IR 05000259/1973014
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c'*" 'A UNITED STATES
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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION l! ( p. ep i
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DIRECTORATE OF REGUIATORY OPERATIONS g
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230 P E AC HT RE E ST RE ET. NORT MwEST stargs 09 AT L A NT A. GE ORGI A 30303 RO Inspection Report No. 50-259/73-14 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 818 Power Building Chattanooga, Tennessee 37301 Facility Name: Browns Ferry 1 Docket No. :
50-259 License No. :
DPR-33 Category:
B2 Location: Decatur, Alabama Type of License:
3293 Mwt, BWR (G-E)
Type of Inspection: Routine, Unannounced Dates of Inspection: October 16-19, 1973 Dates of Previous Inspection: September 11-14, 1973 Principal Inspector:
W. S. Little, Reactor Inspector Facilities Test and Startup Branch Accot:manying Inspector:
A. K. Hardin, Reactor Inspector Facilities Operations Branch Other Accompanying Personnel:
C. E. Murphy, Chief Facilities Test and Startup Branch
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Principal Inspector:
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W. S. Little, Reac(o/Anspector Date (/
Facilities Test and Startup Branch i
Reviewed By:
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[/-/2-U C. E. Mu'rphy, Chief [/
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Date Facilities Test and Startup Branch F 8604300275 860317 PDR FOIA MORROWG5-782 PDR
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R0 Rpt. No. 50-259/73-14-2-SUMMARY OF FINDINGS I.
Enforcement Action A.
Violations 1.
Certain activities under your license appear to be in violation of AEC requirements. These apparent violations are considered to be of Category II severity.
a.
Contrary to paragraphs 3.3. A.1 and 4.3. A.1 of the Technical Specifications, two control rods were in-operable and calculations indicated that the sub-criti-cality margin could not be achieved in the most reactive condition with the above two control rods withdrawn, the strongest control rod fully withdrawn, and with the other rods fully inserted. TVA reported this incident as Abnormal Occurrence Report No. BFAO-7320W and during the inspection said that they consider the incident to be a technical spacification violation. The commitments made in the abnormal occurrence report have been imple-mented and no further response is required on this item.
b.
Contrary to paragraph 3.8.B.8. of the Technical Specifi-cations, the reactor was operated for more than one hour without the stack radiation monitor. This violation was reported as Abnormal Occurrence Report No. BFAO-7324 by TVA on October 16, 1973.
A ten-day special report will be submitted and no additional response to this violation is required.
(Details II, paragraph 5)
2.
Certain activities under your license appear to be in violation of AEC requirements. These apparent violations are considered to be of Category III severity.
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Contrary to paragraph 6.3.A.9. of the Technical Speci-a.
tications, TVA did not adhere to BF-ISI-1, " Access Control," in that the public safety officer left the gatehouse with the doors unlocked.
(Details I, para-graph 2)
II.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Matters A.
Violations Prompt Reporting of Design and Construction Deficiencies (Report No. 50-259/73-12)
Resolved.
(Details I, paragraph 3)
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R0 Rpt. No. 50-259/73-14-3-Miscellaneous Violations in RO Inspection Report No. 50-259/73-13 Awaiting TVA response to the letter to the licensee.
B.
Safety Items None III. New Unresolved Items 73-14/1 Failure of Stack Gas Monitor Pump Motor Modification is in progress to prevent recurrence of sample pump failure.
(Details II, paragraph 5, Unusual Occurrence IV.e.)
73-14/2 Isolation V.tve Failure During a surveillance test, isolation valve PCV-69-12 in the reactor water cleanup systen failed to close remetely.
TVA has submitted Abnormal Occurrence Report No. BFAO-7319W.
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RO:II follow up on corrective action is not complete.
73-14/3 Drywell Pressure Switch Setpoint Error During a surveillance test, the setpoints of the pressure switches, PS-64-56B and -C, were found to be 2.05 and 2.02 psig rather than <2 psig reo.uired by the technical specifi-cation. TVA submitted Abnormal Occurrence Report No. BFAO-7321W dated October 17, 1973, and the corrective action will be confirmed during the next inspection.
73-14/4 Reactor Water Level Switch Setpoint Error During a surveillance test, the setpoints of level switches
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LIS-3-203B and C were found to be 537.5 inches and 537.2 inches rather than >538 inches required by the technical specifications. TVA submitted Abnormal Occurrence Report No. BFAO-7322W dated October 19, 1973, and the corrective action will be confirmed during the next inspection. These switches are Barton Model No. 288A.
(Details I, paragraph 8 and Details II, paragraph 3)
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R0 Rpt. No. 50-259/73-14-4-73-14/5 Condenser Low Vacuum Switch Setpoint Error
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During a surveillance test, the setpoints of vacuum switches PS-2-1A and -lD were found to be 22.8 and 22.3 rather than
> 23 inches of mercury required by the technical specifications.
TVA submitted Abnormal Occurrence Report No. BFAO-7323W dated October 19, 1973, and the corrective action will be confirmed during the next inspection.
73-14/6 Accidental Isolation of the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCIS)
During a startup test at approximately 5% power and 1000 psig, the HPCIS was isolated automatically due to a leaking rupture diaphragm. TVA submitted Abnormal Occurrence Report No.
BFA0-7325W dated October 15, 1973, and the corrective action will be confirmed during the next inspection.
73-14/7 Low Pressure Coolant Injection System (LPCIS) Pressure Switch Setpoint Error During a surveillance test, the setpoints of PdIS-68-85, -89 and -90 were found to be 2.06, 2.13 and 2.10 psid rather than
< 2.0 psid required by the technical specifications. TVA sub-mitted Abnormal Occurrence Report No. BFAO-7326W dated October 25, 1973, and the corrective action will be confirmed during the next inspection. These problems appear to be generic to Barton Model 288 differential pressure indicating switches and is discussed further in Details II, paragraph 3, and Details I, paragraph 8.
73-14/8 Jet Pump Pressure Switch Setpoint Error During a surveillance test, the setpoint of jet pump riser d/p switch PdIS-68-24 was found to be 1.8 psid rather than
>0.5 and <l.5 psid required by the technical specifications.
TVA submitted Abnormal Occurrence Report No. BFAO-7327W dated October 26, 1973, and the corrective action will be confirmed during the next inspection. These problems appear to be generic to Barton Model 288 differential pressure switches and is discussed further in Details II, paragraph 3, and Details I, paragraph 8.
73-14/9 Inoperative HPCI Level Switches
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During a surveillance test, the HPCI condensate header low level switches LS-73-56A and -B were found to operate outside
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R0 Rpt. No. 50-259/73-14-5-the technical specification trip level of > 551 feet. TVA
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submitted Abnormal Occurrence Report No. BFAO-7328W dated October 26, 1973, and the corrective action will be confirmed during the next inspection.
73-14/10 Drywell Leakage Air Monitoring System The air sampling hoses appeared to be filling with water and the radiation indicators were not identified.
(Details I, paragraph 4)
IV.
Status of Previously Reported Unresolved Items 73-13/1 Review of Critical Instrumentation Valve Lineup Compared With Aa-Built Conditions Resolved.
(Details II, paragraph 2)
73-13/2 Vacuum Breaker Failure TVA Abnormal Occurrence Report No. BFAO-7312W was reviewed and the inspector has no further questions.
(Details II, paragraph 2)
73-13/3 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCICS) High Steam Flow Pressure Switch Setpoint Apparent generic pressure switch setpoint drift problem is not yet resolved. Abnormal Occurrence Report No. BFAO-7313W has been revi1wed.
(Details II, paragraph 3, Details I,
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paragraph 8)
73-13/4 Failure of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Inverter Fuse failures are continuing to occur.
(Details II, paragraph'4)
73-12/1 Relief Valves TVA Abnormal Occurrence Report No. BFA0-7314W was reviewed and the inspector has no further questions.
(Details I, paragraph 5)
73-6/1 HPCI and PCIC Systems Water Hammer Resolved.
(Details I, paragraph 6)
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R0 Rpt. No. 50-259/73-14-6-73-5/2 Cask Decontamination Tank Not inspected. TVA stated that modifications are complete.
RO:II will follow up next inspection.
Valve Wall Thickness (AEC Letter to TVA dated June 30, 1972)
In a telecon with Tennessee Valley Authority, Division of Design, on October 23, 1973, TVA committed to having the final report complete by November 15, 1973.
V.
Design Changes None VI.
Unusual Occurrences A.
HPCI Failed to Reach Rated Speed and Flow TVA Abnormal Occurrence Report No. BFm 311W dated September 20, 1973, reported the failure of the HPCI Unit 1 to reach rated speed and flow during a simulated automatic initiation (quick start).
Inspection of the flow controller revealed a " cocked" amplifier plug-in receptacle which did not permit proper connection to the mating amplifier plug. The cause was traced to a missing anchor nut.
The licensee stated they had inspected all similar controllers and had put a retaining material such as "Locktite" to secure the fastener nuts.
The work was completed on September 21, 1973. The inspector stated he had no further question on this subject.
B.
HPCI DP Switch Malfunction TVA Abnormal Occurrence Report No. BFAO-7315W dated September 28, 1973, a DP switch malfunction in the HPCI isolation logic.
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Investigation revealed the switch actuator arm was binding on the cam face. The licensee stated he had investigated the condition of other DP switch models of the type that malfunctioned and had verified no binding was present. This switch is the same model as the switch for which setpoints are drifting.
It was concluded from the type of failure that there was no relationship between the two problems. The item is closed.
C.
Failure of Stack Gas Monitor Pump Motors TVA Abnormal Occurrence Report No. BFAO-7316W dated October 5, 1973, reported a failure of the stack gas monitors attributed to a blown fuse in the power supply to both A & B pump motor.
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RO Rp t. No. 50-259/73-14-7-Corrective action has been determined, but had not been im-plemented at the time of the inspection. The item will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
(Details II, paragraph 5)
P D.
Instrument Line Reversal on RCIC Steam Flow DP TVA Abnormal Occurrence Report No. BFAO-7317W dated October 5, 1973, reported an occurrence of negative flow indication on the RCIC turbine steamline high flow differential pressure switch.
Investigation revealed the instrument lines serving the pressure switch were reversed. The prints for installation of the line
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show the high pressure side of the switch connected to the inside radius of the elbow tap.
The licensee stated the drawing would be corrected. The licensee further stated that all instrument lines to differential pressure switches, listed in the technical specifications, had been verified to be correctly installed. The item is closed.
i VII. Management Interview On October 19, 1973, the inspection results were discussed with
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the following:
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
Division of Power Production (DPP)
J. F. Groves - Assistant Plant Superintendent
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A. M. Qualls - Assistant Operations Supervisor R. G. Metke - Plant Results Supervisor W. D. Poling - Quality Assurance i
Division of Construction (DEC)
E. Hilgeman - Construction Administrator M. M. Price - Assistant Plant Manager J. E. Wilkins - Startup and Test Section Supervisor C. G. Holmes - Construction Engineering Section Supervisor
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Division of Design (DED)
A. L. Mazzetti - Quality Assurance L. D. Weber - QA Coordinator Office of Engineering Design and Construction (OEDC)
G. M. Tolson - Supervisor, Quality Standards
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R0 Rpt. No. 50-259/73-14-8-Division of Power Resource Planning (DPRP)
L. H. Coots - Quality Coordinator General Electric Company (G-E)
R. G. Knirck - Electrical Engineer J. D. Martin - Operations Supervisor J. Nichols - Site Principal Mechanical Engineer The inspector emphasized the importance of watching for and reporting trends and generic problems in analyzing abnormal occurrences and unusual events. DPP and G-E personnel said that the parts to modify the Model 288 Barton pressure switches will be expedited inorder to try to minimize the setpoint drift problems.
The violations, abnormal occurrences, unusual events and unresolved items described in the previous sections were discussed.
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R0 Report No. 50-259/73-14 II-l DETAILS II Prepared by:
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/8[A>/e/J A. K. Hardin Date Reactor Inspector Facilities Operations Branch Dates of Inspection: October 16-19, 1973 Reviewed by:
g.d.,k L M8///3 R. C. Lewis Date Acting Chief Facilities Operations Branch 1.
Persons Contacted Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
H. J. Green - Plant Superintendent G. Dewease - Assistant Results Supervisor T. Cox - Assistant Plant Maintenance Supervisor J. Pittman - Instrument Engineer General Electric Company (G-E)
R. Knirck - Electrical Engineer 2.
Vacuum Breaker Failure During a reactor cooldown, the drywell pressure was noted to decrease to less than minus 0.5 inches water gauge. The pressure differential switches are set to open the vacuum breakers
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between the suppression chamber and the reactor building automatically at -0.5 inches water gauge in the suppression chamber.
Investigation revealed the sensing line valves to the pressure differential (AP) switches were closed, isolating the AP switches. The licensee's corrective actions to eliminate this type of oversight were verified to be in progress. The action consisted of including all instruments in critical plant systens on check lists, to assure that the required instruments are in service.
In addition, the licensee stated they have visually observed their panel mounted instrumentation, where possible, to i
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R0 Report No. 50-259/73-14 II-2 observe instrument response and have field checked the instruments that could not be verified on a panel. Unresolved items 73-13/1 and 73-13/2 are resolved.
3.
RCICS High Steam Flow Pressure Switch Setpoint on September 14, 1973, the AP switch in Unit 1 RCIC isolation logic was found to have drifted from its original setting of equal to or less than 450 inches water gauge to 457 inches water gauge.
The switch is identified as a Barton Model 288 with a range of 0 to 500 inches H20. The licensee increased the set point verification frequency to once every two weeks, as compared to once per month.
Only one set of data was available for the switch which indicated a continuing setpoint drift problem. One switch had drifted upward about 1.5 percent, a redundant switch had drifted downward by about 6 percent.
The switch vendor has informed TVA that the problem is caused by slippage of the set point locking device and the vendor has designed new set point locks. At the management interview the inspector cautioned the licensee that the two week set point verification frequency should be ascertained to be frequent enough to maintain the set points within Technical Specification limits.
The licensee concurred they would review the data and further increase the frequency of set point verification if necessary. The licensee did not have a date for when new locking devices would be installed, but stated they would pursue obtaining and installing the devices in an expeditious manner.
4.
Failure of HFCI Inverter TVA has experienced several instances of HPCI inverter power supply failure due to a blown fuse. The inverter converts de to ac power for use in the HPCI speed control module. Following the first failure on September 8, 1973, several changes were made to the inverter to reduce the potential for overheating. A modified inverter was
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installed about September 18,.1973.
On September 29, 1973, a second failure occurred. Tests, such as power supply interruptions, overload conditions, and load interruptions were conducted on the overload conditions, and load interruptions, were conducted on Unit 2 inverter to isolate the cause of the fuse failures. At the time of the inspection, the specific cause of the failures had not been determined. The licensee is continuing an accelerated program to resolve the problem and has committed to advising L when a resolution of the problem has been determined.
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R0 Report No. 50-23a/73-14 II-3 5.
Failure of Stack Gas Moni*. ors On September 26, 1973, the stack gas monitor pump motors were found inoperable due to a blown fuse.
On October 15, 1973, the event recurred.
The licensee has concluded that replacement of the existing No. 8 power cables with 1/0 cable. and replacement of the B-class pump motor insutation with H class insulation will resolve the problem. The revisiona had not been implemented at the time of the inspection.
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The inspector stated the item would be retained as unresolved pending a later inspection.
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RO Rpt. No. 50-259/73-14 I-l
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DETAILS I Prepared by:
g W. 3.' Little,' Reactov/aspector Da' e
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Facilities Test and Startup Branch Dates of Inspection: October 16-19, 1973 Reviewed by:
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C."E. Murphy, Chief 7//
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Facilities Test and Startup Branch 1.
Persons Contacted Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
Division of Power Production (DPP)
H. J. Green - Plant Superintendent J. F. Groves - Assistant Plant Superintendent T. Bragg - Nuclear Engineer R. Metke - Plant Results Section Supervisor General Electric Company (G-E)
P. Zimmerman - Nuclear Engineer 2.
Access Control The Browns Ferry industrial security instruction, BF-ISI-1, requires that the public safety officer ".
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the gatehouse, he shall see that the gates are locked.
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October 19, 1973, when the inspectors were entering the plant, the public safety officer was not in the gatehouse and the door into the restricted operating area was unlocked. The officer was at the vehicle access gate which is in direct line of sight within approximately 30 yards of the gatehouse.
The officer did have his back to the gatehouse for short periods of time while allowing a vehicle to pass through the gate.
Several people were in the gatehouse and no one attempted to enter the restricted area when the officer was absent. The inspector told DPP personnel that the public safety officer's leaving the gatehouse with the doors un-locked was considered a violation of their security procedur _
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RO'Rpt. No. 50-259/73-14 I-2 3.
Prompt Reporting of Design and Construction Deficiencies TVA's reply to this violation described in RO Inspection Report No.
50-259/73-12 committed to revising procedures in order to improve on the prompt reporting of design and construction procedures as required by 10 CFR 50.55(e). The inspector reviewed DED-QAP 1.9, Rev. 2,
" Reporting of Deficiencies in Design and Construction of Nuclear Power Plants," and BF-79, Rev. 2, "Deficienty, Deviation or Non-conformance Reporting," and has no further questions on this item at this time.
4.
Drywell Leakage Air Monitoring System Both the FSAR and technical specifications require air sampling instrumentation to monitor for coolant leakage into the drywell.
This instrumentation consists of a constant air monitor which continuously monitors the drywell atmosphere for particulate, total gaseous, and iodine activities. The inspector noted several things about this constant air monitor (CAM) on the west side of the reactor building at the 565 foot elevation:
One of the air sampling hoses had a low point immediately a.
upstream of the CAM and was almost full of water which had condensed in the hose.
b.
Only one of the three indicating meters on the CAM was identified, as to the type of radioactivity being monitored.
Because of the water in the air sampling line, the inspector questioned whether the air monitoring system could be considered operable. DPP stated that they would take immediate steps to correct the above an'd
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to prevent their recurrence. The inspector will follow up on this during the next inspection.
5.
Relief Valves
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The inspector looked at the test and. calibration records for the relief valves. The records confirmed that the setpoints were set
as described in Abnormal Occurrence Report No. BFAO-7314W dated September 28, 1973, and tested as described in the TVA design
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deficiency report dated August 29, 1973. The inspector stated that he had no further questions.
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R0 Rpt. No. 50-259/73-14 I-3 6.
HPCI and RCIC Systems Water' Hammer The inspector examined the startup test records for STI-14 and -15.
Both systens had been tested at design conditions and excessive vibration did not occur in the turbine steam discharge lines in the i
to rus.
This was also confirmed with the test engineer assigned to
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these tests. The inspector stated that he had no further questions.
7.
Startup Test Program
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The inspector reviewed the official test records for the following:
" Master Hot Functional Test Instruction (MHFTI)"
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STI-14, " Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System" STI-15, "High Pressure Coolant Injection System" STI-16, " Selected Process Temperatures"
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STI-17, " System Expansion" STI-25, " Main Steam Line Isolation Valves" STI-35, " Recirculation and Jet Pump System Calibration" STI-72, "Drywell Atmospheric Cooling" All tests required by the MHFTI (power up to ~10% at rated temperature and pressure) have been completed except verifying the residual heat removal system (RHRS) performance during a reactor cooldown. The Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) has reviewed the test results from the MHFTI, and the inspector reviewed the minutes of the October 14, 1973, meeting describing the PORC review. The PORC review resulted in-several suggestions and two limitations that must be resolved before
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exceeding 20% power: One, that DED review the system expansion data that failed to meet acceptance criteria, and two, that DED review the
drywell atmosphere cooling data.
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The test record for STI-17 indicated that the recirculation loop A expansion data did not meet acceptance criteria.
Expansion in the
"X" direction was measured as +0.100 inches compared to a predicted j-0.071 inches, and in the "Z" direction, was +0.261 inches compared i
with a predicted -1.039 inches. The acceptance criteria required the measured valves to be within 50% of the calculated valves. A preliminary
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R0 Rpt. No. 50-259/73-14 I-4 review by G-E and TVA indicated that operation at test condition 1 (15-35% power, ~48% coreflow, ~41% pump speed) was acceptable, but based on PORC's recommendation, DPP will not exceed 20% power without
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DED's written recommendations. The inspector will follow up on this during the next inspection.
The test record for STI-72 indicated that one thermocouple is reading above acceptable test criteria. Based on PORC's recommendation, DPP will not exceed 20% power until DED reviews the data and gives them written authorization to proceed. The inspector will follow up on this during the next inspection.
All of the above mentioned test records were reviewed relative to the requirements of the TVA administrative procedures, the test instruc-tions and technical specifications. The inspector had no further questions at this time.
8.
Generic Instrument Setpoint Drift Problems
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A large number of the abnormal occurrences have occurred because of setpoints drif ting in between surveillance tests. Most of these have occurred on Barton Model No. 288 instruments. The recommended fix is relatively simple as described in Details II, paragraph 3.
DPP stated that instrument setpoints are set at a valve which is above or below the setpoints by an amount equivalent to the published in-strument accuracy. Therefore, the variation from the technical specification requirements reported in the abnormal occurrence reports should be added to an amount equivalent to the instrument accuracy to determine the total drift which had occurred. The inspectors expressed concern over the number of abnormal occurrences of this type and DPP said that the fix on these instruments will be-expedited.
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