IR 05000269/1979014
| ML19208D319 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 07/13/1979 |
| From: | Bradford W, Verdery E, Whitener H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19208D285 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-79-14, 50-269-79-1A, 50-270-79-14, 50-287-79-1A, NUDOCS 7909280230 | |
| Download: ML19208D319 (11) | |
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'o UNITED STATES
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i',1, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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E REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA sT., N.W..sulTE 3100 oy...../
ATL ANT A, GEORGI A 303o1
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Report Nos. 50-269/79-14, 50-270/79-14, and 50-287/19-15 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street
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Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 Facility Name: Oconee 1, 2 and 3 Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270 and 50-287 License Nos. DPR-3 DPR-47 and DPR-55 Inspection a.
c e Nuclear Stat n M
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Y Inspector: _. Whitener
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/Da e' Signed se
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W.'M. Bradford fate / Sighed Accompanying Personnel:
. R. Denton, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation D. F. Ross, Deputy Director, Division of Project Management T. M. Novac, Chief Reactor System Branch E. S. Christenburg, Office of Executive Legal Director B. A. Wilson, Examiner, Operator Licensing Branch J. J Buzy, Examiner, RII Operator Li ensing Branch YN h
Approved by i
.Verdery,ActinfectionChief
' Date Si'gned
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SUIDiARY Date of Inspection May 1-31, 1979 Areas Inspected This routine unannounced inspection involved 325 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of plant operation, procedure changes, plant modifications, fallowup on IEB 79-05B, licensee event report followup, witnessing of feedwater stability flow testing, nonreportsble event review and plant tour.
In addition a special, announced inspection of licensee's compliance with the requirements of the Commission order of May 7, 1979 was conducted. This additional inspection involved 29 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.
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Su=a ry-2-Results Of the eight areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance os deviations were identified in six areas; two apparent items of noncon:pliance were found in two areas:
(infraction, failure to sample and analyze prior to liquid release from tce laundry hot shower tank - paragraph 11); (infraction, failure to follow procedures to maintain plant status - paragraph 12).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Li,censee Employees Duke Power Company W. S. Lee, President W. O. Parker, Vice President, Steam Production
- J. E. Smith, Station Manager
- J. M. Davis, Superintendent of Haintenance
- J. N. Pope, Superintendent of Operations
- R. M. Koehler, Superintendent of Technical Services
- R. T. Bond, Licensing and Projects Engineer
- D. J. Vito, Associate Engineer, Licensing R. C. Adams, I&E Engineer D. Clardy, I & E Coordinator J. Shaw, I&E Coordinator D. Havice, I&E Coordinator B. Carney, Assistant Engineer, Mechanical Maintenance K. Canady, Manager, Project Coordination and Licensing D. C. Holt', Systems Engineer, Licensing
- J. Brackett, Senior QA Engineer R. L. Gill, Head Licensing Engineer H. W. Morgan, Shift Supervisor J. W. Herring, Shift Supervisor T. D. Patterson, Shift Suparvisor G. B. Jones, Shift Supervisor D. W. Yoh, Shift Supervisor L. C. Evans, Assistant Shift Supervisor D. L. Gordan, Assistant Shift Supervisor R. T. Scott, Assistant Shif t Supervisor'
W. R. Pollard, Assistant Shift Supervisor D. F. Roth, Assistant Shift Supervisor W. A. Forton, Assistant Shift Supervisor
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F. E. Owens, Assistant Shift Supervisor D. J. Phillips, Assistant Shift Supervisor C. M. Sheridon, Assistant Shift Supervisor E. G. LeGette, Assistant Shift Superv_sor 0. C. Kohler, Assistant Shift Supervisor P. J. Chudzik, Assistant Shift Supervisor E. A. Force, Assistant Shift Supervisor S. M. Pryor, Assistant Shift Supervisor L. L. Howell, Assistant Shift Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included 4 technicians, 20 operators, 3 office personnel and 4 technical support personnel.
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- Attended exit interview.
2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 17, 24 and June 1, 1939 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The inspection findings were acknowledged without significant com.aent.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Findings (Closed) Deficiency. Late submit tal of LER's.
The inspector verified that the licensee is submitting LER's within the specified time periods after an event.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Plant Operations The inspector reviewed plant operations to ascertain conformance with regulatory requirements, technical specifications and administrative directives. The control room logs, shift supervisors logs and the removal and restcration record books for all three units were reviewed.
Interviews with a number of plant operations personnel were held on the day and night shifts.
Supervisor and control room operator actions were observed during the shift and at shift change. The actions and activities were conducted as prescribed in Section 3.08 of the Station Directives.
The number of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required by Technical Specification C.1.1.3.
Operators were responsive to annunciator alarms and appeared to be cognizant of plant status.
The following areas were toured by the inspecters:
a.
Unit 3 Reactor Building b.
Unit 2 Reactor Building c.
Unit 1 -2 Spent Fuel Pool d.
Pentration Room, Unit 3 e.
Turbine Building f.
Auxiliary Building g.
Rad Waste Treatment Facility 1052 043
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Electrical Equipment Rooms i.
Cable Spreading Rooms
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Reactor Building Purge Rooms kl Keowee Hydro Station Observations were made during the tours of housekeeping and cleanliness, ongoing activities, security, equipment status and radiation control practices.
In general, housekeeping and cleanliness were found to be satisfactory. Security and radiation control practices were adhered to during the periods of observation. There were no fluid leaks, or exces-sive piping vibrations noted during the tour.
Lock out tags on equipment required to be tagged were found as specified by Station Directive 3.1.1.
Within the areas inspected, no fire hazards were observed.
Also, during periods of observation the inspector verified the presence of a Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) in the control room. The inspector verified that the SRO assigned had coupleted training on the B&W simulator and had no other responsibilities other than to advise the shift supervisor during any transient to coordinate the overall eiforts of all operators.
Verification of the presence of an operator at emergency feedwater (EW)
pump was also conducted around the clock. The inspector verified, through interviews, that the operator had been trained on the operation of the pu.rp and that a direct communication link to each control room was available.
In a few instances, it appeared that the EW watchman was not familiar with the reason for his assignment, but was trained in how to start the EW pump if the need arose.
This was discussed with operations management who reviewed the purpose of the assignment with those operators assigned.
Comunications checks were being performed on an informal basis and appeared satisfactory. But, due to the on going construction activities around the EW pumps, operations management agreed to formalize the check. A test is conducted twice each shift and results are documented in the routine surveillance test procedure.
The training program for the EW watchmen was reviewed and found satis-factory. The men have a troubleshooting guide available to them at the watch station and a copy of the operating procedure.
6.
Procedure Changes The licensee has revised the emergency and operating procedures related to the eciergency feedwater (EW) system to reflect the separation of the EW system from the integrated Control System (ICS). The operator actions resulting from the system realignment and modification are to verify that all EW pumps are actuated either automatically or manually and to maintain the steam generator water level at a prescribed value which depends on whether the reactor coolant pumps are operating.
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emergency actions are implemented by the operator whenever there is a loss of main feedwater pumps caused by system f ailures or loss cf of fsite power.
The e procedures have been reviewed to assure that sufficient guidance is provided to the operator.
The review included consideration of verifying reriings of certain key parameters by using alternate instrumentation and specification of parameter va'ees that must be controlled by the operator.
Comments from the inspector anc other staff members of the NRC were incorporated in the appropriate procedurex. The licensee also included a requirement to include independent verification of the restoration of equipment following tests or maintenance on the EFW system.
The following procedures were reviewed:
EP/0/A/1800/6, Loss of RC Flow EP/0/A/1800/8, Steam Supply ~ System EP/0/A/1800/14, Loss of Steam Generator Feedwater OP/0A/1102/6, Removal and Restrration of Station Equipment OP/1/A/1106/6, Emergency Feedwater System OP/2/A/1106/6, Emergency Feedwater System OP/3/A/600/1, Emergency feedwater System PT/1/A/600/a, Periodic Instrument Survelliance PT/2/A/600/1, Periodic Instrument Survellance PT/3/A/600/1, Periodic Instrument Surveillance PT/1/A/600/11, Emergency Feedwater System PT/2/A/600/11, Emergency Feedwater System PT/3/A/600/11, Emergency Feedwater System Within the areas inspected no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
IEB 79-05B Followup The licensee's responses and actions taken in regard to IEB 79-05B were reviewed to verify that these actions fulfilled the requirements to develop procedures, train operators and to make changes in set points and designs.
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Procedure Development The inspector verified that procedures for the natural circuhtine mode of operation had be;n developed and approved. These procedures require increasing steam generator level setpoint to initiate natural circulation. The procedures address the reactor vessel presaure and
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temperature limitations when the high pressure injection system is in service. Also guidance is provided on anticipatory response and annunciation for specified transients.
The following procedures were reviewed:
EP/0/A/1800/4, Loss of Reactor Coolant EP/0/A/1800/6, Loss of Reactor Coolant Flow EP/0/A/1800/14, Loss of Steam Generator Feedwater EP/0/A/1800/28, Loss of Feedwater During N.tural Circulation OP/0/A/1102/16, Planned Initiation of Natural Circulation b.
Operator Training Special training classes were conducted for all licensed personnel on the concept and use of the emergency and operationg procedures recently revised as a result of the TMI-2 accident. Each licensed individual was tested following the training. The inspector verified that licensed individuals assigned to an operating unit as supervisor or operator on the control board had received a grade of 90% or higher. Any individual not achieving a 90% grade was required to repeat the tvaining.
The training program was discussed with each licensed individual to verify that he had received the required knowledge in natural circula-tion procedures and that he understood the technique for determining the degree of subcooling of the primary coolant.
In addition, the inspector verified that operating personnel were instructed in the reporting requirements as discussed in the IEB-79-05B, item 6.
A dedicated phone has been installed in the Unit 1, 2 and 3 control rooms and the shift supervisors' office.
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PORV and High Pressure Trip Setpoints To minimize the operation of the power operated relief valve (PORV)
and to reduce the energy input to the reactor coolant system during transients that result in primary system volume increases, the following setpoint changes were made:
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High RCS Pressure setpoint Date 2294 psig April 21, 1979 PORV 2450 psig April 21, 1979
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8.
High Pressure Injection System Modification (NSM 1080)
Previous small break loss of coolant i ' lyses considered the reactor coolant pump (RCP) suction line as the. timiting break location for small breaks. Assuming only one of two trains of the high pressure injection (HPI) system were available, the installed system was adequate to provide the necessary core cooling. However, it has been determined that the limiting break location for small breaks is the pump discharge of the reactor coolant system cold legs and not the RCP suction. A revised safety analysis performed by the NSSS vendor, for breaks at this loca-tion, revealed that one train of HPI flow was insufficient to maintain the core covered.
Interim measures have been in effect that require operator actions outside the control room. Permanent plant modifications have been proposed and accepted.
These changes are currently being cocipleted on Oconee Unit 3 and will be installed during future cold shutdowns on Units 1 and 2.
The modifications consist of a cross-connect line between the A and B HPI discharge lines down stream of the Engineered Safeguards (ES) valves and another tie-line connecting this cross-connect line and toe B and C HPI pumps discharge header. The newly installed velves are manually con-trolled, electrically operated valves, capable of being manipulated from the control room. Thus operator actions outside the control room will be eliminated.
The inspector reviewed appropriate operating, emergency and periodic surveillance procedures that have bcen revised to incorporate this modification for Unit 3.
The following procedures were reviewed:
OP/3/A/1104/2, HPI System EP/0/A/1800/4, Loss of Reactor Coolant PT/3/A/o00/1, Periodic Instrument Surveillance PT/0/A/150/15C, Valve Functional Test PT/3/A/202/11, HPI Performance Test.
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The inspector considered these revised procedures to be satisfactory.
9.
Emergency Feedwater Flow Test The inspector witnessed the emergency feedwater flow test, performed on-May 6, 1979. The test verified the auto start feature for all three EFW pumps and EFW system stability under different flow condition.
All three EW pumps were automatically started and supplied feedwater to the common header. The auto start signal came from a simulated loss of the Unit 2 main feedwater pumps. To test system stability, the Test Coordinator introduced a flow imbalance to the system by closing a supply valve without the control room operator's knowledge. The control room operator then stabilized the system by throttling valves as necessary. A stable flow condition was reestablished without difficulty. Test procedure, TT/0/A/325/01, EW Flow Test, approved May 6,1979, was reviewed by the inspector. No problems were identified with the performance of the test using this procedure.
10.
Emergency Notifications IEB 79-05B, issued April 21, 1979, requested a response from licensees'
concerning their procedures for reporting certain situations to the i;RC within one hour of occurence. The Duke Power Company response, dated May 5, 1979 was reviewed by the inspector.
Station Directive 3.1.5 was revised to require prompt notification upon a unscheduled event involving the reactor which cannot be controlled or stabilized by use of normal operating procedures.
In additics, a letter dated May 22, 1979, from the RII office advised DPC of the installatica of dedicated telephones within the Unit 1-2 Control Room and Unit 3 Control Room. These phones, as well as others have been installed and are currently available for use.
Detailed instructions covering the use of these phones had not been developed.
11.
Unsampled Liquid Weste Release On May 24, 1979, 2335 gallons of water was released from the laundry and hot shower tank (LHST) without sampling prior to the release.
Sampling is required oy technicial specification 3.9.8.
Discussions with licensee personnel and a review of selected records revealed the following:
Liquid waste is normally collected in the "A" LHST until a release is required. The waste is then transferred to the "B" LHST and sampled in preparation for release. No flow was observed when attempting to release the waste from "B" LHST.
A recheck of the valve lineup revealed no The operator then decided to use the "A" pump to release the "B" errors.
tank. But due to a subsequent incorrect valve lineup, the contents of
"A" LHST was released in place of "B" LHST.
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The release of liquid waste without sampling and performing activity analysis is in noncompliance with Technical Specification 3.9.8 and has been designated as an infraction in the Notice of Violation (269/79-14-01).
This event was reported by the licensee in report R0-269/79-15, dated June 7, 1979. Corrective actions described in the licensee's report have been reviewed and found adequate. The valves and lines associated with the ^'A and B" LHST's have been color coded and labeled. Operating procedures listed below have been revised and reviewed by the inspector to assure the correct pump and tank combination are aligned for the planned release:
OP 0/A/1104/34, LHST System OP 0/A/1104/32, Interim Rad Waste Disposal System 12. Contaminated Water Spill On May 16 and 17, 1979, while transfering water from the Unit 3 fuel Transfer Canal to the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) a small amount spilled into the West Penetration Room floor drain and onto the ground outside. At the time of the spill the BWST was in recirculation. The flow path during recirculation is from the bottom of the BWST, through the purification system and returning through the vent header to the BWST. Prassure in the BWST during the transfer operation caused che recirculation flow to spill through the vent header and bachwards through the floor drain.
Contributing to the problem was an oten 4 inch valve in the vent header. This valve is normally closed. The valve was opened without a procedore change or proper adminstrative control for a change in plant status. This failure to follow procedures as required by Technical Specification 46.4.1 b, has been designated as an infraction in the Notice of Violation (287/79-15-01).
13.
Station Tour The inspectors and NRR staff members toured the emergency feedwater pump areas and the control rooms for all three units.
Inspection activities performed during the tour included:
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An inspection of each EW pump.
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Discussions with operating personnel stationed at the EW pumps verification that adequate procedural guidance was available, and that the individuals understood their duties and how to perform those duties.
C.
A test of the communications system between Units 1 and 2 EW pump stations and the respective control room.
D.
Verification of the main flowpath valve lineups for Units 1 and 2 EW systems.
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Verification that the discharges of all three EW pumps has been cross connected such that each and all of the pumps could supply emergency feedsater to the unit requiring it.
F.
Verification that an additional full time Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) (or previously licensed SRO), with TMI training, was stationed
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in the Unit I control room.
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Discussions with the SRO's and R0's assigned to each unit.
H.
Review of the logic diagrams for the modification to automatically start all three EFW pumps on a loss of both main feedwater pumps on any unit.
No items of noncompliance or deviatons were identified.
14.
Review of Training The inspector reviewed training records to verify that all licensed reactor operators and Senior Reactor Operators assigned to the current shift schedules had completed the TMI-2 training at the Babcock and Wilcox simulator.
The inspection reviewed the results of the audit examinations given during the period May 13-16, 1979. For those individuals who received a grade of 90% on either of the audit examinations, the inspector reviewed their test papers and concurred in the validity of the test score assigned by the Training Services Group.
In addition, the inspettor reviewed a shift schedule to be effective on May 17, which reconstituted the assigned shifts for Unit I such that the assigned Senior Reactor Operators (SRO)
and Reactor Operator had attained a score of 90% or greater on one of the audit examinations.
Plant management committed to not having either an SRO or R0 assigned to an operating unit unless the individual audit examinations or had satisfactorily completed a requalification program covering (a) the TMI-2 incident, (b) small break loss of coolant accident analysis, and (c) the Oconee procedure changes and plant modifications which had been implemented as a result of (a) and (b) above.
The inspector reviewed a training summary for six licensed individuals (SRO & RO) which listed all training activities these individuals had participated in since the THI-2 incident.
In addition, the inspector interviewed three of these six individuals concerning the topics covered, the lengths of the various activities, and their opinion as to the adequacy of training received.
Na items of noncomplian e or deviations were identified.
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