IR 05000280/1988047
| ML18153B563 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 12/22/1988 |
| From: | Jape F, Lenahan J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18153B562 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-88-47, 50-281-88-47, NUDOCS 8901050174 | |
| Download: ML18153B563 (8) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY-COMIVIISSION-. -- --* -**
REGION II
101 MARIETTA. STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-280/88-47 and 50-281/88-47 Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company Glen Allen, VA 23060 Docket Nos.:
50-280 Qnd 50-281 Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted:
December 5-9, 1988 License Nos.: DPR-32 and DPR-37 Inspecto~r~
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Accompanying Personnel:
P. Balmain Approved by:
~"1 CbtA.,.. t, F. Jape, Chief Test Programs Section Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY
Date Signed (2-/'-¥/? l Date Signed Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in the areas of the reactor cavity water seal assembly modifications, pipe supports and snubber survei 11 ance program, repairs to the roadway used for transportation of spent fuel storage area, and repairs to protective coatings on ductwork in the Unit 1 containment buildin Results:
In th~ areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identifie A weakness was i dent ifi ed during review of snubber survei 11 ance procedures involving failure of licensee personnel to signoff steps in the procedures after completing portions of the surveillances, Paragraph PDR ADOCK 05000280 Q
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- 1. * Persons Contacted Licensee Employees REPORT DETAILS
- R. C. Bilyen, Licensing Specialist
- R. H. Blount, Superintendent, Technical Services P. Doody, Project Engineer, Reactor Cavity Seal Repair
- M. R. Kansler, Station Manager
- G. D. Miller, Licensing Coordinator
- H.* L. Miller, Assistant Station Manager, Operations and Maintenance
- P. N. Tucker, Supervisor, Site Engineering Office - Nuclear S. D. Windle, Coatings Engineei D. Wong, Snubber Engineer Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers and operator NRC Resident Inspectors W. E. Hal land
- L. Nichalson
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- Attended exit interview Inspection of Pipe Supports and the Snubber Surveillance Program, Units 1 and 2 (70370)
The inspector examined procedures and quality records related to the snubber survei 11 ance program and inspected selected snubbers and pipe supports on safety-related piping system Acceptance criteria utilized by the inspector are specified in Technical Specification 4.1 Review of Snubber Surveillance Procedure The inspector examined the following procedures which control the snubber surveillance activities:
(1)
Procedure Numbers 1-PT-39A-1 and 2-PT-39A-l, Visual Inspection
- Accessible Snubbers - As Left (2)
Procedure Numbers 1-PT-398-1 and 2-PT-398-1, Visual Inspection
- Accessible Snubbers - As Found (3)
Procedure Numbers 1-PT-39A-2 and 2-PT-39A-2, Visual Inspection
- Inaccessible Snubbers - As.Left
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(4)
ProcedurB Numbers 1-PT-398-2 and 2-PT-398-2, Visual Inspection
- Inaccessible Snubbers - As Found (5)
Procedure Numbers 1-PT-39.3 and 2-PT-39.3, Mechanical Snubber Functional Testing (6)
Procedure Numbers 1-PT-39_.4 and 2-PT-39.4, Snubber Functional Test (7)
Procedure Number PT-39.5, Snubber Surveillance Program Update (8)
Procedure Number ENG-51.0, Snubber Selection for Functional Testing The inspector also examined Engineering Work Procedure (EWR)88-173,
. Repairs to Mi see 11 aneous-Supports. The EWR address rep 1 acement of a bent hanger rod OA> a spring can support on the Loop 11C 11 safety injection pipin The inspector observed the bent hanger during a previous inspection (See paragraph 3 of Inspection Report Number 50-280/88-33 and 50-281/88-33).
Based on the EWR evaluation, the licensee determined that the spring hanger was st i 11 operable and that other supports in the vi ci ni ty of the damaged hanger were not affecte The EWR procedure specifies *method for replacement of the bent hanger ro Inspection of Snubbers and Pipe Supports The inspector performed a w~lkdown inspection to examine selected mechanical and hydraulic snubbers installed on safety-related piping system in Units 1 and 2 safeguards buildings and in Unit 1 contain-ment buildin The piping systems included portions 6f the reactor coolant, main steam, auxiliary feedwater, main feedwater and RH During the walkdown inspection, the inspector verified that snubbers were not damaged, that the attachment to the supporting structure and piping was secure, that the fluid level in the hydraulic snubber reservoirs was higher than target levels, and that leakage of the fluid was not occurrin During the wa 1 kdown inspection, the inspector also examined selected spring cans and rigid restraints installed on the safety-related piping systems listed above and verified that the supports were not damaged and that attachment to the piping and supporting structure was secur Review of Quality Records The inspectQJ' examined the following quality records:
(1) Results of visual inspections performed on Unit 1 inaccessible snubbers in May 1987, September 1987 and April 1988.
C2)
Results of the visual inspection performed on Unit 2*
inaccessible snubbers in December 198 ~
(3)
Results of functional tests performed on Unit 1 snubbers in June 198 (4)
EWR 88-245 which evaluated three mechanical snubbers which, when tested in June 1988, were found to be damage The damage was attributed to possible overload of the snubbers by a transien (5)
Results.of functional tests performed, to date, <!luring the current refueling outage on Unit 2 snubber (6)
Results of visual inspections performed on Units 1 and 2 inaccessible and accessible snubbers during the current outage One inoperable inaccessible Unit 1 snubber was identified. This snubber, which is located on the 11A 11 steam generator, was found to be empty of fluid.. The inspector witnessed inspection of
~his snubber during a previous inspection (See paragraph 3 of NRC Inspection Report No. 50-280/88-38 and 50-281/88-38).
During review of the procedures documenting visual inspection of Unit 2 snubbers performed during the current outage, the inspector noted that some steps in the procedures had not been signed off prior to proceeding with the next step in the procedur The inspector discussed this problem with licensee engineers and concluded that the steps which ~ere nbt signed off had been performed in their proper sequenc This problem was, also discussed with licensee man*agement personnel during the exit interview. The licensee has implemented a procedure enhancement program to upgrade procedures and is emphasizing the need to follow procedures to all personne The failure to signoff the steps in the procedures has essentially,no safety significance, but indicates a weakness in the documentations of important activitie Within the area inspected, violations or deviations were not identifie.
Reactor Cavity Seal Assembly Modifications - Units 1 and 2 (86700) Background On May 17, 1988, with Unit 1 in a refueling and mainten~nce shutdown, the refueling cavity seal ring depressurized resulting in leakage of approximately 25,000 to 30,000 gallons of water from the refueling cavit The water level in the refueling cavity dropped approximately one foot, The prompt actions of an operator caused the cavity seal ring to be repressurized and stopped the leakage from the refue 1 i ng cavit At the request of NRC, Region I I, the 1 i censee documented their planned correct"ive actions for the Unit 1 cavity sea 1 in a 1 etter to NRC, Region II, dated October.3, 1988, Seri a 1 No.88-362, Subject:
Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2 Reactor Cavity Seal
~ Action Pla The action plan encompassed four areas:
design, testing, procedures and trainin Region II inspectors
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conducted an inspection October 3-14, 1988, to verify that "the licensee implemented their commitments in modification of the Unit 1 cavity seal assembl (See NRC Inspection Report N /88-38 and 50-281/88-38).
During the current inspection, the inspector examined the records of modifications to the Unit 2 cavity seal assembly interviewed operators concerning monitoring of the cavity level, ano examined records documenting operational checks. Details of the inspection are discussed in paragraph 3.b through 3.d belo Review of Records Documenting Unit 2 Cavity Seal Assembly Improvements
' The inspector examined the completed EWR and accompanying work plans which were prepared to implement modifications to the Unit 2 reactor cavity seal assembl The EWRs reviewed included the following:
(1)
EWRs88-379 and 88-379A, which provided backing rings for the inner and outer J-seals on the seal rin (2)
EWRs88-380 and 88-380A, which provided for installation of strong backs between the diaphragm p 1 ate and reactor vesse 1 flange to reduce deflection of the diaphragm plate to prevent loss of seallng of the J-seal *
(3)
EWRs88-381, 88-381A, 88-3818, and 88-381C, which provided. for installation of a backup nitrogen supply system for the inflatable seal This included installation of two nitrogen cylinders, pressure regulator valves, check valves, and instrument tubing to provide a backup air supply for the pneumatic cavity sea (4)
EWRs88-382, and 88-382A through 88-382F, which provided installation of a neoprene sponge gasket on the diaphragm plat During review of the above listed EWRs, the inspector verified that signoffs were completed, that hold points were complied with, and that revisions to EWRs were documented and approved when changed conditions were encountered:
Review of Remote Monitoring of Reactor Cavity Level
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The inspector examined EWR 88-402, Level Indication of Reactor Cavity During Refueling. This EWR provides an evaluation of the use of the pressurizer level indication to monitor'the cavity level remotely in the control roo The inspector interviewed operators concerning the remote monitoring of the cavity lev~l and observed the pressurizer level instruments and verified that the pressurizer levels indicated on the instruments coincided with the* observed cavity level per EWR 88-40 While in the contro 1 room, the inspector examined.
abnormal operating procedure AOP 22.1, Loss of Refueling Cavity
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Leve 1, verified that the copy was current, and determined through interviews that the operators were familiar with the loss of cavity seal event of May 17, 198 The inspector also examined drawing numbers 11548-FM-25C, Flow Diagram, Compressed Air System - Sh 5, and 11548-FM-75C, Valve Operating Numbers, Compressed Air System - Sh 5, and verified that copies of these drawings on file in the contra~
room had been upgraded to incorporate design changes implemented by EWR 88-38 The revised drawings elarify the valve lineups for the normal air supply and the backup nitrogen s.upply to the pneumatic seal Review of Records Documenting Daily Operational Checks of -Backup Nitrogen Supply to Pneu~atic Seals The inspector examined Operational Check Procedure OC-27, Containment Walkdown Check This procedure requires licensee operators to verify the backup nitroge~ and instrument air system valve lineups, to record the nitrogen cylinders pressures, and monitor and record any leakage from cavity seal The procedure is performed daily on the mid-shif The inspector examined completed OC-27 procedures which documented. the required containment walkdown checks performed for Units 1 and 2 on November 24 through. November 30, 1988, for Unit 1 on December 5, 6 and 8, 1988, and for Uriit*2 on December 1 and December 6 through 8, 198 No discrepancies were noted during these walkdown checks. There was no leakage observed from the cavity seal leakoff line Within the ~rea inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie.
Repairs to Coatings on Recirculation Ducts in Unit 1 Containment Building (62701)
During walkdown inspections of the Unit 1 containment building, licensee personnel observed that coatings applied to the exterior of the recirculation ductwork were blistering and delaminatin This problem was evaluated by EWRs88-422 and 88-422A Evaluate VS Containmen~ Recirculation Duct The inspector reviewed the EWR Results of the licensee 1 s inspections. and evaluations of the coatings disclosed the epoxy white top coating applied to the exterior surfaces pf the containment recirculation ductwork and supporting structural steel was blistering and delaminating from the inorganic zinc primer* coa The inorganic zinc primer is intact and is not exhibiting these defect The problem is limited to ductwork installed in 1981 under design change package 77-3 In order to resolve this problem, the licensee will remove the failed top c~at materials by scrapping using hand tools. The licensee has concluded that the remaining undamaged zinc primer coat will provide interim corrosion protectio The licensee will perform evaluations to determine if additional corrective action is require The inspector,
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accompanied by the licensee's coatings engineer, walked down the
- containment building and examined the failed coating Work was in progress to remove the damaged coatings in some area. The inspector noted that the damaged coatings were 1 imited to the areas on the ductwork discussed in EWR 88'-422A, and that coatings on the containment liner plate, structural steel, other ductwork, and concrete walls were in satisfactory conditio The condition of the zinc primer coat under the damaged coatings was satisfactor The licensee plans to perform periodic examinations of the epoxy coating remaining on the affected duct to identify any areas wi:th delaminated coatin The licensee has performed an evaluation of the affect of failure of the coatings which will remain on these ducts and has concluded that failure of the remaining coatings would not effect the recirc spray equipmen The licensee has inspected Unit 2 coatings and verified that a similar problem (coating failure) does not exist in the Unit 2 containment buildin Within the area inspected, violations or deviations were not identifie.
Repairs to Spent Fuel Cask Haul Road (01102)
On August 26, 1988, Surry personnel were.transporting a loaded spent fue cask to the storage pad when the trans~orter began to sink lnto the road on the south side. The transporter's tire dug i~to the gravel road eight to ten inches on the right (south) side with the cask resting on the ground and the entire 150-ton cask/transporter 1 i sting approxim,ate ly 6 degree The cask was loaded with 21 spent fuel assemblie The bottom of the cask normally rides approximately 6 inches off the groun The licensee used hydraulic jacks and steel plates to level the transporter and then moved it to its storage location under normal powe The road was dry and had been used for transportation of the preceding seven cask This problem was documented on Deviation Report No. SI 88-087 The cause of the problem was determined to be erosion of the shoulder area of the cask haul road, ponding of water along port,ons of the haul road, and the fact that the edge of the cask haul road was not clearly marke The 1 i censee i s*sued EWR 88-335 to implement the repairs to the roa The inspector reviewed their EWR during a previous inspection (See Inspection Report No. 50-280/88-38 and 50-281/88-38).
o During the current inspection, the in specter wa 1 ked down the road and observed that the grading work required by the EWR had been almost complete This includ'ed cleaning of existing culverts and ditches, re-grading of the haul road, placement of rip-rap in drainage ditches, and installation of 4x4 ~osts to mark the edges of the 24 foot wide, specially constructed, cask haul roa Within the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identifie *J
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7 Exit Interview The inspection scope and results* were summarized on December 9, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed belo Although reviewed during this inspection, proprietary information is not contained in this report. Dissenting comments were not received from the license o
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