IR 05000259/1989041
| ML18033B080 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 12/01/1989 |
| From: | Rankin W, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18033B079 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-89-41, 50-260-89-41, 50-296-89-41, NUDOCS 8912200074 | |
| Download: ML18033B080 (17) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 11 101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
+w*w+
Report Nos.:
50-259/89-41, 50-260/89-41, and 50-296/89-41 Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority 6N 38A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Docket Nos.:
50-259, 50-260 and 50-296 License Nos.:
DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68, Facility Name:
Browns Ferry 1, 2, and
Inspection Conducted:
Octo 30 - November 3, 1989 Inspector:
'.
N. Sartor, Jr.
Accompanying Personnel:
F. Kantor (NRR, PEPB)
.
M. Stein (Sonalysts, Inc.)
I
'Approved by:~
~
~
W..H. Rankin, ief Emergency Preparedness Section Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
// 38 Date Signe Date Signed SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, ann'ounced inspection was the observation and evaluation of the annual emergency exercise.
State and local governments participated fully in this exercise.
Additionally, NRC participated in the exercise with the Headquarters Executive Team and the Region =II Base Team and Site Team.
TVA-also provided support to the State on November 2,
1989, with the Ingestion Exposure Pathway exercise.
Results:
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
Based upon the scenario used and the response observed thereto, the licensee successfully demonstrated the capability.to perform in accordance with the Emergency Preparedness Plans and Procedures to adequately provide for the-health and safety of the public.
8912c~00074 891205 P DR ADOCK 05000iP59
REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. Bynum, Vice President, Nuclear Power
- G. Campbell, Plant Manager
- P. Carier, Licensing Manager
- J. Corey, Radcon Superintendent
- T. Cornelius, Radiological Emergency Manager
'W. Harland, Work. Control Supervisor
- J. Hutton, Operations Superintendent
- 0. Kingsley, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Power
- R. Kitts, Manager, Emergency Preparedness
- B. Marks, Manager, Emergency Preparedness-Proorams
- L..Retzer, Fire Protection Supervisor
- S. Rudge, Site Programs Manager
- G. Turner, Browns Ferry Nuclear Site guality Manager
- R. Tuttle, Browns Ferry Nuclear Site Security Manager
- T. White, Supervisor, Communications
- T. Youngblood, Emergency Preparedness Manager
- 0. Zerinque, Site Director Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors 2.
- D. Carpenter, Site Manager
"C. Patterson, Restart Coordinator
- Attended exit interview Exercise Scenario (82302)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that provisions had been'ade to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee, State, and local Emergency Plans and organization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The scenario developed for this exercise was adequate to fully exercise
'the onsite and offsite emergency organizations of the licensee and provided sufficient emergency information to the State and local government agencies for their full participation in the exercise.
Although some minor-inconsistencies with messages and data were noted
duri'ng the exercise, it did not detract from the overall performance of the licensee's emergency organization.
No violations 'or deviations were identified.
3.
Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to determine that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee had been specifically established and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as required by
CFR 50.47(b) (1),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specified criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.A.
The inspector observed that specific emergency assignments had been made for the licensee's emergency response organization and there were adequate staff avai:lable to respond.to the simulated emergency.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Fmergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
This area was observed to determine that arranoements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources had been made, that arrangements to accommodate licensee staff and the NRC response team at the'icensee's Emergency Operations Facility Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) in Chattanooga, Tennessee had been made, and that other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response had been identified as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(3),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV;A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.C.
State and local staff were accommodated at the State Emergency Operations Center in Decatur, Alabama.
The licensee's staff and NRC response team were accomodated at the CECC.
Licensee contact with offsite organizations was prompt and'ssistance resources from various agencies were prepared to assist in the simulated emergency.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to determine that a
standard emergency classification and action level scheme 'was in use by the nuclear facility licensee as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(4),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.D.
An inspector observed that the emergency classification system was in effect as. stated in the Radiological Emergency Plan and in the Implementing Procedures.
The system appeared to be adequate for the classification of the simulated accident and the emergency procedures provided for initial and continuing mitigating actions during the simulated.emergenc.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established for notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations and emergency 'personnel, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations had been established; and means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway had been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and specified criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.E.
An inspector observed that notification methods and procedures had been established and were used to provide information concerning the simulated
. emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response organizations and to alert, the licensee's augmented emergency response organization.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to determine that provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response oroanizations and emergency personnel as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(6),
CFR 50, Appendix E,
. Paragraph IV.E, and specified criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.F.
~
Communications among the licensee's emergency response facilities and emergency oroanization and between the licensee's emergency response organization and offsite authorities appeared adequate.
No significant communications related problems were identified during this exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Public Education and Information (82301)
This area was observed to determine that information concerning the simulated emergency was made available for dissemination to the public as
. required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.G.
Information was provided to the media and the public in advance of the exercise.
The information included details on how the public would be notified and what initial actions they should take in an emergency.
A rumor control program was in place.
The Joint Information Center (JIC)
was established and appeared adequately equipped.
News releases appeared to be timely and well coordinated.
No violations or deviations were identifie Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph -IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.H:
The inspector observed the activation, staffing, and operation of selected emergency response facilities.
No equipment deficiencies were observed during the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.,
Accident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to determine that adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring -actual or potential offsit'e consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.I.
The accident assessment program included both an engineering assessment of plant status
'and an assessment-of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident.
Both programs appeared effective during this exercise in analyzing the plant status so as to make recommendations to the Site Emergency Director concerning mitigating actions to reduce damage to plant equipment, to prevent release of radioact'ive materials and to terminate the emergency condition.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Protective Responses (82301)
This area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented promptly as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(10),
and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.J.
An inspector verified the licensee had and used
'emergency procedures for formulating protective action recommendations for offsite populations within the 10 mile emergency
.,planning zone (EPZ).
The licensee's protective action recommendations were consistent with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
and other criteria and notifications >>ere made to the appropriate State and local authorities within the 15-minute criteria.
The-licensee demonstrated the ability to-assemble onsite personnel and provided an accountability report to the Site Emergency Director (SED) in approximately 27 minutes.
No violations or deviations were identifie.
Exercise Critique (82301)
I The. licensee's critique of the emergency exercise'as observed to determine that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were formally presented to licensee management for corrective actions as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(14),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The licensee s critique process reflected prior planning, indepth analysis of observations made during the exercise, and management commitment to improve the emergency preparedness program by making necessary coirrections.
Following the exercise termination, lead con'trollers for the emergency facilities conducted critiques to secure any player comments or observations.
- The exercise controller/evaluator staff then analyzed the play'er responses observed during the exercise against the scenario and the exercise objectives to provide an evaluated exercise critique to management on November 3,
1989.
Although the critique to management reflected a fully successful exercise with no exercise weaknesses, numerous ai eas for improvement were presented and management support to an improved program was provided.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13.
14.
Federal Evaluation Team Report The report by the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional Assistance Committee and Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IV staff) concerning the activities of offsite agencies during the exercise will be forwarded by separate correspondence.
Action on Previous Inspectiori Findings (92701)
(Closed)
Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-259, 260, 296/89-25-01:
Scenario development team did not have a clear understanding of the basis for classification of postulated accident.
The scenario review as well as exercise observations'eflected a clear understanding of the basis for classification of the postulated accident by the scenario development team.
15.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on November 3, 1989, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Attachment:=
Goals and Objectives
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)
EMERGENCY PL'AN (EP)
EXERCISE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES The 1989 BFH EP exercise will be a full-scale exercise requiring full participation by TVA, the state, and local emergency response agencies.
'VA will support the state in an Ingestion Exposure Pathway exercise.
TVA's goals for the 1989 BFN exercise are as follows:
.1.
To allow plant and Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) personnel to test and demonstrate their response capability in accordance with the Nuclear Power-Radiological Emergency Plan (NP-REP),
BFH Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs),
and CECC EPIPs to protect the health and safety of TVA employees and the general public.
2.
To demonstrate the deficiency observed in a recent exercise listed in item H has been corrected.
3.
To provide training for emergency response personnel.
4.
To perform post-exercise critiques to determine any areas requiring additional capability improvement and to identify emergency preparedness weaknesses.
5.
Demonstrate the ability of TVA to support the state in their emergency response activities within the Ingestion Exposure Pathway emergency planning zone.
v A.
Control Room Object'ives 1.
Demonstrate the ability of the Site Emergency Director (Shift Operations Supervisor fSOS]) to classify an emergency condition and make required notifications to the Operations Duty Specialist within five minutes and to the NRC within one hour.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to provide onsite protective action measures for plant personnel.
3.
Demonstrate the precise and clear transfer of responsibilities from the Control Room staff to 'the, Technical Support Center (TSC) staf.
Demonstrate the ability of the SOS to update Control Room personnel of the status of the emergency situation and actions currently being planned by the:TSC.
5.
Demonstrate the ability of the Control Room personnel to maintain equipment status, plant status, corrective actions taken and to maintain logs.
6.
Demonstrate effective command and control by the SOS in the control room.
B.
TSC Objectives 1. Demonstrate the ability to activate the TSC within 60 minutes.
2. Demonstrate effective command and control by the Site Emergency Director (SED) in the TSC-3. Demonstrate the problem solving capabilities of the TSC staff to identify the cause of the incident, and mitigate the consequences of the incident.
4. Demonstrate the ability of the SED in the TSC to classify an emergency condition.
5. Demonstrate the ability to effectively utilize inplant radiation monitors.
6. Demonstrate the ability to perform timely assessments of onsite radiological conditions.
7. Demonstrate the timely updating of TSC status boards.
8. Demonstrate timely updating of the OSC and the Control Room, and the transfer of technical informati'on to the CECC.
9. Demonstrate the ability to assemble onsite personnel (in the protected area)
and provide an accountability report to the SED within 30 minutes after sounding the accountability alarms.
10. Demonstrate the precise and clear transfer of accurate information between,the TSC staff, and the CECC staff.
C.
OSC Objectives
.I.
Demonstrate the ability to activate the OSC within 60 minutes.
2.
Demonstrate effective command and control by the OSC manage.
Demonstrate the following capabilities:
a.
OSC teams are briefed on plant conditions.
b.
Adequate RadCon support is provided..
c.
The exposure of onsite emergency workers is controlled.
d.
Proper use of protective clothing.
e.
OSC teams are tracked in a timely manner.
4.
Demonstrate that there are adequate communications and efficient
,transfer of information between the OSC and the,TSC, RadCon laboratory, and Chemistry laboratory.
5.
Demonstrate the timely updating of OSC status boards.
6. Demonstrate the radiological control capability to:
a.
Perform effective inplant and site boundary surveys during radiological emergencies while following good RadCon and ALARA practices.
b.
Track changing radiological conditions through timely documentation of survey results.
c.
Make timely and effective transfers of survey results fxom the OSC RadCon staff to the OSC and TSC.
d.
Track and control the exposure of onsite emergency workers.
e..
Make a timely and efficient activation of the plant environmental monitoring van and the establishment of adequate communications with the TSC and/or the CECC.
7.
Demonstrate the chemistry capability to obtain and analyze samples or data as necessary to support plant assessment and radiological assessment activities.
D.
CECC Objectives 1.
Demonstrate that the Operations Duty Specialist makes the initial emergency notifications to the State within five minutes after plant notification and,offsite TVA emergency personnel are notified in a timely manner.
2.= Demonstrate the ability to activate the CECC within 60 minutes.
3.
Demonstrate that the CECC Director makes a clear=announcement the CECC is declared operational, maintains effective command and control in the CECC, and provides periodic briefings to the CECC staf. Demonstrate the ability to effectively use TVA corporate or outside support organizations and to obtain vendor or other outside resources, if needed.
5. Demonstrate the precise and clear transfer of accurate information between the TSC staff and the CECC staff.
6. Demonstrate the ability of the CECC staff to direct and coordinate the deployment of Radiological Monitoring Teams and coordinate TVA dose assessment activities.
7. Demonstrate the ability of the Dose Assessment Team to obtain, analyze, and use onsite and/or offsite radiological conditions and meteorological information to produce dose assessments to provide to the CECC Director in a clear and timely manner.
8. Demonstrate the ability to inform, update, and coordinate with State Radiological Health personnel regarding meteorological, dose assessment information, and plant status.
9. Demonstrate the ability of the CECC Plant Assessment Team to analyze current plant conditions, identify projected trends and potential consequences, and provide the information to the CECC Director.
10. Demonstrate the ability of the CECC to provide at le'ast hourly updates of plant status to the-state.
11. Demonstrate a timely and effective flow of information between CECC Radiological and Plant Assessment Teams.
12. Demonstrate the timely and accurate updating of CECC status boards.
13. Demonstrate that proper security is established and maintained for the CECC.
14. Demonstrate the ability to alert Federal and industrial emergency contacts as appropriate.
15. Demonstrate the adequacy of communications links between the CECC and State Emergency Operation Centers.
E.
Enviions Assessment Activities 1.
Demonstrate the ability of the Radiological Monitoring Teams to efficiently and effectively utilize their procedures to perform dose rate surveys, collection and analysis of radiological samples,"and other prescribed radiological monitoring activitie ~
Demonsfrate the ability of the monitoring teams to follow contamination control procedures under field conditions if warranted.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to control the exposure of offsite utility emergency workers.
4.
Demonstrate effective command and control of radiological monitoring activities by the plant and/or CECC and that adequate conmunications links exist.
F.
Public Information Objectives l.
Demonstrate the ability of site media relations to draft the first news release at the site while the CECC is being activated.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate information with non-TVA agencies from the CECC before the JIC is activated.
3.
Demonstrate the ability of the information staff in the CECC to develop timely and accurate news releases.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate information with non-TVA agencies at the JIC following activation.
5.
Demonstrate the ability of Rumor Control in the JIC and EIC to identify and respond to rumors.
6.
Demonstrate the ability to support the state and counties in their emergency response activities at the JIC for the ingestion pathway exercise.
G.
Credit will be taken for the following required EP drills.
I.
Plant environmental radiological monitoring drill.
2.
Plant RadCon drill.
3.
TSC/CECC communications drill.
Offsite environmental radiological monitoring drill.
5-CECC dose assessment drill.
H.
Open NRC inspector follow-up item (IFI):
No specific criteria or'mergency action level existed in EPIP-1 for the postulated emergency situation (reactor water cleanup line break.)
The control room controllers remained outside the control room horseshoe and did not interact adequately with the control room participants to answer questions and closely obser've their actions.
(IFI 50-259, 260, 296/89-2501)
TEA:PAL 8/16/89 5529E
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