IR 05000259/1989060
| ML18033B171 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 01/31/1990 |
| From: | Carpenter D, Little W, Patterson C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18033B170 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-89-60, 50-260-89-60, 50-296-89-60, NUDOCS 9002130226 | |
| Download: ML18033B171 (20) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-259/89-60, 50-260/89-60, and 50-296/89-60 Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority 6N 38A Lookout Place
- 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Docket Nos.:
50-259, 50-260 and 50-296 License Nos.:
DPR-33; DPR-52, and DPR-68 Facility Name:
Browns Ferry 1, 2,,and
Inspection Conducted:
December 15, - January 15, 1990 Inspector D.
R.
Carp t r, NRC Site Manager A.
a rson, RC Restart Coordinator Da S gned f'A/
Da S'e Accompanied by:
E. Christnot, Resident Inspec'tor W. Bearden, Resident Inspector K. Ivey; Resident Inspector Approved by:,
W.
S. itt
, Section Chief, Inspection Programs, TVA Projects Division reer D te igned SUMMARY Scope:
This routine resident inspection included surveillance observation, maintenance observation, modifications; operational safety verification, refueling activities, fitness for duty program, site management and organization.
Results:
N The licensee started defueling activities during this report period.
The offload activities were carried out in a methodical and conservative manner, paragraph six.
'yOI )2 1 30226 90020 1 pof",nDOCI'. 0 OOO2-".,'+
Q PDC
Continuing difficulties were noted with SIs, paragraph two.
These are similar to the programma ic problems identified in IR 89-43.
There are no cited violations or deviations in this inspection repor REPORT DETAILS Persons 'Contacted Licensee Employees:
0. Zeringue, Site Director
~G. Campbell, Plant Manager
"M. Herrell, Plant Operations Manager R. Smith, Project Engineer-J. Hutton, Operations Superintendent A. Sorrell, Maintenance Superintendent G. Turne'r, Site guality Assurance Manager P. Carier, Site Licensing Manager P. Salas, Compliance Supervisor
- J. Corey, Site Radiological Control Superintendent
'.'uttle, Site Security Manager Other licensee employees or contractors contacted included licensed reactor operators, auxiliary operators, craftsmen, technicians, and public'afety officers; and quality assurance, design, and engineering personnel.
NRC Personnel:
- W. Little, Section Chief
- D. Carpenter, Site Manager
- C. Patterson, Restart Coordinator
- E. Christnot, Resident Inspector W. Bearden, Resident Inspector K. Ivey, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview Acronyms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraphs Survei:llance Observation (61726)
\\
The inspectors routinely observed surveillance testing activities and reviewed SIs during this reporting period.
The inspections consisted of reviews of SIs for technical adequacy and conformance to TS,,verification of test instrument calibration, observation of the conduct of the test, confirmation of proper removal from, and return to service of the system, and a review of the test data.
The inspectors also verified that limiting conditions for operation were met, testing was accomplished by qualified personnel, and the SIs were completed at the required frequenc a The inspector reviewed the performance of O-SI-4.10.D, Reactor Building Crane.
The licensee used revision 4 of this SI, however, steps had to be changed in order to complete the SI.
This resulted in revision 5 being written to the procedure.
The following steps were changed as shown:
Revision
7.4.7
- CLOSE reactor building crane Main Disconnect, in cr ane cab, or VERIFY closed.
, Revision
I 7.4.7 CLOSE reactor building crane Main Disconnect, by pushing start, button in crane cab, VERIFY M/G sets started:
Revision
7. 4. 14,20 OPERATE MAIN HOIST MASTER SWITCH to HOIST.
7.4.14.21 VERIFY main hoist raises at control speed.
Revision
7.4.14.20 OPERATE MAIN HOIST MASTER SWITCH to RAISE and DEPRESS thumb switch.
7.4. 14.21 After hoist clears limit, RELEASE thumb switch.
7.4. 14.22 VERIFY main hoist raises at control speed.
Similar changes were made to Section 7.4. 15 in order to complete the SI.
The way revision 4 was written sections 7.4.14 and 7.4. 15 could not be performed.
This problem of being unable to perform an approved and validated SI is indicative of a
SI issue previously documented in IR 89-43.
b.
An inspector reviewed portions of 2-SI-2, Instrument Checks and Observations, during control room walkdowns.
No deficiencies were identified.
t The inspectors observed portions of O-SI-4.9.A3.a, Common Accident Signal Logic.
This infrequently performed test requires more extensive preparation and planning than most SIs.
It involves testing the accident logic for all three units and all eight diesel generators.
The completed test procedure package and test results were reviewed.
No deficiences were identified with the performance of this S d.
An. inspector observed the performance o'f 2-SI-4.2. C-l(B),
APRM Calibration, which was being conducted on the B APRM.
The inspector noted that the IMs performing the SI were unable to perform step 7.8. 16.56 as it was written.
Step 7.8. 16.56 required raising the power potentiometer until.the HI indicator at the top of the cabinet illuminated; however; the HI indicator. was already illuminated.
A review of the preceding steps revealed that step 7.8. 16.49 resulted in illuminating the HI trip indicator and there was no subsequent step to reset the indication prior to step 7.8. 16.56 'he inspector noted that the SI had been verified and validated on June 30, 1989.
The inspector.
brought this issue to the attention of licensee management, for resolution and the licensee performed an investigation to determine the cause of the procedure problem.
'I The inspectors discussed this issue with licensee personnel responsible for the investigation and reviewed associated documenta-tion to determine whether the licensee had initiated appropriate actions.
The licensee's investigation revealed the following:
During the validation performance for this SI, the setpoints were found to be within tolerances and the calibration steps were not performed.
Step 7.8. 16.56 is part of the calibration steps.
A walkdown of the.calibration steps was conducted for the validation.
A walkdown could not identify that the HI light would be illuminated.
Many of the SIs for instrumentation contain steps to calibrate instrument setpoints if they are found to be out-of-tolerance.
The calibration steps are validated by walkdown in accordance with the validation procedure (SDSP 7.4).
The licensee's management has recognized this problem and stated that the validation procedure would be revised to allow the responsible supervisor to perform an entire SI for validation even though the procedure itself might not require all steps to be performed.
'The licensee also planned to re-validate all calibration SIs which had provisions validated by a
walkdown
~ 'hese corrective actions will be followed up during routine resident inspections.
No violations or deviations were identified in the Surveillance Observa-tion area.
3.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors routinely reviewed and observed plant maintenance activities on selected safety-,related systems and components to verify that they were conducted in accordance with requirements.
The following
items were considered during these inspections:
the limiting conditions for operations were met; activities were accomplished using approved procedures; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials 'used were properly certified; proper tagout clearance procedures were adhered to; and radiological controls were implemented as required.
Maintenance requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which might affect plant safety.
The inspectors observed the, following maintenance activities during this report period:
MR 1020864; Rep'l,acement of the RPS MG Set Circuit Protector 2A2 Overvoltage Relay.
Following completion of modification work associated with DCN H7461-P2 on December 20; 1989, applicable portions of 2-SI-4. 1.B-16 were performed as post modification testing.
The overvoltage relay that provides electrical isolation capability between 1E.
and Non-1E RPS power distribution would not adjust to a
normal downscale position.
The relay was replaced in accordance with ECI-O-OOO-RLY003, Electrical Corrective Instruction Replacement of Relays, and EMI-106, Wire Lifts/Retermination Documentation and Troubleshooting.
Post maintenance testing was accomplished with an approved special instruction which provided both functional testing and relay calibration for the newly installed relay.
The inspector observed portions of the ongoing work and reviewed the completed package along with the documentation to support post maintenance testing.
No deficiencies were 'identified.
b.
MR 916456:
Troubleshooting of Refuel Bridge Support Equipment.
During a
performance of EPI-0-079-CRA001, Step 7.2. 16, licensee personnel identified that the power supply for the monorail trolley motor heater appeared to be disconnected.
Maintenance personnel checked all bridge mounted motor heaters to verify power available.
Troubleshooting was accomplished in accordance with EMI-106, Wire Lifts/Retermination 'ocumentation and Troubleshooting.
All associated power supplies were found to be properly connected except for the monorail trolley motor heater.
Licensee personnel were not able to determine a cause for the unconnected heater.
The inspector observed portions of the ongoing work.
No deficiencies were identified.
C.
MR 1020881:
Replacement of the B2 Stack Gas Sample Pump.
The pump was found to'e inoperable with a
blown power supply fuse.
The licensee disassembled the pump and determined that the motor was still functional but that the pump was locked up.
The cause of the original failure documented on the MR was usage of the incorrect type of oil.
The inspector noted that the work instructions used for the replacement pump 'specified the required oil be used.
The instruc-tions contained various precautions including a warning that both
'
pumps were not to be r'emoved, from service at the same time.
Troubleshooting
was accomplished in accordance with EMI-106; Wire Lifts/Retermination Documentation and Troubleshooting.
PMT to verify proper sample flow was accomplished in accordance with applicable portions of O-SI-4.2K-lFT, Instrument Functional Test of Rad.
Gas Effluent Main Stack Gas Monitoring Instrumentation.
No deficiencies were identified.
d.
MR 1020972:
Remove, Decontaminate, and Correct Blade Guide Alignment on Misoriented, Dual Assembled Blade Guides.
This MR was required to provide enough blade guides for the Unit
fuel offload.
The inspector noted that radiation protection coverage was maintained during the transfer of the blade guides to and.
from the SFSP.
Forty-six sets of blade guides were removed and checked for alignment problems.
The inspector reviewed the MR and supporting documentation.
The inspector noted that the attached work instructions specified that the work was to be performed in accordance with Mechanical Maintenance Guide MMG 030, Repairs on Control Rod Blade Guides.
Additional controls that affected the work were included in PMI 6. 10, Ma'terial Control, and PMI - 7.2, Prevention of Foreign Materials in Fuel Pool.
No deficiencies were identified.
e.
An inspector observed the performance of a portion of 2-SI-4.1.B-16, RPS MG-Set, which was being conducted as a
PMT.
The associated modification workplan was issued to change out the voltage adjust potentiometer for RPS MG set A and add time delay circuits to the 2A1 and 2A2 circuit protectors.
These changes were a par t of the overall upgrade to improve circuit protector performance.
No deficiencies were identified during the performance of the PMT;- however,,
the overvoltage relay for the 2A1 circuit protector did not meet the acceptance criteria and personnel performing the test initiated a
MR to replace it ( see 3.a above).
No violations or deviations were identified in the Maintenance Observation area.
4.
Modifications (37700, 37702, 37828)
Th'e inspector reviewed the following ongoing modification activities:
Cable Installation During a routine tour of the reactor building on January 2,
1990, the inspector observed a
cable installation that exceeded the minimum, bend radius.
The installation was in the unit 2 reactor building at elevation 621 feet, located in the overhead above the 480 volt shutdow'n transformer B02A.
An open pull box was seen with three cables, inside the box.
Two of the cables were bent to form a
degree turn, which seemed acceptable, but one cable was bent 180 degree On January 3,
1990, the inspector toured the area with a modifica-tions supervisor and QC inspector to review the work.
The work was determined to be ongoing work to replace power cables for the LPCI MG Sets.
The cables in the pull box and associated conduit were to be removed, and a
larger conduit installed'ith new cables.
The inspector reviewed DCN W5487A approved on June 29, 1989 and associated work plans WP 2460-89 and WP 2461-89.
The three cables in the pull box supplied power to the 2EA LPCI MG Set.
The ECN replaced three LPCI MG Set cables.
As a result of a cable inspection program, various cables were identified for replacement because their jackets were damaged.
This deficiency was identified by CAQR BFP-88-1030.
Completion of the work plans to replace the cables will resolve the cable installation concern.
Drywell,Tour On December 21, 1989, the inspector and the 'Assi stant Director for TVA Inspection Programs toured the unit two drywell.
Inside the drywell work was in progress.
to install the CRD housing lateral restraint.
Anchor bolt holes were being drilled in the concrete walls for installation of support beams.
Several hole locations had to be relocated because of stri king reinforcing steel bars while drilling.
Each relocation was being evaluated by engineering personnel.
No deficiencies were identified during the tour.
The health physics staff was very helpful and professional during the drywell entry.
CRD Restraint Modifications Safety Evaluations Review
= During this r'eporting period, the licensee was in the process of installing CRD lateral restraints in Unit 2.
To perform this modification, the licensee and GE completed a safety evaluation which included keeping the mode switch in the shutdown position and bypassing the APRM and SRM scram functions to prevent spurious scrams.
When the licensee decided to offload the core, the safety evaluation was reviewed and revised to allow the CRD restraint work to continue coincident with offload activities.
The licensee and GE revised the safety evaluation to lift the restraints on the mode switch, APRMs, and SRMs so fuel movement could be conducted.
The revised, safety evaluation was approved by the PORC in a
special meeting.
An inspector reviewed the revised safety evaluation and attended the special PORC meeting.
No deficiencies were identified.
No violations or deviat'ions were identified in the Modifications area.
5.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The'RC inspectors were kept informed of the overall plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operations.
Daily discussions
were held with plant management and various members of the plant operating staff.
.The inspectors made routine visits to the control rooms.
Inspection observations included instrument readings, setpoints and recordings; status of operating systems; status and alignments of emergency standby
'systems; onsite and offsite emergency power sources available for automatic operation; annunciator alarm status; adherence to procedures; adherence to limiting.conditions for operation; nuclear instrument operability; temporary alterations in effect; daily journals and logs; stack monitor recorder traces; and control room manning.
This inspection activity also included numerous informal discussions with operators and supervisors,.
and observation of shift turnover s.
General plant tours were conducted, including portions of the turbine building, each reactor building, the refuel floor, and general plant and yard areas.
- Observations included valve positions and system alignment; snubber and hanger conditions; containment isolation alignments instrument readings; housekeeping; proper power supply and breaker alignments; radiation area controls; tag controls on equipment; work activities in progress; and radiation protection controls.
Informal discussions were held with selected plant personnel in their functional areas during these tours.
a.
Radiological Controls The inspectors observed HP practices and verified the implementation
.
of radiological controls.
On a regular basis, RWPs were reviewed and specific work activities were monitored to ensure the activities were being conducted in accordance with the applicable RWPs.
Selected
. radiation protection instruments were verified operable and calibra-tion frequencies were reviewed.
The following RWPs were reviewed:
RWP 89-2-02553-00 Title Unit 2 Core Unload and Support Work.
No deficiencies were'dentified.
90-2-02531-00-01 Unit 2 Repair and Maintenance of Refuel Floor Boom (Crane)
and Grap'pie.
No deficiencies were identified.
Equipment Clearances The inspectors reviewed the clearances identified below to verify compliance with SDSP-14.9, Equipment Clearance Procedure, and that the clearances contained adequate information to properly isolate the affected portions of the systems being tagged.
Additionally, the inspectors verified, on accessible equipment, that the required tags were installe Cl earance 2-89-978
'qui pment/Pur ose t
Unit 2 Mode Switch.
This clearance was issued to hold the switch in the shutdown'osition during CRD restraint modifications.
No deficiencies were identified.
2-90-004 Unit 2 Control Rod Reactor Manual Control Switches.
This clearance was issued to prevent control rod withdrawal during RPIS probe maintenance.
No deficiencies were identified.
Engineered Safety Features Walkdown An inspector performed an ESF partial walkdown of system 63, Standby Liquid Control, to confirm that the licensee's system lineup procedure agreed with the plant drawings and the as-built configura-tion, and to identify any conditions which might degrade plant performance.
This walkdown included reviews of the in-plant layout of tne system, electrical power'o the system, and control room controls 'and indications.
The inspector reviewed and utilized the following documentation for the walkdown:
TS Section 3.4 SLC System LCOs and Surveillance Testing FSAR Chapter 3.8 SLC System Description and Analysis 2-OI-63 2-SI-4.4.A.2 2-47-E854-1 SLC System Operating Instructions SLC System Functional Test SLC System Flow Diagram The inspector identified no defi,ciencies in the plant configuration, valve lineup, equipment conditions,'vailability of electrical power, or control room indications.
This inspection will continue and be completed during the next reporting period.
'.
Unit Status All three units remained in an extended outage as part of the BFNP recovery plans. 'nits 1 and 3 are defueled.
Unit 2 began the report period with fuel loaded until defueling began'n January 6,
1990.
The refueling activities are discussed in paragraph six.
No violations or deviations were identified in the Operational Safety Verification area.
Refueling Activities (60705, 60710)
In January, 1989, the licensee loaded fuel into the Unit 2 reactor with a projected startup date of September, 1989.
Since loading fuel, new work
items have emerged and the completion of work has been delayed because of the requirement for divisional outages'or safety systems to meet TS requirements with fuel in the reactor.'n December, 1989, the licensee decided to offload the fuel From Unit 2 to eliminate the requirement for divisional outages and allow the completion of the remaining work in a
bulk mode.
The licensee believes that this will decrease the time required to complete activities to restart the unit.
On January 6,
1990, at 2:00 a.m.
(CST), the licensee began to offload the fuel from Unit
reactor.
This activity was scheduled to last approximately three weeks.
The offload continued until January 9,
1990, at 4: 10 p.m.
(CST),
when the fuel handling hoist was damaged following the offload of the 224th fuel assembly.
The damage occurred shortly after the fuel assembly was placed in the storage location and the refueling bridge was being moved toward th'e core to pick up the next fuel assembly.
The licensee believes that the fuel grapple struck one of several blade guides that. are stored in storage locations nearby, and along the direct path that the telescoping mast would have traveled.
The damage, which amounted to a slightly bent section in the mast, left the Unit 2 Refueling Bridge inoperable.
The licensee replaced the mast and fuel grapple assemblies on the Unit 2 Refueling Bridge with those from the Unit 3 Refueling Bridge..
Repairs were completed and the licensee resumed offloading activities at ll:26 p.m.
(CST)
on January 12, 1990.
This was the only significant delay that the licensee has experienced during the offloading activities performed during this reporting period.
As of the close of this reporting period, 370 of 764 fuel assemblies had been removed from the core.
The inspectors provided expanded site coverage for the offloading activities.
The inspectors witnessed offload related activities on the refuel floor including fuel handling, maintenance, surveillance testing, gA oversight, and radiological controls.
The inspectors observed that the operability of refueling related equipment and systems was verified, and that periodic testing was performed as required.
The inspectors observed refuel floor SRO shift turnovers and crew briefings and verified that 2-GOI-100-3, Refueling Operations, was followed in the conduct of all offload activities.
The inspectors observed activities in the control room and made routine plant tours to maintain a
status of plant conditions.
The inspector selected four systems required to be operable to support fuel offloading for status review.
The systems are as follows:
System
Residual Heat Removal Service Water, System 57D
DC Electrical, System
Standby Gas Treatment, and System 67 -
Emergency Equipment Cooling Water.
The inspector observed that all four systems were in accordance with the applicable operating instruction and that the system status folders were 'up to date with respect to hold orders, maintenance requests and caution orders in affect at the time of the review.
The inspector's review noted two minor discrepancies.
The first involved the manner in which system status log sheets wer e filled ou The second was two DC circuit breakers located side by side with the same numerical designation.
The licensee had since issued instructions to ensure that all log sheets would be completed in a consistent manner.
The two DC circuit breakers have been relabeled to indicate that one breaker was a Unit 1 breaker and the other breaker was a Unit 3 breaker.
No violations or deviations were identified in the area of Refueling Activities.
CFR 26, Fitness For Duty Program, TI-2515/104, Fitness For Duty Utilizing TI-2515/104, the residents attended and reviewed the licensee's
CFR 26 training program.
The licensee conducted three types of training consisting of one two-hour session for the initial training, one two-hour session for refresher training and one four-hour session for supervisors'he'icensee training included the handing out of three manuals, one for each session, titled Initial Training Manual, Refresher Training Manual and Supervisors Manual.
After completion of each 'training session an exam was administered and each participant was provided with'
manual specific to the type of training.
The TI-2515/104 contained three appendices labeled Fitness for Duty Awareness Training, Fitness for Duty Training for Supervisors and Fitness Duty Training for Escort's.
These Appendices consisted of check list attachments.
Although the licensee did not conduct a training session specifically for escorts, the majority of the TI-2515/104 checklist items for Appendix C, Fitness for Duty Training for Escorts, was contained within the licensee's initial and refresher training sessions.
No violations or deviations were identified in the area of Fitness for Duty Program.
Cold Meather-Preparations (71714)
During this reporting period, the northern Alabama area experienced cold weather with temperatures below zero degrees Fahrenheit.
As a result of this record cold weather, the facility had several areas of water systems freezing, cracking, and/or breaking.
Four of the areas involved the fire protection system, two of the areas involved potable water and one area involved demineralized water.
No safety related system was damaged by the cold weather.
The four areas of damaged fire protection were:
the diesel driven flow test header valve, O-HCV-26-1403, cracked; the switch yard shunt reactor fire protection valve, O-FCV-26-41, froze; the main generator hydrogen trailer port fire header, froze and broke; and the fire header to a newly construction warehouse, which is not in use, froze and broke.
The licensee initiated MR 1027063 and replaced the cracked diesel driven flow test header valve.
This was done on an immediate basis
'because this placed the facility in a seven day LCO.
The switch yard fire protection valve was thawed and returned to service.
The facility does not have any hydrogen on site at the hydrogen trailer port and repairs had
'not been completed to the trailer port fire headers by the end of this reporting period.
The newly constructed warehouse sustained significant damage to the office areas.
Information from the licensee and the inspector's review indicated that three of the areas involving the fire protection 'system were part of the licensee's-freeze protection program.
The area of fire protection which was not part of the freeze protection program was the newly. constructed warehouse.
The licensee's initial corrective action involved a possible change in the procedure for verifying freeze protection for the fire protection systems and upgrading the freeze protecti.on hardware associated with these areas.
Site Management and Organization (36301,'6800, 40700)
The licensee continues 'to fill management vacancies with experienced, qualified individuals from outside TVA.
During this inspection period, the Mechanical.
Maintenance Superintendent, Plant Manager - Unit 3, and Technical Support=
Superintendent positions have been 'illed.
The Unit 3 - Plant Manager is a position reporting to the Site Director that, will be responsible for the integrated effort to bring Unit
up to a
level that could support a restart.
The licensee has established a
separate organization structure to work on Unit 3
~
This was done so that the focus of the main site organization would be totally on Unit 2 restart activities.
10.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 16, 1990 with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below'.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by 'the inspectors during this inspection.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
11.
Acronyms ANSI APRM BFNP CAQR CFR CRD CST DCN ECN EMI ESF FSAR GE American National Standards Institute Average Power Range Monitor Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Condition Adverse to Quality Report Code of Federal Regulations Control Rod Drive Central Standard Time Design Change" Notice Engineering Change Notice Electrical Maintenance Instruction Engineered Safety Feature Final Safety Analysis Report General Electric
GOI HP IM IR LCO LPCI MG MMG MR NRC
~ OI PMI PMT PORC QA QC RPIS RPS RWP SDSP SFSP SI SLC
.
,
TS'VA WP General Operating Instructions
=
Health Physics Instrument Mechanics Inspection Report Limiting Condition for Operation Low Pressure Coolant Injection Motor Generator Mechanical Maintenance Guide Maintenance Request Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operating Instructions Plant Managers Instructions Post Modification Test Plant Operations Review Committee Quality Assurance Quality Control Rod Position Indication System Reactor Protection System Radiation Work Permit'ite Directors Standard Practice Spent Fuel Storage Pool Surveillance Instruction St'andby Liquid Control Source Range Monitor Senior Reactor Operator Temporary Instructions Technical Specifications Tennessee Valley Authority Work Plan
L 0