IR 05000259/1974002
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UNITED STATES f.
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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION UF20THATE OF REGULATORY OPERATICH3
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Pergs et AT t.a N r A. GE ORG s a M 30 3 B0 Inspection Report No. 50-259/74-2 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 818 Power Building Chattanooga, Tennessee 37301 Facility Name: Browns Ferry 1 Docket No.:
50-259 License No.:
DPR-33 Category:
B2 Location: Decatur, Alabama Type of License:
3293 Mwt, BWR (G-E)
i Type of Inspection: Routine, Unannounced
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Dates of Inspection: January 30 and February 11-14, 1974 Dates of Previous Inspection: January 8-11, 1974 Principal Inspector:
W. S. Little, Reactor Inspector Facilities Test and Startup Branch
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Accocipanying Inspector:
R. F. Sullivan, Reactor Inspec':or Facilities Operations Branch Other Accompanying Personnel:
C. E. Murphy, Chief
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Facilities Test and Startup Branch (January 30, 1974 only)
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Principal Inspector:
t, W. T.'Little, React'or,I)fspector
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Date Facilitie Test nd Startup Branch J*
7N Reviewed By: /
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C. E. Murphy,(Ch)6f, Facilities Test and tartup Branch 8604300236 860317 PDR FOIA MORROW 85-782 PDR
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R0 Rpt. No. 50-259/74-2-2-SIMMARY OF FINDINGS 1.
Enforcement Action A.
Violations 1.
Certain activities under your license appear to be in violation of AEC requirements. These apparent violations are considered to be of Category II severity.
a.
Contrary to the requirements of Section 6.3. A.6 of the Technical Specifications, TVA plant operations were carried out when running a surveillance test which was not described in the test procedure.
(Details I, paragraph 21)
b.
Contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, " Corrective Action," TVA did not take prompt corrective action to restore the reactor building and main steam pipe tunnel air temperatures to normal conditions.
(Details I, paragraph 21)
c.
Contrary to the requirements of Technical Specification 3.8.B.8, the turbine building ventilation radiation monitor was out of service for more than one hour and no substitute was provided.
(Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-748)
2.
Certain activities under your license appear to be in violation of AEC requirements. The following is considered to be of Category III severity.
Contrary to the requirements of Technical Specification *
6.6.A and Browns Ferry Standard Practice BF05, " Monitoring of Plant Equipment," the shift engineers and assistant shift engineers daily journal did not accurately state when the relief valve stuck open and did not state that the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system was manually initiated following the vessel isolation and the relief valve malfunction.
(Details I, paragraph 21)
II.
Licensee Action on Previousiv Identified Enforcement Matters A.
Violations 1.
Miscellaneous Violations, Report 50-259/74-1 Awaiting TVA response to violation letter.
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R0 Rpt. No. 50-259/74-2-3-2.
Nonconforming Drywell Head Gasket, Report 50-259/73-13, Violation I.A.l.b Resolved.
(Details I, paragraph 2)
III. 'New Unresolved Items 74 2/1 Turbine Building Vent Radiation Monitor (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-748)
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TVA reported that this monitor had been out of service without a replacement for 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> versus one hour allowed by the Technical Specifications.
74-2/2 Main' Steam Line Pressure Switch Setpoint Drift (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-7410)
During a surveillance test on February 13, 1974, switches PdIS-1-36B and -50A were found to operate outside the technical specification limit. TVA will submit an abnormal occurrence report.
74-2/3 Main Steam Relief Valve Stuck Open PCV-1-41 stuck open on February 12, 1974, following a reactor isolation and scram. TVA will submit an abnormal occurrence report.
(Details I, paragraph 21)
IV.
Status of Previously Reported Unresolved Items 74-1/1 Diesel Generator Voltage Regulator Failure Awaiting vendor's report.
(Details I, paragraph 3)
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74-1/2 Main Steam Relief Valve Bellows Seal Leakage (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-7349)
No change.
(Details I, paragraph 4)
74-1/3 Drywell Isolation Valve Failure (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-7351)
Awaiting solenoid failure study results.
(Details I, paragraph 5)
74-1/4 Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) Pressure Switch Setpoint Error (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-7352)
Awaiting accelerated testing results.
(Details I, paragraph 6)
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R0 Rpt. No. 50-259/74-2-4-
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74-1/5 Reactor Water Level Switch Setpoint Drift (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-741)
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Awaiting accelerated testing results.
(Details I, paragraph 7)
74-1/6 Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Closure Time (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-742)
Resolved.
(Details I, paragraph 8)
74-1/7 Valved Out Pressure Switches (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-743)
Resolved.
(Details I, paragraph 9)
73-16/5 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Pressure Switch Setpoint Drift (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-7340)
Resolved.
(Details I, paragraph 10)
73-16/8 Main Steamline Pressure Switch Setpoint Drift (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-7344)
No change.
(Details I, paragraph 11)
73-16/10 LPCI Pressure Switch Setpoint Drift (Abnormal Occurrence 3FAO-7346)
Closed.
(Details I, paragraph 12)
73-14/4 Reactor Water Level Switch Setpoint Error (Abnormal Occurrence BFA0-7322, -7333, -7341)
Closed.
(Details I, paragraph 13)
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73-14/7 LPCI Pressure Ewitch Se'. point Error (Abnormal Occurrence BFA0-7326 and -7346)
Closed.
(Details I, paragraph 14)
73-14/8 Jet Pump Fressure Switch Setpoint Error (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-7327)
Closed.
(Details I, paragraph 15)
73-13/3 RCIC Pressure Switch Setpoint Error (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-7313)
Closed.
(Details I, paragraph 16)
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l R0 Rpt. No. 50-259/74-2-5-73-14/5 Condenser Low Vacuum Switch Setpoint Error (Abnormal Occurrences BFAO-7323, -7331, and -7339)
Closed.
(Details I, paragraph 17)
V.
Design Changes None VI.
Unusual Occurrences 1.
Diesel Start System Failure (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-744)
Re solved.
(Details I, paragraph 18)
2.
HPCI Turbine Governor Instability (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-747)
Resolved.
(Details I, paragraph 20)
3.
Standby Liquid Control Pump Packing Failure (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-745)
The inspector reviewed TVA's abnormal occurrence report and stated that he had no further questions.
VII. Management Interview A.
January 30, 1974 A meeting was held in Chattanooga, Tennessee, between Region II and TVA management to discuss abnormal occurrences and operating experience. Details I, paragraph 25 summarizes the subjects covered in this meeting. The following were in attendance:
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
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Office of Power J. E. Gilleland - Assistant to the Manager of Power W. D. Poling - Quality Assurance Division of Power Production (DPP)
E. F. Thomas - Director J. Calhoun - Nuclear Operations Coordinator H. J. Green - Browns Ferry Plant Superintendent R. A. Sessoms - Instrument Engineer
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R0 Rpt. No. 50-259/74-2-6-Division of Power Resource Planning (DPRP)
R. H. Davidson - Chief, Nuclear Engineering Branch (NEB)
A. W. Crevasse - Quality Assurance, NEB J. T. Lence - NEB B.
Feb ruarf 14, 1974 The inspection results were discussed with the following:
TVA Division of Power Production (DPP)
J. F. Groves - Assistant Plant Superintendent J. C. Dewease - Assistant Results Section Supervisor Office of Power W. D. Poling - Quality Assurance Division of Construction (DEC)
E. Hilgeman - Administration C. G. Holmes - Supervisor, Construction Engineering Section J. E. Wilkins - Startup and Test Section Supervisor M. N. Sawyer - Assistant Startup and Test Section Supervisor Division of Engineering Design (DED)
A. L. Mazzeti - Quality Assurance
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C. D. Bolinger - Quality Assurance Office of Engineering Design and Construction (OEDC)
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A. F. Pagano - Quality Assurance Division of Power Resource Planning (DPRP)
L. H. Coots - Quality Assurance General Electric Company J. L. Perreault - Startup Test Engineer
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R0 Rpt. No. 50-259/74-2-7-1.
A discussion of the events leading up to and following the relief. valve stuck open incident and the resulting violations
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in Section I were discussed.
(Details I, paragraph 21)
2.
The reporting of abnormal occurrences was discussed, especially the need for more detailed information, the cause, and corrective action.
Specific examples were given.
TVA indicated that they will improve on these areas.
(Details I, paragraph 5, 9, 18)
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R0 Rpt. No. 50-259/74-2 I-1 M
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DETAILS I Prepared by: ~/
W. S. Liteld", Reactor Inspector
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Fee 111cies Test and Startup Branch Dates of Inspection: February 11-14, 1974 Reviewed by: [. d.
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3 f/7fd C. E. Murphy, Chiefgf Date Facilities Test and Startup Branch 1.
Persons Contacted Tennessee Valley Authority Division of Power Production (DPP)
- H. J. Green - Plant Superintendent
- J. F. Groves - Assistant Plant Superintendent J. B. Studdard - Operations Superintendent A. M. Qualls - Assistant Operatings Superintendent J. G. Dewcase - Assistant Results Section Supervisor
- M. Lyon - Health Physics Supervisor
Division of Construction (DEC)
J. T. Walker - Mechanical Engineering Section Supervisor R. Olson - Mechanical Engineer 2.
Report No. 50-259/73-13 Violation I.A.l.b, Nonconforming Drywell Head Gasket Audit report number BF-73-3 dated January 3, 1974, was reviewed by the inspector. The audit confirmed that nonconforming materials were ' -
being properly controlled. The inspector stated that he had no further questions.
3.
Diesel Generator Voltage Regulator Failure (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-7347)
DPP individuals said that they had not yet heard from the vendor concerning the cause of the regulator failure. The inspector will hold this item open until the vendor's report is received.
- Also contacted by telephone subsequent to the inspection.
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a RO Rpt. No. 50-259/74-2 I-2 4.
Main Steam Relief Valve Bellows Seal Leakage (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-7349)
P This relief valve was being replaced while the inspector was at the site. TVA's findings will be reviewed during the next inspection.
5.
Drywell Isolation Valve Failure (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-7351)
The inspector told DPP individuals that this abnormal occurrence report was deficient in that it did not state why the pilot solenoid valve stuck open and it did not state TVA's plans to determine the cause of failure. This item will remain open awaiting more information.
6.
Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) Pressure Switch Setpoint Error Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-7352)
The accelerated testing of these Barton Model 288 pressure swtiches is still in progress and this item remains open.
7.
Reactor Water Level Switch Malfunction (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-741)
The accelerated testing of these Barton Model 288 pressure switches is still in progress and this item remains open.
8.
Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Closure Time (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-742)
The inspector reviewed the ten-day report dated January 17, 1974, and stated that he had no further questions.
9.
Valved Out Pressure Switches (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-743)
The inspector reviewed the ten-day report dated January 17, 1974. The inspector asked a DPP representative for amplification concerning their-corrective action. He replied that procedures (Section Instructions)
were being revised to require independent verification that instru-mentation is operable following maintenance. He stated that the corrective action had already been implemented by a ecmorandum issued by the section supervisor prior to issuing the section instructions.
The inspector stated that he had no further questions on this item.
10. High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Steam Flow Pressure Switch Setpoint Drift. (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-7340)
The inspector confirmed that the accelerated testing of these.Barton Model 288 pressure switches has been completed without additional excessive drifting of the setpoints. The inspector stated that he had no further questions on this item.
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R0 Rpt. No. 50-259/74-2 I-3 11. Main Steamline-High Flow Pressure Switch Setpoint Drift (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-7344)
DPP individuals stated that they had not yet heard from the vendor concerning the cause of the bellows failure. This item remains open.
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12. LPCI Pressure Switch Setpoint Error (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-7346)
l Subsequent to this occurrence another identical abnormal occurrence
(BFAO-7352) was reported on the same instrument. Followup on this problem will continue as unresolved item 74-1/4, and 73-16/10 is
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considered closed rather than carry two identical unresolved items.
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l 13. Reactor Water Level Switch Setpoint Error (Abnormal Occurrences BFAO-7322, -7333, -7341)
Another identical occurrence on the same switches was reported (BFAO-741).
i Followup on this problem will continue as unresolved item 74-1/5, and 73-14/4 will be closed rather than carry two identical unresolved items,
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i 14. LPCI Pressure Switch Setpoint Error (Abnormal Occu'rrences BFAO-7326 and
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-7346)
Another identical occurrence (BFAO-7352) was reported on this instrument.
Followup on this problem will continue as unresolved item 74-1/4, and 73-14/7 is closed rather than carry more than one identical unresolved
item.
i 15. Jet Pump Pressure Switch Setpoint Error (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-7327)
The inspector confirmed chat the accelerated testing on this switch'is complete and no excessive setpoint drift problems have occurred. This
item is considered to be closed, i
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16. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCICS) High Steam Flow Press'ure Switch Setpoint (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-7313)
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u The inspector confirmed that the accelerated testing on this switch is
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complete and no excessive setpoint drif t problems have occurred. This item is considered to be closed.
17. Condenser Low Vacuum Switch Setpoint Error (Abnormal Occurrences
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BFAO-7323, -7331, and -7339)
The inspector confirsed that the accelerated testing on these switches
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is complete and no excessive setpoint_ drift problems have' occurred. This
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item is considered to be closed.
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RO Rpt. No. 50-259/74-2 I-4 t
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18. Diesel Start System Failure (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-744)
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The inspector reviewed the ten-day report dated January 15, 1974.
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He asked DPP personnel if they had checked to see that the daily
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I maintenance checks in which the air receivers were blown down and i
the lubricator oil level checked had been made. They replied that j
they verified that this had been done. The inspector asked the DPP individuals if in their monthly starting tests of the diesels j
the air start systems are alternated to insure that each air start J
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system was used to start the diesel on a minimim frequency of every
two months. They replied that their procedure is written such that
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each air start system is tested every two months. The inspector
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stated that he had no further questions on this item, i
j 19. Radioactive Material Release to Unrestricted Areas (Abnormal Occurrence
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BFAO-746)
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I The inspector reviewed the ten-day report dated January 30, 1974.
This report was submitted relative to Violation I.A.l.a. in report
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l 50-259/74-1. The report confirms the inspector's understanding _of i
the corrective action that had been implemented and he stated that he had no further questions on this item.
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20. HPCI Turbine Governor Instability (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-747)
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The inspector reviewed the ten-day report and discussed the incident I
with DPP personnel. The inspector stated that he had no further i
questions on this item.
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21. Main Steam Relief Valve' Stuck Open (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO 749)
Following a trip of the MSIV's and a resulting reactor scram, a main
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steam relief valve (PCV-1-41) stuck in the open position causing a '
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j rapid depressurization and cooldown of the. primary coolant system.
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The scram occurred at 4:01 p.m. on February 12, 1974, and PCV-1-41.
stuck open at 5:32 p.m.
Following the scram the RCIC system was
manually initiated to control water level and a relief valve was
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i automatically and manually initiated to contrcl system pressure and j
remove decay heat. PCV-1-41 had opened and closed normally several j
times before it stuck open. DPP tried _ to manually cycle the valve j
but it would not respond and remained open. Once the reactor i
pressure decayed to N300 psig the feedwater oooster pumps supplied.
the required coolant to maintain reactor water level. At no time-i, before or after the valve malfunction did the reactor water level
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reach as low as 496.5 inches (initiate HPCI or RCIC) or as high as
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e R0 Rpt. No. 50-259/74-2 I-5 582 inches (trip RCIC and HPCI). The top of active fuel is at the 360 inch elevation. TVA estimated that %91,000 gallons of primary coolant was lost to the torus.
The cause of the MSIV trips and the scram was high temperature in
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the main steam pipe tunnel. The tunnel high temperature occurred because the reactor building supply and exhaust fans were off for an excessive length of time during and af ter running surveillance test 4.2.A.21 in which the reactor zone static pressure control regulators were calibrated. The inspector looked at surveillance test instruction 4.2.A.21 and found it to be deficient in that no instructions were given concerning the reactor building supply and exhaust fans. The inspector stated that this appeared to be in violation of Technical Specification Section 6.3.A.6 which requires that detailed written procedures be prepared, approved and adhered i
to for surveillance testing requirements.
The surveillance test 4.2.A.21 had been completed at 1:30 p.m. on February 12, 1974. However, the man responsible for the test failed to notify the unit operator, and the operator did not know until
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he asked at shift change (3:00 p.m.).
The new shift failed to take action to restart the reactor building fans and one of the four pipe
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tunnel high temperature instruments tripped at 3:50 p.m. giving an alarm. A second one tripped at 4:01 p.m. causing the MSIV violation and the resulting reactor scram. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Section XVI,
" Corrective Action" requires prompt identification and correction of conditions adverse to quality. Contrary to this requirement the
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TVA individual responsible for the surveillance test did not notify i
the shift engineer or his representative that the test was completed.
The inspector examined the daily journals of the shif t engineer,
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assistant shift engineer and unit operator. The journals appeared to be inadequate in certain areas:
(a) The shif t being relieved did not adequately describe t'he condit' ion '
of the reactor building fans being off for an excessive period'
of time.
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(b) Neither the shif t being relieved nor the oncoming shif t journals indicate that an attempt was made to evaluate the plant conditions without normal cooling air flow in the building.
(c) Only the shif t engineer journal noted that a relief valve stuck open and the time indicated was in error approximately 30 minutes.
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R0 Rpt. No. 50-259/74-2 I-6 (d) None of the journals indi.cated that following the incident one of the corrective actions taken was to. manually initiate the RCIC system.
These appear to be contrary to the requirements of standard practices BF05, " Monitoring Plant Equipment", and to the Technical Specification requirement in Section 6.6.A. that requires operating logs.
A DPP representative told the inspector that the failed valve and one other had responded slower than the others when manually operated.
TVA replaced both of these plus the valve that had the bellows leakage indication alarm. The replacement valves are being taken from Unit 2.
The removed valves will be disassembled to determine why the valve stuck open, why the bellows leakage occurred, and why the other valve's response was slow when manually actuated.
TVA believes their MSIV experience has been very good in the light of the large number of times that they have been actuated during the torus vibration testing.
Prior to this time each safety and relief valve had been tested manually twice and were actuated during the torus vibration tests as follows:
PCV-1-4 eleven times PCV-1-5 five times PCV-1-18 six times d
PCV-1-19 twenty-three times PCV-1-22 one time PCV-1-23 four times PCV-1-30 eight times PCV-1-31 seven times
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PCV-1-34 two times PCV-1-41 eleven times P CV-1-42 two times TVA will run tests on the replacement valves at 250 psig to confirm-their operability, and will run capacity tests at the rated pressure during reactor startup to confirm the operability of the replacement valves.
22. ROB 73-6 " Inadvertent Criticality in a Boiling Water Reactor" TVA's response to this R0B dated January 14, 1974 was reviewed by the inspector and discussed with DPP individuals. The inspector asked when the defective instructions, mentioned in their letter, would be revised. A DPP individual stated that the following would be revised by March 1, 1974:
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R0 Rpt. No. 50-269/74-2 I-7 MHI-7, " Friction Testing" SI4.3.C, " Scram Testing" (Unassigned number), " Function Testing" SI4.3.A-1, " Shutdown Margin" SI4.10.A.2, " Shutdown Margin for Control Rod Maintenance" The procedures currently in use during the startup test phase have been reviewed and found to be adequate.
The inspector will follow up on this work after March 1, 1974.
23. Inconsistancies Between Technical Specifications and Plant Procedures The inspector told a DPP representative that he had noticed the following disagreements between the technical specifications and standard practices:
BFEl, " Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Surveillance Program" a.
(1) Page 2, Paragraph B, second sentence should pertain to limiting safety system settings, and safety limits in addition to limiting conditions for operation.
(2) Page 2, Paragraph F, first sentence should state "within 5 days or the period allowed by the technical specifications, whichever is less."
b.
BFA42, " Reporting of Nuclear Plant Operating and Plant Performance Information" (1) Page 10,Section VIII, first line; and Plant Superintendent, part 2; should read " telephone and telegraph" rather than
" telephone or telegraph."
(2) Page 11,Section IX, should state that if a saf ety limit is exceeded that the plant shall be shut down and operation shall not be resumed until authorized by the AEC.
24. ROB 74-1, " Valve Deficiencies" The inspector reviewed the summary inspection sheets for the Unit 1 Walworth valves. TVA's response dated February 4,1974, that no weld deficiencies were found in the Walworth valve yokes was confirmed by the inspector. The inspector will follow up on the TVA inspection of the Darling valves.
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RO Rpt. No. 50-259/74-2 I-8 25. Meeting with TVA Management Concerning Operating Problems
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On January 30, 1974, RO:II personnel met with TVA management in Chattanooga. The inspector emphasized the following items:
a.
Correctness of initial 24-hour abnormal occurrence reports.
Both the telephone and telegraph report on BFAO-7345 stated that the core spray leak detection switches were found outside their required setpoints whereas the switches were actually found
" pegged" downscale. TVA made no attempt to correct the erroneous report until the ten-day abnormal occurrence report was submitted, b.
In complying with technical specifications, system operability is determined using the definition of operability in Section 1.0 of Technical Specifications, " capable of performing its intended function in its required manner." The core spray pipe leak detection system as described in abnormal occurrence BFAO-7345 was not operable and any plant operation beyond the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> allowed by the technical specifications was in violation.
c.
System operability can not be assumed if that system has failed for some yet unknown reason.
d.
Setpoint drift problems resulting in abnormal occurrences. The steps TVA was taking to learn why the setpoints drift excessively, and how to prevent the drift was discussed extensively. TVA indicated that they were vigorously pursuing this problem and expected to be able to report their plans and, hopefully, the resolution in the near future.
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R0 Rpt. No. 50-259/74-2 II-l DETAILS II Prepared by: h N7M7 4" R. F. Sullivan, Reactor Inspector Date Facilities Operations Branch Dates of Inspection: February 12-14, 1974 Reviewed by:
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W.C.Seidg, Branch Chief, Facilities
'Date Operations 1.
Individuals Contacted
- H. J. Green - Plant Superintendent J. F. Groves - Assistant Superintendent
- M. Lyon - Health Physics Supervisor J. G. Dewease, Sr. - Assistant Results Supervisor 2.
Personnel Contamination l
On February 13, 1974, 11 personnel received facial contamination all with some ingestion suspected since nasal swabs were positive. The swabs ranged from 1200 to 7000 d/m. These personnel had been in the drywell during the time a relief valve on the main steam line was being removed for repairs. There were three other personnel who had been in the drywell and were not contaminated but they had been in the lower level.
Health Physics personnel made the initial entry to the drywell in the morning to determine radiological conditions and establish requirements for the Special Work Permit which was executed for the job. No respira-tory protection was required because an air sample taken at 8:40 revealed the concentration of airborne activity to be 1.54 x 10 g.m.-
microcuries/ml. A health physics technician was continuously on du'ty at the drywell to follow the progress of the work. A continuous air moni-tor (CAM) was operating in the drywell with one of its major sampling ports in the vicinity of the valve work. The CAM recorded outside th.e, drywell and was under surveillance by the health physics technician. The recording indicated an increase in airborne activity for about 5 minute duration starting at about 2:30 p.m.,
but the increase in level was still below the alarm point which was set to warn of the need for respiratory protection.
Shortly after the relief valve had been removed maintenance personnel noted water vapor rising from the open pipe flange and, at this point, which was about 2:30 p.m., all personnel evacuated the drywell.
Shortly before this time several personnel, upon leaving the drywell, were found contaminated on their upper bodies including the face, but the evacuation of the drywell was completed before personnel could be called out.
- Information was received from these personnel at the site and during subsequent telephone conversations on February 15 and 21, 197 _ -_-_
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RO Rpt. No. 50-259/74-2 11-2 Health Physics personnel again made an entry to the drywell to ascertain the apparent change in radiological conditions. Smears of surfaceg in the vicinity of the relief valve were as high as 25,000 d/m/100 cm while smears in the lower level were 750 d/m. An air sample taken at 3:25 p.m.
near the open flange showed 6.93 x 10-10 microcuries/ml. As preventive measures before resuming the maintenance work, a blank was installed over the open flange and the mechanical vacuum for the main condenser was placed in service.
(Earlier in the day, maintenance work was being performed in the condenser so the vacuum system was off.) Re-entry to continue work on the relief valve was not made until early the next day at 3:00 a.m.
No respiratory protection was required.
An attempt was made to identify and quantify radioisotopes in the air sample using the pulse height analyzer. The activity level was too low to provide good quantitative results but the primary constituents appeared to be Co-58 and Co-60.
Other isotopes identified were:
Sb-124, W-187, Zr-95, Nb-95, Zn-65 and Cr-51.
The licensee's whole body counter was brought to the site on February 14 and the first of the contaminated employees was being counted by 11:00 a.m.
The inspectors were informed shortly before leaving the site that the preliminary calculation for the employee with the highest nasal swab indicated he received less than 1% of a body burden.
By February 15, 1974, all 11 contaminated personnel had been checked on the whole body counter. Three showed positive indication above the detection limit of 0.1 microcuries. The amounts were; 0.24, 0.23 and 0.15 microcuries of Cr-51.
All were less than 1% of body burden.
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