IR 05000259/1999005

Insp Repts 50-259/99-05,50-260/99-05 & 50-296/99-05 on 990725-0904.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Operations,Maintenance,Engineering & Plant Support

ML20212M175
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	10/01/1999
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML18039A877	List: IR 05000259/1999005
References
50-259-99-05, 50-260-99-05, 50-296-99-05, NUDOCS 9910080200
Download: ML20212M175 (9)

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l U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 11 i

Docket Nos: 50-259,50-260, 50-296 License Nos: DPR-33, DPR-52, DPR-68 Report Nos: 50-259/99-05, 50-260/99-05, 50-296/99-05

' Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)

Facility: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1,2, & 3 Location: Corner of Shaw and Browns Ferry Roads Athens, AL 35611 Dates: July 25 - September 4,1999

. Inspectors: W. Smith, Senior Resident inspector J. Starefos, Resident inspector E. DiPaolo, Resident inspector P. Bonnett, Resident inspector, Limerick Plant, Region I C. Smith, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch, Division of Reactor Safety Approved by: P. E. Fredrickson, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects

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L 9910080200 991001 ADOCK 0 9 hDR Enclosure

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1,2, and 3 NRC Inspection Report 50-259/99-05, 50-260/99-05, 50-296/99-05 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering,

- and plant support. ' In addition, there was a followup inspection of the effectiveness of Site Engineering. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspectio Ooerations

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Operators continued to demonstrate good professionalism, conservatism, and communications in control of the plant (Section 01.1).

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With Unit 1 being in long-term layup, and based on a visual inspection, the Unit 1 drywell was being maintained in an acceptable condition (Section 01.2).

Maintenance

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Maintenance work activities observed during the inspection period were performed in a professional manner (Section M1.1).

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The licensee's staff demonstrated good coordination, communication, and attention to detail while performing high risk main turbine control troubleshooting (Section M1.2).

Surveillance testing was performed satisfactorily during this inspection period (Section M1.3).

Good engineering direction of troubleshooting and good maintenance support of repair

. activities were observed during resolution of a reactor core isolation cooling turbine trip / throttle valve that failed to trip as expected (Section M1.4).

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Corrective actions with respect to the problem evaluation reports associated with the resolution of the high pressure coolant injection system design basis calculations were adequate to prevent recurrence of the identified deficiencies (Secton E8.3).

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L Report Details Summarv of Plant Statuo Unit 1 remained in a long-term lay-up condition with the reactor defuele Unit 2 operated at or near full power with the exception of scheduled power reductions for

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. routine workf Between August 24 and August 31,1999, power was reduced to approximately 82% on two occasions to correct problems with condensate pump 28.' Repairs were made and the unit was returned to full powe Unit 3 operated at or near full power with the exception of scheduled brief power reductions for routine work. Also, on September 2,1999, recirculation pump 2A was tripped and power was stabilized at approximately.70%. Although the symptoms of the recirculation pump problem were similar to those documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-259,260,296/99-04, the root

' cause was a relay card failure. The licensee replaced the failed card. The unit was returned to full power on September 3,199 L_Qaerations 01 Conduct of Operations

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01.1 General Comments (71707)

' The inspectors observed control room activities daily when on site and toured accessible portions of the plant. The inspectors found, in general, that the operators were properly performing their duties and responsibilities in accordance with regulatory requirements, and were attentive to the indications on the control panels. The operators' responses to incoming alarms were timely and appropriate. During tours of the plant, the inspectors found it to be maintained in good materiel condition, and found the licensee staff to be actively implementing improved standards of housekeepin O1.2 insoection of Unit 1 Drvwell

' Ingepetion Scope (71707)

An inspection of the defueled Unit 1 drywell was performed to determine the level of housekeeping and materiel condition, considering its long-term layup status, Observations and Findinas On August 16,1999, the inspectors, performed the above inspection tour of the Unit 1 drywell. The materiel condition of the systems and components in the drywell was appropriately maintained, and except for a few cases where mirror insulation was removed from its piping, the insulation was in good condition. Coatings on the drywell structure were intact. General housekeeping and lighting was acceptabl I l

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2 Conclusions With Unit 1 being in long-term layup, and based on a visual inspection, the Unit 1 drywell was being maintained in an acceptable conditio Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901)

08.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort (LER) 50-296/1999-004-000: Inoperability of Two Divisions of the Unit 3 Core Spray System Due to Personnel Error. This issue was documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-259,260,296/99-04, Section 04.1. A }

non-cited violation (NCV) was identified for failure to select the correct core spray pump for testing. Upon reviewing the LER, no additionalissues were foun . Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Maintenance Comments (62707)

The inspectors observed portions of the following work orders (WO):

WO 99-006564-000. Calibrate Temperature Switch 0-TS-65-14 for Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) Filtration Unit *

WO-99-008968-000, Troubleshoot and Repair Unit 2 Reactor Core Isolation i

Cooling (RCIC) Turbine Trip / Throttle Valve (2-FCV-071-0009) j

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WO 99-005657-000, Adjust Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant injection System (HPCI) Stop Valve (2-FCV-073-0018) Balance Chamber Pressure a

WO 99-007624-000, Troubleshoot Unit 2 Main Turbine Master Trip Solenoid ,

Valve B Trip indication Throughout the inspection period the conduct of main 5 nance was performed in a

- professional manner. Workers demonstrated knowledge of assigned tasks. Proper radiological controls was observe M1.2 Troubleshootina Main Turbine Controls Inspection Scope (62707)

The inspectors observed portions of WO 99-007624-000, Troubleshooting Unit 2 Main Turbine Master Trip Solenoid Valve B Trip indicatio i

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b.- Observations and Findinas o

- The prejob briefing for troubleshooting the Unit 2 main turbine master trip solenoid valve B trip indication was detailed. Emphasis was placed on peer checking of critical steps and on following the troubleshooting plan. The inspectors noted that, because the maintenance was determined to be high risk (i.e., potential for turbine trip), the plan was designed to minimize risks of a turbine trip during troubleshooting. The troubleshooting plan was systematic and resulted in discovering a wiring discrepancy which had 4 complicated previous troubleshooting attempts. Good coordination and communication between operations, engineering, and maintenance personnel were observe Conclusions The licensee's staff demonstrated good coordination, communication, and attention to detail while performing high risk main turbine control troubleshootin I M1.3 General Surveillance Comments (61726)

The inspectors observed portions of the following surveillance procedures (SP):

SP 0-SR-3.6.4.3.2(A VFTP), SGT Filter Pressure Drop and in-Place Leak Tests -

Train A, Revision j

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SP 3-SR-3.3.5.1.5(DWP D-ECCS), Core Standby Cooling Systems HPCI, LPCI,

& CS Initiation - High Drywell Pressure Instrument Channel D Calibration, Revision :

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SP 2-SR-3.6.1.3.5(CS 1), Core Spray Motor Operated Valve (MOV) Operability Test, Revision *

SP 2-SR-3.5.3.3, RCIC System Rated Flow at Normal Operating Pressure, Revision 7A Performance of surveillance testing met regulatory requirements. and problems were not encountered, except as noted in Section M1.4. Self-checking was evident, and the test performers kept the procedure steps signed off as the tests progresse M1.4 RCIC System Testina Insoection Scooe (61726. 62707)

On August 18,1999, the inspectors observed portions of SP 2-SR-3.5.3.3, RCIC System Rated Flow at Normal Operating Pressure, and assessed the licensee's response to problems encountere t

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P 4 { Observations and Findinas During the performance of SP 2-SR-3.5.3.3, the inspectors noted good testing practice A problem was encountered when the RCIC turbine trip / throttle valve (2-FCV-71-9) failed l to trip as required by the procedure. The operators demonstrated good management of {

the problem by promptly attempting to determine the cause of the failure to trip. Because the cause was not readily identified, the operators properly secured from the test and placed the system in a safe condition. The licensee initiated Problem Evaluation Report (PER) 99-008992 and promptly commenced troubleshooting and repair activities. Good engineering direction of troubleshooting and support of repair activities was observed by the inspector L The licensee found that the valve operator screw spindle was bent and there was binding between the operator screw spindle and the spring retainer yoke cap. The licensee subsequently replaced the affected parts and returned RCIC to service well within the Technical Specification (TS) allowed outage time. The licensee stated that the apparent cause of the failure to trip was a combination of the bent screw spindle, spindle nut wear, 1 and a loose trunnion screw. The inspectors observed that these conditions could cause i binding and failure of the valve to trip. The licensee could not determine the cause of the bent screw spindle, but postulated that it was damaged during past maintenance work that involved removal of the valve operator. The inspectors considered the licensee's actions appropriate to correct the problem and prevent a recurrenc Conclusions Good engineering direction of troubleshooting and good maintenance support of repair activities were observed during resolution of a RCIC turbine trip / throttle valve that failed to trip as expecte .

Ill. Engineering E8 Misce:laneous Engineering issues (92903,37551)

E (Closed) Unresolved item (URI) 50-259/1997-04-01: Resolve Maintenance Rule implementation on Browns Ferry Unit 1. The licensee submitted a partial exemption to the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) to the NRC on February 4,1999. This partial exemption was reviewed and approved by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) on August 9,1999. NRR's letter to TVA partially exempted Browns Ferry from the explicit scoping requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(b), and instead, allowed the site to consider the defueled and long-term lay-up status of Unit 1, when establishing the scope of the Maintenance Rule Program. The exemption stated that structures, systems, and components that perform a required function for Unit 1 in its present defueled status or that directly support the operation of Unit 2 or Unit 3 must be included in the scope of the licensee's Maintenance Rule Program, but Unit 1 systems and components not required to be functional would not be required to be included in the licensee's Maintenance Rule i Progra c _ - . - . - - - - - - - - - -

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5-E8.2 '(Closed) LER 50-260/1999-006-000: Main Steam Safety / Relief Valves Exceeded the Technical Specifications Setpoint Tolerance Due to Pilot Valve Disc / Seat Bonding. The licensee found that 5 of the 13 main steam safety / relief valves (SRVs) exhibited lift settings in excess of the TS set point tolerance of 13 percent. The cause was attributed to corrosion bonding at the pilot valve disc / seat interface. Although the test results were ,

in excess of the TS setpoint tolerance, the licensee concluded that the failure of the 5 SRVs would not have resulted in exceeding the TS safety limit during an abnormal operating transient. In addition, the licensee conducted additional testing at an independent test facility which provided a validation of the Wyle Laboratory test method This issue continues to be an industry problem and is being evaluated by the Boiling Water Reactor Owner's Group (BWROG) SRV Drift Fix Development Committee and the valve manufacturer. The licensee continues to participate in the BWROG evaluation for a permanent solution to the problem. In addition, the licensee has implemented an electrical logic modification, based on a BWROG recommendation, designed to open the SRVs when reactor steam dome pressure meets or exceeds the SRV setpoint pressur The pressure switch actuation minimizes the effects of SRV setpoint drif E8.3 (Closed) Inspection Followuo item (IFI) 50-260. 296/98-11-02: HPCI System Design Basis Calculations - Minor Errors and Non-Conservative Assumptions (Six Examples). j All six of the PERs related to this IFl were dispositioned as Level "C" PERs, which -

required detemlination of apparent causes and specific actions to be taken to correct the ;

PER condition and causes. The inspector reviewed the apparent causes documented in j the below listed PERs and concluded that the apparent causes and developed corrective actions provided reasonable assurance for recurrence control of the identified deficiencie Corrective actions were developed and implemented for each of the PERs liste '

.- PER 98-014338: Calculation MD-O-0073-92-0184

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PER 98-014420: Calculation MD-Q-0073-870190

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PER 98-014418: Calculation MD-O-0073-870193

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PER 98-014419: Calculation MD-Q-0073-880139

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PER 98-014388: Surveillance Requirement 3.5.1.8, HPCI Flow Test, Section 7.20

PER 98-014331: TS Section 3. The inspector determined the corrective actions to be adequate for the resolution of the respective PERs, and did not identify any deficiencies during the review.

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E8.4 (Closed) IFl 50-260.296/98-02-06: Review DCN and Safety Evaluation for FSAR Table 7.8-2 Changes. The inspector reviewed plant modification design change notice (DCN) W-17672A and verified that it had been used to make design changes to the torus narrow range instruments. This plant modification replaced Unit 3 instruments 3-FIC-64-54, -66 and 3-LT-64-54, -66 with thermal dispersion level sensing units manufactured by Fluid Components, Inc. It also replaced wide range level instruments 3-LT-64-159A, -159B with Rosemount Model 1154DP5RG transmitters. Changes to Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Table 7.8-2 due to these plant modifications were incorporated into the FSAR via SAR Change Package No.16-016, dated November 11, 199 On April 4,1998, the licensee wrote PER 98-000574 to document a deficiency where FSAR Table 7.8-2 was incorrectly marked up for the suppression chamber water level j indication range in SAR Change Package 16-016. This design error was contained in )

plant modification DCN T30200A which failed to differentiate between instrument loops I of Units 2 and 3. The Unit 2 instrument loop was incorrectly shown as having a range of-15 inches to +10 inches when the installed instrument range was -25 inches to +25 inche The inspector reviewed the corrective actions developed and implemented for the above PER and verified that FSAR Table 7.8-2 was planned to be revised to include information for Unit 2 which was erroneously removed from the FSAR. SAR Change Package 18-031 was prepared by the licensee for revising FSAR Table 7.8-2 to differentiate between the suppression chamber water level indication of Units 2 and No deficiencies were identified during this revie V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The resident inspectors presented inspection findings and results to licensee management on September 10,1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings i presented. The license did not identify any of the materials reviewed during this )

inspection as proprietar PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee T. Abney, Licensing Manager R. Coleman, Radiological Control Manager J. Corey, Radiation Protection and Chemistry Manager R. Greenman, Site Support Manager J. Herron, Interim Site Vice President J. Johnson, Site Quality Assurance Manager R. Jones, Plant Manager R. LeCroy, Site Security Manager i

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J. Ledgerwood, Maintenance Superintendent G. Little, Operations Manager R. Moll, System Engineering Manager W. Nurnberger, Chembe/ Superintendent D. Olive, Operations Serf.rintendent D. Sanchez, Training Manager J. Schlessel, Maintenance Manager i J. Shaw, Design Engineering Manager B. Shriver, Assistant Plant Manager R. Wiggall, Site Engineering Manager INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551 Engineering IP 61726 Surveillance Observations IP 62707 Maintenance Observations IP 71707 Plant Operations IP 71750 Plant Support Activities IP 92901 Followup - Plant Operations IP 92903 Followup - Engineering ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED

.G19Bd 50-296/1999-004-000 LER Inoperability of Two Divisions of the Unit 3 Core Spray System Due to Personnel Error ,

(Section 08.1).

50-259/1997-04-01 URI Resolve Maintenance Rule implementation on Browns Ferry Unit 1 (Section E8.1). l 50 260/1999-006-000 LER Main Steam Safety / Relief Valves Exceeded the Techr ical Specifications Setpoint Tolerance Due to Pilot Valve Disc / Seat Bonding (Section E8.2).

.50-260, 296/98-11-02 IFl HPCI System Design Basis Calculations -

Minor Errors and Non-Conservative Assumptions (Six Examples) (Section E8.3).

50-260, 296/98-07.-06 IFl Review DCN and Safety Evaluation for FSAR Table 7.8-2 Changes (Section E8.4).

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