IR 05000259/1987031

Insp Repts 50-259/87-31,50-260/87-31 & 50-296/87-31 on 870921-25.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness Program

ML20235W345
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	10/06/1987
From:	Decker T, Testa E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20235W325	List: IR 05000259/1987031 ML20235W324
References
50-259-87-31, 50-260-87-31, 50-296-87-31, NUDOCS 8710160155
Download: ML20235W345 (8)

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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~g REGION 88

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,j 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

'e ATLANTA, GEORGI A 3032'l

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j 0070S1987

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Report Nos.:

50-259/87-31,50-260/87-31,50-296/87-31

' Licensee:

Tennessee Valley Authority 6N 38A Lookout Place 1)01 Market Street Chattanooga, TN -37402-2801 Docket Nos.:

50-269, 50-260, 50-296 License fios.:

DPR-33, DPR-52, DPR-68 Facility Name:

Browns Ferry 1, 2, and 3 Inspection Conducted: S pte ber 21-25, 1987

Inspector:

/8-4 -6'7 E. J. Testa Date Signed Ac;ompanying Personnel:

L,K.fohen b

/#'d ' 87 Approved by:

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Date Signed T. R. Decker, Section Chief Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope:

This routine, announced inspection involved review and evaluation of the emergency preparedness program.

Results:

No violations or deviations were identified.

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I 8710160155 071000ADOCK 05000259 PDR PDR-a C _______

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REPORT DETAIL 1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• J; Walker, Plant Manager

• J. Olson, Unit 1 and Unit 3 Superintendent

• R. McKeon, Unit 2 Superintendent

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• B. Marks, Supervisor, Corporate Emergency Preparedness Branch

• M. Bolch, Manager, Radiological Emergency Preparedness

"T. Cornelius, Project Engineer, Radiological Emergency Preparedness

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• C. Beasley, Manager 'Information Services

• C. Dexter, Chief, Browns Ferry Training Branch

• R. Tuttle, Site Security Manager

'*L. Ivey, Licensing Engineer

• C. Hiseh, Compliance Licensing Engineer

• W. Dawson, Operator Training Instructor l

E. Kingery, Supervisor, Corporate Emerg6ncy Preparedness Branch E. Pugh, Instructor, Radiological Control Training / General Employee Training B. Graves, Instructor, Radiological Control H. Williamson, Program Manager, Corporate Emergency Preparedness Branch J. Polehn, Health Physicist T-. Teague, Public Information Planner M. Meek, Shift Engineer P. Dempsey, Shift Technical Advisor A. Edmonds, Shift Clerk A. Jones, Shift Engineer D. Kelly, Shift Technical Advisor P. Largin, Shift Clerk Other licensee employees contacted included construction craf tsmen, engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security office members, and office personnel.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission G. Paulk, Senior Resident Inspector

• E. Christnot, Resident Inspector

• C. Patterson, Resident Inspector

• Attended exit interview 2.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 25, 1987, l

i with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.

The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below.

No dissenting comments were received from the

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licensee.

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.

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Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspection.

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Emergency Detection and Classification (82201)

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4); 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Sections IV.B and IV.C; and Section 2, and Appendix A of the licensee's Emergency Plan, this program area was inspected to determine whether th9 lfcensee used and understood a standard emergency classification and action level scher,e.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's classification procedures.

The event classifications in the procedures were consistent with those required by regulation and the Emergency Plan.

The classification procedures did not appear to contain impediments or errors which could lead to incorrect or untimely classification.

Selected emergency action levels (EALs) specified in the IP-1 procedure were reviawed.

The reviewed EALs appeared to be consistent with the initiating events specified in Appendix 1 of NUREG-0654 and the Emergency Plan.

The inspector noted that some of the EALs were based on parameters obtainable from Control Room instrumentation.

The inspector verified that the licensee's notification procedures included criteria for initiation of offsite notifications and for development of protective action recommendations.

The notification procedures required that cffsite notifications be made promptly after declaration of an emergency.

The inspector discussed with licensee representatives the coordination of EALs with State and local officials.

Licensee documentation showed that the licensee had discussed the EALs during July 1987, with State representat'ives and that these officials agreed with the EALs used by the licensee in a formal response dated September 23, 1987.

Interviews were held with two shift engineers, and two shift technical advisors to verify that they understood the relationship between core status and such core dcmage indicators as containment high-range radiation monitor, inadequate-core-cooling indicator, high-range effluent monitor, fuel temperature indicator, containment hydrogen monitor.

All interviewees appeared knowledgeable of the various core damage indicators

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and their relationship to core status.

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The res, possibility and authority for classification of emergency events and initiation of emergency action were prescribed in licensee procedures and in the Emergency Plan.

Interviews with selected key members of the licensee's emergency organization revealed that these personnel understood

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their responsibilities} and authorities in relation to accident

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classification, not',fication, and protective action recommendations.

Selected Radiological Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures were reviewed

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by the inspector and discussed with licensee personnel.

The IPs provioed e

direction to users concerning timely classification of accidents.

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personnel interviewed appeared to be familiar with the classification information in the IPs.

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Walk-through evaluations involving accident classification problems and notifications were conducted with two shift engineers, twc shift technical advisors, and two shift clerks.

The Shift Engineers and Shift Technical Advisors promptly and properly classified the hypothetical accident situations presented to them, and appeared to be familiar with appropriate classification procedures. The proper notification forms were completed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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ProtectiveActionDecision-Making (82202)

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9) and. (10); 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3; and Section 5 of the licensee's Emergency Plan, this area was inspected to determine whether the licensee had a 24-hour-per-day

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capability to assess and analyze emergency conditions and mak?.

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recommendations to protect. the public and onsite workers, and whether

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offsite officials had the authority and capability to initiate prompt protective action for the public, s.

The inspector discussed responsibility and authority for protective action decision-making with licensee representatives and reviewed pertinent portions of the licensee's Emergency Plan and procedures.

The plan and procedures clearly assigned responsibility and authority for accident assessnent and protective action decision-making.

Interviews with members of the licensee's emergency organization showed that these personnel understood their authorities and responsibilities with respect to accident assessment and protective action decision-making.

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Walk-through evaluations involving protective action decision-making were conducted with two shift engineers and two shift technical advisors all of whom appeared to be cognitant of appropriate onsite protective measures and aware of the range of protective action recommendations appropriate to offsite protection.

Personnel interviewed were aware of the need for timeliness in making initial protective action recommendations to offsite officials.

Interviewees demonstrated adequate understanding of the requi rement that protective action recommendations be based on core condition and containment status even if no release is in progress.

The capability of offsite officials to make protective action decisions and to promptly notify the public was discussed with licensee representa-tives.

Licensee procedures made provisions for contacting responsible

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4 offsite authorities ~on a 24-hour basis. Backup communications links with offsite authorities were available.

.No violations or deviations were identified.

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Knowledge and Performance of Duties (Training) (82206)

Pursuant; to 10CFR50.47(b)(15) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,

-Section IV.F, this area was inspected to determine whether emergency response personnel understood their emergency response roles and could perform their assigned functions.

The inspector. reviewed the description (in the Emergency Plan) of the

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training program, training procedures,'and selected lesson plans, and interviewed members of the instructional staff.

Based on these reviews-and interviews, the inspector determined that the licensee had established

'a formal emergency training program.

Records of training for key members of the emergency organization for the

period January 1,1987 to' September 18, 1987, were revieweo. The training records revealed that personnel designated as alternates or given interim responsibilities in the emergency organization were provided. with appropriate training.

According to the training records, the type, amount, and frequency of training were consistent with approved procedures..

The inspector conducted walk-through evaluations with selected key members of the emergency organization.

During these walk-throughs, individuals were 'given various hypothetical sets of emergency conditions and data and asked to talk.through the response they would make if such 'an emergency actually existed. The individuals demonstrated familiarity with emergency procedures and equipment, and no problems were observed in the areas of emergency detection and classification, notifications, assessment action

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(including plant conditions, in-plant sample collection and analysis, and j

offsite monitoring), and protective action decision-making.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7.

Dose Calculation and Assessment (82207)

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), this area was inspected to determine whether there was an adequate method for assessing the consequences of an i.

actual or potential radiological release.

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The. inspector reviewed IP-3, Alert, Table 1 and Table 2 and the following

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reports: Emergency Dose Assessment Procedures for Atmospheric Releases of

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Radioactivity Technical Basis (0HS-20-80-05), Revision 3, dated January 1983; RAC:

A Computer System for Radiation Accident Dose Assessment (0HS-20-80-07), Revision 1, dated April 1984; and Emergency Dose Assessment Procedures for Atmospheric Releases of Radioactivity from TVA Nuclear Power Plants (RH-82-1-RA1), Revision 1, dated January 1984.

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procedure had provisions for calculating doses for ground and elevated releases, monitored and unmonitored pathways such as the' plant stack.

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building vents..' containment leakage.

The inspector fdiscussed the dose projection models used by the licensee s

and the State of Alabama.

The two models were compatible and 'no major-l

. differences were.noted.

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The licensee. procedures made provision for' timely incorporation of dose assessment results into the offsite protective action reconinendation process.-

Du ring interviews with key licensee emergency response personnel, all appeared to recognize the uncertainties associated with

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dnse projections and the importance of making protective action

recommendations based on plant conditions.

The inspecto.r, during walk-throughs, observed initial dose assessment by shift. engineers and shift technical advisors.

The individuals demonstrated am acceptable ability to make initial dose assessments using Table 1 and Table 2 of Procedure IP-3, Alert, IP-4, Site Area Emergency, IP-5, General Emergency.

The inspector discussed the backshift availability of personnel qualified to -_make dose calculations.

Licensee representatives stated that such personnel were available on all shifts and supported by personnel from the Central Emergency Command Center in Chattanooga.

The inspector verified from a review of current staffing levels and emergency response training records that this capability existed.

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The inspector reviewed a comparison study between the licensee dose model and the NRC Interactive Rapid Dose Assessment Model (IRDAM) used by the State of Alabama. The study results of NRC and TVA Radiological Emergency Planning Model Comparison January 1985, indicated that no significant differences were noted.

The reasons for, and significance of, minor differences were recognized and documented by the licensee.

No violations or deviations were identified.

8.

Public Information Program (82209)

' Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.2, this area was inspected to determine whether basic emergency planning information was disseminated to the public in the plume-exposure-pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) on an annual basis.

The licensee has developed an emergency response information brochure for

- use by the public residing in or frequenting the 10-mile emergency-planning zone (EPZ).

Licensee representatives stated that the brochure j

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was updated annually.

Licensee procedures required a coordinated review

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and annual update of the brochure.

Licensee documentation showed that development of the brochure was coordinated with the appropriate offsite

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authorities.

The inspector reviewed the current brochure and verified

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that it included the information specified by NUREG-0654,Section II.G.

I According to licensee representatives, the means used by the licensee to inform the transient population of appropriate emergency response measures and action included posted notices and signs at boat access ramps and

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recreation areas.

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l A review of the licensee documentation showed that the 1987 edition of the l

public information brochure was sent to residences within the 10-m11e EPZ

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during March 1987.

The public information brochure provided a point of contact for obtaining additional information.

Based on the discussion, the inspector determined that the type of information provided was adequate.

l An inspection of roads within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone revealed a limited number of blue directional / evacuation route signs referenced in the Emergency Information brochure and the radiological emergency information signs located at recreational areas within the 10-mile radius.

The directional / evacuation route signs are designed to designate evacuation routes and direct evacuees to Registration and Reception Centers located outside the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone.

Inspector Followup Item (50-259, 260, 296/87-31 41):

Periodically verify that evacuation route signs referenced in the Emergency Information Booklet and on the radiological information signs located at recreational areas within the 10 mile emergency planning zones are in place.

No violations or deviations were identified.

9.

Inspector Followup Items (92701)

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(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 259/85-52-06, 260/85-52-06, 296/85-52-06:

Failure to adequately provide for protective response of onsite personnel via an effective PA systems and informative announcements.

At the tine of the inspection, an Engineering Change Notice had been issued and is being tracked.

This item will be reviewed during a future inspection, b.

(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 259/85-52-07, 260/85-52-07.

296/85-52-07:

Determine adequacy of cross-referencing of rewritten energency opereting inspections.

At the time of the inspection, a i

new contractor had been hired to perform this task.

Completion date uncertain.

This item will be reviewed during future inspections.

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(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 259/85-52-08, 260/85-52-08, 296/85-52-08:

Review FEMA 43 Documentation when available along with licensee's records to determine adequacy of PNS System's testing and Evaluation Schedule.

At the tine of the inspection, the licensee

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-stated that time for!: completion:of this'~ item was at least 1 year,

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3:g This ftem will continueito be. reviewed during future-inspections.

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- (0 pen) Inspector. Followup -Item f(IFI): 259/87-18-01, 260/87-18-01,..

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296/87-18-01:

Inclusion of Xey Emergency Ressonse. Personnel.in a on-call: list and periodiciverification of. thei r timely availability

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'by unannounced drills. 'At the time ~of this inspection,'a draft Site Director Standard Practice Procedure "SDSP-22.2, Emergency Response"

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Organization,'? was scheduled for review by, the.PORC on September 25, 1987.

Duty < Papers were being assigned and some communication drills -

had been completed.

This item will.be reviewed during a future

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