IR 05000269/2018003

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Integrated Inspection Report 05000269/2018003, 05000270/2018003, and 05000287/2018003

ML18306A754
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	11/02/2018
From:	Frank Ehrhardt Division Reactor Projects II
To:	Burchfield J Duke Energy Corp
References
IR 2018003
Download: ML18306A754 (26)

Text

UNITED STATES ember 2, 2018

SUBJECT:

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION - NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000269/2018003, 05000270/2018003, AND 05000287/2018003

Dear Mr. Burchfield:

On September 30, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3. On October 16, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff.

The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

NRC inspectors documented three Severity Level IV violations with no associated finding. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy. If you contest the violations or significance of the NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC resident inspector at the Oconee Nuclear Station.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Frank J. Ehrhardt, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, 50-287 License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55

Enclosure:

IR 05000269/2018003, 05000270/2018003, and 05000287/2018003

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers: 50-269, 50-270, 50-287 License Numbers: DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55 Report Numbers: 05000269/2018003, 05000270/2018003, 05000287/2018003 Enterprise Identifier: I-2018-003-0042 Licensee: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Facility: Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Location: Seneca, SC Inspection Dates: July 1, 2018 to September 30, 2018 Inspectors: E. Crowe, Senior Resident Inspector J. Parent, Resident Inspector A. Ruh, Resident Inspector C. Fontana, Emergency Preparedness Inspector W. Loo, Senior Health Physics Inspector S. Sanchez, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector Approved By: F. Ehrhardt, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring licensees performance by conducting a quarterly baseline inspection at Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3 in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. NRC and self-revealed findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the tables below.

List of Findings and Violations Failure to Maintain the Effectiveness of the Emergency Plan Cornerstone Severity Cross-cutting Report Section Aspect Not Severity Level IV (SL IV) Not 71114.04 -

Applicable Non-Cited Violation (NCV) Applicable Emergency Action 05000269,270,287/2018003-01 Level and Closed Emergency Plan Changes The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV (SL IV) NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 50.54(q)(2), for the licensees failure to maintain the effectiveness of the Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS) Emergency Plan (E-Plan). Specifically, from December 2014 until January 2018, the licensee failed to perform an adequate 10 CFR 50.54(q)evaluation for their E-Plan when a corresponding change was made to their Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP).

Failure to Make a 60 Day Notification of an Actuation of an Emergency AC Power Source Cornerstone Severity Cross-cutting Report Section Aspect Not SL IV Not 71153 - Follow-up of Applicable NCV 05000269,270,287/2018003- Applicable Events and Notices of 02 Enforcement Closed Discretion An NRC identified SL IV violation of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) was identified for the licensees failure to make a required 60-day notification. Keowee Hydro Unit 2 automatically started on May 7, 2018, following an electrical lockout of the Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 3 startup transformer.

Main Steam Relief Valve As-Found Lift Pressure Prohibited by Technical Specifications Cornerstone Severity Cross-cutting Report Section Aspect Not SL IV Not Applicable 71153 - Follow-up of Applicable NCV 05000287/2018003-03 Events and Notices of Closed Enforcement Discretion A self-revealed SL IV NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.1, Main Steam Relief Valves (MSRVs), was identified when a routine lift pressure test revealed that two of sixteen main steam relief valves were higher than allowed by TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.7.1.1 for a duration that was longer than the conditions TS required action completion time.

Additional Tracking Items Type Issue number Title Report Status Section LER 05000287/2018-001-00 Two Main Steam Relief Valve 71153 Closed Setpoints Found Out of Tolerance LER 05000269/2018-001-00 Unit 1 Manual Reactor Trip 71153 Closed Due to Main Feedwater Flow Control Valve E/P Converter Failures

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 operated at or near 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP) for the entire inspection period.

Unit 2 operated at or near 100 percent RTP for the entire inspection period.

Unit 3 operated at or near 100 percent RTP for the entire inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515 Appendix D, Plant Status and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection Impending Severe Weather

The inspectors evaluated readiness for impending adverse weather conditions for tropical storm Florence on September 13, 2018.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment Partial Walkdown

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Keowee Hydro Unit 1 during planned maintenance to Keowee Hydro Unit 2 on July 17, 2018

(2) Protected service water system during monthly planned maintenance to standby shutdown facility (SSF) on July 24, 2018

(3) 1B low pressure injection train during planned replacement of the 1A low pressure injection trains flow transmitter on August 1, 2018

71111.05AQ - Fire Protection Annual/Quarterly Quarterly Inspection

The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:

(1) Yard protected area south, protected service water building, and essential siphon vacuum building on September 13, 2018

(2) Unit 2 turbine building elevation 775 (turbine driven and motor driven emergency feed water pump areas) on September 13, 2018

(3) Unit 1 & 2 spent fuel pool and hot machine shop on September 14, 2018

(4) Unit 3 auxiliary building elevation 838 (purge inlet and exhaust rooms, air handling rooms) on September 14, 2018

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures Internal Flooding

The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the SSF on July 18, 2018, and the auxiliary building on August 27, 2018.

71111.11 - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Operator Performance

The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operators perform a down power to 98 percent and a turbine valve movement test on August 11, 2018.

Operator Requalification (1 Sample)

The inspectors observed and evaluated a training scenario on the simulator on July 31, 2018. The scenario involved the unit experiencing an earthquake which caused an unusual event to be declared. Unit 1 main transformer had an oil leak, which prompted the operators to perform a rapid unit shutdown. During the rapid unit shutdown, the unit experienced an anticipated transient with-out scram, when there was a loss of 2 reactor cooling pumps with no reactor trip, which then required the reactor to be manually tripped. A second earthquake caused a dam failure, loss of the condenser cooling water intake canal, and flooded the turbine building. Flooding of the turbine building caused the loss of the main feed pumps and all emergency feedwater pumps, which prompted feeding the steam generators via the protected service water system and an alert to be declared.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness Routine Maintenance Effectiveness

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:

(1) Main Keowee step-up transformer lockout received during Keowee hydro emergency start test on April 11, 2018

(2) 2B low pressure injection cooler low pressure service water header flow element erratic indication on June 9, 2018

Quality Control (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated maintenance and quality control activities associated with the following equipment performance issues:

(1) Commercial grade dedication of Hubbell connector (Engineering Change (EC) 411479)and Matheson pressure regulator (EC 412981)

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:

(1) Unit 1, 2, and 3 elevated risk (yellow risk) during planned removal of Unit 2 east penetration room high-energy line break flood barrier with 3C high pressure injection (HPI) pump out of service on July 18, 2018

(2) Unit 1, 2, and 3 elevated risk due to monthly SSF planned maintenance and viper testing of Unit 2 SSF auxiliary service water supply valve (2CCW-0268) on July 24, 2018

(3) Unit 1 elevated risk (yellow risk) due to combination of 1A low pressure injection train being out of service concurrently with a breach in a fire stop on August 1, 2018

(4) Unit 1 elevated risk (yellow risk) during planned removal of 1C low pressure injection (LPI) pump from service on August 13, 2018

(5) Unit 1, 2, and 3 emergent work controls while resolving primary instrument air compressor and backup air compressor deficiencies on September 11, 2018

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Unit 2 reactor building cooling unit 2B unexpected operations on August 1, 2018

(2) CT-5 transformer control cabinet wiring is leaking green slime on the majority of the wiring in the control cabinet, on August 6, 2018

(3) Switchyard batteries SY-1 and SY-2 bus tie breaker indicates closed on August 21, 2018

(4) Water intrusion into Unit 1 and Unit 2 common control room from ceiling on August 24, 2018

(5) Failure of SSF air conditioner air flow gauge (Nuclear Condition Report (NCR)

===02226926) on August 28, 2018

(6) Auxiliary Building flood curb height discrepancy (NCR 02227194) on August 28, 2018

(7) Motor operated valves 3HP409 and 3HP410 breaker settings may not allow sufficient margin to ensure breakers will not trip if locked rotor current occurs (NCR 022277050 on August 29, 2018

(8) Low pressure service water instrumentation is mounted to non-seismic structure (NCR 02227857) on August 29, 2018

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

The inspectors evaluated the following permanent modifications:

(1) EC 114675, Replace Chiller A, on September 19, 2018

(2) EC 114881, Changes to main steam relief valve (MSRV) discharge piping and assumed set point drift in stress and transient analyses, on September 25, 2018

71111.19 - Post Maintenance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:

(1) OP/0/A/1106/027, Instrument Air System after replacement of the 5CR relay on July 12, 2018

(2) PT/2/A/0160/008, Reactor Building Cooling Unit Fan Operation Test after replacement of failed speed control relay on August 3, 2018

(3) IP/0/A/3001/001, Limitorque Preventive Maintenance, after electrical and mechanical maintenance of the low pressure injection B discharge to HPI suction valve (3LP-16) on August 6, 2018

(4) PT/1/A/0600/027, PAM Instrument Channel Checks after replacement of the 1A LPI trains flow transmitter on August 6, 2018

(5) PT/3/A/0600/028, 3MS-93 Nitrogen Supply Leakage Test after replacement of the check valve (3N-VA-308) on August 16, 2018

(6) Work Order (WO) 20235886 functional verification following MP/0/A/3007/019, Air Handling Unit - SSF - Air Conditioning Preventive Maintenance Safety Related System on August 23, 2018

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests: Routine

(1) PT/1/A/2200/020, KHU-1 ACB IST Surveillance on July 24, 2018

(2) PT/1-2/A/0251/002, SF Cooling Pump Test on July 29, 2018

(3) PT/2/A/0600/013, Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Test on July 30, 2018

(4) PT/0/A/0600/021, Standby Shutdown Facility Diesel-Generator Operation on August 21, 2018 In-service ===

(1) PT/0/A/0400/005, SSF Auxiliary Service Water Pump Test (Comprehensive) on July 24, 2018

71114.01 - Exercise Evaluation

The inspectors evaluated the biennial emergency plan exercise during the week of August 13, 2018. The exercise scenario simulated a lightning strike that caused a loss of AC power for greater than 15 minutes. A simulated, increasing in size, loss of coolant accident (LOCA) cause an engineered safeguards (ES) actuation. A simulated Site Area Emergency was declared based on the ES actuation and containment pressure greater than 10 pounds per square inch gauge (psig) with less than one full train of the containment heat removal system. An electrical penetration failed as temperature and humidity increased. A dose assessment led to a simulated General Emergency classification being declared.

71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes

The inspectors evaluated Emergency Action Level (EAL), Emergency Plan (E-Plan), and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) changes during the week of August 13 2018. This evaluation does not constitute NRC approval of the EALs, E-Plan and EPIPs.

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation Drill/Training Evolution

The inspectors evaluated an emergency preparedness drill in the simulator and technical support center on July 11, 2018. The drill simulated a fire that damaged both Unit 1 motor driven emergency feedwater pumps and an Alert declaration. A simulated, increasing in size, small break LOCA that caused an ES actuation. A simulated Site Area Emergency was declared based on the ES actuation being caused by an unisolable RCS leak and radiation monitors indicating a loss of the fuel cladding barrier. The containment equipment hatch began to leak which led to a simulated General Emergency classification being declared.

71114.08 - Exercise Evaluation - Scenario Review

The inspectors performed an in-office review and evaluated the proposed scenario for the biennial emergency plan exercise at least 30 days prior to the day of the exercise.

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below for the period from July 2017 through June 2018.

(1) heat removal system

(2) safety system functional failures

(3) reactor coolant system activity

(4) drill & exercise performance

(5) emergency response organization drill participation

(6) alert & notification system reliability

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to chips of concrete breaking away from the SSF diesels concrete exhaust structure:

(1) NCR 01832862, 2012 5yr Civil/Structural Inspection per EDM-410 and WO 1989673

(2) NCR 02085249, SSF North Entrance Roof Overhang Concrete Degrading

(3) NCR 02118469, Debris on North Door of the SSF

(4) NCR 02145743, SSF Diesel Exhaust Chimney and Roof Inspection

(5) NCR 02186009, Concrete Curb on SSF Diesel Exhaust Chimney Delay

71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Licensee Event Reports

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports which can be accessed at https://lersearch.inl.gov/LERSearchCriteria.aspx:

(1) LER 05000269/2018-001-00, Unit 1 Manual Reactor Trip Due to Main Feedwater Flow Control Valve E/P Converter Failures

(2) LER 05000287/2018-001-00, Two Main Steam Relief Valve Setpoints Found Out of Tolerance

OTHER ACTIVITIES

- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL 60855.1 - Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation The inspectors evaluated the licensees independent spent fuel storage installation cask loadings between June 21, 2018, and August 1,

INSPECTION RESULTS

Observation

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution

Since 2012, there have been five NCRs written due to chips of concrete breaking away from the SSF diesels concrete exhaust structure. The inspectors evaluated these NCRs and identified concerns of gradual degradation in the condition of the SSFs diesels concrete exhaust structure. The inspectors observed the performance of the five year civil & structural inspection of the exhaust structure. The licensee identified increased degradation of the concrete and that repairs were needed. The licensee performed the repairs which were observed by the inspector. In conclusion, the inspectors determined the licensee displayed a weakness in their ability to accurately identify the magnitude of concrete degradation which affected the licensees ability to perform corrective actions in a timely manner.

Failure to Maintain the Effectiveness of the Emergency Plan Cornerstone Severity Cross-cutting Report Section Aspect Not Applicable SL IV Not Applicable

71114.04 - NCV 05000269,270,287/2018003-01 Emergency Action

Closed Level and Emergency Plan Changes

Introduction:

The inspectors identified a SL IV NCV violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50.54(q)(2), for the licensees failure to maintain the effectiveness of the Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS) Emergency Plan (E-Plan). Specifically, from December 2014 until January 2018, the licensee had not revised the E-Plan for a change that was made to the protective action recommendation (PAR) implementing procedure. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as NCR 02225050.

Description:

While performing a detailed review of a 10 CFR 50.54(q) change to the ONS E-Plan, the inspectors identified that one of the changes involved updating the PAR flow chart. The 10 CFR 50.54(q) documentation mentioned that the update was to bring the E-Plan current with the already revised PAR procedure (RP/0/A/1000/024). This procedure revision was implemented in December 2014 to comply with the 2011 emergency preparedness (EP) rule change described in NUREG-0654, Supplement 3. The inspectors found that the implementation of the NUREG-0654, Supplement 3 requirements revealed that the ONS E-Plan had not been maintained. The inspectors determined that an adequate 10 CFR 50.54(q)evaluation was not performed, since the E-Plan was not revised to meet the NUREG-0654, Supplement 3 regulatory requirements after a corresponding change was made to the PAR implementing procedure in December 2014. The inspectors found that there were three prior opportunities for the licensee to revise the E-Plan before the inspectors identified that the E-Plan had not been effectively maintained since December 2014.

Corrective Action(s): The licensee entered this issue into their CAP and agreed that the discrepancy should have been recognized and corrected when first identified.

Corrective Action Reference: NCR 02225050

Performance Assessment:

The licensees failure to effectively maintain the E-Plan by not performing a 10 CFR 50.54(q)evaluation when changes were made to the EPIPs was determined to be a compliance violation and is dispositioned using the Traditional Enforcement process.

Enforcement:

Severity: This finding was a violation of NRC requirements, and because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function; since, the change involving the omission in the PAR flow chart adversely impacted NRCs ability to make regulatory decisions. This finding is determined to be a SL IV violation in accordance with Section 6.6.d.1 of the Enforcement Policy because it involves the licensees ability to meet or implement a regulatory requirement not related to assessment or notification such that the effectiveness of the emergency plan is reduced.

Violation: Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50.54(q)(2) states, in part, a licensee shall maintain the effectiveness of an emergency plan that meets the requirements in Appendix E to this part.

Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to maintain the E-Plan when from December 2014 until January 2018, the ONS E-Plan had not been revised after a change was made to the PAR implementing procedure following the sites implementation of NUREG-0654, Supplement 3 new requirements.

Disposition: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Failure to Make a 60 Day Notification of an Actuation of an Emergency AC Power Source Cornerstone Severity Cross-cutting Report Section Aspect Not Applicable SL IV Not Applicable 71153 - Follow-up NCV 05000269,270,287/2018003-02 of Events and Closed Notices of Enforcement Discretion

Introduction:

An NRC identified SL IV violation of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) was identified for the licensees failure to make a required 60-day notification. Keowee Hydro Unit 2 automatically started on May 7, 2018, following an electrical lockout of the Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 3 startup transformer.

Description:

At 1:49 AM on May 7, 2018, Keowee Hydro Unit 2 automatically started when the units startup circuitry actuated due to a current being impressed upon the startup circuitry. The impressed current originated from the failure of the Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 3 loss of main generator electrical load relay. The loss of load relay failed in a manner which caused an alternating current signal to be applied to the direct current (DC) electrical buses in the Oconee Nuclear Site DC system. The combination of existing grounds on the Oconee Nuclear Site DC system and the impressed current resulted in the automatic start of Keowee Hydro Unit 2. The hydro unit started and operated in a standby mode as designed. Additional plant equipment also responded to this event in that the Unit 3 startup transformer received an electrical lockout signal and the sites primary instrument air compressor tripped from an interpreted high discharge temperature signal.

The licensee evaluated the above conditions for reportability and failed to recognize that a 60 day notification/report was required. The licensee indicated to the NRC staff that a valid actuation did not occur because the hydro unit did not receive an emergency start signal.

The NRC inspectors evaluated the automatic circuitry, the maintenance status of Keowee Hydro Unit 2 at the time of the event, and the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The inspectors determined the actuation signal was not a valid start signal for the hydro unit and that the unit remained fully operable in a non-maintenance status during the automatic start of the unit. Additionally, the safety function for the Unit 3 relay failure did not require the performance of the emergency AC power path safety function due to electrical power being provided through a dedicated offsite power path. The inspectors reviewed the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and determined that a 60-day notification was required because the event failed to meet the second conditional statement of this requirement (the actuation was invalid and occurred while the system was properly removed from service or occurred after the safety function had been already completed.)

Corrective Actions: The licensee entered the event in their corrective action program and implemented a troubleshooting plan. The licensee replaced the failure Unit 3 loss of main generator electrical load relay and repaired the grounds of the DC buses. The licensee also performed an extent of condition evaluation which identified no additional issues.

Corrective Action Reference: Action Request (AR) 02203967

Performance Assessment:

The inspectors determined this violation was associated with a minor performance deficiency.

Enforcement:

Severity: The ROPs significant determination process does not specifically consider the regulatory impact in its assessment of licensee performance. Therefore, it is necessary to address this violation which impedes the NRCs ability to regulate using traditional enforcement. This issue is similar to example d.9 in Section 6.9, Inaccurate and Incomplete Information or Failure to Make a Required Report in the NRC Enforcement Policy dated May 15, 2018.

Violation: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Reportable events states in part that the holder of an operating license under this part or a combined license under part 52 of this chapter for a nuclear power plant shall submit a Licensee Event Report (LER) for any event of the type describe in this paragraph within 60 days after the discovery of the event. In the case of an invalid actuation reported under 50.73(a)(2)(iv) other than actuation of the reactor protection system when the reactor is critical, the licensee may at its option, provide a telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER. 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv) states that any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B) of this section except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation; or the actuation was invalid and occurred while the system was properly removed from service or occurred after the safety function had been already completed. 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(8) states in part, emergency AC electrical power systems, including: emergency diesel generators (EDGs); hydroelectric facilities used in lieu of EDGs at the Oconee Station.

Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to notify the NRC on July 6, 2018 (the 60 day reporting period), of the invalid actuation of hydroelectric unit in their emergency AC power system which occurred on May 7, 2018.

Disposition: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Main Steam Relief Valve As-Found Lift Pressure Prohibited by Technical Specifications Cornerstone Severity Cross-cutting Report Section Aspect Not Applicable SL IV Not Applicable 71153 - Follow-up of NCV 05000287/2018003-03 Events and Notices of Closed Enforcement Discretion A self-revealed SL IV NCV of TS 3.7.1, Main Steam Relief Valves (MSRVs), was identified when a routine lift pressure test revealed that two of sixteen main steam relief valves were higher than allowed by TS SR 3.7.1.1 for a duration that was longer than the conditions TS required action completion time.

Description:

LER 05000287/2018-001-00 was submitted for an event discovered on April 20, 2018, associated with two of sixteen main steam relief valves that failed to satisfy TS SR 3.7.1.1 during as-found lift pressure testing conducted prior to entering a Unit 3 refueling outage.

Upon discovery, the licensee satisfied the TS Required Actions by promptly restoring the valves lift pressure within tolerance. However, per the guidance from NUREG 1022 Rev. 3, the existence of similar discrepancies in multiple valves was an indication that the discrepancies may have arisen over a period of time and that the condition existed during plant operation. The licensee determined that the causes of the test failures were a combination of setpoint drift for both valves and possible binding of internal components on one of the valves. Although the lift pressures were above the acceptance criteria, the condition was bounded by current safety analysis limits and assumptions.

Corrective Action(s): The valves were adjusted to bring their lift pressure within tolerance.

Subsequently, the licensee disassembled, inspected, repaired and retested the valves during the refueling outage in May 2018.

Corrective Action Reference(s): NCR 02200195

Performance Assessment:

The inspectors determined the condition was not reasonably foreseeable and preventable by the licensee and therefore was not a performance deficiency. Specifically, random setpoint drift is a recognized valid phenomenon that can occur despite routine testing and maintenance. Additionally, the licensee was in the process of implementing long term corrective actions to improve valve clearances during scheduled routine preventive maintenance periods. However, the failure unexpectedly occurred prior to the next scheduled disassembly.

Enforcement:

Severity: Traditional Enforcement is being used to disposition this violation with no associated Reactor Oversight Process performance deficiency per NRC Memorandum Interim Guidance for Dispositioning Severity Level IV Violations with No Associated Performance Deficiency (ML18158A220). This violation is characterized as a Severity Level IV NCV based on its similarity to example 6.1.d.1 in the Enforcement Policy.

Violation: Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3 Technical Specifications Subsection 3.7.1, Main Steam Relief Valves (MSRVs), Condition A required that, with one or more MSRVs inoperable, the unit be placed in Mode 3 in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and Mode 4 in 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br />. Contrary to the above, on April 20, 2018, the licensee discovered that two MSRVs were unknowingly inoperable during the operating cycle for a period exceeding 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> without entering Mode

Disposition: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was controlled to protect from public disclosure.

• On October 16, 2018, the inspector presented the inspection results to Mr. J. Ed Burchfield, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

71111.01: Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures

RP/0/A/1000/035, Severe Weather Preparation, Rev. 4

71111.04: Equipment Alignment

Documents

AD-OP-ALL-0201, Protected Equipment, Rev. 4

Complex Activity Plan for Keowee Unit 2 Monthly - WO 20227447; 20227030

OSS-0254.00-00-1053, Protected Service Water System, Rev. 2

Protected Equipment Clearance: PRT-1 -18-1LPSW-4 OOS -0240

Drawings

K-0700, Rev. 42

K-6700, Rev. 15

OFD-102A-1.1, Rev. 61

OFD-102A-1.2, Rev. 61

OFD-131A-1.1 Rev. 2

OFD-131A-1.2, Rev. 1

OFD-131A-2.2, Rev. 1

OFD-131A-3.2, Rev. 2

Engineering Change 409602

Work Orders/Requests

20019689; 20205114; 20212098; 20212100; 20227447; 20227030

71111.05: Fire Protection

Documents

AD-EG-ALL-1520, Transient Combustible Control, Rev. 11

O-FS-0-PA-9000-002, Yard Protected Area South, Rev. 3

O-FS-1-AB-9796-001, Unit 1 - Auxiliary Building & Reactor Building Elevation 796, Rev. 003

O-FS-2-TB-9775-001, Unit 2 - Turbine Building Elevation 775, Rev. 001

O-FS-3-AB-9838-001, Unit 3 - Auxiliary Building Elevation 838, Rev. 003

OSS-0254.00-00-4008, Design Specification for Fire Protection, Rev. 42

Procedures

MP/0/A/1705/019, Fire Protection - SLC - Related Fire Doors - HELB Doors - Annual and Bi-

Monthly Inspections, Rev. 027

71111.06: Flood Protection Measures

Nuclear Condition Report

227194

Documents

OSC-7256, External Flood/Ground Water Mitigation Requirements, Rev. 1

OSC-10790, Oconee Nuclear Station Internal Flooding Analysis, Rev. 3

OSC-11214, Standby Shutdown Facility, Rev. 1

OSC-8671, Auxiliary Building Flood Design Values, Rev. 6

SD 3.2.16, Control of Passive Design Features, Rev. 9

71111.11: Licensed Operator Requalification

Documents

AD-DC-ALL-0302, Control of What It Looks Like (WILL) Sheets, Rev. 0

AD-EP-ALL-0803, Evaluation and Critique of Drills and Exercises, Rev. 4

AD-HU-ALL-0003, Conduct of Pre-Job Briefs and Post-Job Critiques, Rev. 5

AD-OP-ALL-0203, Reactivity Management, Rev. 9

AD-OP-ALL-1000, Conduct of Operations, Rev. 13

OMP 1-14, Notifications, Rev. 017

OMP 2-23, Shift Manager Rules of Practice, Rev. 024

Procedures

AP/0/A/1700/005, Earthquake, Rev. 030

AP/0/A/1700/006, Natural Disaster, Rev. 031

AP/0/A/2000/001, Keowee Hydro Station - Natural Disaster, Rev. 007

AP/1/A/1700/010, Turbine Building Flood, Rev. 010

AP/1/A/1700/013, Dam Failure, Rev. 034

AP/1/A/1700/029, Rapid Unit Shutdown, Rev. 013

AP/1-2/A/1700/035, Loss of SFP Cooling and/or Level, Rev. 020

EP/1/A/1800/001 00, Unit 1 EOP Immediate Manual Actions and Subsequent Actions, Rev. 001

EP/1/A/1800/001 0L, Unit 1 EOP Rules and Appendix, Rev. 001

EP/1/A/1800/001 0Q, Unit 1 EOP Enclosures 5.41-5.46, Rev. 005

OP/1/A/1102/020, Control Room Rounds, Rev. 133

OP/3/A/1102/004, Operation At Power, Rev. 133

PT/3/A/0290/003, Turbine Valve Movement, Rev. 021

RP/0/A/1000/001, Emergency Classification, Rev. 006

RP/0/A/1000/002, Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure, Rev. 013

Other

Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Plan, Revision 2018-001

OP-OC-SAE-R229, Exercise Guide, Rev. 3

71111.12: Maintenance Effectiveness

Documents

EC 411479, Hubbell Connector (Tee) 9230010887, Rev. 0

EC 4122981, Matheson Pressure Regulator 9230024451, Rev. 0

Oconee Nuclear Station Maintenance Rule Database

OSC-11630, 1/2 inch instrument tubing off 2LPSFE-0076 and 2LPSFE-0077

Nuclear Condition Reports

01908921; 01946159; 02122301; 02197986; 02211855; 02211888; 02215445; 02215703;

216141; 02216145;

Procedures

PT/0/A/0620/016, Keowee Hydro Emergency Start Test, Rev. 51

Work Orders/Requests

20071559; 20110845; 20164936;

71111.13: Risk Assessments

Documents

AD-NF-ALL-0501, Electronic Risk Assessment Tool (ERAT), Rev. 1

AD-NF-NGO-0502, Probabilistic Assessment (PRA) Model Technical Adequacy, Rev. 2

Projected ERAT Risk Profile for ONS Units 1, 2 & 3- 18W29

Projected ERAT Risk Profile for ONS Units 1- 18W30

Protected Equipment Clearance: PRT-1 -18-1LPSW-4 OOS -0240

Projected ERAT Risk Profile for ONS Units 1- 18W33

ONS Unit 1 Operator Log, Dayshift for August 13, 2018

Clearance OPS-1-18-LPI-1C LPI PU PM-1558

OSS-0254.00-00-1025, Design Basis Specification for the Instrument Air System, Rev. 14

UFSAR Section 9.5.2, Instrument and Breathing Air Systems

Drawings

O-155B-230, Auxiliary Building - Unit 2, Miscellaneous Steel, East Penetration Room: Flood

Barriers (EPR / FB) General Location & Layout, Rev. 0

O-155B-240, Auxiliary Building - Unit 2, Miscellaneous Steel, East Penetration Room: Flood

Barriers (EPR / FB) Installation & Typical Details, Rev. 0

OFD-102A-1.2, Flow Diagram of Low Pressure Injection System (LPI Pump Discharge), Rev. 61

O-0703-D, One Line Diagram Station Auxiliary Circuits 600V/208V L/C 1X5 & MCC 1XH, 1XK,

1XL & 1XT, Rev. 64

O-0703-E, One Line Diagram Station Auxiliary Circuits 600V/208V L/C 1X6 & MCC 1XI, 1XN,

1XP & 1XQ, Rev. 74

O-0702, One Line Diagram 6900V & 4160V STA Auxiliary Sys, Rev. 39

OFD-137B-1.1, Flow Diagram of Instrument Air System, Rev. 26

OFD-137C-1.1, Flow Diagram of Service Air System, Rev. 19

OFD-137C-1.2, Flow Diagram of Service Air System, Rev. 17

OFD-137C-1.4, Flow Diagram of Service Air System, Rev. 5

Engineering Change 409602

Nuclear Condition Reports

222324; 02222345; 02222347; 02222569

Procedures

SD 3.2.16, Control of Passive Design Features, Rev. 9

NSD 415, Operational Risk Management (Modes 1-3) per 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), Rev. 8

AD-WC-ALL-0410, Work Activity Integrated Risk Management, Rev. 7

WPM 609, On-Line Risk Assessment Utilizing Electronic Risk Assessment Tool (ERAT), Rev.

AD-WC-ALL-0200, On-Line Work Management, Rev. 13

MP/0/A/3005/001, Flood Outlet Devices and Flood Barriers PM, Rev. 3

IP/1/A/0275/006 C, Unit 1 Safety Related Functional Test of the MDEFWP and TDEFWP

Initiation Pressure Switches and Cooling Water Valves, Rev. 7

MP/0/A/1840/040, Pumps - Motor - Miscellaneous Components - Lubrication - Oil Sampling -

Oil Change, Rev. 38

Work Orders/Requests

20019689; 20205114; 20212098; 20212100; 20185649; 20217317, 20232716, 20118988,

20118989

71111.15: Operability Evaluations

Documents

OSS-0254.00-00-2011, 100KV Alternate Power System Design Basis Document, Rev. 17

OSC-8671, Auxiliary Building Flood Design Values, Rev. 6

Drawings

O-805-F, Rev. 5

OEE-238-18, Rev. 15

OEE-238-18A, Rev. 0

OFD-116N-1.1, Flow Diagram of Standby Shutdown Facility HVAC, Rev. 9

Nuclear Condition Reports

2095402; 02222338 02223099; 02224105; 02226106; 02226742; 02226795; 02226926;

227194; 02227705; 02227857

Procedures

IP/0/A/0100/001, Controlling Procedure For Troubleshooting and Corrective Maintenance, Rev.

MP/0/A/3007/047, Air Monitor Service - Preventive Maintenance, Rev. 19

OP/2/A/1104/015, Reactor Building Cooling System, Rev. 38

PT/2/A/0160/008, Reactor Building Cooling Unit Fan Operation Test, Rev. 21

Work Orders/Requests

20116718; 20116719; 20059690; 20117695; 20275192

71111.18: Plant Modifications

Calculations

OSC-2729, Oconee Nuclear Station RETRAN Transient Analysis Model, Rev. 15

OSC-2790, HVAC Calculations for Chillers A & B, Rev. 02

OSC-3120, Oconee Relay Setting and Breaker Coordination, Rev. 024

OSC-3922, Units 1 & 2 Low Pressure Service Water System (LPSW) Flow Model, Rev. 014

OSC-7969, ROTSG UFSAR Section 15.8 - Turbine Trip, Rev. 6

OSC-8022, ROTSG UFSAR Section 15.3 - Rod Withdrawal at Power Accident, Rev. 3

OSC-11501, MSRV Capacities After Implementation of Increased Setpoint Tolerances, XMS-1

Through 16, Rev. 0

OSC-7503, Main Steam Relief Valve Lines Qualification Piping Analysis Problem 4-01-01,

Rev. 6

OSC-3708, Main Steam Safety Valve Transient Evaluation (ONDS-0240), Rev. 12

OSC-6667, Auxiliary Building and Turbine Building Loss of Cooling and Ventilation Analysis,

Rev. 23

OSC-7183, Control Room Area Cooling System (CRACS) Single Failure Analysis, Rev. 007

OSC-8863, Oconee PRA Model Integration Notebook, Rev. 006

Documents

DC-3.12, Cable Ampacity Design Criteria, Rev. 2

DPND-1553.63-0733, ONS MSSV Setpoint Re-Stagger, Rev. 0

EC 114675, Replace Chiller A, Rev. 7

UFSAR Section 10.3, Main Steam System

OM 235.--0498.001, York Chillers Model YSDCDBS3-CNA0 Instruction Book, A & B Chillers,

Rev. D7

OM 254.0190-001, Crosby Nozzle Safety Valves Instruction Book No. 10, Installation,

Maintenance and Adjustment, dated March 2, 1987

OM 254.0002-001, High Capacity Nozzle Type Safety Valve - Welded Inlet - Main Steam,

Rev. 3

OSS-0241.00-00-0004, Conventional Thermal Insulation, Rev. 006

OSS-0254.00-00-1003, (Mech) Condenser Circulating Water (CCW) System, Rev. 042

OSS-0254.00-00-1021, (Mech) Design Basis Specification for the Control Room Ventilation

System, Rev. 035

UFSAR Section 3.1.11Criterion 11 - Control Room (Category B)

UFSAR Section 3.11.4, Evaluation for License Renewal

UFSAR Section 3.11.5, Loss of Ventilation

UFSAR Section 7.5.2.5, Steam Generator Pressure

UFSAR Section 9.4.1, Control Room Ventilation

UFSAR Section 15.1.8, Single Failure and Loss of Offsite Power Assumptions

USAS B31.1.0-1967, Power Piping

Letter,

H. N. Berkow (NRC) to M. S. Tuckman (Duke), April 26, 1996 (SER for DPC-NE-3002

regarding safety valve opening characteristics)

Drawings

OFD-116J-1.5, Flow Diagram of Chilled Water System (WC) Pumps and Chillers, Rev. 25

OFD-124A-1.2, Flow Diagram of Low Pressure Service Water System Turbine Bldg. (Main

Turbine Oil Tank), Rev. 56

Nuclear Condition Reports

2161515; 02175016; 02175159

Other

CFR 50.59 Evaluation for Replace WC System Control Room Chiller A

ONS Unit 1 Operator Log (6/29/2018)

ONS Unit 2 Operator Log (6/28/2018 - 6/30/2018)

Technical Specification - section 3.7.16

Procedures

MP/0/A/1200/015, Valve - Main Steam Safety Relief - Reconditioning, Rev. 34

OP/0/A/1106/029, Control Room, Equipment Room, and Cable Room Chillers, Rev. 055

PT/1/A/0600/001, Periodic Instrument Surveillance, Rev. 338

Work Orders

20187645; 20222772

71111.19: Post-Maintenance Testing

Documents

AD-EG-ALL-1155, Post Modification Testing, Rev. 4

AD-PI-ALL-0106, Cause Investigation Checklists, Rev. 1

OSS-0254.00-00-1028, Design Basis Specification for the Low Pressure Injection and Core

Flood System, Rev. 54

UFSAR Section 18.3.17.15, Standby Shutdown Facility HVAC Coolers Preventive Maintenance

Activity

Drawings

OEE-238-18, Rev. 15

OEE-238-18-0A, Rev. 0

OEE-352-4, Rev. 3

Engineering Change 409602

Nuclear Condition Reports

218198; 02222324; 02222338; 02222345; 02222347; 02222569

Procedures

IP/0/A/0100/001, Controlling Procedure for Troubleshooting and Corrective Maintenance, Rev.

IP/0/A/0101/001, Low Risk Maintenance Configuration Control, Rev. 017

IP/0/A/3001/001, Limitorque Preventive Maintenance, Rev. 96

IP/0/A/5180/002, Cutler-Hammer Type M Relay Bench Test, Rev. 005

OP/0/A/1106/027, Instrument Air System, Rev. 122

OP/2/A/1104015, Reactor Building Cooling System, Rev. 38

PT/1/A/0600/027, PAM Instrument Channel Checks, Rev. 037

PT/2/A/0160/008, Reactor Building Cooling Unit Fan Operation Test, Rev. 21

PT/3/A/0600/028, 3MS-93 Nitrogen Supply Leakage Test, Rev. 009

MP/0/A/3007/019, Air Handling Unit - SSF - Air Conditioning - Preventive Maintenance Safety

Related System, Rev. 44

MP/0/A/3007/0040, Belt Driven Equipment Alignment and Tensioning, Rev. 3

Work Orders/Requests

205114; 20207464; 20210406; 20266831; 20272216; 20235886

71111.22: Surveillance Testing

Nuclear Condition Report

29523

Drawings

OFD-133A-2.1, Condenser Circulating Water System (CCW Intake Pumps Discharge), Rev. 36

OFD-133A-2.5, Condenser Circulating Water System (SSF Aux Service), Rev. 60

Other

OSS-0254.00-00-1000, Design Basis Specification for the Emergency Feedwater and Auxiliary

Service Water Systems, Rev. 55

OSS-0254.00-00-1006, Design Basis Specification for the Spent Fuel Cooling System, Rev. 23

OSS-0254.00-00-1048, Design Basis Specification for Keowee Air Circuit Breaker (AB) Air

System, Rev. 10

OSS-0254.00-00-1005, Design Basis Specification for the Standby Shutdown Facility Auxiliary

Service Water System, Rev. 38

OSC-3233, SSF Service Water System Hydraulic Model, Rev. 22

OSC-4171, SSF ASW Design Inputs Calculation - Volume 1, Rev. 37

OSC-11380, SSF Service Water System Hydraulic Model (Fathom), Rev. 2

OSC-7149, SSF ASW Minimum Flow Line Instrument Uncertainty - - 0CCWPG0867, Rev. 2

Procedures

PT/1-2/A0251/002, SF Cooling Pump Test, Rev. 55

PT/1/A/2200/020, KHU-1 ACB IST Surveillance, Rev. 011

PT/2/A/0600/013, Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater Test, Rev. 74

PT/2/A/2200/020, KHU-2 ACB IST Surveillance, Rev. 010

PT/0/A/0400/005, SSF Auxiliary Service Water Pump Test, Rev. 67

PT/0/A/0600/021, Standby Shutdown Facility Diesel-Generator Operation, Rev. 16

OP/0/A/1600/010, Operation of the SSF Diesel-Generator, Rev. 95

Work Orders/Requests

251058; 20255940; 20252213; 20270725

71114.01: Exercise Evaluation

Procedures

RP/0/A/1000/18, Core Damage assessment Procedure, Rev. 1

RP/0/A/1000/024, Protective Action Recommendations, Rev. 4

RP-0-A-1000-009, Assembly and Accountability Procedure, Rev. 3

AD-EP-ALL-0109, Offsite Protective Action Recommendations, Rev.s 0, 1, 2, 3 and 4

AD-EP-ALL-0103, Activation and Operation of the Emergency Operations Facility, Rev. 2

AD-EP-ALL-0106, Activation and Operation of Operations Support Center, Rev. 1

AD-EP-ALL-0202, Emergency Response Offsite Dose Assessment, Rev. 6

AD-EP-ALL-0203, Field Monitoring During Declared Emergency, Rev. 2

AD-EP-ALL-0803, Evaluation and Critique of Drills and Exercises, Rev. 4

Records and Data

Control Room Simulator, Corporate Emergency Operations Facility, Joint Information Center,

Local Emergency Operations Facility, Operational Support Center, Technical Support Center -

Documentation packages (Logs, Event Notification Forms, Protective Action Recommendations,

Media Releases, and Radiological Dose Assessments)

Corrective Action Program Documents (Condition Reports)

AR 2158523, Correct RP/0/A/1000/024 Rev. 4 EREG

AR 2162376, 10CFR50.54(q) review for ONS standard ERO EPIPs

AR 2221783, AD-EP-ALL-0109 Revision 3 50.54Q

AR 2224700, Objective J.7 Unsatisfactory in EOF during ONS exercise 1804

AR 2224827, Objective I.3 Unsatisfactory in EOF - ONS Exercise 1804

71114.04: Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes

Procedures

Oconee Emergency Plan, Rev. 2018-002

AD-EP-ALL-0502, Emergency Preparedness 10 CFR 50.54(q) Training Requirements, Rev. 1

AD-EP-ALL-0602, Emergency Plan Change Screening & Effectiveness Evaluations 10 CFR 50.54(q), Rev. 5

Change Packages

10CFR50.54(q) Screening Evaluation Form for Fleet Standard ERO Project, Rev. 3, dated

December 6, 2018

CFR 50.54(q) Screening Evaluation Form for Offsite Protective Action Recommendations,

Rev. 3 dated August 1, 2018

CFR 50.54(q) Screening Evaluation Form for ONS Emergency Plan Section P.9 Rev. 2017-

003, dated September 25, 2017

CFR 50.54(q) Screening Evaluation Form for ONS Emergency Plan Rev. 2017-004, dated

October 4, 2017

CFR 50.54(q) Screening Evaluation Form for ONS Emergency Plan Rev. 2018-001, dated

July 17, 2018

CFR 50.54(q) Effectiveness Evaluation Form for ONS Emergency Plan Rev. 2018-001,

dated July 17, 2018

CFR 50.54(q) Screening Evaluation Form for ONS Emergency Plan Rev. 2018-002, dated

March 20, 2018

CFR 50.54(q) Effectiveness Evaluation Form for ONS Emergency Plan Rev. 2018-002,

dated August 7, 2018

Corrective Action Program Documents (Condition Reports)

AR 2178482, ONS ERO members not contacted for Augmentation drill

AR 2218180, ONS drill 18-03 procedure discrepancy

NCR 02225050, Incorrect Emergency Plan information from December 2016 until January 2018

71114.06: Drill Evaluation

Documents

ONS Drill #1803 Scenario Manual

EPDR-ONS Drill 18-03 Critique Report, dated August 8, 2018

71114.08 - Exercise Evaluation - Scenario Review

Procedures

Oconee Emergency Plan, Rev. 2018-002

AD-EP-ALL-0103, Activation and Operation of the Emergency Operations Facility, Rev. 2

AD-EP-ALL-105, Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center, Rev. 1

AD-EP-ALL-0106, Activation and Operation of Operations Support Center, Rev. 1

AD-EP-ALL-108, Activation and Operation of the Joint Information Center, Rev. 1

PD-EP-ALL-800, Drill and Exercises Program, Rev. 5

Records and Data

ONS Emergency Action Level Initiating Condition Tracking Matrix, exercise cycle: January 1,

2014 to December 31, 2021

ONS-ERO Drill 2016-05

ONS-ERO Drill 2016-06

ONS-ERO Drill 2016 Contaminated PI

ONS-ERO Drill 2017-4th Quarter Table Top

ONS-ERO Drill 2017 Augmentation

ONS-ERO Drill 2017-MS-1

ONS-ERO Practice drill for dual sites

ONS-ERO Drill 2017-01a

ONS-ERO Drill 2017-02

ONS-ERO 2017-03 practice dual tabletop

2017-04 Dual Site Exercise

ONS-ERO Drill 2017-05

ONS-ERO Drill 2017-06

2017 Team proficiency drill

2017 Rollup for crew evaluations

Crew Evaluations 2018

ONS Event 18-1001

FEMA Final After Action Report for Oconee Nuclear Station Radiological Emergency

Preparedness Exercise, Exercise date: December 13, 2016, report dated February 17, 2017

71151: Performance Identification Verification

Documents

AD-LS-ALL-0004, NRC Performance Indicators and Monthly Operating Report, Rev. 1

AD-PI-ALL-0100, Corrective Action Program, Rev. 18

CSM 3.10, Primary Lab Sampling Frequencies, Specifications, and Corrective Actions, Rev. 059

Licensee Event Report 269/2017-001, Revision 0

MSPI Derivation Report

NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7

Unit 1 station logs covering period of July, 2017 through June, 2018

Unit 2 station logs covering period of July, 2017 through June, 2018

Unit 3 station logs covering period of July, 2017 through June, 2018

Procedures

AD-EP-ALL-0001, Emergency Preparedness Key Performance Indicators, Rev. 1

AD-EP-ALL-0002, NRC Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline Emergency

Preparedness Cornerstone, Rev. 1

AD-EP-ALL-0803, Evaluation & Critique of Drills & Exercises, Rev. 0

CP/0/A/2005/022, Determination of Reported Tech Spec Dose Equivalent Iodine-131, Rev. 006

Records and Data:

DEP opportunities documentation for 3rd and 4th quarters 2017, and 1st and 2nd quarters 2018

Siren test data for 3rd and 4th quarters 2017, and 1st and 2nd quarters 2018

Drill & exercise participation records of ERO personnel for 3rd and 4th quarters 2017, and 1st and

2nd quarters 2018

Documentation of Performance Indicator data from July/1/2017 through June/30/2018 for Heat

Removal System

Documentation of Performance Indicator data from July/1/2017 through June/30/2018 for Safety

System Functional Failures

Documentation of Performance Indicator data from July/1/2017 through June/30/2018 for

Reactor Coolant System Activity

71152: Problem Identification and Resolution

Calculations

OSC-6993, Standby Shutdown Facility 5 Year Civil / Structural Inspection, Rev. 4

Documents

AD-EG-ALL-1650, Licensee Aging Management, Rev. 2

AD-EG-ONS-1214, Condition Monitoring of Structures, Rev. 000

AD-HU-ALL-0003, Conduct of Pre-Job Briefs and Post-Job Critiques, Rev. 5

AD-PI-ALL-0100, Corrective Action Program, Rev. 18

EDM-410, Inspection Program for Civil Engineering Structures and Components, Rev. 17

Nuclear Condition Reports

01832862; 02085249; 02118469; 02145743; 021860009

Procedures

AP/0/A/1700/005, Earthquake, Rev. 030

OP/0/A/1600/010, Operation of the SSF Diesel-Generator, Rev. 095

Work Orders/Requests

01989673; 02094345; 20234648

71153: Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (NOED)

Documents

AD-PI-ALL-0100, Corrective Action Program, Rev. 18

AD-PI-ALL-0104, Prompt Investigation Response Team, Rev. 4

IP/1/A/0275/012 A, Unit 1 Feedwater Control Valve Demand and Interlock Calibration, Rev. 003

MP/0/A/1200/015, Valve - Main Steam Safety Relief - Reconditioning, Rev. 34

ASME OM Code-2004, Mandatory Appendix I

EC 114881

LER 05000287/2012-001-00

LER 05000287/2013-001-00

LER 05000287/2015-001-00

LER 05000269/2018-001-00

Drawings

O-422M-31, Instrument Details Main FDW Valve Control 1FDW-32 & 1FDW-41, Rev. 20

OM 254.0002-001, High Capacity Nozzle Type Safety Valve - Welded Inlet - Main Steam,

Rev. D3

Nuclear Condition Reports

2198480; 0220195

Work Orders/Requests

246250; 20247772; 20247773

Other

Information Notice 2006-24, Recent Operating Experience Associated with Pressurizer and

Main Steam Safety/Relief Valve Lift Setpoints

Section 4OA5: Other Activities

Documents

NUH-003, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report for the Standardized NUHOMS Horizontal

Modular Storage System for Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Appendix P, Rev 14

Oconee Nuclear Station Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation 10 CFR 72.212 Evaluation

for Phase VIII, Rev. 0

TQ-OO-12424001, Training and Qualification Guide ISFSI Surveillance, Rev. 0c

ISFSI Module Roof Slab Temperatures between January 1, 2018 and April 4, 2018

Whiting Nuclear Crane Inspection Report for Unit 3 Spent Fuel Pool 100 Ton Crane dated

February 1, 2018

Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program sample locations C1, C2, C3, C4, EAST28 and

WEST28 data from January 2000 through March 2018

Radiological Surveys ONS-M-20180628-2, ONS-M-20180627-11, ONS-M-20180625-15, ONS-

M-20180625-14, ONS-M-20180618-20, ONS-M-20180621-1, ONS-M-20180618-8, ONS-M-

20180718-11

UFSAR Section 9.1, Fuel Storage and Handling, Rev 26

50.59 Screening for AR 02161397

2.48 Screening for AR 02161398

Nuclear Condition Report

2193693

Other

AR 02180853, 02179522

Procedures

OP/2/A/1102/020 D, SSF and Outside Rounds, Rev. 87

MP/0/A/1500/023, ISFSI Phase V, VI, and VII DSC Loading and Storage, Rev. 30

MP/0/A/1500/024, ISFSI Phase VIII DSC Loading and Storage, Rev. 0

AD-EG-ALL-1520, Transient Combustible Control, Rev. 9

MP/0/A/1810/019, Cask - Nuhoms 24PTH-S-LC Dry Storage Canister - Welding, Rev. 32

NED-NE-ALL-2101, Helium Mass Spectrometer Leak Test for Dry Fuel Storage ISFSI, Rev. 1

PT/0/A/0750/010, Inspection of Fuel Assemblies Prior to Insertion in ISFSI, Rev. 8

Work Orders/Requests

20197575, 20196690

24