IR 05000269/1979023
| ML19210D251 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 09/28/1979 |
| From: | Hardin A, Jape F, Martin R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16162A286 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-79-23, 50-270-79-21, 50-287-79-23, NUDOCS 7911260197 | |
| Download: ML19210D251 (8) | |
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
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REGION II
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101 MARIETTA ST,, N.W., SUITE 3100 o
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Report Nos. 50-269/79-23, 50-270/79-21, and 50-287/79-23 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 Facility Name: Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287 License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55 Inspection at Oconee Site near Seneca, South Carolina Inspectors:
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Date Signed
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A. K Hardin
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H. D. Jen ns
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vb/n Date ' Signed Approved by:
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R. D. Ma'rtin, Section Chief, RONS Branch
'Date/ Signed SUMMARY Inspection on August 1-31, 1979 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 114 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of plsnt operations, LER followup, partial followup of IEB 79-05C, plant tours, housekeeping and review of fire protection modifications.
Results Of the six areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in five areas; one apparent deviation was found in one area (fire protection modification commitments).
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
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Duke Power Company
- J. E. Smith, Station Manager
- J. M. Davis, Superintendent of Maintenance
- J. N. Pope, Superintendent of Operations
- R. M. Koehler, Superintendent of Technical Services
- R. T. Bond, Licensing and Projects Engineer R. C. Adams, I&E Engineer
- J. Brackett, Senior QA Engineer H. W. Morgan, Shift Supervisor J. W. Herring, Shift Supervisor T. D. Patterson, Shift Supervisor G. B. Jones, Shift Supervisor D. W. Yoh, Shift Supervisor L. C. Evans, Assistant Shift Supervisor D. L. Gordan, Assistant Shift Supervisor R. T. Scott, Assistant Shift Supervisor W. R. Pollard, Assistant Shift Supervisor D. F. Roth, Assistant Shift Supervisor W. A. Horton, Assistant Shift Supervisor F. E. Owens, Assistant Shift Supervisor C. M. Sheridon, Assistant Shift Supervisor E. G. LeGette, Assistant Shift Supervisor 0. C. Kohler, Assistant Shift Supervisor P. J. Chudzik, Assistant Shift Supervisor E. A. Force, Assistant Shift Supervisor
S. M. Pryor, Assistant Shift Supervisor L. L. Howell, Assistant Shift Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included 4 technicians, 20 operators, 3 office personnel and 4 technical support personnel.
- Attended exit inteview.
2.
Exit Interview
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The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 10, 17, 24, and 31 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
The inspection findings were acknowledged without significant comment.
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Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings P
Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or deviations. A new unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in paragraph 8.
5.
Plant Operations The inspector reviewed plant operations to ascertain conformance with regulatory requirements and Technical Specifications. The Unit supervisor's log and control room operator's log were reviewed against the logging requirements of Oconee Nuclear Station Directive 3.1.19 and 3.1.20.
Dis-cussions were held with several plant operators and supervisors regarding reactor status and tours were conducted of portions of the auxiliary building, turbine building, and auxiliary feedwater area to observe house-keeping, security, and radiation control practices.
In this area of in-spection no items of noncompliance or deviations were observed.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMITS Several Technical Specifications related to surveillance tests, safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting conditions for operation were reviewed. These were:
T.S. 3.3.1.b, Low Pressure Service Water Pumps (Unit 2)
T.S. 3.3.1.f, Borated Water Storage Tank (Unit 2)
T.S. 3.3.3, Core Flood Tanks (Unit 2)
T.S. 2.1, Core Protection Limits (Unit 2)
T.S. 4.5.4.1, Low Pressure Injection System (LPI) Leakage (Units 1,2, and 3)
T.S. 4.8.2, Main Steam Stop Valve Leakage (Unit 1)
During review of the LP,I leakage test data, the licensee was unable to locate the data for Unit I for the 1978 test. The licensee had other records which recorded that the test had been performed in 1978. After a
. search, the licensee concluded the data had been lost in the process of transmittal to document control. A licensee representative stated he had seen the test data and was sure the test met acceptance criteria and fur-ther indicated he would review putting a letter in file to that effect. The item is closed.
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6.
Review of Licensee Events Reports
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The inspector performed an in-office review of nonroutine event reports to verify that the report details met license requirements, identified the cause of the event, described corrective actions appropriate for the iden-tified cause, and adequately addressed the event and any generic implica-tions.
In addition, for those reports marked with as asterisk, the inspec-tor examined selected operating and maintenance logs and records and in-ternal incident investigation reports. Personnel were interviewed to verify that the report accurately reflected the circumstances of the event, that the corrective action had been taken or responsibility assigned to assure completion and that the event was reviewed by the licensee as stipu-lated in the Technical Specifications. The following event reports were reviewed:
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- R0-269/79-18, RB Gaseous Rad Monit. ors Inoperable
- R0-269/79-19, Excessive Quadrant Power Tilt
- R0-269/79-23, PRVS Inoperable R0-269/79-24, SG Tube Leak R0-270/79-4, Unidentified RCS Leakage in Excess of 1 GPM
- RO-281/79-10, RB Gsseous Rad Monitors Inoperable 7.
Trip Recovery: Unit 2 on July 18, 1979 A Unit 2 reactor / turbine trip occurred at 1955 hours0.0226 days <br />0.543 hours <br />0.00323 weeks <br />7.438775e-4 months <br /> on 7/18/79. The trip occurred when lightning strikes occurred at a Greenville Substation. As a result, the 230 KV switch yard at Oconee experienced a voltage loss and the RC pump monitors initiated the reactor trip.
Trip recovery was initiated at 2238 hours0.0259 days <br />0.622 hours <br />0.0037 weeks <br />8.51559e-4 months <br /> on 7/18/79. An estimated critical rod configuration was determined using OP/2/A/1103/15," Reactivity Balance Procedure". As rods were withdrawn per OP/2/A/1102/02, " Reactor Trip Recovery", the operator halted startup due to a higher than expected increase in countrate when rod groups 1, 2 and 3 were withdrawn to 100%.
Critical was estimated to occur at 5% on Group 5.
Since shift change was due, the shift supervisor decided to hold rod position for the oncoming shift.
Countrate was stable indicating the reactor was suberitical.
The oncoming shift inserted rods to 50% on Group 1.
While rechecking the critical prediction, the new calculation indicated criticality would occur at 45% on Group 5.
Reactor criticality was achieved at 0133 hours0.00154 days <br />0.0369 hours <br />2.199074e-4 weeks <br />5.06065e-5 months <br /> on 7/19/79 with rods withdrawn to 25% on Group 6.
This is within the allow-able band.
The inspector and licensee personnel reviewed records, interviewed person-nel and recalculated critical prediction to determine the reason the first estimate was incorrect.
Two reasons were identified:
first, the xenon
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worth value was off by 17%, apparently due to an input error to the computer program; and second, the temperature correction of 0.396% AK/K was not used because the operator believed it to be negligible.
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Licensee management indicated that calculations for critical rod configu-ration would be stressed during future requalification classes and that a revision to the calculation form will be considered to enable the operator to determine if the allowable band would include group 4 at less than 100%
withdrawn.
There were no items of noncompliance identified within t'he areas reviewed.
8.
Loss of Fressurizer Level: Unit 3 on March 7, 1979 On March 6, 1979, Unit 3 was shutdown due to unidentified RCS leakage greater than 1 gpm. LER R0-287/79-6 was issued by the licensee as required by Technical Specifications discussing the leakage problem. Also briefy discussed in the LER was a problem with the pressurizer level recorder.
The inspector reviewed records, interviewed personnel and discussed the pressurizer level loss with licensee management. The findings are dis-cussed below.
During cooldown, pressurizer level normally decreases but coincidently shortly after midnight on March 7, 1979, HP-120, Makeup valve to RCS, failed closed due to a leaking diaphram in the valve operator, and the pressurizer level recorder pen stuck at an indicated level of about 84 inches. Upon discovery of the stuck recorder pen, the control operator reeseablished level through HP-26.
He also closed HP-7, letdown valve, and RC-3, Spray line block.
There are two annunicator alarms on pressurizer level.
One is a low level alarm at 200 inches and the second is an emergency low alarm at 80 inches.
The 200 inch alarm had been on due to normal level decrease for several hours before the recorder pen stuck. And the 80 inch alarm was apparently not noticed. This alarm should have actuated at about 0020 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> on March 7, 1979, almost simultaneously with the letdown storage tank high level alarm.
During review of these alarms, it was discovered that the 200 inch alarm comes from the level recorder. To ensure availability of this alarm in case of recorder problem, the licensee moved the alarm source from the recorder to the level switch. This modification was completed on all three Oconee units. The 80 inch emergency low level alarm originates from the level switch and is not affected by the level recorder.
The inspector requested a review of why HP-120 fails closed on loss of air to the controller rather than fails open to prevent recurrence of this The licensee has not completed invertigating this request. This event.
item has been identified as unresolved item 79/23-01.
9.
HP Training for Escorted Workmen During a tour.of the Unit 1-2 cable spreading room, the inspector inter-viewed several craftsman working in the room. The men were working on NSM 1275 and commented that they had not had health physics or security training to enable them free access. Therefore they were required to be escorted 1 063
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while on the job within the cable spreading room. Followup on the security aspects of their comments will be pursued by an NRC Security Inspector.
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The health physics comments were followed up and are discussed below.
Discussions were held with licensee management concerning the health physics comments from the workmen. The expressed areas of concern were (1) they had been assigned to work at Oconee for several weeks but had not been given health physics training yet, (2) they were requested to remove a cable reel from a contaminated zone within the turbine building, and (3)
they were requested to pull cables through a radiation zone.
Licensee management followup on these items and reported the following:
1.
Employees assigned temporarily are not always given health physics training unless their job requires them to work within a radiation control zone (RCZ).
In this particular situation, 16 employees in the 22 man crew had health physics training.
Starting in October, 1979, all employees will be required to pass the health physics training program before unescorted entry into the protected area is allowed.
2.
A cable reel, located in the turbine building, had water dripping on it from a leaky valve in the secondary system. The work foreman had HP survey the reel before the workmen moved it from the potentially contaminated zone. No contamination was found and it was released by health physics and moved by the unknown to another location in the turbine building.
3.
The foreman requested a health physics survey before cable pulls are made that pass overhead of a contaminated zone.
The cable trays and work areas are surveyed prior to sending men to enter the area.
It is concluded that proper HP practices appeared to have been followed and there were no items of noncompliance associated with these concerns. Licensee management indicated that HP training of personnel who are to work in protected areas for a number of weeks is desirable and indicated their intent to provide training for all unescorted personnel in the protected area.
10.
IEB 79-05C Followup The licensee's response and actions taken in regard to Items 1 A and 1 B of IEB 79-05C were verified. The licensee's response is dated August 24, 1979.
Emergency procedures EP/0/A/1800/4, Loss of Reactor Coolant and EP/0/A/1800/8, Steam System Leak-Rupture,were revised and approved on July 30, 1979 to
require that upon reactor trip and initiation of HPI caused by low RC system pressure, all operating reactor coolant pumps trip..These procedure changes satisfy Item 1A.
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Item 1 B was satisfied by scheduling manpower as stated in the IEB and by
- letter to shift supervisors dated July 30, 1979. The manpower requirements have been spot checked throughout the month of August.
11.
Fire Protection System Verification Reference:
(a) Duke Power Company Letter dated June 29, 1979, from W. O. Parker, Jr., to H. R. Denton, NRR The inspector reviewed the status of the licensee's fire protection system as it related to the commitments made by Duke Power Company to the USNRC in Reference (a).
In the letter, the Current Status of Modifications listed the following modifications as being completed as of August 17, 1979:
Fire Header Piping Fire Barrier Penetrations Portable Handlight Portable Fire Extinguishers
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Emergency Breathing Air Supply Fire Hose Nozzles Cable Penetration Fire Stops There were additional items listed as being completed; however, the inspec-tor determined that the completion of the NRC's verification of Duke Power Company's commitments to the Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report for Oconee Nuclear Station dated August 11, 1978, would be handled by the Region 2 fire protection specialists.
The items listed above were identified by the inspector as being completed with the following exceptions:
"Firewall 50" was identified as being inadequate around cables in a floor penetration in Unit # 1 equipment room cable shaft.
"Firewall 50" surrounding cables supported by a square of unstrut was found to be inadequate in the Unit # 2 equipment room near the smoke exhauster.
Lift ring holes in the concrete hatch in Unit # 2 equipment room had been foamed but had not been refoamed after being removed for use.
Fire barrier is inadequate for Cable ISX3A.
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The door between Units # 1 and # 2 cable rooms was open without a fire watch. The door was the required fire boundary between the rooms and was not mechanically aligned to shut without a conscious effort on the part of each person passing through it to pull it to (the inspector verified the door to be shut prior tc his departure from the site. A work request was initiated to have the door repaired).
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These examples of failure to meet commitments made to the NRC in the form of Reference (a), collectively constitute a deviation (269/79-23-01 and 270/79-21-01).
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