IR 05000259/1987039

Insp Repts 50-259/87-39,50-260/87-39 & 50-296/87-39 on 871103-05.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness Exercise,Involving NRC Observation of Key Functions & Locations During Exercise

ML20234F083
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	12/10/1987
From:	Decker T, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20234F015	List: IR 05000259/1987039 ML20234F011
References
50-259-87-39, 50-260-87-39, 50-296-87-39, NUDOCS 8801110320
Download: ML20234F083 (20)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:' UNITED STATES km REog%

.. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -

1. • ',

- '#$ REGION 11 g, , j 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

• 's ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

% ,$ 4 *"** DEC 311987 Report Nos.: 50-259/87-39, 50-260/87-39, 50-296/87-39 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 6N 38A Lookout Place I 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Docket Nos.: 50-259, 50-260, 50-296 License Nos.: DPR-33, DPR-52, DPR-68 ' Facility Name: Browns Ferry Inspection Conducted:- '1ber 3-5 1987 [,

/8-///[ Inspector [[* W.~M. Shrtbr /7 Date Signed j , Accompanying Personnel: J. L. Kreh E. D. Testa A. H. Johnson Kr M. Clark / / IR', Bryan.(Bat' elle) t Approved by [# M+ d /f?-//-#/ /g T. R'. ~ Decker,,Sytion Chief Date Signed Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY i Scope: Routine, announced inspection of the Browns Ferry emergency preparedness exercise, involving observation by six NRC representatives of key functions and locations during the exercise.

Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

i l

8801110320 B71231 PDR ADOCK 05000259 i G PDR ' __-_ ___ - _ _- * .: ',. . * . ,. ~ . REPORT DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• H. P. Pomrehn, Site Director
• J. G. Walker, Plant Manager
• D.

Wall, TSC Controller

• A. W. Sorrell, RADCON Manager
• T. E. Adkins, Lead CECC Controller
• W. C. Thomison, Technical Support Services Manager
• R. McKeon, Operations Superintendent
• G. D. Henry, Reactor Engineer
• K. L. Welch, Technical Assessment #1
• J. A. Savage, Compliance
• B. C. Morris, Licensing
• J. L. Ingwerson, Site Emergency Support
• A. S. Johnson, Plant Manager's Office
• N.

Catrol, Lead, Control Room Controller

• R. E. Jackson, Nuclear Security Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security office members, and office personnel.

NRC Resident Inspectors

• G. L. Paul k
• C, R. Brooks
• Attended exit interview 2.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 5,1987, , with those persons indicated. in Paragraph l' above.

The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below.

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspection.

4.

Exercise Scenario (82301) , I The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to assure that provisions were made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements defined in the licensee's Emergency Plan and I - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ -

- _ ___ __ - ____ _ _ - _ _ _ __ .: . ,. .,. . .' i organization pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NUREG-0654.

I The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and f discussed with licensee representatives. While no major scenario problems wtre identified, several inconsistencies became apparent during the uercise.

The inconsistwies, however, failed to detract from the overall performance of the licensee's emergency organization.

The scenario developed for this exercise was detailed, and fully exercised the onsite emergency organization.

The scenario provided sufficient information to the State, counties, local governments and Federal agencies consistent with their participation in the exercise.

The licensee demonstrated a significant commitment to training and personnel through the use of controllers, evaluators, and specialists participating in the exercise.

The inspector observed neither prompting nor undue interaction between controllers and players, with one exception.

The exception was the controller prompting the Shift Engineer's clerk on use of the automatic paging system for making the initial personnel notifications to activate the onsite emergency response facilities.

The observed prompting prevented the Site Emergency Director from demonstrating the capability to make required notifications in a timely manner.

Prompt notification was an exercise objective identified by the licensee.

This finding was identified as an exercise weakness (50-259, 260, 296/87-39-01).

This item will be reviewed during subsequent exercises.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5.

Assignment of Responsibility (82301) This area was observed to assure that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee were specifically established, and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), Paragraph IV. A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.A of NUREG-0654.

The inspector observed that specific emergency assignments were made for the licensee's emergency response organization, and that adequate staff was available to respond to the simulated emergency. The initial response organization was augmented by designated licensee representatives; however, because of the scenario scope and conditions, long term or continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was not required.

Discussions with licensee representatives and detailed review of the site Radiological Emergency Plan indicated that a sufficient number of trained technical personnel were available for continuous staffing of the augmented emergency organization, if needed. The inspectors observed.

activation of the Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), and the Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) and - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ - -

,: > -

.- .

determined that required staffing and assignment of responsibility were consistent with the licensee's Emergency Plan and approved Implementing Procedures.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6.

Onsite Emergency Organization (82301) The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to assure that the following requirements were implemented pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.B of NUREG-0654: (1) unambiguous I definition of responsibilities for emergency response; (2) provision of adequate staffing to assure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times; /3) specification of onsite and offsite support organizational interactions.

Tne inspector observed that the-initial onsite emergency organization was adequately defined, and staff was available to fill key functional positions within the organization.

Augmentation of the initial emergency response organization was accomplished through mobilization of available on-shift personnel. The on-duty Shift Engineer assumed the duties of Site Emergency Director promptly upon initiation of the simulated emergency, and directed the response until formally relieved by the Plant Manager.

Required interactions between the licensee's emergency response organization and State and local support agencies were adequate and consistent with the scope and objectives of the exercise.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7.

Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301) This area was observed to determine that arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources were made, and that other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response were identified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E. Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0645, Section II C.

Arrangements for requesting assistance resources are provided for in the l Emergency Plan.

Inspection disclosed that required arrangements appeared l to be consistent with the Emergency Plan and scope of the exercise.

No violations or deviations were identified.

l 8.

Emergency Classification System (82301) l This area was observed to determine that a standard emergency classification and action level was in use by the nuclear facility licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), 10 CFR 50, Apm.ndix E.

Parap :.ph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section II.D.

I

R $. !- . .

An inspector observed that the emergency classification system was in effect as stated in the Radiological Emergency Plan and the Implementing Procedures.

The system appeared to be adequate for the classification of the simulated accident and the en.ergency procedures provided for initial and continuing mitigating actions during the simulated emergency.

No violations or deviations were identified.

, , 9.

Notification Methods and Procedures (82301) This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established for notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations had been established; and means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway have been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.0, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section II.E.

The inspector observed that notification methods and procedures were established to provide information concerning the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response organizations.

Inspection disclosed that notification methods appeared to be consistent with the Emergency Plan and respective implementing procedures.

No violations or deviations were identified.

10.

Emergency Communications (82301) This area was observed to assure that provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in NUREG-0654, Section II.F.

< The inspector observed communications within and between the licensee's emergency response facilities (Control Room, TSC, OSC, CECC), the licensee and offsite response organizations, and the offrite environmental monitoring teams and the TSC/CECC.

The inspector also observed information flow among the various groups within the licensee's emergency organization.

It was noted that onsite personne'l were not kept apprised of the emergency status via informative PA system announcements.

A similar inspector followup item (50-259, 260, 296/85-52-06) from the 1985 exercise resulted in this observation being identified as an exercise weakness (50-259, 260, 296/87-39-02).

This item will be reviewed during subsequent exercises.

No violations or deviations were identified.

---_--___---__J

_ _ _ _ _ - _ M.

. ..

.

11.

Public Education and Information (82301) This area was observed to assure that information concerning the simulated emergency was made available for dissemination to the public pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in NUREG-0654, Section II.G.

Information was provided to the media and public in advance of the exercise.

The information included details on how the public would be notified and the initial actions which should be taken during an emergency. A rumor control program was also in place.

The licensee activated and fully staffed the Joint Information Center (JIC) at John C. Calhoun Community college.

The facility was used by the licensee for preparation, coordination and dissemination of emergency news information. Written press releases were prepared and issued for the JIC.

Releases issued were timely, and adequately reflected plant emergency conditions.

A corporate spokesman was designated to conduct periodic press briefings. The briefings were technically accurate and presented in a manner readily understood by laymen; however, a potential problem occurred at the 8:50 am news briefing when the alternate TVA spokesman indicated that protective action recommendations (PARS) had been made to the State but the implementation status was not known at that time. The problem was avoided by ending the news briefing without a question and answer session, which permitted the State spoke man to be updated and l cognizant of protective actions planned for implementation-by the l State.

Interaction and direct cooperation of the licensee with the State and counties was effective.

However, the inspector noted that more formalized i coordination between the licensee and State regarding the activation of the JIC would be appropriate.

Representatives of State and counties were l accommodated at the JIC.

The cited representatives fully participated in the composition of news releases.

News releases were the product of integrated activity of the licensee and the above cited support groups.

Similarly, State, Federal and county representatives assigned to the JIC, fully participated in planning and presentation of periodic press briefings held during the exercise.

Operation and management of the JIC was effectively implemented, and was consistent with emergency plan requirements and approved procedures.

No violations or deviations were identified.

12.

Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301) This area was observed to assure that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in NUREG-0654, Section II.H.

________ _-__-__- - -- _ ___ _ a

T 'i

.

. .. . ' .

The inspector observed activation, staffing, and operation of the. emergency response facilities, and observed the use of equipment therein.

Emergency response facilities used by the licensee during the exercise included the Control Room, Technical Support Center, Operations Support.

Center, and Central Emergency Control Center, a.

Control Room - The Control Room personnel acted promptly to initiate emergency response to the simulated emergency.

With the exception of the controller prompting discussed in Paragraph 4, the' notifications-to onsite and offsite personnel were performed timely and in accordance with procedures.

Personnel were knowledgeable and used their procedures;~however, an inspector noted that some action steps appeared to be dwelled on too long before proceeding.

It was also noted that emergency procedure steps were not annotated with initials and time entries in accordance with procedural instructions.

This observation was identified as an inspector followup item (50-250, 260, 296/87-39-03).

This item will be reviewed during subsequent exercises.

b.

Technical Support Center - The TSC was activated and staffed in approximately 1 hour following notification by -the Site Emergency Director of the simulated emergency conditions leading to the Alert classification.

The TSC staff appeared to be - knowledgeable concerning their emergency responsibilities, and TSC operations appeared to be adequate. The TSC appeared to have adequate _ equipment for the support of the assigned staff.

Operations Support Center - The OSC was staffed promptly following c.

activation of the Emergency Plan.

Significant changes had been made to the structure of the OSC since the last emergency exercise, and this year's scenario was very demanding regarding the ' number of repair and assessment teams required.

As a result, some problem - areas were identified by both the licensee and NRC observers.

The more significant problem was command and control of the teams composed of the Auxiliary Unit Operators (AU0s).

The OSC Director was responsible for assembling the AVO teams but was not cognizant of neither the AU0s nor their individual skills.

Also, since the TSC was a relay for communications between the Control Room and the OSC, a delay in the exchange of information was observed.

Based on the above observations, the need for improved command and control of assessment and repair teams' from the OSC was identified as an inspector followup item (50-259, 260, 296/87-39-04).

The inspector also noted that the Main Steam Relief. Valve (MSRV) troubleshooting team neither developed a troubleshooting plan in advance nor maintained a log to include team members and repair actions taken.

This observation was identified as a followup item (50-259, 260, 296/87-39-05).

No violations or deviations were identified.

y _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

. _ - __ - _ _ __ _ _ - __ _ _ _ - M '. . , . . ' .

13. AccidentAssessment(82301) This area was observed to determine that adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B and specific guidance promulgated in NUREG-0654, Section II.I.

The accident assessment program included both an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident.

The inspector noted that plant assessment activities at the CECC were not prioritized and a poor quality graph resulted in different values between the CECC and TSC core damage assessments.

However, neither of these findings appeared to have a negative effect on accident mitigation.

No violations or deviations were identified.

14. Protective Responses (82301) This area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented promptly as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and specific guidance promulgated in NUREG-0654, Section II.J.

The inspector verified that the licensee had emergency procedures for formulating protective action recommendations for offsite populations within the ten mile EPZ. The licensee's protective action recommendations were consistent with EPA and other criteria.

No violations or deviations were identified.

15. Exercise Critique (82301) The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that shortcomings identified as part of the exercise were brought to the attention of management and documented for corrective action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E, 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in NUREG-0654. Section II.N.

The licensee conducted a player's critique immediately following the exercise and a comprehensive Controller / Evaluator critique on November 4, 1987.

The Licensee /NRC critique was conducted on November 5, 1987, with exercise controllers and observers, licensee management, and NRC representatives.

The licensee's critique was detailed and comprehensive.

Following the management critique, the NRC inspector provided preliminary findings observed during the exercise.

No violations or deviations were identified.

_ - _ _ _ _ _ _

• ,;,

. .

. 16.

Inspector Followup (92701) a.

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-259, 296/85-52-06: Failure to adequately provide for protective response of onsite personnel via-an effective PA system and informative announcements.

This item was also observed and discussed in Paragraph 10, above.

Based upon the lack of adequate corrective action, this finding was reclassified as an exercise weakness (50-259, 260, 296/87-39-02).

b.

(Closed) IFI 50-259, 296/85-52-07: Determine adequacy of cross-referencing of rewritten emergency operating instructions (Closed IFI 81-19-35).

This was not identified to be a problem during the exercise.

c.

(Closed) IFI 50-259/86-33-01: Exercise Weakness - Failure to meet TSC objectives of demonstrating effective command and control and problem solving capabilities of the TSC staff.

During the annual exercise, effective command and control and problem solving capabilities were demonstrated in the TSC.

d.

(Closed) IFI 50-259/86-33-02: Exercise Weakness - Failure to meet OSC objectives of demonstrating timely transfer of information to TSC and ability to conduct timely inplant health physics surveys.

The OSC transferred information to the TSC on a timely basis and conducted timely inplant health physics surveys.

e.

(Closed) IFI 53-259/86-33-04: Exercise Weakness - Control Room staff was not timely informed of the transfer of responsibility to the TSC.

A firm announcement was made in the Control Room when responsibility was transferred to the TSC.

f.

(Closed) IFI 50-259/86-33-05: Licensee identified problems presented in critique - documented on 0IL by Nos. 86-EP-01 through 86-EP-39.

This item is closed as the EP Section is no longer maintaining a list of all licensee identified problems from the annual exercise.

g.

(Closed) IFI 50-259, 260, 296/87-18-01: Inclusion of key emergency response personnel in an on-call list and periodic verification of their timely availability by unannounced drills.

The licensee had recently installed an automated paging system (APS) for expediting the notification of the plant emergency response organization.

17.

Federal Evaluation Team Report The report by the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional Assistance Committee and Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region II staff) concerning the activities of offsite agencies during the exercise will be forwarded by separate correspondence.

L_ __ _ _ _ ___ _ _

.. . .. ,. '

Attachment: Browns Ferry Narrative Summary and Goals and Objectives -_ -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- -

. _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. .. '.

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT , 1987 GRADED EXERCISE NARRATIVE SUMMARY . , Unit 1 is in the startup mode pulling control rods and just critical, the first rod was pulled at 0447 CST, with the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) at =1920 F and 0 psig.

This startup is following a five-day outage to fix the Main Turbine (MT) thrust bearing wear detector. Unit I core is approximately 50-percent into core life with RCS activity 1.5 pCi/gm dose equivalent I-131.

Unit 2 is at 100-percent power steady state operation for the last 28 days. The core is near end of life. RCS activity is 2.6 pCi/gm dose equivalent I-131 and has remained constant at that level for the last 25 days. The unit is in day 5 of'a 7-day Limiting Condition for Operation (L.C.O.) in accordance with Technical Specification 3.5.E.2. due to the HPCI turbine being tagged to replace the main oil pump. Maintenance expects to complete the job and return the RPCI to operations next shift. All surveillance requirements for the HPCI inoperability have been completed and are not due again until tomorrow midnight shift. The 1B Control Rod Drive (CRD) pump is tagged to repair the speed increaser.

Maintenance expects two additional days work before returning it to operations.

Condensate domineralizer 2E' resin trap is tagged for replacement with the clearance just now issued to the Shif t Engineer.

SI 4.1.B.10 on the Main Steam Line'(MSL) rad monitors is due this shift and SI 4.11.A.1.a on the High Pressure Fire Protection Logic is in progress.

Unit 3 is in a refueling outage with the core fully unloaded.

Fuel is being shuffled in the spent fuel storage pool and feedwater nozzle work inside the vessel is in progress. The spent fuel pool gates have been installed and RHR system loop I is in the supplemental fuel pool cooling mode with RHR pump 3C running.

RHR pumps 3B and 3D are tagged and disassembled.

The CRD system is tagged for scram valve maintenance.

Unit 3 Suppression Pool has been drained and torus modifications are in progress.

The exercise begins with a postulated localized earthquake with sufficient acceleration to alarm seismic trigger operation at 1 0.lg and cause noticeable onsite building movement.

The most obvious immediate damage is to the Condensate Storage Tanks (CST's) 1, 2, and 3 and to the switchyard.

It is assumed that a majority of the ceramic insulators in the switchyard fail, causing a total loss of offsite power to the plant.

All Diesel Generators (D.G.) start and electrically tie onto their respective 4KV shutdown board. The "old" CST's are damaged to the extent that #1 and #3 are leaking through ruptured plates and #2 although not leaking, is sagging and leaning toward the Northeast.

An ALERT should be declared by the Shift Engineer (S. E.) at this time based on Unit 1 panel 9-4 alarm " Seismic Trigger A (B) (C) Reactor Building, El. 519".

Unit 1 and Unit 2 both have scrammed and the Main resm Isolation valves (MSIV's) have isolated. The control room operators will enter the Emergency Operating Instructions (E0I's) and the S. E. uhould initiate BFN EPM-T.

Inspection teams will be assembled and begin inspecting all plant areas. Unit I will have been returned to shutdown cooling within 1 hour, s Confidential 3fffi 3119E Mh",al N ,DO NOT DIVULGE

__ _ _ _ - _ _ __ l }, Th3 RCIC on Unit 2 is pumping to th3 vases 1 cnd racctor pr:scure is being controllsd by manuni cpar tion cf th3 M31n Stram R3110f Valvcs (MSEV) in ceccrd:nco with EOI-1 RC/p. Suppression pool cooling 10 placed in , j service in accordance with EOI-1 S/Q and E0I-2 Sp/T. Recovery I operations continue until at approximately 1-1/2 hours into the exercise, an aftershock ot. curs.

The af tershock is of sufficient magnitttde to cause ) additional structural and component failures.

All three "old" CST's { collapse, the suppression pool drain line on Unit 2 fails and begins ! leaking at approximately 1200 gpm, and a steam leak of approximately 1100 #/hr. develops on 2-FCV-73-3.

This causes airborne contamination in the Unit 2 reactor building.

Control power to RCIC and the MSRV's is lost due to a problem in Unit 2 panel 25-32.

This makes them both inoperable from the control room or panel 25-32.

At this point, there is no high pressure makeup to the Unit 2 reactor.

There is a possibility of losing tha suppression pool as a heat sink due to the leaking drain line. The MSRV's continue to operate in the pressure relief mode. A SITE AREA EMERGENCY should be declared based on plant conditions. Unit 1 is in shutdown cooling.

Unit 2 MSRV's continue to operate in the pressure relief mode and reactor water level continues to decrease. When the low reactor water level setpoint of -114.5" is reached at = 3 hours and.15 minutes, load shedding logic initiates, causing the Diesel Cenerator output breakers to trip open deenergizing the Units 1 and 2 4KV Shutdown Boards. The D.G.'s immediately reenergize the 4KV Shutdown Boards and the RHRS, CSS, and EECW pumps sequence on line on Unit 2.

Due to reactor pressure, the LpCI and CSS pumps cannot inject so the operator stops all eight pumps, overrides the containment cooling interlocks and realigns the RHRS to the suppression pool cooling mode. The Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) pump automatically restarts to supply cooling to the drywell essential loop.

Unit 2 reactor water level continues to decrease until the core begins to uncover. Maintenance continues to attempt repairs on the torus drain line and panel 25-32 and at approximately 4 hours into the event, the Unit 2 RCIC is repaired and can be used. When cooler suppression pool water is pumped into the reactor by the RCIC, it is postulated that severe fuel clad damage occurs due to the thermal shock.

The extent of fuel clad damage is assumed to be 50-percent.

RCIC continues pumping the suppression pool to the reactor but due to the drain line leak, the pool level continues to decrease.

The decision is made to transfer water from Unit 1 pool to Unit 2 pool.

Reactor water level eventually is restored to the normal range. Attempts to reenergize a 4KV Unit Board are successful as Shutdown Bus 2 is placed in the backfeed mode with "C" and "D" D.C.'s operating in parallel.

2A CCW pump is started and the operators begin equalizing the Main Steam Lines (MSL) l in order to open the MSIV's.

About 7-1/2 hours into the event, the MSIV's are opened and reactor pressure is being manually controlled by the operators through the Main Turbine Bypass Valves (BpV's).

A hotwell pump and condenaate Confik;r':iq! Ofill cm,o J $ b b4 h2h - y x DCiNOT DNULGEs ___ _____ -______

_ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .-

l bMatar pump cra etcetsd to cod fesdw; tar to the r61cter wh n n:rd:d, , .insing tha normal fesdwatsr system.

As the eccetcr is d:proosurized, en ' offsito pcwze lins, Trinity 161KV, b2com;a evailcblo. Th3 units era removed from backfeed and station service is aligned to the Trinity 161KV line via the start busses.

About 8-1/2 hours into the event, Unit 2 reactor pressure has been reduced low enough that the steam leak on 2-FCV-73-3 has stopped, reactor water level is near normal and stable, and cooldown/depressurization is continuing through the BpV's.

The exercise will be terminated at this point.

NSC:RKQ 3119E 9-15-87 . Don'(is ^~<'1k,! idential Driil NOT DlVUtQE ! .

. . . BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) P. RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN (REP) EXERCISE . GOALS AND OBJECTIVES - The 1987 BFN REP exercise will be a full-scale exercise requiring full participation by TVA, State, and local emergency response agencies.

Exercise Goals TVA's goals for the 1987 BFN exercise are as follows* 1.

To allow plant and offsite personnel to test and demonstrate their ( response capability in accordance with the BFN REP and REP I implementing procedures to protect the health and safety of TVA employees and the general public.

2.

To ensure that weaknesses observed in previous exercises have been corrected.

3.

To identify emergency response capabilities that are in need of improvement or revision.

Exercise Obicctives General Objectives: -'s , 1.

Demonstrate the ability to alert and mobilize TVA emergency response s.

personnel and to activate TVA emergency centers in a timely manner.

This exercise will be initiated between the hours of midnight and 6 a.m.

2.

Demonstrate the adequacy, operability, and effective use of emergency communications equipment and the adequacy of the communications systems.

3.

Demonstrate the ability of each emergency response facility manager to maintain command and control over all emergency response activities conducted from his facility throughout the exercise.

4.

Demonstrate the primary functional responsibilities and/or problem-solving capabilities of emergency response personnel.

i 5.

Demonstrate that timely and accurate information can be supplied to the State on a frequent basis.

6.

Demonstrate that a timely and accurate flow of information can be maintained between the plant and the Central Emergency Control Centor , ' (CECC).

3_ lCo Tdentiijgggs i o , c v I!!w!a - n r . i c,; ..N Yl.) & i

--ee dS** a '* E* _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _

q

l

l - . . -2- , 7.

Demonstrate the ability to effectively generate protective action recommendations.

Specific Objectives: A.

Control Room Objectives 1.

Demonstrate the ability of the Site Emergency Director (Shift Engineer) to classify an emergency condition and make required

notifications in a timely manner.

2.

Demonstrate the ability to formulate and implement initial onsite protective action measures for plant personnel.

3.

Demonstrate the precise and clear transfer of responsibilities from the Control Room staff to the Technical Support Center (TSC) staff.

4.

Demonstrate the ability of the Shift Engineer to periodically inform Control Room personnel of the status of the emergency situation and actions currently being planned by the TSC.

! 5.

Demonstrate the ability of the Control Room personnel to maintain current knowledge of equipment and plant status and corrective actions taken through timely, detailed log keeping.

,.s t } . 6.

Demonstrate the ability of the Control Room personnel to make a timely determination of the cause of an incident and perform mitigating actions to place the unit in a safe and stable i condition through effective command and control.

' B.

TSC Objectives 1.

Demonstrate the ability to alert and mobilize the TSC emergency response personnel and to activate the TSC in a timely manner.

2.

Demonstrate that effective command and control occurs in the TSC.

I 3.

Demonstrate the primary functional responsibilities and problem solving capabilities of the TSC staff in support of the Control < Room staff's effort to identify the cause of the incident, mitigate the consequences of the incident, and place the unit in j a safe and stable condition.

{ l 4.

Demonstrate the proficiency of the Site Emergency Director in the TSC to classify an emergency condition based on current l plant conditions and the proficiency of the Site Director in directing the overall site response and resources to support the Site Emergency Director in accident mitigation activities.

f% \\ c ~.,-,p ,% r= s ..

\\ m_ ' ,a ! ' - . DO N * . f"

- -- _

.' . . -3- . (q 5.

'j Demonstrate the ability to direct and coordinate in-plant Rad Con surveys in order to formulate and implement onsite protective actions.

6.

Demonstrate the ability to perform timely assessments of onsite radiological conditions to support the formulation of offsite protective action recommendations.

7.

Demonstrate the timely updating of T3C status boards.

8.

Demonstrate timely updating of the Operation Support Center (OSC) and the Control Room, and the transfer of technical information to the CECC.

9.

Demonstrate the ability to assemble onsite personnel within the protected area and provide an accountability report to the Site Emergency Director within 30 minutes after sounding the radiological emergency sirens.

e 10.

Demonstrate the ability to effectively control access to the site and control rooms.

C.

OSC Objectives 1.

(} Demonstrate the ability to alert and mobilize the OSC emergency response personnel and to activate the OSC in a timely manner.

v 2.

Demonstrate the ability of the OSC staff to initiate and coordinate activities in an efficient and timely manner through effective command and control.

3.

Demonstrate that OSC teams are thoroughly briefed on plant conditions, that adequate Rad Con support is provided before being dispatched and that the exposure of onsite emergency workers is controlled.

4.

Demonstrate that adequate communications are maintained between OSC teams and the OSC and that each team is tracked in a timely manner.

S.

Demonstrate that there is adequate communications and efficient transfer of information between the OSC areas and the TSC, Rad Con laboratory, and Chemistry laboratory.

6.

Demonstrate the timely updating of OSC status boards.

I D.

Radiological Control and Chemistry Objectives 1.

Demonstrate the ability to alert and mobilize Rad Con personnel in a timely manner.

p) ,, - . _. _... -. _ _, ) t ,r,- .q . , ! '

it. .. l . l __ i

I

,' , . . -4- ' .

[- 2.

Demonstrate the ability of the Rad Con staff to perform { \\ effective in-plant and site boundary surveys during radiological

emergencies while following good Rad Con and ALARA practices.

3.

Demonstrate the ability to track changing radiological conditions through timely documentation of survey results.

! 4.

Demonstrate timely and effective transfer of survey results from the Rad Con laboratory to the TSC and OSC.

5.

Demonstrate the ability to track and control the exposure of onsite emergency workers.

6.

Demonstrate a timely and efficient activation of the plant environmental monitoring van and the establishment of adequate communications with the TSC, RMCC, and/or CECC.

7.

Demonstrate the ability to obtain and analyze samples drawn from the in-plant normal or postaccident sampling systems to support plant radiation release calculations.

E.

CECC Objectives 1.

Demonstrate that the Operations Duty Specialist makes the initial emergency notifications to the State and offsite TVA r% emergency personnel in a timely manner.

N.,) ' 2.

Demonstrate the ability to alert and mobilize the CECC emergency response personnel and to activate the CECC in a timely manner.

3.

Demonstrate that the CECC Director makes a clear announcement when he determines the CECC operational, maintains effective command and control in the CECC, and provides periodic briefings to the CECC staff, 4.

Demonstrate the precise and clear transfer of accurate j information between the TSC staff and the CECC staff.

! 5.

Demonstrate the ability of the CECC staff to direct and coordinate the deployment of Radiological Monitoring Teams and coordinate TVA dose assessment activities with those conducted by the State.

> 6.

Demonstrate the ability of the Dose Assessment Team to obtain, analyze, and use onsite and/or offsite radiological conditions and meteorological information to produce dose assessments to support formulating protective action recommendations and to , provide the recommendations to the CECC Director in a clear and timely manner.

t y -. _ _ _. -- (t.)' ' .., ' ' I c I & K.T b r e ' _ - _ _ _ _

.' . . . -5- . ,m ( ) 7.

Demonstrate the ability to inform, update, and coordinate with \\- # State Radiological Health personnel regarding meteorological, dose assessment information, and plant status.

8.

Demonstrate the ability to periodically inform and update Radiological Monitoring Control Center (RMCC) emergency response personnel regarding the status of the emergency conditions.

9.

Demonstrate the ability of the CECC Plant Assessment Team to analyze current plant conditions, identify projected trends and potential consequences, and make protective action recommendations to the CECC Director using the Protective Action Guide (PAC) logic diagram.

10.

Demonstrate the ability of the CECC to provide periodic updates of onsite status and provide protective action recommendations to the State in a clear and timely manner.

11.

Demonstrate the ability of the Core Damage Assessment Team to generate source term information in a timely manner.

12.

Demonstrate a timely and effective flow of information between CECC Radiological and Plant Assessment Teams.

13.

Demonstrate the timely updating of CECC status boards, p (_,) 14.

Demonstrate that proper' security is established and maintained for the CECC.

15.

Demonstrate the ability to alert Federal and industrial emergency contacts as appropriate.

F.

Environs Assessment Activities 1.

Demonstrate the ability to coordinate Radiological Monitoring Teams from the' RMCC in conjunction with the State.

2.

Demonstrate the ability of the Radiological Monitoring Teams to efficiently and effectively utilize their procedures to perform dose rate surveys, collection and analysis of radiological samples, and other prescribed radiological monitoring activities.

j 3.

Demonstrate the ability of the monitoring teams to follow contamination control procedures under field conditions if warranted.

4.

Demonstrate the ability to control the exposure of offsite emergency workers.

) -

---

7 b

, , -} NOT3 %..:c -_ _ _ _ _ _.

>

' l - . . i - , L,. -6- [ l \\-- ' ~ ~ 5.

Demonstrate effecti've command and control of radiological monitoring activities from the plant, RMCC, and/or CECC as appropriate.

1 G.

Public Information Objectives ' 1.

Demonstrate the ability to effectively provide timely and , I accurate information to the public and coordinate periodic news media briefings with the State.

2.

Demonstrate the ability of the JIC media monitors to function effectively as a key part of the rumor control system.

3.

Demonstrate that the JIC Director exercises effective command and control of the TVA/JIC workroom.

4.

Demonstrate the News Desk's ability to brief the press via telephone.

H.

Communications Objectives 1.

Demonstrate the REP notification procedure throughout the notification chain, beginning at the BFN Control Room and extending to State and local authorities.

(} 2.

Demonstrate the adequacy of communications links between the (m,/ plant and the CECC.

3.

Demonstrate the adequacy of communications links between the , CECC and the State Emergency Operations Center.

4.

Demonstrate the adequacy of communications links between the j CECC and the JIC.

S.

Demonstrate the adequacy of communication links between the CECC and the RMCC.

I.

Exercise Conduct Objectives 1.

Continue improvements of controller and evaluator performance through an increased level of participation.

2.

Demonstrate the ability to adequately perform postexercise critiques to determine any areas requiring additional capability improvement.

3.

Provide training for new emergency response personnel.

,o r- - is,) ()b?? n ~~ - _ _ _,, U fi

e oA NOT r cg, .s -- N i .___

_ _ _ _______ -_-_-___-__-__ - - - - - ' ' . . -7- . J.

Credit till be taken for the following required REP drills.

1.

Environmental radiological monitoring drill.

2.

Plant Rad Con drill.

3.

CECC/ Stat.e communications drill.

4.

TSC/CECC communications drill.

5.

CECC dose assessment drill.

. - NSC:JLR:TCB revised 8-19-87 2844E

r-- - -- s.

'o.y.

, .,_.. J l }}