IR 05000259/1989025
| ML18033A840 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 07/13/1989 |
| From: | Rankin W, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18033A839 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-89-25, 50-260-89-25, 50-296-89-25, NUDOCS 8907260110 | |
| Download: ML18033A840 (7) | |
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UN IT E D STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 JUL i8 1989 Report Nos.:
50-259/89-25, 50-260/89-25, and 50-296/89-25 Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority 6N 38A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Docket Nos.:
50-259, 50-260 and 50-296 License Nos.:
DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68 Facility Name:
Browns Ferry 1, 2, and
Inspection Conducted:
May
- June 2, 1989 Inspector:
W.
. Sartor, r.
Accompanying Personnel:
B. Haagensen (PNL)
M. Stein (PNL)
K. Ivey W. Rankin t
Approved by: CP W. H.
Ran in, C ief Emergency Preparedness Section Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards 7/8
ate igne a
e igned SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was the observation and evaluation of the annual emergency exercise.
Results:
The licensee's performance observed was fully satisfactory to meet all exercise objectives.
The only negative observations made by the NRC inspection team focused on the failure of the exercise scenario development team to have a
clear understanding of the Site Area Emergency Action Level event used in this exercise.
S5'07260iiO 8907iS PDFl ADOCI O=OOO2ry
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- M. Bolch, Browns Ferry Nuclear Radiological Emergency Manager
- T. Chinn, Operations Support/Procedures Manager
- M. Hellums, Licensing Manager
- R. Kitts, Emergency Preparedness Manager
- M. Lovell, Fire Protection Manager
- J. Maddox, Project Engineer Controls Manager
- N. Moon, Chemistry Control Manager
- B. Morris, Corrective Actions Manager
- J. Olson, Site Support Manager
- F. Tsakeres, Radiological Protection Manager
- R. Tuttle, Site Security Manager
- 0. Zerinque, Site Director Other licensee
. employees contacted during this inspection included supervisors, engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors K. Ivey
- C. Patterson
- Attended exit interview Exercise Scenario (82302)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that provisions had been made to test the licensee's integrated emergency response capability as well as to test a major portion of the basic elements within the licensee's Emergency Plan as required by
CFR 50.54(t),
50.47(b)(14),
and Section IV.F of Appendix E to
CFR 50.
The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and discussed briefly with licensee representatives.
A concern noted that the exercise scenario listed the classification of the Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and loss of offsite power at 1830 hours0.0212 days <br />0.508 hours <br />0.00303 weeks <br />6.96315e-4 months <br /> as
" a Site Area Emergency (SAE)
based on an emergency action level (EAL) of Primary Coolant Break outside of containment without isolation."
This EAL does not exist in the Emergency Plan Classification Logic Procedure (EPIP-1).
The Site Emergency Director (SED) did classify events at the SAE level based on his judgement that the plant conditions had degraded to the point where the threat was appropriate.
However, there was no specific EAL that was met that would have made this classification necessary.
The failure
of the exercise scenario development team to have a clear understanding of the basis for classification of the postulated accident was identified as an inspector followup item (IFI) (IFI 50-259, 260, 296/89-25-01).
An inspector also noted that the Control Room controllers remained outside the horseshoe area during the initial accident phase.
They entered this area momentarily to hand out messages and data sheets.
As a result they were not able to observe and evaluate player performance nor were they able to intercede at appropriate moments when scenario data was inaccurate or players had reasonable questions regarding message events.
Fortunately, the players'evel of performance was sufficient to sort out the difficulties and they made no major mistakes.
Under different circumstances, this detached method of evaluation would have been inadequate to prevent scenario problems or detect incorrect operator actions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's organization was observed during the simulated emergency to ensure the requirements of Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50 were implemented addressing the description, responsibilities, and assignments of the onsite emergency response organization.
The inspector observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was adequately defined and that staff was available to fill key functional positions within the emergency organization.
The Shift Operating Supervisor (SOS)
assumed the duties of the SED promptly upon initiation of the simulated emergency and directed the response until relieved as the SED, by the Plant Manager.
The SED declared the TSC operational approximately 40 minutes after the emergency declaration.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4 ~
s.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to verify that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the licensee as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(4)
and Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50.
The Emergency Plan Classification Logic Procedure (EPIP-1)
provided for the correct classification of the emergency situations.
The scenario team did not appear to have a firm understanding of the EAL procedure.
This is noted as an IFI in Paragraph 2.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to assure that provisions existed for prompt communications among the principal response organization and emergency
personnel as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(6),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUERG-0654,Section II.f.
The communications hardware among the licensee's emergency response facilities and emergency organization appeared fully adequate.
The information flow between the various emergency response facilities (ERFs)
was significantly improved over previous exercises and was adequate to support event mitigation, classification, and protection action recommendations (PARs).
The ERF PA system was used to brief all ERFs regarding plant status.
In all cases, events were known in the TSC shortly after they occurred in the plant.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Accident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.I.
The accident assessment program included an engineering assessment for plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting form the accident.
The effective use of status boards and periodic briefings'y the Operational Support Center (OSC) Director kept the OSC functional teams well informed.
The TSC was able to monitor the progress of plant repair teams.
The SED's management of the TSC's resources was extremely effective in focusing the right resources at the right problem at the right time.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
(Closed)
IFI 50-259, 260, 296/87-39-01:
Failure to demonstrate objective of SED's ability to make notifications to site emergency response personnel.
The inspector noted that the Shift Clerk correctly and promptly initiated the notifications to site emergency response personnel when directed to notify.
However, the inspector also noted it was approximately 10 minutes after the emergency declaration before the Shift Clerk was notified.
b.
(Closed)
IFI 50-259, 260, 296/87-39-02:
Onsite personnel were not kept apprised of the emergency status.
Significant improvement was noted in keeping onsite personnel apprised of the emergency status.
This area is planned for further hardware upgrade.
c.
(Closed)
IFI 50-259, 260, 296/87-39-04:
Need for improved command and control of OSC repair and assessment teams.
The OSC was functionally organized and'ontrolled very effectively by the OSC
Item Number 50-259, 260) 296/89-25-01 Oescri tion and References IFI - Scenario development team did not have a clear understanding of the basis for classification of postulated accident (Paragraph 2).
Director in a prioritized repair effort that successfully blocked the release path.
d.-
(Closed)
IFI 50-259, 260, 296/88-30-01:
Failure to demonstrate adequate and effective emergency communications flow between and within the emergency response facilities (ERFs).
The information flow between ERFs was significantly improved and provided for event classification and mitigation.
8.
Exercise Critique (82301)
and Exit Interview The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to assure that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were formally presented to licensee management for corrective actions as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(14),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria in NUERG-0654,Section II.N.
Effective player critiques were held following exercise termination.
In addition, the controller/evaluator staff of the exercise prepared a
detailed and thorough critique and presented it to the licensee's management, exercise controllers and observers, and NRC representatives on June 2, 1989.
Following the licensee's critique, the NRC Team Leader provided a summary of the NRC observations.