IR 05000272/1978025
| ML18078A542 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 11/06/1978 |
| From: | Keimig R, Norrholm L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18078A540 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-78-25-01, 50-272-78-25-1, 50-311-78-35, NUDOCS 7812280012 | |
| Download: ML18078A542 (15) | |
Text
Report N Docket N U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I 50-272/78-25 50-311L78-35 50-272 50-311 DPR-70 c
License N CPPR-53 Priority Category Bl Licensee:
Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark, N~w Jersey 07101 Facility Name:
Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units l and 2 Inspection at: Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey
//- ~-78 date signed
date signed date signed Approved by:
roJects
//- ~ -Zt:S
- date signed Inspection Summary:
Ins ections on Se tember 17-0ctober 14, 1978 Combined Re art Nos. 50-272/
78~25 and 50-311/78-35
.
- **Un1t**FAraas",f.tls§ected: Rout_ ine inspections by the resident inspector of plant
- operations inclu ing tours of the facility; log and record reviews; observation of Emergency Drill; review of recent Licensee Event Reports; IE Bul_letin responses; and, followup on previous inspection item The inspections involved 40 inspector-hours by the NRC resident inspector. *
.
Unit 2 Areas Insected: Routine inspections by the resident inspector of plant testing, including tours of the facility; test program controls; preoperational training of plant personnel; comparison of as-built plant with FSAR description; fire prevention/protection systems; QC surveillance of testing; witnessing of ting; and followup on IE Bulletins. The inspections involved 43 inspector-rs by the NRC resident inspecto esults:
No items of noncompliance were identifie Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
7 8 12 2 8 ~
( (_"
- DETAILS *Persons Contacted PSE&G C. Johnson, Startup Engineer S. LaBruna, Maintenance Engineer A. Meyer, Site QA Engineer E. Meyer, Project QA Engineer H. Midura, Manager - Salem Generating Station W. Reuther, Site QAD F. Schnarr, Station Operating Engineer R. Silverio, Assistant to the Manager J. Stillman, Station QA Engineer D. Tauber, Site QA Engineer W. Treston, Site QAD J. Zupko, Chief Engineer Porter-Gertz Consultants, In S. W. Porter, J The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel during the course of the inspections including management, clerical, maintenance, operations, performance, quality assurance, and construction personne.
Status of Previous Inspection Items (Closed) Noncompliance (272/78-14-02): Failure to post/acknowledge changes to emergency plan implementing procedure Effectiveness of licensee corrective action as detailed in correspondence dated July 5, 1978, was verified by the inspecto (Closed) Unresolved item (272/78-17-02): Inclusion of all portable friskers (RM-14) in the Inspection Order syste By selective sampling of 11 in-use 11 portable radiation monitors, the inspector verified that RM-14 1s were now included in the Inspection Order system for periodic calibratio No instrument past due for calibration was identifie Unit 1 Shift Logs and Operating Records The inspector reviewed the following plant procedures to determine the licensee established requ1rements in this area in preparation for a review of selected logs and record AP-5, Operating Practices, Revision 8, August 24, 1977 AP-13, Control of Lifted Leads and Jumpers, Revision 2, Apri 1 10, 1978 Operations Directive Manual AP-15, Tagging Rules, Revision 0, April 13, 1976 The inspector had no questions in this are Shift logs and operating records were reviewed to verify that:
Control Room log sheet entries are filled out and initialed; Auxiliary log sheets are filled out and initialed; Log entries i nvo_l vi ng abnormal conditions pro vi de s uffi ci ent detail to communicate equipment status, lockout status, correction, and restoration; Log Book reviews are being conducted by the staff; Operating orders do not conflict with Technical Specification requirements; Logs and records were maintained in accordance with Technical Specifications and the procedures in 3.a abov The review included the following plant shift logs and operating records as ind1cated and discussions with lice~see personnel:
Log No. 1 - Control Room Daily Log, September 18, 19, 20, 26, 27, October 8-9, 1978 Log No. 3 - Control Console Reading Sheet, September 18, 19, 20, 26, 27, October 8-9, 1978
Operating Department Memoranda #1 through 26 Supervisory Letters Temporary Jumper and Lifted Lead Log - all *active (both Units)
The inspector had no further questions in this are.
Plant Tour During the course of the inspections, the inspector made obser-vations and conducted multiple tours of:
Control Room Relay Room Auxiliary Building Service Water Structure Yard Areas Rad Waste Building Containment (at power)
Site perimeter Electrical penetration area C1rculating Water Structure Control Point Turbine Building The following determinations were made:
Monitoring instrumentatio The inspector frequently verified that selected instruments were functional and demonstrated parameters within Technical Specification limit Valve Position The inspector verified that selected valves were in the position or condition required by the Technical Specifications for the applicable plant mod Radiation Control The inspector verified by observation that control point procedures and posting requirements were being followe The inspector identified no failure to properly ~ost radiation and high radiation areas~
Plant housekeeping conditions. Observations relative to p1ant housekeeping and fire hazards identified no notable condition *
Fluid leak No fluid leaks were observed which had not been identified by stat1on personnel with corrective action i ni ti ated, as necessar *
Piping vibratio No excessive piping vibration was noted during the plant tour Selected pipe hangers and seismic restraints were observed and. no adverse conditions note Control Room annunciators. Selected lit annunciators were discussed with control room operators to verify that the reasons for them were understood and corrective action, if required, was being take By frequent observation through the inspection, the inspector verified that control room manning requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(k) and the Technical Specifications were being me In addition, the inspector observed that frequent tours were made by shift supervisio The following acceptance criteria were used for the above
. i tern Technical Specifications Operatioris Directives Manual Inspector judgement The following specific observations were made by the inspector and identified promptly to station managemen A previously identified steam leak in the Safety Injection Pump room was observed to be getting worse and potentially damaging No. 11 SI Pump moto The source of the leak was apparently the house heating steam syste The leak was immediately repaire The inspector identified some questionable fire barriers during plant tours. Subsequent investigation by licensee personnel verified functional integrity, however, another barrier penetration was found not to be properly seale This barrier was immediately restored to functional statu..
- *
Licensee Event Reports (LER's) In Office Review of Licensee Event Reports The inspector reviewed LERs submitted to the NRC:RI office to verify that details of the event were clearly reported, including the accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of corrective action. The inspector determined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic implications were involved, and whether the event warranted onsite followu The f o 11 owing LE Rs were reviewed:
- *
- 78-26/03L Failure of Motor Operated Valve lSJl 78-27/03L Inoperable 100 ft. Elevation Air Lock Exterior Door 78-28/03L Inoperable 100 ft. Elevation Air Lock Interior Door
- 78-29/0lT Inoperability of Power Range Channels N41 and N42, Loss of both Source Range Channels in Mode 3 78-30/03L Control Bank and Shutdown Rod Misalignment 78-31/03L Control Bank D Misalignment 78-33/03L No. 11 Steam Genera tor Steam Fl ow Channe 1 I I Inoperab 1 e
- 78-34/04L Missed Surveillance: Functional Test of S/G Slowdown Radiation Monitoring Channels lR19, A,B,C,D 78-35/03L Loss of No. 2 Station Power Transformer 78-36/03L Vital Bus Undervoltage Relay Setting Outside Technical Specification Limits 78-38/03L No. 11 Steam Generator Steam Flow Channel II Inoperable 78-39/03L No. 13 Containment Fan Coil Unit Inoperable 78-40/03L Auxiliary Feed Water Storage Tank Level Less Than Allowed by Technical Specifications 78-41/03L Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio Greater Than 1.02
78-42/03L No. 13 Steam Generator Steam Flow Channel I Inoperable
- 78-43/03L Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio Greater Than 1.02 78-44/03L No. 11 Steam Generator Feedwater Flow Channel II Inoperable 78-45/03L 100 ft. Elevation Personnel Air Lock Inoperable
- 78-48/03L Electrical Penetration Fire Barriers Inoperable 78-49/03L No. 13 Steam Generator Level Channel IV Inoperable 78-50/03L No. 15 Containment Fan Coil Unit Inoperable 78-51/03L lA Vital Instrument Inverter Inoperable Onsite Licensee Event Followup For those LERs selected for onsite followup (denoted by asterisks in detail paragraph 5), the inspector verified that reporting r~quirements of Technical Specifications and Regulatory Guide 1.16 had been met, that appropriate corrective action had been taken, that the event was reviewed by the licensee as required by AP-4, 6, and 7, and that continued operation of the facility was conducted in accordance with Technical Specification limit The following findings relate to the LERs reviewed on site:
-- 78-26/03L As indicated in the supplementary LER submitted July 12, 1978, the cause of an incorrectly sized motor on this valve was personnel error during maintenanc In addition to the sample verifi-cation of 25 motor operators conducted by the licensee, the inspector selected 10 motor operated valves and also verified that the correctly sized valve motor was installe /0lT The cause of this occurrence was a technician 1s failure to properly identify the Nuclear Instrument cabinets when making connections to the reactivity computer for special testin The inspector further noted that a complete procedure, while it may not have prevented the occurrence, was not prepared for this evolution. This item is open pending development of an acceptable procedure for connecting the reactivity compute (272/78-25-02)
!
.
-- 78-34/04L
Surveillance of the Steam Generator blowdown radiat1on monitoring channels is included in the Inspection Order syste The same system generates overdue lists for surveillance not completed by a pre-determined date. The inspector noted that the 11 overdue 11 date is, in some cases, the day the item is past due as determined by the Technical Specifi-cation As a result, some surveillance requirements are flagged as late only after the1r due date has passe The event in question was directly attri-buted to a supervisor's miscalculation of the due date. This area will receive further review during routine program inspection /03L The circumstances detailed in this LER were identified by the inspector (Inspection Report 50-272/78-22).
The licensee's report is incomplete in that it does not "identify the event as occurring during a power increase from less than to greater than 50% reactor powe Due to the circuit arrangement of overhead annunciators, the operator may not be aware of a quadrant power tilt problem when increasing power to greater than 5b%.
The licensee stated that a supplementary LER will be submitted which will address the situation including design and procedure modifications. This item is unresolve (272/78-25-03)
-- 78-48/03L As stated in the LER, the licensee conducted a verification of other penetrations affected by the design change in question to assure their operabilit Subsequent checks by the inspector and maintenance personnel identified ~nother open penetration seal, demonstrating the need to verify that all safety
- related fire barrier penetration seals are functiona The verification is in progress. This item is unre-solved pendin9 completion of this total verificatio (212/78~25-d_l }
.
. The following Licensee Event Reports required corrective action pursuan~ t6 the license or Technical Specifications:
78-29/01 p 78-34/04L 78-40/03L (late report)
Except as noted above, the inspector had no further questions in this are *
Unit 2 Preoperational Test Program Implementation Controls By review of turnover (POTI) packages and examination of systems, the inspector verified that jurisdictional controls were identified and observed by construction, testing, maintenance and operating personne Systems subjected to the above review during this reporting period included Safety Injection, Component Cooling and Residual Heat Remova No violation of jurisdictional boundaries was observed. However, some failures to completely identify components as to jurisdictional responsibility were note Observations were made in the vicinity of valves 2SJ135, 21SJ134 and 22SJ13 The valves and associated piping, all of which had been turned over to PSE&G, were still identified as being under the cognizance of the UEC Test grou This finding together with similar observations detailed in paragraph 11 constitute an unresolved ite (311/78-35-01) Preoperational Testing Quality Assurance By review of POTT packages and Outstanding Items, the inspector verified that QC-identified items relative to systems being turned over were tracked to resolutio In addition, during observation of testing the inspector verified that QC surveillance of testing was being conducted and that mandatory witness points were being observed by testing and QC personne No items of noncompliance were identifie.
Preoperational Fire Prevention/Protection The inspector conducted frequent tours of the control room, relay room, and the balance of plant to verify the continued operability of fire suppression equipmen In one instance, both C02 extinguishers were missing from their location in the equipment rack area behind No. 2 Control Roo These extinguishers were irranediately replace The licensee stated that site safety personnel conduct daily tours which include checks for the presence of fire extinguisher As evidenced by attached tags, each extinguisher is inspected monthly.
The inspector also conducted an inspection to determine the character-istics of material used by maintenance personnel to re-seal fire barrier penetrations. The only sealant used is* SEMCO PR 855 Silicone Foam, which is packaged as a two-part cartridge (SEMKIT).
The fire retardant characteristics of this material are discussed in Inspection Report 50-272/78-1 No other sealant was identified by the inspecto The inspector had no further questions relative to the abov.
Radiation Protection-Preoperational To assess preparations for Unit 2 operation in the area of radiation protection, the inspector attended two sessions of radiation protection orientation being conducted for Production Department operations and maintenance personnel. These personnel, currently assigned to Unit 1, will be working at Unit 2 when operatin The inspector verified that:
the specified training was conducted; personnel on the attendance list were in attendance; an unbiased test was administered; environmental conditions were not detrimental to training; instructor was adequately prepared; and, the presentation addressed the assigned topic The inspector had no questions in this are.
Comparison of As-Built Plant to FSAR Description As a continuing effort until licensing of Unit 2, the inspector per-formed a verification, using construction prints and field observa-tions, to determine that various safety-related systems have been constructed as described in the facility's Final Safety Analysis Repor The systems reviewed during this reporting period included Reactor Coolant Safety and Relief Valves and associated pipin The fol1owing were includ~d in this review:
FSAR Section PSE&G Drawing 218711 II 239051
- PSE&G Drawing 239052 239053 239054 239055 239056 239057 239058 RC-2-3 Sheet 3 RC-2-3 Sheet 5 RC-2-3 Sheet 7 Field Observations - Containment 130 1 and 78' elevations
- Pressurizer all levels The review included valve and pipe size, design rating, setpoints, piping arrangements and leak-off configuration The inspector had no questions in this are.
PlantTour The inspector conducted periodic tours of all. accessib.le areas in the plant. During these tours, the following specific items were evaluated:
-.-
Hot Wor Adequacy of fire prevention/protection measures use Fire Equipmen Operability and evidence of periodic inspection of fire suppression equipmen Housekeepin Minimal accumulations of debris and main-tenance of required cleanness levels in systems under or following testin *
Equipment preservation. Maintenance of special preservative measures for installed equipment as applicabl Component Taggin Implementation and observance of equipment tagging for safety or equipment protectio Maintenanc Corrective maintenance in accordance with established procedure Instrumentation. Adequate protection for installed instrumentatio *
Cable Pulling. Adequate measures taken to protect cable from damage while being pulle *
Communicatio Effectiveness of public address system in all areas of the site.*
Equipment Controls. Effectiveness of jurisdictional controls in precluding unauthorized work on systems* in test or which have been teste Log Completeness of logs maintained and resolution of identified problem *
Foreign Material Exclusion. Maintenance of controls to assure systems which" have been cleaned and flushed are not re-opened to admit foreign materia *
Security. Implementation of security provisions. Particular attention to maintenance of the Unit 1 protected area boundar Testing. Spot-checks of testing in progress are mad * The fol lowing specific comments apply to tours made during this in~pection perio *
The inspector observed conflicting jurisdictional tagging on the Safety Injection Pump ammeter in the control roo Both the UEC Test Group (green) tag and the Salem Startup Group (or~nge) tags were displayed. **Only the orange ta should have been in P.lace since POIT had been effected for the syste In another case, the Component Cooling Pump 4 KV breakers did not have orange Salem Startup Group tags to indicate their turnover status. These discrepancies were immediately corrected and stated to be isolated cases by the licensee. This item is unresolved pending further review of jurisdictional tagging controls by the inspecto (311/78-35-01}.
...
While interviewing operators assigned to the Unit 2 control room, the inspector identified a need to provide guidance regarding the significance of instrument and bezel. tagging (jurisdictional and operability). Some confusion or lack of knowledge was evident. A memorandum to the Operating Department was issued by the Startup Engineer on October 11, 1978 providing this guidanc *
- SITE
In a continuing review, the inspector selected ten com-ponents which were to have danger tags affixed in accordance with outstanding Tagging Requests on file in the control roo Two tags (22A and 22B Diesel Generator Starting Air Compressors) were not in place and the associated control switch was in the ON position. It was later determined that the tags had been cleared, but not all sheets of the tagging request had been removed *from the control room, giving the indication that the request was still outstandin In addition, one tag was found loose on the floor near the associated breaker pane This was immediately replace The effectiveness of safety tagging of components wi 11 receive con ti nui ng review by the inspecto The inspector had no further questions relative to the abov.
IE Bulletin and Circular Followup
- The IE Bulletins discussed below were reviewed to verify that:
Licensee management forwarded copies of the response to the bulletin to appropriate onsite management representative Information discussed in the licensee 1s reply was supported by facility records or by visual examination of the facilit Corrective action taken was effected as described in the repl The licensee 1s reply was prompt and within the time period described in the bulleti The review included discussions with licensee personnel and observation and review of items discussed in the details belo By correspondence dated July 6, 1978, the licensee responded to IE Bulletin 78-06, Defective Cutler-HaJTDTier Type M Relays with DC toils, stating that the Salem facilities do not use these relay No application of these relays was identified by the inspector during plant tours of both units.
14 By correspondence dated August 18, 1978, the licensee responded to IE Bulletin 78-10, Bergen-Patterson Hydraulic Shock Suppressor Accumulator Spring Coils, stating that no Bergen-Patterson hydraulic snubbers are installed at Sale Inspection identified no Bergen-Patterson snubbers in use at either facilit The inspector had no further questions relative to the above item. Site Emergency Drill On September 26, 1978, at approximately 9:30 a.m., the licensee initiated the annual emergency drill. The exact time and scenario were not announced to station personne The drill postulated a design-basis loss of coolant with operation of all safeguards systems. Site evacu-ation was conducted to the point of assembly at the security buildin Unit 2 construction personnel were not included in the exercis The inspector attended the pre-drill briefing for referees~ observed the drill in the control*room and attended the post-drill critiqu The drill was evaluated by the inspector from the view of ensuring compliance with annual drill requirements of the Unit 1 Emergency Plan and ~reoperational training for Unit 2 operating* personne The following comments were provided by the inspector and included
. in the* dri 11 critique for foll owup and re so 1 ution: Complete accountability status of personnel was not obtained until approximately 40 minutes after initiation of the dril The problem appears to stem from use of the Unit l/Unit 2 cross-over points by construction personne Operating personnel in the control room were frequently distracted by the requirements of the operating plant. The dual functions of operating the plant and participating in the drill appeared to detract from both, especially for the Senior Shift Superviso One Control Operator was continuously assigned to monitor the control board and did not significantly participate in the exercis The SSS Office was employed effectively for communications, particu-larly telephone notification On several occasions, however, the office was unattended, resulting in delays in picking up incoming return call *
.... -
15 Some equipment failed in-service during the exercise (one SAM-2 monitor, Police VHF radio). Acceptable alternatives were identified and utilize *
-
The inspector had no further comments with respect to the state of training of personnel involved or the identification of problem areas for resolutio.* Unresolved Items Areas for which more information is required to determine accept-ability are considered unresolved. Unresolved items are contained in Paragraphs 5, 6 and 11 of this repor.
Exit Interviews At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and.findings *
.
1