IR 05000269/1979016

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IE Insp Repts 50-269/79-16,50-270/79-15 & 50-287/79-17 on 790601-30.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Maint,Security,Training,Ler Followup,Radiation Protection & Strike Planning
ML15222A057
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 07/23/1979
From: Bradford W, Elisle G, Jape F
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML15222A056 List:
References
50-269-79-16, 50-287-79-17, NUDOCS 7908300544
Download: ML15222A057 (12)


Text

UNITED STATES (

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-269/79-16, 50-270/79-15 and 50-287/79-17 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 Facility Name: Oconee Nuclear Station License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55 Inspection at 0 ee N lear Station ear Seneca, South Carolina Inspectors:

pe pe ate-Sgned

.

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g n e 7d

Bel s e at ig ed te gne~d E. J rd e

g d Approved b erdery, Acting Se ion Chief, RONS Branch ate ign d SUMMARY Inspection on June 1-30, 1979 Areas Inspected This routine unannounced inspection involved 240 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of plant operations, maintenance, security, training, LER followup, strike planning, radiation protection and instrument calibratio Results Of the eight areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in seven area os-4

DETAILS Persons Contacted Duke Power Company

  • J. E. Smith, Station Manager
  • J. N. Pope, Superintendent of Operations
  • R. M. Koehler, Superintendent of Technical Services
  • R. T. Bond, Licensing and Projects Engineer
  • D. J. Vito, Associate Engineer, Licensing
  • J. M. Davis, Superintendent of Maintenance R. C. Adams; I&C Engineer D. Clardy, I&E Coordinator J. Shaw, I&E Coordinator D. Havice, I&E Coordinator B. Carney, Assistant Engineer, Mechanical Maintenance K. Canady, Manager, Project Coordination and Licensing D. C. Holt, Systems Engineer, Licensing
  • J. Brackett, Senior QA Engineer R. L. Gill, Head Licensing Engineer H. W. Morgan, Shift Supervisor J. W. Herring, Shift Supervisor T. D. Patterson, Shift supervisor G. B. Jones, Shift Supervisor D. W. Yoh, Shift Supervisor L. C. Evans, Assistant Shift Supervisor D. L. Gordan, Assistant Shift Supervisor R. T. Scott, Assistant Shift Supervisor W. R. Pollard, Assistant Shift Supervisor W. A. Horton, Assistant Shift Supervisor F. E. Owens, Assistant Shift Supervisor D. J. Phillips, Assistant Shift Supervisor C. M. Sheridon, Assistant Shift Supervisor E. G. LeGette, Assistant Shift Supervisor 0. C. Kohler, Assistant Shift Supervisor P. J. Chudzik, Assistant Shift Supervisor E. A. Force, Assistant Shift Supervisor S. M. Pryor, Assistant Shift Supervisor L. L. Howell, Assistant Shift Supervisor
  • Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 15, 22 and 28, 1979, and July 3, 1979, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 abov All subjects addressed in this report were discussed and acknowledged by licensee management without significant commen Thelicensee identified problem involving failure to comply with TS 3.4.4 concerning operability of the

-2 emergency condenser circulating water system on Unit 2 was discussed July 3, 1979, with licensee management. Licensee management stated that the issue will be reviewed and correcte.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item 270/78-34-01, Identification, storage and handling of calibration blocks. Licensee has revised procedure QCM-1, Control of Calibration Standards, on June 18, 197 Implementation was verified by the inspector and the missing and damaged blocks have been replace.

Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio.

Plant Operations The inspector reviewed plant operations to ascertain conformance with regulatory requirements, technical specifications and administrative direc tives. The control room logs, shift supervisors logs and the removal and restoration record books for all three units were reviewe Interviews with a number of plant operations personnel were held on the day and night shift Supervisor and control room operator actions were observed during the shift and at shift chang The actions and activities were conducted as prescribed in Section 3.08 of the Station Directive The number of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required by Technical Specification C.1.1.3. Operators were responsive to annunciator alarms and appeared to be cognizant of plant statu Throughout the inspection period, the following areas were toured by the inspector: Unit 1 and 3 Reactor Building Turbine Building Auxiliary Building Electrical Equipment Rooms Cable Spreading Rooms Control Rooms Observations were made during the tours of housekeeping and cleanliness, ongoing activities, security, equipment status and radiation control practice In general, housekeeping and cleanliness were found to be satisfactor Security and radiation control practices were adhered to during the periods of observation. There were no fluid leaks, or excessive piping vibrations noted during the tou Lock out tags on equipment required to be tagged were found as specified by Station Directive 3. Within the areas inspected, no fire hazards were observe On June 30, 1979, on the 12 a.m. to 8 a.m. shift, load was reduced on Unit No. 2 to 90% in preparation of isolating and draining the circulating water side of main condenser section 2A2 to determine condenser tube leakage. At 0725 a.m.,

the licensee found 5 out of 6 Emergency Condenser Circulating System (ECCW) manual valves closed and locked. These valves were identified as 2CCW-1, 2, 3, 4, and These valves, with the exception of 2CCW-2, were opened immediately. Valve N CCW-2 is required to be closed for this operatio An automatic valve, downstream of the manual valve, is designed to open upon loss of O'ffsite power and the ECCW system will con tinue to operate as an unassisted syphon system to supply sufficient water to the condenser for decay heat removal and emergency cooling requirement The above condition had apparently existed since May 15, 1979, when the ECCW system had been isolated for previous condenser maintenance. At that time the condensers had been cleared for maintenance by the use of the station removal and restoration procedure which documents the administrative control of the abnormal valve lineu When the work had been completed, the station removal and restoration procedure was initiated, which would have required the operator to place these valves in the open and locked positio Apparently, the operator failed to perform his assigned task of returning the system to operable status as require This issue was investigated by the licensee and reported to the NRC in a letter dated July 16, 197 The corrective actions specified in that letter are considered adequat.

Maintenance Selected maintenance activities were observed and reviewed to verify the following:

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The activities were accomplished using approved procedures by qualified personnel

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The limiting conditions for operation were met while the components or systems were removed from service for maintenance

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Testing and calibration was performed as necessary prior to returning the component or system to operating status

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Quality control records were available

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Materials or components used were certified as required by plant procedures

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A welding and cutting permit which required a fire watch was issued The following acceptance criteria were used, as appropriate, for the above items:

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FSAR

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ANSI N18.7-1972

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Station Directives 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.5 and 3.3.15

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Administrative Policy Manual Section 3.3 and Findings were acceptable on the following activities:

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Retorqueing of Feed Water nozzles 4, 5, and 6 (x. axis).

Unit 3

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MP/O/A/1130/05

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Primary and Secondary side manway, Hand Holes and Feedwater Nozzle Nut Retorquein Replacement of Feedwater valves No. 106 and 108 on Unit No. I with 1/2 inch air operated 'y' type valves to satisfy NRC Commitment No. 102-18 NSM NO.-0N-0957, Rev. OA and 2 MP/0/a/1200/42 - Disassembly and Reassembly of Lonergan Relief Valve No. 2RV 13 During the period of observation, the inspector verified that the data was properly recorded, test equipment was calibrated within the required interval, acceptance criteria were met and QC hold points were observe No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie.

Physical Security Throughout the month of June, implementation of the physical security program was observe The areas inspected included access and badge controls pat down searches and communication check The guidance and acceptance criteria used for this inspection is provided in 10 CFR 73.5 No items of noncompliance were identifie Access control was checked each time the inspector entered the protected area. Persons and packages were observed being searched on June 6, 8, 28, 29 and 3 This review included observation that all persons within the protected area properly displayed their identification badg To determine compliance with escorting procedures, the inspector spot checked visitors and their escorts. The escort is required to remain with the visitor at all times and keep control of the visito The procedures and requirements were followed during this period of observatio The inspector verified that communication checks were conducted satisfac toril On June 3, 1979, the State and local police were on site and National Guard forces were placed on alert to assist site security forces during an anti-nuclear demonstration held at the licensee's visitor cente Inter-plant communication checks were conducted as well as communication checks with state and local police and standby force For the period examined all checks were completed as require No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie.

Training The inspector attended licensed operator requalification training lectures in which sub-critical multiplication and 1/M plots were covere The inspector noted that non-licensed operators also attended these lecture There was class participation throughout the lecture The presentation and technical content of the lectures appeared to be adequat The inspector verified by review of training records and by direct questioning of twelve (12)

non-licensed employees that training had been received in administrative controls and procedures, radiological health and safety, industrial safety, controlled access and security procedures, emergency plan, quality assurance, on-the-job training and fire fighting trainin The inspector verified that female employees are provided instruction concerning prenatal radiation exposur The inspector attended a new employee training clas The following acceptance criteria were used, as appropriate, for the above items:

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ANSI N18.1.1971

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Appendix A to 10 CFR 55

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Section 6.1.1 of the Technical Specification

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Oconee Nuclear Station Directives 2.5.1 and 2. Administrative Policy Manual Section No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie.

Review of Licensee Event Reports The inspector performed an in-office review of nonroutine event reports to verify that the report details met license requirements, identified the cause of the event, described corrective actions appropriate for the identi fied cause, adequately addressed the event and any generic implication In addition, for those reports marked with an asterisk, the inspector examined selected operating and maintenance logs and records and internal

-6 incident investigation report Personnel were interviewed to verify that the report accurately reflected the circumstances of the event, that the corrective action had been taken or responsibility assigned to assure completion and that the event was reviewed by the licensee, as stipulated in the Technical Specification The following event reports were reviewed:

  • RO-269/79-9 RB High Pressure Trip Switches out of Calibration in Non-Conser vative Direction
  • RO-269/79-12, RB Spray Pump Inoperable RO-269/79-13, Excessive Quadrant Power Tilt
  • RO-269/79-1 4, NI Instrumentation Out-of-Calibration
  • RO-270/79-2, Pressurizer Sample Valve Inoperable RO-270/79-3, RB High Pressure Trip Switches Out of Calibration in Non-Conser

vative Directio RO-270/79-5, Control Rod 3, Group 6 Inoperable

  • RO-287/79-6, Unidentified RCS Leakage in Excess of 1GPM
  • RO-287/79-7, Containment Isolation Valve Inioperable in the Open Position
  • RO-287/79-8, High RPS Flux/Flow Imbalance Trip Settings

A copy of the NRC shutdown order for ANO-1 issued June 2, 1979, was received at Oconee on June 3, 197 The order was the result of procedural inadequacies relative to the emergency feedwater syste Upon receipt of the order at Oconee, licensee management conducted a review of procedures, listed below, to determine if the same or a similar inadequacy existed at Ocone The review conducted by plant operations personnel and verified by the NRC inspector, revealed that procedures covering the regulatory requirement were adequate and no changes or retraining was require The following procedures were reviewed:

OP/1/A/1102/01, Startup Procedure

-7 OP/2/A/1102/01, Startup Procedure OP/3/A/1102/01, Startup Procedure OP/1/A/1106/06, Emergency Feedwater System OP/2/A/1106/06, Emergency Feedwater System OP/3/A/1106/06, Emergency Feedwater System PT/O/A/600/18, EFW Train Operability Test OP/O/A/1102/06, Removal and Restoration of Station Equipment 1 Feedwater Transient - Unit 1 On June 11, 1979, Unit 1 tripped from 100% full power due to to a loss of both main feedwater pumps. The recently installed rea ctor trip circuit on loss of both feedwater pumps functioned as designe Within six seconds after the feedwater pumps tripped, all three emergency feedwater pumps started automatically, and the Unit 1 feedwater supply valves opened to their preset position of 60%.

The reactor operator took manual control of the feedwater supply valves and Ehanle8 athe valves closed to maintain minimum steam generator water level. The valves were throttled to about 20% open to maintain the 25 inch minimum level. The emergency feedwater flow rate to each steam generator was about 240 gpm with the valves at 20% ope Both main feedwater pumps were reset and returned to service in about 20 minutes after the trip. Steam generator level decreased to about 15 inches until the main feedwater pump discharge pressure was high enough to supply water to the steam generators. The delay in reestablishing main feedwater flow was about 2 minutes and was caused by the emergency feedwater pumps stopping automatically when the main feed pumps were rese A change was made to the loss of Steam Generator Feedwater Emergency Procedure, EP/O/A/1800/l4, to require placing the emergency feedwater pump turbine control switch, on. the reactor control board, in run position after the auto star This prevents loss of emergency feedwater when re-starting the main feed pump The operator returns the control to auto after feedflow is stabilize A review of the transient data revealed that operator actions were responsive, timely and correc The newly installed feedwater trip circuit performed its intended functio.

Licensee Plans for Coping With Strikes DPC Oconee management has developed contingency plans covering strike The plan was reviewed by the inspector to determine if the contents were consistent with regulatory requirement The inspector found the plan consistent with regulatory requirement In general, the plan utilizes supervisory and exempt personne Staffing assignments for plant management, operations, maintenance, chemistry, radiation protection and security functions have been predetermine Required training needs have been identified and arrangements have been made to anticipate future requirement Discussion with licensee management revealed that they are familiar with the plan and their assignment.

Instrument Calibration Verification The inspector conducted a review of the following measuring/testing devices used as a primary standard in the calibration of plant equipmen Instrument Number Description OC1AC 27134 Pneumatic Pressure Tester OClAC 27249 Potentiometer OCMNT 27501 Dial Indicator tester OCHNT 27882 Torque wrench Calibration Tester OCMNT 27844 Jo Blocks OCHNT 27832 Jo Blocks OCHNT 27844 Jo Blocks OCHNT 27538 Jo Blocks The following items were verified for the above listed instruments:

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The calibration frequency was met and accuracy verifie The accuracy is traced to the National Bureau of Standard Storage and control is in accordance with approved procedure The inspector conducted a review of the following calibration procedures and test results:

1P/0/0150/01G, RB Temperature Recorder Calibration 1P/0/0210/01A. CF Tank Level Instrumentation

-9 1P/0/0201/01A, CF Tank Press Instrumentation 1P/0/0202/01D, Emergency HPI Flow Instrumentation IP/0/0202/01F, LDST Level Instrumentation IP/O/B/0233/03, Low Level RB Normal Sump Temperature and Level 1P/0/0301/03E, N15 Calibration 1P/0/0301/035, SR-lR Channel Test 1P/0/0301/03G, N17 Calibration 1P/0/0305/01E, RPS Channel A Temperature Calibration 1P/0/0305/01F, RPS Channel B Temperature Calibration 1P/0/0305/01G, RPS Channel C Temperature Calibration 1P/0/0305/01H, RPS Channel D Temperature Calibration 1P/0/0305/01I, RPS Channel A Flow Calibration 1P/0/0305/01J, RPS Channel B Flow Calibration 1P/0/0305/01K, RPS Channel C Flow Calibration 1P/0/0305/01L, RPS Channel D Flow Calibration 1P/0/0305/01M, RPS Channel A Pressure Calibration 1P/0/0305/05B RPS, Channel B R. B. High Pressure Trip Calibration 1P/0/0305/05D RPS, Channel D R. B. High Pressure Trip Calibration 1P/0/0310/07C, ES Logic Subsystem 1 R. B. Isolation Channel 5 Calibration 1P/0/0310/070, ES Logic Subsystem 1 R. B. Spray Channel 7 Calibration 1P/0/0340/04, CRD Absolute Position Indication 1P/0/0340/05, CRD Relative Position Indication 1P/0/0330/02D, Control Rod Drive Patch Test 1P/0/0330/03A, Control Rod Drive Trip Test iP/O/A/0301/03A, NI-1 S. R. Calibration

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1P/0/A/0301/03B, NI-2 S. R. Calibration 1P/0/a/3000/03, 125 VDC Capability Test 1P/0/A/3000/08, 230 K Switchyard Battery Capability Test 1P/0/0360/15, Process Radiation Monitoring 1P/0/0361/01A, Area Radiation Monitorin The above procedures and calibration results were reviewed to verify that:

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Reviews and approvals were being conducted and data was recorded and evaluate Test instruments were listed and identified in the test result Technical contents were correct and verification of return of equipment to service and removal of test equipment was being performe Adherence to Technical Specifications requirements and limiting conditions for operatio The inspector used one or more of the following acceptance criteria for evaluating the instrument calibration verification:

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ANSI N4 ANSI N18.7-1972

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Quality Assurance Program Within the areas inspected no items of noncompliance or deviation were identifie.

Radiological Protection Operation On June 24-25 the Auxillary Building (common for all units) and the Unit 3 Reactor Building were inspected for proper radiological instrumentation, exposure control, and radiological posting and contro The inspector checked calibration dates on friskers at exit stations; noted proper posting and control of radiation areas, including the proper utilization and posting of rope barriers; and physically checked that doors posted as locked radiation areas were locked as required by 10 CFR 20.20 The inspector observed HP control of the personnel hatch for Unit 3 contain ment entry and exit; observed various operations conducted under RWP requirem ents; checked portable instruments in use for operability and calibration date; and checked mobile airborne samplers in containment for proper operatio The inspector also observed workers exiting at several radiological control areas using proper frisking techniques as required by Station Directive 3.8.10 of 6/3/79; interviewed 3 HP personnel concerning stay times, dress

out procedures, and housekeeping requirements; and noted posting of notices in accordance with 10 CFR 19.11 requirement No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.