent radioactive resin The inspector reviewed the licensee's engineering review and analysis for the modification and also conducted a walkdown of the facilit The review included a determination that design changes were processed and controlled by established procedure, and that post modification testing was adequate to demonstrate operability of the facilit No discrepancies were note Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 19, 1988, with those individuals identified by an asterisk in paragraph The following new items were identified by the inspectors during this exi One apparent violation was identified in paragraph 4 with regard to licensee review and conclusions of the installation errors associated w~th the low head safety injection discharge valves to the suction of the high head safety injection pump This is another example of 280,281/88-32-0l identified in Inspection Report 280,281/88-3 One inspector followu item was identified in paragraph 4 for followup on discrepancies and corrective actions regarding motor bperated valves (280; 281/88-45-01).
The inspector expressed concern over the repeated wetting of the AFW pump motors during heavy rains as discussed in paragraph 4.. This was given as an example of a weakness in aggressively pursuing comprehensive solutions that prevent recurrenc In addition, an example of a weakness in the root cause program was identified during the followup of the LER discussed in paragraph 7. Although the licensee stated in the LER that a root cause analysis would be performed, the appropriate maintenance engineers were not cognizant of the repair activities and the defective parts were discarded prior to any examinations for failure.. (IF! 280;* 281/88-45-02)
The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings with no dissenting comment The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of th materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.