IR 05000259/1989054
| ML18033B144 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 01/18/1990 |
| From: | Carpenter D, Little W, Patterson C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18033B143 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-89-54, 50-260-89-54, 50-296-89-54, NUDOCS 9001300168 | |
| Download: ML18033B144 (16) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-259/89-54, 50-260/89-54, and 50-296/89-54 Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority 6N 38A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga,-TN 37402-2801, Docket Nos.:
50-259, 50-260, and 50-296 License Nos.:
DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68 Facility Name:
Browns Ferry Units 1, 2, and
Inspection at Browns Ferry Site near Decatur, Alabama Inspection Conducted:
November 15 - December 18, 1989 I
I p
)-
Inspector i
<i)
P.
R. Carpente 'C Site Manager
.
A. Pat drson, NRC Restart Coordinator k
Accomp nied by:
E. Christnot, Resident Inspector W. Bearden, Resident Inspector K. Ivey, Resident Inspector
-) <>
-II Approved by:
W.
S. Little, 'Section Chief, Inspection Programs, TVA Projects Division Dat Si ne Cpi Da e Signed
~c-'e igned SUMMARY Scope:
This routine resident inspection included followup of open items and action on previous inspection findings.
Results:
This inspection report is primarily a closeout of open items and LERs.
Six VIOs, two URIs, and three IFIs items were closed.
The plant licensing staff continues to make good progress in closing out old issues and preparing closure packages for the NRC.
There are no cited violations or deviations in this inspection report.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees:
- 0. Zeringue, Site Director,
"G. Campbell, Plant Manager M. Herrell, Plant Operations Manager
- J. Swindell, Plant Support Superintendent
"R. Smith, Project Engineer
"J. Hutton, Operations Superintendent A. Sorrell, Mai,ntenance Superintendent
"W. Thomison, Acting Technical Support Superintendent G. Turner, Site guality Assurance Manager P. Carier, Site Licensing Manager
- P. Salas, Compliance Supervisor J.
Corey, Site Radiological Control Superintendent R. Tuttle, Site Security Manager Other licensee employees or contractors contacted included licensed reactor operators, aux'i liary operators, craftsmen, technicians, and.
publ'ic safety, officers; and quality assurance, design, and engineering personnel.
NRC Employees
- D. Carpenter, Site Manager
"C. Patterson, Restart Coordinator
- E. Christnot, Resident Inspector
"W. Bearden, Resident Inspector
- K. Ivey, Resident Inspector
"Attended exit interview Acronyms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
2.
Followup On Open Inspection Items (92701)
a.
(Closed) IFI 259/85-25-02, Electrical Design Error.
This it'em was opened to track a
design error di scovere'd by the licensee in the electrical circuit for two handswitches which allowed the bypassing of the interlock for drywel 1 purging in the Run mode of operation.
With these switches in the bypass position and the unit mode switch in Run, the SGTS, CREV and some Group VI i solations would be inoperable.
Subsequent to the above inspection, the licensee submitted LER No.
259/85-09 which reported this design error in the PCIS logic.
An
'nspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions for this LER and documented the review in NRC IR 88-28.
The inspector had reviewed the ECN, associated workplan, and related PMT which the
licensee performed to resolve this issue.
No discrepancies were identified during that review.
This item is closed.
(OPEN)
IFI 259, 260, 296/88-11-01, Example A,
Establish Method For Transferring EQ Material.
(CLOSED)
IFI 259, 260, 296/88-11-01, Example B,
Provide EQ Training For Contract Engineering Personnel.
(CLOSED)
IFI 259, 260, 296/88-11-03, EQ Training Program For Maintenance. Craft Personnel.
NRC inspection 88-11 identified=a number of concerns in the EQ area, some. of which involved the adequacy of the administrative portions of the program.
The specific concerns involved mainly the training of personnel and a
process for transferring EQ material.
When a
reqUired item of equipment is available from another TVA plant, and it meets all technical and quality requirements, a
transfer requisition is initiated instead of a procurement specification and purchase requisition.
Procedures assign the responsibility for determining the adequacy of a
transferred item's technical and quality requirements to the Contract Engineering Group.
,The inspector's reviews determined, that measures had not been established to ensure that EQ reviews are performed for transferred materials within the scope of '10 CFR 50.49.
Discussions with personnel from CEG revealed that the BFN EQ project is often contacted by the group to verify that the transferred material is suitable for its end use.
CEG personnel also review the suitability of transferred material for EQ applications by use of the environmental qualification parameters for transferred equipment.
In addition, the CEG personnel had not been trained in the requirements of the EQ program.
A licensee audit identified a lack of EQ training of site personnel.
After two discussions with licensee management, the training instructor, and a
review of objective evidence, the inspectors determined that TVA'
management has not yet corrected this deficiency.
The licensee'
exi sting maintenance training program, which is task specific, did not provide for the EQ training necessary to assure that equipment qualifications as established are maintained during plant maintenance activities.
The inspector reviewed these items as they pertain to training only.
The licensee instituted a
training program by developing and conducting training on the following:
EQP001.001, Introduction to Environmental Qualifications EQP001.002, TVA EQ Program - The Basic Elements EQP002.000, Dedication, Procurement and Replacement of
CFR 50.49 Items EQP004.001, Environmental Qualification Data Packages/Binders
EQP005.001, EQ Training for Craftsman and Engineer's Maintaining the Qualification of 10 CFR 50.49 Environmentally Qualified Components EQP006, EQP007, EQ for Planners/Schedulers and Engineers Introduction to Mechanical Equipment Qualification EQP009.001, EQ for Construction and Modification Personnel The inspector interviewed plant personnel from the Operations, Maintenance, Engineering, Modifications, and Support Departments, and reviewed selected training records.
During thi s review it was noted that 478 personnel received training in EQP001.001, 898 personnel received training in EQP005.001, and that a significantly smaller number of.personnel received training in EQP001.001, EQP002
, and EQP006.
It was also noted that no training was given for EQP007, Introduction to Mechanical Equipment Qualification and EQP009.001, EQ for Construction and Modifications Personnel.
The specific training required in these two areas was discussed with the BFN Maintenance Supervisors and Modification Managers.
The review of EQP005.001 indicated that 133 modifications personnel, consisting
,of both engineers and craftsman, received training performed using this lesson plan.
The inspector determined that the licensee instituted a training program and has conducted adequate training for members of plant, engineering and craft personnel.
Example
"A" of IFI 88-11-01 will remain open pending further review during a
future NRC EQ inspection.
IFI 88-11-03 and Example
"B" of IFI 88-11-01 are closed.
(CLOSED) IFI 259, 260, 296/88-21-06, Adequacy of Identifying and Closing Out Significant Hardware Test Exceptions, Licensee's Categories 1. 1 and
~ 2.
This item was initially identified as a
result of the NRC inspector's followup of the licensee's handling of the TEs identified by the RTP.
As of mid July 1988, 444 TEs had been identified, of which 101 were still outstanding.
The restart testing group reviewed the TEs and categorized each into the following six areas:
Category
Equipment Deficiencies, which is subdivided into equipment malfunction (1. 1)
and equipment performance (1.2)
Category
Procedural Difficulties, which is subdivided into procedure errors/editorial (2.1);
procedure method/performance (2.2); plant
condition/equipment avail ability (2. 3);
and prerequisite/initial conditions (2.4)
Category
Category
Category
Personnel Errors, which is subdivided into test director errors (3: 1)
and support personnel errors (3.2)
Partial Release (4.0), which is used when the JTG releases a particular section of a test for performance Calibration Deficiencies, which is subdivided into'easuring and test equipment (5. 1)
and" process instruments (5.2)
Category
Other The inspector reviewed selected TEs from Test Procedures RTP-052-4, 057-5, 065, and 082 against this categorization.
It was noted that of the 444 TEs, 92 involved equipment malfunction, category 1. 1, and
involved equipment performance, category 1.2.
The inspector observed that MRs, procedure changes (intent as well as non-intent),
and CAQRs were used to document and close out TEs.
The inspector expressed concern that these MRs, procedure changes, and CAQRs should be given appropriate consideration in the final review and approval of each test results package The inspector has monitored the overall RTP activities from September 1987 to this reporting period.
Based on this continuous monitoring, the inspector concluded that the RTP identified and adequately categorized TEs.
URI 259, 260, 296/89-38-03, Possible Failure to Follow the BFN Program for Identifying and Closing Significant TEs and to Control RTP Procedure Changes, was closed in IR 259, 260, 296/89-53-02.
This IFI is closed.
No violations or deviations were identified during the Followup 'of Open Inspection Items.
e 3..
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92702)
a.
(Closed)
VIO (259, 260, 296/83-53-01),
Failure to Provide
,Timely Corrective Action on Conditions Adverse to Quality.
This violation was identified during a
NRC special team inspection conducted at TVA's headquarters offices in Knoxville and Chattanooga, Tennessee'uring that inspection the inspectors identified that, the licensee was not ensuring effective execution of the quality assurance program, in that all conditions adverse to quality had not been promptly corrected.
Many examples of licensee identified deficiencies were still unresolved.
The NRC had issued four 'violations within the preceding two year period for
0
failure to take prompt corrective action by mechani sms defined within the QA Program.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's responses to the violation dated February 16, 1984 and April 25, 1984.
In those responses the violation was attributed to the failure of both standard procedures and informal escalation measures to achieve timely corrective action.
Subsequent to the above team inspection, a
new standardized Corrective Action Program has been developed and implemented, which the licensee states will result in directing management priorities at reducing the number of CAQs and establish prompt response to identified deficiencies.'he QA manual and plant procedures have been revised for the propose of ensuring prompt attention to
. corrective action and to provide a
formal escalation process for those items that are not completed within the required period.
This is to be accomplished by tracking and trending.of open CAQRs and providing reports to be reviewed at the appropriate managerial levels.
Escalation to higher levels of management is = performed whenever required to obtain the proper amount of attention to any overdue corrective action.
Another change is that TVA QA Audit findings are now documented as CAQRs rather than tracked separately as audit items.
The licensee has developed a standardized root cause analysis program and has conducted root cause training for STAs, licensing, and engineering personnel.
The licensee has established a
MRC, whose composition and responsibilities have been delineated in SDSP-3. 13, Corrective Action.
Effective use of the MRC to review and oversee the corrective action program, should result in an improvement in the evaluation of CAQRs at Browns Ferry.
NUREG 1232 Vol
documents that the NRC has found TVA's program concerning CAQ to be acceptable.
Some problems with timely identification and processing of CAQs have been identified by the NRC (Violation 89-10-02)
and improvements to the program have been implemented.
The satisfactory implementation of the CAQR program will continue to be evaluated in future NRC inspections.
Although the licensee has a large backlog of open CAQRs and PRDs, there is evidence of an increase in management attention toward completion of scheduled corrective actions The formal escalation, process is working for any items that are allowed to go past their due date without the required action completed.
The inspector determined that adequate licensee corrective actions have occurred such that future fai lures of this type should be prevented.
This item is close (CLOSED)
VIO (259, 260, 296/87-41-01),
Fai lure to Take Corrective Action.
This violation was identified during a
NRC review of the licensee's corrective action program.
The inspector identified that the licensee's engineering organization was not effective in reducing the number of delinquent CAQRs.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to the violation dated March 14, 1988.,
In that response the licensee attributed the violation to ineffective management attention to executing the corrective action plan to improve DNE's CAQR processing.
The licensee committed to take
'steps to improve progress in reducing delinquencies for corrective action plans and recurrence control plans and to monitor any exceptions to the CAQR commitment dates and procedurally mandated processing dates on a regular basis.
Subsequent to the above inspection, the licensee has completed steps to fully implement the new standardized corrective action program.
The QA manual and plant procedures have been revised to ensure prompt attention to corrective action and provide a formal escalation process for those items that are not completed within the required time frame.
This has been implemented by hiring a full time CAQR manager with a 'CAQR group staffed of permanent TVA employees rather than contractors who are assigned to CAQR processing and tracking activities.
At the time of the NRC inspection, contractors were performing this function.
The licensee has developed a
TROI/CAQ program to continuously monitor for exceptions to the requirements of the new Corrective Action Program.
During a
recent special NRC inspection, that was documented in Inspection Report 89-37, the staff noted that significant improvement has been made in TVA's corrective action program.
Items now receive proper attention at the appropriate managerial levels.
Escalation to higher levels of management is performed whenever
" required to obtain the proper amount of attention to overdue corrective action.
The inspector has determined that adequate licensee corrective actions have been performed to consider this item closed.
(CLOSED)
URI (259, 260, 296/85-20-01)
Blown Fuses in HPCI Circuits.
This item was opened to track a possible error in the HPCI logic circuits discovered during the followup to an event which occurred on March 4,
1985.
The Unit
HPCI system had been declared inoperable due to a blown fuse in the power supply circuits. supplying the initiation logic.
Inconsistencies concerning resistors installed in the solenoid field suppression circuits for the HPCI Steam Line Drain Isolation Valves, 73-6A 5 73-6B, were identified during the licensee troubleshooting activitie Subsequent to the above inspection, the licensee submitted LER No.
259/85-06 which reported the blown fuse event to the NRC.
An inspector documented in Inspection Report 87-26 his review of" the licensee's corrective actions for this LER.
At the time the inspector reviewed the corrective action associated with the blown fuse he determined that a violation had not occurred.
The licensee has performed a safety evaluation which confirmed that the open resistors did not have an impact on HPCI operability.
That safety evaluation was reviewed by the NRC as part of the followup to violation 259, 260, 296/85-36-01 and is documented in Inspection Report 89-40.
This item is closed.
(CLOSED)
VIO 260/89-06-01, Nine Examples of Failure to Follow Surveillance Procedures-and Four Examples of Inadequate Procedures.
This item included thirteen specific examples of deficiencies in surveillance testing and instrument calibrations.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to the violation, the item closeout package, and associated documentation and verified that the committed corrective.actions had been completed and should prevent the recurrence of the specific examples.
The inspector reviewed revised procedures and documentation of personnel training sessions and walked down portions of the revised procedures in the field.
No discrepancies were identified.
This item is closed.
The inspector noted that the licensee has implemented a
program to incorporate the calibration of instrumentation into loop calibrations instead of generic procedures as reviewed in the original inspection.
The inspector held discussions with licensee personnel on this program, reviewed a revised procedure, and noted that changes were ongoing.
Generic deficiencies in the Surve'i llance Testing Program indicated by the numerous examples cited in violations and LERs were reviewed in the NRC SI Program inspection (IR 89-43)
and any followup of generic issues will be performed in accordance with the findings of'hat inspection.
(CLOSED)
VIO 259, 260, 296/88-04-02, Failure to Follow Procedures For Work Plan Control And The Preparation of gA Records.
This violation involved the licensee failure to have the SOS, at the time of the violation referred to as Shift Engineer, sign a work plan which removed a
piece of security equipment from service.
The violation also involved the use of scratch pads by control room personnel to assist in maintaining the official control room logs.
The first item involved the Work Plan Control Form BF-62 for work plan WP0017-86, Cable Pull and Camera Support for Permanent Power Installation, which was not properly completed.
Step IV.B required a
check to determine if any plant equipment is to be removed from
servic'e by the work plan and Step XI required the Shift Engineer to give permission to take any equipment out of service.
The work plan did not specify that the security CCTV's would 'be taken out of service nor was the shift engineer's permission obtained.
The second item involved the quality of Reactor Operator logs.
Some logs continued to have legibility problems and logs that were legible were sometimes uninterpretable by personnel with a
good understanding of plant equipment, programs, and 'procedures.
Entries were made which identified a procedure in progress by number wi,thout stating the title of the procedure, so that proper documentation of the activity could be made.
Many abbreviations, acronyms and initialisms were used without a list of such approved shortcuts.
All of these factors made it difficult to interpret activities performed during the shift without asking for a
line-by-line interpretation by the operator on-shift.
A recurring deficiency was the use of a temporary
"scratch pads" by the unit operators.
Log
.
entries were not made at the time of an occurrence.
Operators made entries on a temporary scratch pad during the shift and then at some point prior to shift turnover transferred these entries into the official log.
Section 4. 1 of the Nuclear guality Assurance Manual, Part III contained the licensee's requirements for permanent gA records.
Paragraph 6. 1 stated that written instructions that, cover gA records preparation shall include requirements to ensure that gA records are complete, legible, and in black ink or other permanent medium.
An exception is allowed to the permanent medium requirement which allows some documents to be prepared in a
nonpermanent medium.
The document must be converted to a permanent medium prior to final approval and the nonpermanent document must remain under the control and responsibi 1.ity of the supervisor who gives final approval of the document.
Standard Practice 12.24 did not contain any control measures over the nonpermanent scratch-pads.
The inspector did a follow-up review on the use of scratch pads and documented the following observations in IR 88-21:
Procedures requi re log entries to be made directly into the official record at the time of the event.
The inspector observed several operators over the course of this inspection period, and in all except two instances they were found to be in compliance with the new guidelines.
In those two instances, occurrences were not recorded-in the log, even though significant time had elapsed since they had occurred, and operators were still using temporary scratch pads.'he operators did not appear to be involved in activities that would prevent them from making prompt log entries.
These cases were reported to the Operations Superintendent and were considered to be examples of continuing noncomplianc The inspector reviewed the response to the violation dated May 23, 1988.
In the response; the licensee stated the reason for the first item was human error on the part of a modification foreman
'in n'ot getting approval prior to commencing work and was considered an isolated case.
The reason for the second item was a procedure that encouraged the use of scratch pads which was not in accordance with the requirements of an upper tier procedure.
The corrective action for the first item consisted of initiating CARR BFP880196 and initiating a
new procedure, SDSP 8.4, Modification Work Plans, which superseded the outdated procedure, BF 8.3, used to originate the old work plan.
These actions, plus the fact that the modification foreman involved left TYA permanently, were considered by the licensee as adequately addressed.
The corrective action for the second item consisted of revising procedure BF 12.24, Conduct of Operations, which deleted use of scratch pads and issuing a
new procedure, PMI 12. 12, Conduct of Operations, which clearly forbids the use of personal informal notes as inputs to log entries.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and found them to be acceptable.
The resident inspectors have not noted the use of scratch pads by control room personnel in the -last several months.
This item is closed.
f.
(CLOSED)
YIO 260/88-02-04, Example A,
Failure To Follow Procedures For The Support And Installation Of Piping Systems.
(CLOSED)
YIO 260/88-02-04, Ex'ample B,
. Failure'o Follow Procedures For The Installation Of Electrical Conduit Systems-And Junction Boxes.
This violation involves the 'licensee fai lure to follow procedures in the Engineering Changes and Modifications area and included two examples.
The first example was in two parts.
f (1)
Work Plan 2152'-87, issued to accomplish part of ECN P3116, performed a verification and correction of field conditions for various hangers and pipe supports for the HPCI System.
At the time of inspection, WP 2152-87 was field complete and reviewed by the cognizant engineer.
A discrepancy was noted in the inspector's review of the work plan which involved Support H-94.
This support required adjustment of the spring load to bring the load in accordance with plan requirements.
However, the Hanger and Restraint Inspection Date Sheet MAI-23, Attachment A,
Step 5. 1.3 was checked
"no" in the inspection required check list, indicating that no final inspection of threaded connection integrity was required.
'Since the threaded connections on the hanger were loosened to make the adjustments per the work plan, the inspection requirements of MAI-23, Attachment A, Section 5. 1.
should apply.
The inspector further noted that step 5. 1.4, which verifies that all structural shapes are the correct, size and installed correctly, was also checked no, even though the installation shape was 'modifie During discussions with the cognizant engineer concerning WP 2152-87, the inspector was advised that the final hanger inspection was not applicable at the time of work plan closure for isolated hangers such as those under this WP and that some other mechanism would accomplish the final inspection.
The engineer was unable to identify what mechanism would apply.
The inspector concluded that MAI-23 was the applicable criteria after further discussion with licensee management.
(2)
Hanger H-94 was laterally repositioned on the supported HPCI pipe and was adjusted to design values for spring can load.
There was no supporting documentation to document this hanger movement.
The inspector noted that the repositioned and adjusted installation resulted in a misalignment of about
degrees of the strut, turnbuckle and pipe clamp assembly with respect to the spring can assembly.
The work plan referenced MAI-23 for the installation, Section 2.6.
MAI-23 requires support points to be relocated laterally to line up with the pipe if the support can be fabricated within the allowable support fabrication tolerances of Section 2.7.
Section 2.7.3 requires that a
degree tolerance be applied to specified angles unless restrictive.
The inspector concluded that the modified installation was not made in accordance with a
work plan or referenced requirements.
The inspector reviewed drawing 47B2455-202 and walked down the HPCI system and verified that support H-94 was in place.
The adequacy of the support, as well as its final alignment, is a
BU 79-14 issue.
The example of this violation addressed personnel not following procedures.
The licensee's corrective action consisted of training personnel in the use of procedure MAI-23, Support and Installation of Piping Systems in Category I Structures, Revision 6..
The inspector reviewed the procedure and the attached list of training c'lass attendance.
It should be noted that the overall BU 79-14 program at BFP is an ongoing activity and final resolution will not occur until just prior to restart.
Consequently all hardware 79-14 items will be closed at restart.
This example is closed.
The second example of the violation included the following:
the conduit cable installation of ECN P0753 was inspected in the Auxiliary Instrument Room ¹2, 593'levation; the Cable Spreading Room, 606'levation; and the control room Panel 9-3, 617'levation.
Numerous deficiencies were noted, including:
in the Auxiliary Instrument Room ¹2, two conduits were found with loose fittings and one conduit was found with a
cover mi ssing; in the Cable Spreading Room one conduit was found with loose fittings and numerous conduit covers were missing; and in the Control Room panel number 9-3, one conduit cover was found missing, several fittings were found loose and debris from work activity was in the bottom of the pane The inspecto~
reviewed the licensee's corrective action, which included training in the use of procedures MAI-27, Installation Of Electrical Conduit Systems, and MAI-44, Cable Pulling For Insulated Cables up to 15,000 volts.
The inspector reviewed the procedures and the attached attendance lists.
The inspector also walked down the Unit 2 auxiliary instrument room portions of Unit 2 cable, spreading room and observed the interior of the Unit 2 control
, cabinets.
No loose conduits, missing conduit covers, unsupported conduits or debris were observed.
This example is closed."
g.
(CLOSED)
VIO 296/80-41-02, Main Steam Safety Valve Maintenance This violation was for failure to follow procedure during main steam safety relief valve maintenance.
A safety valve was reassembled using a
new gasket, but the old gasket material was.not removed, nor were the flange surfaces cleaned.
The licensee added QA signoffs to the procedures to verify the removal of old flange gaskets and cleaning of gasket surfaces.
The inspector reviewed the applicable maintenance procedures, MMI-13 and MCI-0-001-VLV002 and found the QA signoffs in the procedures.
The signoff steps were designated as a
NRC commitment to this violation.
This item is closed.
No violations or deviations were identified during the review of action on previous inspection findings.
4.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 18, 1989 with those persons indicated in paragraph
above.
The inspectors described the areas inspected and di scussed in detail the inspection
= findings.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
~
Acronyms ANSI ANS BFN BU CAR CAQR CCTV CEG CFR CREVS DG DNE ECN EQ EQP American National Standards Institute American National Standard Browns Ferry Nuclear Bulletin Corrective Action Report Condition Adverse to Quality Report Closed Circuit Television Contract Engineering Group Code of Federal Regulations Control Room Emergency, Ventilation System Die'sel Generator Department of Nuclear Engineering Engineering Change Notice Environmental Qual.ification Environmental Qualification Program
HPCI HVAC IFI INPO IR JTG LER LOP/LOCA MAI MR MRC NE NPP NRC PCIS PMI QA RPS RPT RTP SBGT SDSP SI STD TE TROI TVA URI VIO High Pressure Coolant Injection
= Heating, Ventilation 5 Air Conditioning Inspector Followup Item Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Inspection Report Joint Test Group Licensee Event Report Loss of Power/Loss of Coolant Accident Modification Addition Instruction Maintenance Request Management Review Committee Nuclear Engineering Nuclear Performance Plan Nuclear Regulatory Commission Primary Containment Isolation-System Plant Manager Instruction
- Quality Assurance Reactor Protection System Recirculation Pump Trip Restart Test Program Standby Gas Treatment System Site Director Standard Practice Surveillance Instructions Standard Test Exception Tracking, Reporting of Open Items Tennessee Valley Authority Unresolved Item Violation