IR 05000272/1978023

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IE Inspec Repts 50-272/78-23, 50-311/78-27 on 780812-0916 During Which No Items of Noncompliance Were Noted.Major Areas Inspected Incl:Routine Inspec of Oper & Construc
ML18078A470
Person / Time
Site: Salem  PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 10/10/1978
From: Norrholm L
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML18078A469 List:
References
50-272-78-23, 50-311-78-27, NUDOCS 7811300298
Download: ML18078A470 (13)


Text

U.S. NUCLEAR.REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. 50-272/78-23.~=311~

Docket No. 50-272. 50-311 c

License No. DPR-70, CPPR-53 Priority-------

Category Bl


Licensee:

Public Service Electric and Gas*Company 80 Park Place Newark, New Jersey Facilit~ Name: Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2 Inspection at:

Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey and Newark, New Jersey Inspection Inspectors:

Approved by:

Inspection Summary:

, eactor Projects

& NS Branch date signed date signed date signed Ins ection on Au ust 12-Se tember 16, 1978 Combined Re art No. 50-272/78-23 and*

50-311/78-27 Unit 1 Areas Inspected; Routine inspections by the resident inspector of plant oper-ations, including tours of the facility; log and record reviews; action on IE Bulletins and Circulars; activities of the Nuclear Review Board; plant emergency procedures; and, followup on previous inspection item The inspections involved 24 inspector-hours by the NRC resident in~pecto Unit 2 Areas Inspected: Routine inspections by the resident inspector of plant construe-*

tion and testing; including tours of the facility; test program controls; pre-operational staff training; fire protection; action on IE Bulletins and Circulars. The inspections

. involved 22 inspector-hours by the NRC resident inspecto Re lts: No items of noncompliance were identified with respect to Unit With respect t

"t 1, one item of noncompliance was identified (Infraction-Failure to maintain oper-a cire barrier penetration seal, Paragraph 3d).

7811300~98 Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)

  • DETAILS Persons Contacted PSE&G E. Baradale, Project Construction Manager J. Gagliardi, Lead Engineer - Controls J. Heller, Manager Nuclear Operations C. Johnson, Startup Engineer S. LaBruna, Maintenance Engineer A. Meyer, Site QA Engineer E. Meyer, Project QA Engineer J. Midura, Manager-Salem Generating Station P. Moeller, Associate Engineer W. Pavincich, Senior Engineer-Electrical W. -Reuther, Site QAD F. Schnarr, Station Operating Engineer J. Schubel, Lead Engineer R. Silverio, Assistant to the Manager J. Stillman, Station QA Engineer D. Tauber, Site QA Engineer T. Taylor, Senior Engineer W. Treston, Site QA J. Zupko, Chief Engineer RadServices, In F. Dickey, Instructor The inspector also interviewed and talked with other licensee personnel during the course of the inspections including manage-ment, clerical, maintenance, operations, performance, quality assurance, and construction personne Status of Previous Inspection Items (Closed) Unresolved Item (272/77-04~13~Requalification program change to clarify handling of lectures when personnel score less than 80% on a section of the quarterly examination The licensee*

has submitted Amendment 42 to the Final Safety Analysis Report which includes modifications to the operator requalification program which deal with the above concer The inspector had no further questions on this item.

(Closed) Unresl oved Item (272/78-17-01 ): review of Design Change Request ED-357 relative to seismic mounting of panels containing reactor coolant flow transmitter The inspector reviewed the design change package and the basis for making the mounting mod-ifications at the Newark engineering office The inspector had no further question Unit l Plant Tour During the course of the inspections, the inspector made observations and conducted multiple tours of:

1)

Control Room 2)

Rel ay Room 3)

Auxiliary Building 4)

Service Water Structure 5)

Yard Areas 6)

Rad Waste Building*

7)

Electrical pen.etration area 8)

Circulating Water Structure 9)

Control Point The following determinations were made:

1)

Monitoring instrumentatio The inspector verified that selected instruments were functional and demonstrated parameters within Technical Specification limit )

Valve Position The inspector verified that selected valves were in the position or condition required by the Technical Specifications for the applicable plant mod )

Radiation controls. *The inspector verified by observation that control point procedures and posting requirements were being followe The inspector identified no failure to properly post radiation and high radiation area )

Plant housekeeping conditions. Observations relative to

  • plant housekeeping and fire hazards identified no notable condition. 4 5) * Fluid 1 ea k No fluid 1 eaks were observed which had not been identified by station personnel with corrective action initiated, as necessary.

. 6)

Piping. vibratio No excessive piping.vibration was noted during the plant tour )

Selected pipe hangers and seismic restraints were observed and no adverse conditions note )

Equipment tag informatio The inspector selected items designated to have red DO NOT OPERATE blocking tags attached based on effective Tagging Requests filed in the control roo The presence of legible tags and the corresponding valve or breaker position were verified b_y the inspector during plant tour )

Control Room annunciators. Selected lit annunciators were discussed with control room operators to verify that the reasons for them were understood and corrective action, if required, was being take )

By frequent observation through the inspection, the inspector verified that control room manning requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 (k) and the Technical Specifications were being me In addition, the inspector observed that fre-quent tours were made by shift supervisio The following acceptance criteria were used for the above i tern )

Technical Specificati-0ns 2)

Operations Directives Manual 3)

Inspector judgement

  • The following specific observation was made by the inspector and identified promptly to station managemen During an inspection of the Relay Room on August 16, 1978, the inspector identified one cable penetration to the Control Room above, which had a single cable running through and which had not been re-seale The licensee was not aware of the open penetration, and no fire watch was assigned as required by Technical Specification 3.7. 1 *
  • 5 *.

Subsequent investigation indicated that the pentration had been opened faro plant modifications in October 197 Technical Specification 3.7.11 became a requi.rement with the issue of Amendment* 11 in February 197 Other open pentrations were also identified by the license All had resulted from inad-equate administrative controls in use during the October 1977 modification Licensee corrective action is outlined in Licensee Event Report 78-48/3L dated September l, 197 The inspector.further reviewed maintenance procedure M3Y, Repa.i r of* Fi re Barri er and Flood Protector Sea 1 s, Rev 0, dated July 3l, 197 Use of this procedure for any future mainten-ance or modification requiring the opening of fire barriers should be effective in ensuring subsequent reclosur The above failure to maintain fire barrier* integrity consti-tutes noncompliance with Technical Specification 3.7. 1 (272/78-23-01).

In view of the corrective and preventive measures verified by the inspector, no further response to this item will be require This item will be inspected during a subsequent inspectio.

NRB.Activities The inspector reviewed rouUng files maintained for the Nuclear Review aoard to verify that selected items.required to receive NRB review pursuant to Technical Specification 6.5.2.7 had been reviewed by the Boar *

The following items were selected:

SORC Minutes for meetings 19-78 through 49-78 LER's 78-13 through 78-49 NRC Inspection Reports 50-272/78-01 through 50-272/78-21 No failure to review the required aspects of the above items was identified. The inspector noted that a method of tracking these i terns as they a re routed through the members, instituted i i1 April,

1978, appears to have improved the completeness _of review. No

  • effort has been made by the licensee~ however, to verify that all required i terns have _been provided to the NRB for revie The inspector*further observed that documentation of these reviews in the minutes of the NRB lags considerabl No 1978 review items were documented in minutes at the time of this inspection.

The* licensee's actions concerning NRB reviewed completeness and timliness will be reviewed during subsequent routine inspection. No items of noncompliance were identifie * *

Procedures for Safety Injection System Reset The design of the Salem Safety Injection initiation-system is such that, once the system actuates, the operator must reset the SI sig-nal to recover control of the valves and pumps involve Following this reset, automatic actuation of safety injection components will not occur until the reactor protection trip breakers are rese Use of the SI reset feature does not cause any action other than to permit operator control to secure equipment in the event the signa was false or to establish recirculation following the initial stages of the acciden The inspector reviewed plant procedures to verify that adequate instructions were provided to the operator for guidance in the event that a loss of coolant accident were to occur during the interval between SI reset of a spurious initiation and the restor-ation of automatic respons The pertinent procedures are:

Emergency Instruction I-4.2, Recovery from Safety Injection, Rev. Emergency Instruction I-4.4, Loss of Coolant, Rev. I-4.2 provides detailed steps to reset the Safety Injection and to restore systems to automatic response conditio The procedure does not address operator actions in the event an actual loss of coolant requiring safety injection were to occur during the re-covery operatio I-4.4 provides the initial indications of a loss of coolant and requires the operator to verify that ECCS components have started and to verify the required valve alignment has been achieved. The

  • procedure does not offer suffic~ent guidanc~ relative to starting systems which are not in an automatic standby conditio The licensee stated that the applicable procedures will be revised to cover the interval between reset of the SI and restoration of full automatic response capability. This item is unresolved pend-ing revision to these procedures (272/78-23-02) *
  • Unit 2 Pl ant Tour The inspector conducted periodic tours of all accessible areas in the plan During these tours, the following specific items were evaluated:

(1). Hot Wor Adequacy of fire prevention/protection measures use (2)

Fire Equipmen Operability and evidence of periodic inspection of fire suppression equipmen (3)

Housekeepin Minimal accumulations of debris and main-tenance of required cleanness levels in systems under or following testin (4)

Equipment preservation. Maintenance of special preserva-tive measures for installed equipment as applicabl (5)

Component Taggin Impleinentation and observance of equipment tagging for safety or equipment protectio ( 6) * Maintenanc Corrective maintenance in accordance with established procedures~

(7)

Instrumentation. Adequate protection for installed instrumentation..

(8)

Cable Pulling. Adequate measures taken to protect cable from damage while being pulle (9)

Communicatio Effectiveness of public address system in all areas of the sit (10)

Equipment Control Effectiveness of jurisdictional controls in precluding unauthorized work on systems in test or which have been teste (11)

Logs.. Completeness of logs maintained and resolution of identified problem (12)

Foreign Material Exclusio Maintenance of controls to assure systems which have been cleaned and flushed are not_ re-opened to admit foreign material.

(13) Securit Implementation of security provision Par-ticular attention to maintenance of the Unit 1 protected area boundar ( 14.)

Te*sti n Spot-checks of testfog in progress were mad The following specific comments apply to tours made during this inspection perio (1)

Due to a contaminated water leak from the Unit 1 waste evaporator system on August 2, 1978, the Unit 2 Spent Resin Storage Tank Room had become contaminate In view of the construction acti.vity in progress, the insp.ector made frequent observations of radiological controls in effect in this are On two occasions the inspector identified an apparent lack of adequate posting to inform construction personnel that contamination was present inside the room. Si.gns wereimmediately posted to provide the necessary warnin Properly prepared Radiation Exposure Permits were found to be in use for clean-up and painting activities observed in the roo (2) Temporary heat tape applied to No. 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Motor was observed to have been removed, apparently due to corrective maintenance in progress on the pum The heat tape was replaced prior to completion of the inspection. (Refer to Paragraph 9 of this report for additional information concerning this item.)

The inspector had no further questions relative to the above i tern.

Pre-Operational Staff Training To confirm preparation for operation of Unit 2, the inspector attended training sessions conducted in the areas of radiation protection and emergency plan implementatio Since the operating and maintenance staffs for Unit 2 will include the personnel cur-rently employed at Unit l in the Electric Production Department, the training consists principally of refresher trainin The sessions observed by the inspector included the basic radiation

. protection orientation (RP-1) and a general employee training

  • The inspector verified that the training met the objectives deline-ated by the lesson plan and was effective in meeting those objective.

Pre-Operational Fire Protection/Prevention

. To verify adequacy of fire protection and. prevention measures, the

  • inspector reviewed the findings of independent audits in the area of fire protection conducted by Nuclear Mutual Limited (NML).

The audit reports reviewed were dated.December 1977, March and June 197 The inspector verified that selected findings were followed up and corrective action was effective in reducing fire hazards in vital area One finding deals with adequacy of fire protection during welding and buring operations. This are~ receives continuing review by the inspector during weekly plant tour The inspector had no further questions relative to this are.

Pre-Operational Testing Quality Assurance The inspector reviewed the Pre-Operational Test and Turnover (POTT)

packages for the following systems:

POTT 24-1 Component Cooling System POTT 100-1 Residual Heat Removal The purpose of this review included ensuring that the QA/QC organi-zations took the opportunity to identify outstanding problems with the systems prior to testing, that system outstanding items were identified and their impact on testing was evaluated, and that turnover was being accomplished in accordance with the Startup Manual and implementing procedure In accordance with Startup Manual Implementing Instruction 22 (SMII-22), recommended maintenance of the RHR pumps for the in-terval between POTT and issuance of an operating license had been specified. The maintenance recommended referenced an operating plant surveillance instruction which was not applicable in the current plant mod In addition, no measures were taken to assure that temporary heat tape, which was installed on the RHR pump motors, remained operable during this interval *

Site

Revisi-0n 1 to SMII-22 was issued on September 13, 1978 and includes more definitive guidance relative to maintenance of idle systems until plant operatio In addition, the recommendations of main-tenance of the RHR pumps were modified to include pump rotation and verificati.on of the temporary heat trac The inspector had no further questions relative to these items, however, maintenance will continue to be an inspection item during plant tour.

Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment An inspection was conducted to verify that the licensee had re-ceived IE Circular 78-08, was familiar with the identified prob-lems, and that appropriate action was being taken by the licensee to review the status of environmental qualifications of all safety-

. related electrical equipment/instrumentation at his facilities,

. going beyond the specific equipment problems addressed in previous IE Bulletins. Assignment of Responsibili.ty The inspector verified that the licensee has assigned the responsibility for review of OIE Circular 78-*oa, fncluding evaluation of the fourteen referenced items in the Circular, to specific individual This review became part of an on-going evaluation being con-ducted in this area to respond to requests for additional information made by NRR (Question 5.63 forwarded by corre-spondence dated July 28, 1978, as modified by question 7.30, dated September 7, 1978).

The response to the above questions, i~cluding an outline of testing to be conducted on components which must survive the LOCA environment are scheduled for completion by mid-Octobe Evaluation of the Fourteen References The inspector inquired whether the licensee had performed an evaluation of the fourteen referenced items with respect to each facility. The licensee stated that they were aware of the*problems noted in the reference material, having addressed simil~r issues in responses to NRC Bulletins and as a result of NRR questions re1ative to Unit 2.

The references were available and being used in the evaluatio *

11 Corrective Action The inspector inquired whether the licensee had planned to take any action as a result of his review and evaluation of the items referenced in Circular 78-0 The licensee stated that, in general, the response to NRR questions on the subject will show that in-containment elec-trical components which require survivability will be trace-able to generic tests or, if necessary, specific testing of environmental qualifications. At present, terminal blocks and enclosures have been identified for specific testing to be completed in October, 197 The inspector stated that a future inspection will be conducted to trace the specific environmental qualification of selected electrical components (50-311/78-27-01).

1 IE Bulletin and Circular Followup The IE Bulletins discussed below were reviewed to verify that:

Licensee management forwarded copies of the response to the bulletin to appropriate onsite management represen-tative Information discussed in the 1icensee 1 s reply was sup-ported by facility records or by visuc~l examination of the facilit Corrective action taken was effected as described in the repl The licensee 1 s reply was prompt and within the time period described in the bulleti The review included discussions with licensee personnel and observation and review of items discussed in the details belo By correspondence dated October 28, 1977, the licensee respond-ed to IE Bulletin 77-03, On Line Testing of the Westinghouse Sol id State Protection Syste Followup on this item is documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-272/77-3 The refer-enced procedure has applicability to both Units l and The inspector had no further questions on this item with respect to Salem Unit *

lZ IE Circulars discussed below were reviewed to verify that they had been reviewed for applicability by cognizant management, and appropriate action initiate The review included discussions with ljcensee personnel and observation and review of items discussed in the details belo IE Circular:; 78-04 details an installation error that could prevent_ proper closing of fire door By memorandum dated 6/12/78 the licensee documented completion of a review for applicability. The inspector noted that no sliding fire doors are installed at Sale Proper installation of one roll-down door will be checked by the license IE Circular 78-05 deals with an inadvertent safety injection during cooldown of the plan Details of reviews of this event and subsequent actions taken are in NRC Inspection Reports 50-272/78-09 and 78-2 Operating procedures for Unit 2 will be similar in nature to those in use of Unit 1. IE Circular 78-06 discusses the potential for common mode flooding of ECCS equipment rooms at BWR facilities. The licensee documented a review for applicability in Safety Evaluation SGS/M-SE-027 dated 7/13/7 It is concluded that the drain system at Salem Units 1 and 2 is not subject to the problems identified in the Circular~. IE Circular 78-07 discusses damage on a Bergen-Patterson hydraulic test stan The licensee review concludes that, since no Bergen-Patterson snubbers are installed at Sale~

Generating Station, this concern is not applicabl h.. - IE Circular 78-08, Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment at Nuclear Power Plants, is discussed in Paragraph 1 IE Circular 78-09, Arcing of General Electric Company NEMA Size 2 Contractors, has been received and reviewed by the license More than 30 of the dev.ices are installed at each Salem unit and a program of resistance measurementsto deter-mine whether the identified problem exists is being institute IE Circular 78-13 deals with multiple inoperability of Service Water pumps due to silting. *Details of this condition are discussed in NRG Inspection Reports 50-272/78-22 and 78-0,-

_............

The same maintenance procedures and practices used on Salem Unit l will be applied to Unit The inspector had no further questions on this item relative to Unit IE Circular 78-15, Tilting Disc Check Valves Fail to Close in Vertical Position, was received and reviewed by the license In a memorandum dated August 25, 1978iit is concluded that orientation of installed check valves is horizontal as required and, in any case where non-standard orientation would be required, verification of operability is conducte l.*

IE Circular 78-16, Limitorque Valve Actuators, discusses. fail-ures due to routine manual operation of Limitorque motor operated valve The licensee's review concludes that, since motor operated valves at Salem are operated infrequently in the manual mode and only when the motor fails, faiH.1re due to the cause indicated is unlikel Following repairs to a motor operator, operability is confirmed by electrical operation of the moto The inspector had no further questions relative to the abov.

Exit Interviews At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with facility senior management to discuss inspection scope and finding In addition, exit meetings for Region-based inspections were attended by the resident inspector.