IR 05000259/1989058
| ML18033B147 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 01/10/1990 |
| From: | Breslau B, Kellogg P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18033B146 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-1220 50-259-89-58, 50-260-89-58, 50-296-89-58, NUDOCS 9001300442 | |
| Download: ML18033B147 (16) | |
Text
t.svss RfCtj+
(v
~t cs0 I
sn V/
+vp ts0
+sb*<<+
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-259/589-58, 50-260/89-58, and 50-296/89-58 Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority 6N 38A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Docket Noser 50-259, 50-260 and 50-296 License Nos.:
DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68 Facility Name:
Browns Ferry 1, 2, and
Inspection Conduc d:
December 18-22, 1989 Inspector:
d B.
B Team Members:
1 Y~ Po D te igned L. Lawyer G. Salyers M. MCMill ms ( AIC)
Approved by:
P.
e og Operational Pr grams Section Division of Reactor Safety Da e gned SUMMARY Scope:
The control room operator and the licensed operator requalification accredited training programs were inspected.
The inspection focused on,(1)
how the tasks were analyzed, (2)
how training objectives were derived from tasks, (3)
how training for the tasks were designed, developed, and implemented, (4)
how trainees were observed and evaluated during training to determine their level of task mastery, and (5)
how feedback on training, trainee evaluation, and on-the-job performance indicators are incorporated into revision and evaluation of the training program.
Results:
Positive management attention was noted in solving training needs.
The active role by management in upgrading training has provided an enhanced training program to support safe plant operations.
The adequacy of these efforts will be determined during a future NRC administered licensed operator requalification exam.
9OO)3QQ 2 9OO1iO POP ADOCK O-'DC rq
The simulator deficiencies are well documented and are scheduled to be corrected by the end of 1991, plus the EOIs are scheduled to be upgraded by
'late 1990.
The correction of these weaknesses wi 11 improve operator performance, paragraph 2.g.
No violations or deviations were noted within the areas inspecte REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee employees
- J. Barnes, Nuclear gA 5 E, Auditing Manager
- C. Beasley, Media Relations Specialist
~A. Champion, Manager, Operations Training
- M. DeRoche, Lead Instructor, Requalification Training
- C. Dexter, Manager, BF Training Department
- L. Durham, Manager, Nuclear Training
'D. Glover, Senior Instructional Systems Specialist
- K. Heck, Technical Secretary, Nuclear Safety Review Board
- M. Herrell, Plant Operations Manager
- C. Hsieh, Compliance Engineer
- J. Hutton, Operations Superintendent
- D. Matherly, Manager, Engineering Training
- C. Noe, Manager, Operations Accreditation Training Programs
- J. Olson, Site Support Manager
- P. Salas, Supervisor, Compliance Licensing
- M. Snodgrass, Nuclear gA Audit Specialist
- 0. Zerinque, Site Director NRC Representatives
- D. Carpenter, Senior Resident Inspector
- B. Wilson, Assistant Director, TVA Projects Division
"Attended exit interview Acronyms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
2.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training (41500)
This inspection was conducted using the procedures and checklists of NUREG-1220, "Training Review Criteria and Procedures"
'a ~
Simulator Observations The inspection team observed simulator sessions for both license requalification and hot license training.
Operators were interviewed regarding their experiences in simulator training.
The current cycle of operator license requalification training entails dividing the shift time equally between simulator and classroom training; providing for simulator sessions of approximately four hour duration.
Hot license training is conducted on a similar schedul Simulator sessions were conducted in a professional manner and no problems were observed in the instructor's operation of the simulator.
Use of a
second instructor to operate the simulator ensured that adequate attention could be directed toward the crew's performance.
The instructor's use of the SOS as a discussion leader for critique of crew performance was seen as a strength.
Simulator Fidelity While observing scenarios being per formed by Licensed Reactor Operators and candidates during their initial and requalification training, the inspection team observed several simulator attributes which were dissimilar from those of the plant.
These divergences were in software, hardware or administration.
Four software dissimilarities were observed.
There was no provision on the simulator for in-putting a full scale reading from the main steam line radiation monitor to the
'A'RPS when called for by the EOI.
A second example was the lack of provision for calling up an OD-39 on the process computer at the simulator.
Third, when MSIVs are opened, post scram, the drop in reactor pressure is not realistic.
Finally, a problem with generator synchronizing controls was observed which had reportedly been the subject of a number of problem reports.
The team noted three cases of lack of hardware fidelity and one case of poor labeling.
First, communications instruments are different, e.g. walkie talkies are not used on the simulator, the simulator has fewer telephones, the telephones are of different type phones, etc.
Secondly, the lighting in the simulator is less diffused resulting in a different and much more severe light reflection problem.
Also, the raised platforms for the SOS and ASOS provided in the plant are not duplicated in the simulator.
A final hardware problem noted was not a lack of fidelity but rather a single case of poor labeling in that recorder 2-XR-64-159 has three color coded pens displaying three parameters but the label identifies the source instrument for only two of the pens.
In addition, the label only provides the nomenclature for two of the inputs and those two are reversed in their order of presentation on the panel label.
Administrative items demonstrating lack of simulator
,fidelity were:
l)
The terminet 300 printout was printing so dimly on one occasion that the STA could not read it and missed one stuck out ro )
The team found that PRs, DCRs, ECN, and DCNs had been tabulated and prioritized, thus defining the limits of accident parameter calculations.
However, the simulator instructors were not provided with this listing and thus were more likely to allow a
simulator scenario to run until an inaccurate parameter portrayal was generated.
This exposed the student to an undesirable training experience.
3)
Recorders in the simulator were not time stamped and time calibrated as were the control room recorders.
4)*
Not all prints provided in the control room for operators were available in the simulator, the method of stowage and retrieval was different, or operators needed additional training in print location.
Additionally, place keeping was not being utilized by all SOS's and those who were using a place keeping technique were not using it consistently throughout the EOI training on the simulator.
Browns Ferry management expects such place keeping to be consistently utilized in the plant.
A related problem was that on occasion an ASOS would find that residual place keeping marks were in the EOI when he attempted to utilize it.
c.
Simulator Lesson Material Adequacy The team found the lesson plans for daily simulator training to be lacking performance criteria, ie. expected operator actions.
However, those criteria were included in simulator lesson plans used for weekly testing.
The three or four major evolutions planned for each simulator scenario were not all performed by all instructors.
The criteria for deletion of one or more of the evolutions was not specified.
d.
Student Conduct on the Simulator During several scenarios the team observed a breakdown in the chain of command in that both the ASOS and the SOS were directing the activities of the UO and AUO.
In addition, communications among the crew members needed improvement.
For example, on one occasion the ASOS said
"OK gentlemen, what have we gotl", intending by this to elicit a plant status.
Instead, no response was given.
On another shift the SOS felt it necessary to instruct the shift persons on the parameters he wanted reported and the order in which they should be reported each time an incident occurred.
These communication rules are not enforced and reinforced uniformly across all shift While there were instances of inappropriate operator response to emergencies, they were not numerous and the instructors utilized the opportunity to modify student response.
Pass/fail decisions on the weekly dynamic simulator examinations by the training and operations staff and management were identical to those of the NRC team.
e.
Program Administration After each simulator training scenario the simulator training instructors critique the performance of the crew and of each person on the crew.
These critiques were objective and appropriately received by the students.
One minor weakness was observed.
While all technically oriented enabling objectives were covered in the critiques, it was common to omit the very general ones such as
"The operating crew will continue with a startup from 59 percent power in accordance with GOI-...."
The instructor's station in the simulator is open and located near the student.
From the student location the student can hear the simulated plant operator to whom he is speaking.
Seeing and hearing the simulated plant operator is a constant reminder that the student is in a simulator and not in a real control room.
TSC communications to plant personnel which can be heard in the control room were not simulated in the simulator.
For example, upgrades of emergency classification by the site director after the SOS had turned over that function were not heard in the simulator.
f.
General The inspection team observed JPMs being administered in both the plant and the simulator.
In-plant JPMs were conducted in the control room and locally.
JPMs were being performed for training purposes and were therefore not being formally scored.
BF-OTIL-39, "Development of Job Performance Measures,"
(issued 12/16/89)
formalizes the development process and format for JPMs.
Provisions were included for providing initiating and terminating conditions to the examinee, which satisfied a
commitment made in the requalification exam report.
2)
Evaluator Training and Certification A training program for JPM evaluators had recently been initiated.
It was also reported to the inspection team that General Electric had performed an evaluation of the evaluators and certification recommendations of JPM evaluators were expected soon.
Evaluators appeared to be knowledgeable of proper administration method )
Validation of JPMs JPMs were currently being used as training tools in requalif-ication training.
Concurrent with this training, the instructors were performing additional validation of the steps and.questions.
While this practice of ongoing validation is seen as a strength, the fact that a
number of necessary revisions continue to be identified (beyond those due to plant modifications or procedure changes)
indicated that initial validation may not have been as rigorous as desired.
4)
Performance Standards Standards identified in the JPMs did not always provide sufficient criteria.
Also, neither the procedure (BF-OTIL-39)
or training procedure (ICP020.001)
covering JPMs addressed the consideration of non-critical steps in determining overall pass/fail.
Both of these issues had the potential to result in grading inconsistencies between different evaluators.
g.
Overview of Simulatot Effectiveness The greatest strength of the simulator training at Browns Ferry is the experience,.knowledge and dedication of the instructional staff.
The, primary weaknesses are the simulator's limited ability to exercise the existing EOIs and the human factors weakness of the vendor specific revision 3 guidelines.
Both of these weaknesses increase the burden on the operator.
The team observed that the licensee documented, through their own efforts and those of others (NRC, INPO, etc.),
an exhaustive listing of simulator deficiencies.
These had been reviewed and prioritized, with the residual to be corrected by the simulator upgrade currently scheduled to be completed by the end of 1991.
The existing EOIs, to the extent they can be simulated on the simulator, were observed to be adequate to safely shutdown the plant.
However, revision of the EOIs to the vendor groups'evision
together with revision of the EOIs to correct the remaining deficiencies from NRC inspection report 88-200 will significantly improve their user friendliness.
It is important that the licensee maintains its'urrent'efforts towards upgrading the EOI h.
Cl assr oom Instruction Observations All instructors were required to be trained and certified in accordance with NT-2.920 Rev. O-Interim, "Instructor Training."
This procedure required that instructors be evaluated on an annual basis as part of the recertification process.
It was not required, however that. evaluations be performed specific in all environments in which the instructor will be providing training (i.e. simulator, classroom or laboratory).
A review of instructor certification and training records indicated that several instructors who provide simulator training had not been evaluated in the simulator for certification.
The team did note that additional evaluations were performed by instructor's supervisors, however, these were not necessarily reviewed by the certification staff or entered into the training record.
The inspection team observed classroom instructions over a three day period; observing a different instructor each day.
The instructors observed were knowledgeable of the subject material presented and conducted their respective classes in a professional manner.
The team observed a class presentation of "Heat Transfer and Fluid Flow".
The instructor conducting the class in HTFF, taught from the student text and did not use a lesson outline or an instructor guide.
Discussions with the instructor revealed that lesson outlines nor instructor guides were used by the instructors in conducting the HTFF course.
The licensee stated that consistency between instructors is maintained by having the same two instructors present HTFF.
However, the team noted that each instructor's materials were annotated differently, plus, on occasion a -third instructor had given the lecture.
Based on these facts, the potential exists for inconsistency in class presentations.
The inspection team, while reviewing the licensee's OP171 series lesson plans in the master files, noted that the same subject materials (lesson plans)
were used to instruct AUOs, HLT, HLT review sessions, and requalification classes.
The detail, and method of presentation is different in all four classes.
Different instructor guides and/or lesson plans are not developed for each of the four curriculum levels'.
The instructors use their own judgement as.to the amount of detail needed for each class level.
The licensee stated that consistency was ensured by having the same instructor give the lecture to all six requalification classes.
However, the team observed the presentation for "Residual Heat Removal System" and noted that an excellent presentation was conducted, but differed considerably from the same lecture presented to the previous requalification group.
This lack of instructor guides and lesson plans for the specific trainee level creates additional potential for inconsistency in class presentation The team reviewed the course schedule for class 8905 and concluded that the schedule did not accurately depict the subject content.
The course schedule for class 8905 week three, listed
"RHR" as a subject.
The lecture was a detailed presentation in the systems portion of the curriculum.
Week 14 also listed "RHR", but was presented as a review with question and answers, and covered portions of the OI.
Schedules that fail to reflect course differentiation will cloud future reviews of past schedules when attempting to determine the level of course content taught.
Additionally, class 8905s schedule did not fully support simulator training.
The class schedule that was reviewed, indicated that the classroom lecture for one system was given almost two weeks after the corresponding simulator exercise.
The team reviewed the course schedule for class 8912 and noted the schedule was not developed beyond week 10.
The.licensee acknowledged that the schedule was not complete.
The class was presently in week seven of the fundamentals portion of the program, and the class will not enter the system portion of the schedule until April 1990.
The licensee was evaluating feedback from the 8905 class to determine those needs for incorporation to the systems training for the 8912 class.
The licensee stated an approved schedule will be in place prior to the convening of the April 1990, 8912 system classes.
Program evaluation The licensee's retraining program encompasses a
two year period, which consists of topics that are based on licensee commitments in accordance with
CFR 55, industry events/concerns, inputs from licensed personnel and management, prior annual requalification and examination results, and knowledge and skills associated with tasks that are infrequently performed and are important to successful job performance.
The licensee has developed a
sample plan and testing specification which correlates the K/A rating for topic development of examinations.
This creates a plant specific validated knowledge and ability catalog.
,The licensee's procedure, PMP 0202.05, Nuclear Plant Operator Training Programs, Revision 2 describes the evaluation methodology in place at Browns Ferry.
It includes methods for systematically evaluating the training programs and for revising the programs as required.
The inspection team found documented evidence that such evaluations are taking place on a routine basis after each class, after each training cycle, and on an annual and biannual basis for full program evaluations.
Documentation included completed analysis of examinations, completed instructor critiques, trainee critiques, job performance feedback from supervisors and the results of internal and external evaluations.
Overall, the evaluation process contains most of the essential elements of a good evaluation program.
No violations or deviations were noted
)4
3.
Exit interview (30703)
An exit interview was conducted on December 22, 1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph I above.
The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.. Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Acronyms ASOS AUO BF CFR DCN DCR ECN EOI EPIP HTFF HLT INPO ISCT JPM K/A MSIV NRC NUREG OI PR QA QASE
'RHR RPS SAIC SOS SRO STA TS TSC UO Assistant Shift Operations Supervisor Auxiliary Unit Operator Browns Ferry Code of Federal Regulation Design Change Notice Design Change Request Engineering Change Notice Emergency Operating Instructions Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Heat Transfer 5 Fluid Flow Hot Licensed Training Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Individual Simulator Critical Task Job Performance Measure Knowledge/Ability Main Steam Isolation Valve Nuclear Regulator Coranission Nuclear Regulation Operating Instructions Problem Report Quality Assurance Quality Assurance 8 Engineering Residual Heat Removal Reactor Protection System Science Application International Corporation Shift Operations Supervisor Senior Reactor Operator Shift Technical Advisor Technical Specification Technical Support Center Unit Operator
k 0