IR 05000269/1979041
| ML19305E281 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 01/11/1980 |
| From: | Jape F, Martin R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19305E252 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-79-41, 50-270-79-39, 50-287-79-41, NUDOCS 8004230277 | |
| Download: ML19305E281 (6) | |
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'o UNITED STATES
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~,7, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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E REGION 11 g*[
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o, 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SulTE 3100 C
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303
Report Nos. 50-269/79-41, 50-270/79-39 and 50-287/79-41 Licensee: Duke Power Company Post Office Box 2178 Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 Facility Name: Oconee 1, 2 and 3 Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270 and 50-287 License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55 Inspection at Oconee Nuclear Stat.;n and Lee Steam Station
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R. D. Martin, Seition Chief, RONS Branch D'at/ Signed SUMMARY Inspection on December 3-20, 1979 Areas Inspected This routine inspection involved 52 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of plant operations, licensee reportable event, emergency power system maintenance and followup of IEB 79-21.
Results
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Of the four areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in three areas; one apparent item of noncompliance was found in one area (Infraction: failure to follow procedure resulting in noncompliance with Technical Specification 3.3, paragraph 6).
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees Duke Power Company
- W. O. Parker, Jr., Vice President Steam Production
- J. E. Smith, Station Manager
- J. M. Davis, Superintendent of Maintenance
- J. N. Pope, Superintendent of Operations
- T.
B. Owen, Superintendent of Technical Services
- R. T. Bond, Licensing and Projects Engineer R. C. Adams, I&E Engineer
- J. Brackett, Senior QA Engineer H. W. Morgan, Shift Supervisor J. W. Herring, Shift Supervisor T. D._Patterson, Shift Supervisor G. B. Jones, Shift Supervisor D. W. Yoh, Shift Supervisor L. C. Evans, Assistant Shift Supervisor D. L. Gordan, Assistant Shift Supervisor R. T. Scott, Assistant Shift Supervisor W. R. Pollard, Assistant Shift Supervisor D. R. Roth, Assistant Shift Supervisor W. A. Horton, Assistant Shift Supervisor F. E. Owens, Assistant Shift Supervisor D. J. Phillips, Assistant Shift Supervisor C. M. Sheridon, Assistant Shift Supervisor E. G. LeGette, Assistant Shift Supervisor O. G. Kohler, Assistant Shift Supervisor P. J. Chudzik, Assistant Shift Supervisor E. A. Force, Assistant Shift Supervisor S. M. Pryor, Assistant Shift Supervisor L. L. Howell, Assistant Shift Supervisor
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R. Knoerr, I&E Support Engineer C. T. Yongue, Station Health Physicist Other licensee employees contacted included four technicians, three office personnel, four technical support personnel and four maintenance craftsmen.
Duke Power Company - Lee Station A. Batchelor, Shift Supervisor A. Whitte, Control Operator W. Cannon, Control Operator
- Attended exit interviews
- Attended exit interview on 12/20/79
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2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 7, 12 and 20, 1979, with those persons indicated in Paragraph I above.
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The Station Manager acknowledged the item of noncompliance without significant comment. The matter was discussed in some detail and licensee management stated that an investigation is underway to determine cause and how to prevent recurrence.
Other inspection findings were discussed without significant comment.
3.
Licensee Action of Previous Inspection Findings Not 4.nspected.
4.
Unresolved Items
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Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
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5.
Plant Operations The inspector reviewed plant operations to ascertain conformance with regulatory requirements, technical specifications and administrative directives. The control room logs, shift supervisors logs, and the removal and restoration record books for all three units were reviewed.
Interviews
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with a number of plant operations personnel were held on the day and night shifts.
Supervisor and control room operator actions were observed during the shift and at shift changes. The actions and activities were conducted as prescribed in Section 3.08 of the Station Directives. The number of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required by IEB 79-05C. Operators were responsive to annunciator alarms and appeared to be cognizant of plant
status.
During these periods of observation, the operator assigned the special duty as a "HPI valve watch" and "KI inverter watch" was verified. The person assigned these special duties was knowledgeable of his duties and was located within the appropriate control room.
Plant tours were taken during the inspection period as follows:
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a.
Penetration Room, Unit 1 l
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Turbine Building c.
Auxiliary Building d.
Electrical Equipment Rooms Units 1, 2, and 3 Cable Spreading Rooms Units 1, 2 and 3 e.
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Keowee Hydro Station
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Unit 1 Reactor Building l
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Unit 3 Spent Fuel Storage Building i.
Unit 3 Fuel Receiving Area Observations were made during the tours of housekeeping and cleanliness, ongoing activities, security, equipment status and radiation control practices were adhered to during the periods of observation. On one occasion, the inspector inadvertently opened and egressed from a vital area alarmed door without prenotification to security. A guard immediately responded to the alarm and recorded the event as required by the security
procedure.
Within the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Followup on a Reportable Occurrence On December 17, 1979, the licensee reported that on December 9, 1979, valves 2 HP-24 and 2 HP-25 were made inoperable by an I and E Technician while performing preventive maintenance.
Inspector followup on this event
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is described below.
a.
Event Description At the time of this event, Unit I was in a refueling outage and Unit 2 was at 99% power. An I&E Technician was assigned the task of performing IP/0/A/3001/1, " Electrical Preventive Maintenance for Limitroque Operators," on HP-2 and HP-25 on Unit 1.
The equipment was red-tagged out per procedure and the technician proceeded to the job location.
At 1041 hours0.012 days <br />0.289 hours <br />0.00172 weeks <br />3.961005e-4 months <br /> on December 9, 1979, the control operator in Unit 2 Control Room received an indication that 2 HP-24 valve position had changed, and likewise at 1105 hours0.0128 days <br />0.307 hours <br />0.00183 weeks <br />4.204525e-4 months <br /> an indication was received that 2HP-25 position had changed. A utility operator was immediately dispatched to the valve location to investigate the problem. Reactor
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operation had continued stable without any other alarms.
The utility operator discovered the I&E Technician had incorrectly j
performed maintenance on Unit 2 valves rather than Unit 1.
The four i
valves are located along a corridor and Unit 1 valves are separated by approximately 30 feet from the Unit 2 valves. Each valve was labeled properly.
The procedure is a generic procedure for all Limitroque valves and was properly filled out stating work was to be performed on Unit I valves.
The Technician has performed this work on Unit 3 during the recently completed refueling outage.
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Inspector Findings The work was performed on one valve at a time, thus making only one HPI train inoperable for the period of work.
Operations of either 2 i
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t HP-24 or 2HP-25 would supply all three HPI pumps suction from the borated water storage tank if called for by actuation of the engi-neered safeguards system.
Technical Specification 3.3.5 allows one HPI train to be out-of-service for a 24-hour period. The valves were returned to service, and at 1345 hours0.0156 days <br />0.374 hours <br />0.00222 weeks <br />5.117725e-4 months <br /> December 9,1979, a performance test was completed verifying valve operation.
l The failure of the technician to follow procedure resulting in a degraded condition is considered noncompliance with Technical Speci-fication 6.4.le.
Corrective measures to prevent recurrence are being considered by the licensee.
These will be followed up during a future inspection.
7.
Keowee Maintenance Outage A planned maintenance outage for both Keowee Hydro Units (emergency power
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source for Oconee) was initiated at 0609 hours0.00705 days <br />0.169 hours <br />0.00101 weeks <br />2.317245e-4 months <br /> on November 26, 1979.
Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.2 authorizes a 72-hour outage provided a Lee Station gas turbine generator is in operation providing emergency power to Oconee through the 100KV transmission circuit, separated from the grid and non-safety related loads.
In preparation for the Keowee outage, a Lee gas turbine was placed into service on November 25, 1979, and connected to the Osonee standby bus. The 4160 volt ITD and ITE load centers were connected to the standby bus to provide a SMW load for the Lee gas turbine. A second Lee gas turbine unit was also placed into service and operated in parallel with the first unit.
These two gas turbine units remained in operation for the three day Keowee
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outage.
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Following the three-day outage, Keowee Unit I was returned to service while Keowee Unit 2 remained out-of-service for scheduled weld repair on the rotor. TS 3.7.4 authorizes this outage for a maximum of 45 days. A Lee Station gas turbine generator plus the operable Keowee unit must remain in
service during this outage. During this period, the 4160 volt standby buses are to be energized from the Lee Station gas turbine generator and the operable Keowee unit is connected to the underground feeder.
The resident inspector visited the Lee Station on December 5, 1979, to verify compliance with the TS conditions. During the visit, Lee Station l
Unit 4C was in operation, energizing the Oconee 4160 volt standby buses.
Lee Station Units 6C and 5C were on standby, manually available if needed.
i The operators at Lee Station had a current copy of the Oconee procedure OP/0/A/1107/03, "100KV Power Supply". There were no items on noncompliance or deviations identified during this visit.
On November 30, 1979, the licensee identified an inadequacy in the operating procedure for placing the 100 KV power supply into service. One of the two
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standby buses had been not closed-in to the Lee power source. Followup of this event is continuing by the Resident Inspector.
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IEB 79-21, Temperature Effects on Level Measurements The licensee's response, dated September 14, 1979, was reviewed and followed up by the inspector.
The response to Items 1, 2 and 3 of the Bulletin were found satisfactory and completed.
Item 4 of the Bulletin required revisions, as necessary, of emergency procedures and training of operators on these revisions. The original response stated that this activity would be completed by October 31, 1979.
An additional review of the required revisions and training is currently underway by DPC.
A letter from DPC dated December 6, 1979, requested additional time for completion of Item 4.
Therefore, this item will be inspected on a future
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inspection.
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