IR 05000259/1974006
Text
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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
L - DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS l -{
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l REGION 11 - SulT E 818 230 PE ACHT REE ST REET, NORT HwEST , AT L. A NT A GE OR3e A 30303 RO Inspection Report No. 50-259/74-6 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 818 Power Building Chattanooga, Tennessee 37301 Facility Name: Browns Ferry 1 Docket No.: 50-259 License Nos.: DPR-33 Category: B2 Location: Decatur, Alabama Type of License: 3293 Mwt, BWR (G-E) Type of Inspection: Routine, Unannounced Dates of Inspection: June 6, August 27-29, 1974 Dates of Previous Inspection: May 29-31, 1974 Principal Inspector: W. S. Little, Reactor Inspector Facilities Test and Startup Branch Accompanying Inspectors: C. Alderson, Reactor Inspector Facilities Test and Startup Branch R. F. Sullivan, Reactor Inspector Facilit.ies Operations Branch Principal Inspector: / [ f / 'M W. S. Littie, Reactor Inspector ' Dal;e F 's Test and Start Branch- /acilit C kN Reviewed By: , R.C. Lewis,9ehiorInspector[ Date Facilities Test and Startup Branch 8604300105 860317 PDR FOIA MORROWB5-702 PDR - . - - - -
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.. R0 Rpt. No. 50-259/74-6-2-SUMMARY OF FINDINGS I.
Enforcement Action Violations Certain activities appear to be in violation of AEC requirements. These apparent violations are considered to be of category II severity.
A.
Contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(k), a licensed operator was not present at the controls at all times during operation of the facility.
(Details II, paragraph 2; Details I, paragraph 13) B.
Contrary to the requirements of Technical Specification 6.3.A.5, the corrective maintenance on the HPCI isolation instrument channels was not reviewed, approved and documented as required by TVA procedure SPM BFA-28'. (Details II, paragraph 2) C.
TVA reported in Abnormal Occurrence Report BFAO-7443 that contrary to the requirements of Technical Specification 3.5.1, the core heat genera-tion rate limit was found to be 14.47 versus the allowable 14.35.
(Details III, paragraph 3) , D.
TVA reported in Abnormal Occurrence Report BFAO-7440 that contrary to the requirements of Technical Specification 3.8.B.8, the radwaste building exhaust continuous air monitor was out of service for 1-1/2 hours versus the allowable one hour.
(Details III, paragraph 3) , E.
TVA reported in Abnormal Occurrence Report BFAO-7438 that contrary to Technical Specification Table 3.7.A, main steam isolation valve FCV-1-27 closed in 1.7 seconds versus the minimum allowable of 3 seconds.
(Details III, paragraph 3) II.
Licensee Action On Previously Identified Enforcement Matters t Violations - r 74-3 Rod Sequence Control System Inoperable Resolved.
(Details I, paragraph 2) 74-3 SA Review and Approval of Materials Suitability Resolved.
(Details I, paragraph 3) 74-3 Failure to Perform Surveillance Tests Resolved.
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74-5 Inadequate Maintanance Procedures Abnormal Occurrence Report BFAO-7436 was reviewed and there are no further questions.
III. New Unresolved Items None IV. Status Of Previousiv Reported Unresolved Items 74-5/1 Install Correct Valve Nameplates Not inspected.
74-3/1 Diesel Air Start Motor Failure (Abnormal Occurrences BFAO-7413, -7'.21) Resolved.
(Details I, paragraph 5) 74-3/2 Failure of HPCI Following a Test (Abnormal Occurrence BFA0-7414) Resolved.
(Details I, paragraph 6) 74-3/3 Failure of HPCI To Reach Rated Speed (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-7416) Not inspected.
74-3/4 Vacuum Breaker Limit Switch Failure (Abnormal Occurrence 7417) Resolved.
(Details I, paragraph 7) 74-3/5 Relief Valve Response Time Verification Resolved.
(Report 50-260/74-8, Details I, paragraph 6) - 74-2/2 Main Steam Line Pressure Switch Setpoint Drift (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-7410) Resolved. Accelerated testing completed on March 28, 1974, without additional problems.
74-1/1 Diesel. Generator Voltage Regulator (Abnormal Occurrence BFA0-7347) Closed.
(Details I, paragraph 8)
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. RO Rpt. No. 50-259/74-6-4-74-1/2 Main Steam Relief Valve Bellows Seal Leakage (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-7349) Resolved.
(Details I, paragraph 9) l 74-1/4 Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) Pressure Switch Setpoint Error (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-7352) ! Resolved. Accelerated testing completed without further problems.
74-1/5 Reactor Water Level Switch Setpoint Drift (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-741) Resolved. Accelerated testing completed without further problems.
73-16/8 Main Steamline Pressure Switch Setpoint Drift (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-7344) Switch was lost in transit to vendor.
Since no additional problems have occurred with this switch, this item is closed.
l V.
Organizational Changes I The site organization had been revised to include a Plant Quality Assurance Section reporting directly to the Plant Superintendent.
(Details I, paragraph 10) VI.
Unusual Occurrences None VII. Management Interview The inspection results were discussed with J. F. Groves, Assistant Pla'nt Superintendent, and his staff on August 29, 1974.
The items in Sections I, II and IV were discussed. TVA indicated that ' they would take action immediately to correct Violation I.A.
They also demonstrated that they had already taken steps to prevent the recurrence of violations like I.B.
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. , , . * , R0 Rpt. No. 50-259/74-6 I-1 [ / DETAILS I Prepared By: . 'Date W. S. lfitt)(, Reactor Inspector Facilities Section Facilities Test and Start.up Branch Dates of Inspection: August 27-29, 1974 Reviewed By: [. 6.
M-R. C. Lewis, Senior Inspector Date Facilities Section Facilities Test and Startup Branch 1.
Persons Contacted Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Division of Power Production (DPP) J. F. Groves - Assistant Plant Superintendent W. A. Roberts - Maintenance Supervisor R. G. Metke - Results Supervisor P. L. McCrary - Shift Engineer 2.
Rod Sequence Control System (RSCS) Inoperable The inspector confirmed that station procedures had been revised to require the operator to scram the reactor on interruption of the RSCS below the power level specified in Technical Specification 3.3.B.3.d.
This meets the commitment made in TVA's letter dated May 16, 1974, and the inspector stated that he had no further questions.
3.
QA Review and Approval of Materials Suitability The inspector reviewed procedure SPM BFA6 concerning the review and, , approval of the suitability of new material used in parts and components of critical safety systems. This meets the commitments made in TVA's letter dated May 16, 1974, and the inspector stated that he had no further questions.
4.
Failure to Perform Surveillance Tests The inspector reviewed Abnormal Occurrence Report BFAO-7419W, talked with operators, and reviewed surveillance test records. The inspector stated that he had no further questions on this item.
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.. R0 Rpt. No. 50-259/74-6 '.-2 s 5.
Diesel Air Start Motor Failures (Abnormal Occurrences BFAO-7413 and -7421) The inspector reviewed the work done by TVA on these systems. TVA had not found excessive moisture and rust in the air receivers as expected.
A study by TVA did not justify going to a stainless steel system.
TVA is planning to modify the air system to add blowdown valves on the strainers.
The inspector reviewed the accelerated surveillance test records which confirmed that tests of the air start systems every two weeks from March 22, 1974 until June 14, 1974, were carried out without any system failures. No failures have occurred in routine surveillance tests since June 14, 1974. The inspector stated that he had no further questions on this item.
6.
HPCI High Steam Flow Isolation (Abnormal Occurrences BFAO-7414. -7424. 7435) Numerous incidents have occurred in which the HPCI was initiated and immediately tripped. Subsequent investigations would not reveal anything wrong with the system.
TVA ran many tests to try to detect the reason for the trips. They found that when HPCI was started with a cold turbine that steam flow spikes occurred of sufficient magnitude to exceed the trip setpoint and isolate the turbine. The steam flow would immediately decrease clearing the trip siFnal and making the cause for the trip difficult to determine. The excessive steam flow spikes did not occur when starting a warm turbine. TVA found that adding snubbers to the instrument lines monitoring HPCI steam flow, and adding 3-second time delay relays to the isolation logic prevented these flow spikes from causing an isolation during cold turbine starts.
These modifications were made in June 1974, and experience since that time indicates that a satisfactory solution to the problem was found.
The inspector stated that he had no further questions on this problem.
7.
Vacuum Breaker Limit Switch Failure (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-7417) The inspector stated that the abnormal occurrence report had been reviewed and that he had no further questions.
_ . 8.
Diesel Voltage Regulator Failure (Abnormal Occurrence Report BFAO-7347) - The inspector reviewed reports by Electro-Motive dated July 15, 1974, and by Basler Electric Co. dated August 18, 1974, of tests run on the faulty voltage regulator. Both reports indicated that they could find nothing wrong with the regulator, although neither company could simulate the conditions under which the regulator malfunctioned. The regulator passed all of the vendors acceptance tests. No other failures of this type have occurred since December 19, 1974.
The inspector stated that he had no further questions.
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.. ; . , . .. R0 Rpt. No. 50-259/74-6 I-3 9.
Main Steam Relief Valve Bellows Seal Leakage (Abnormal Occurrence BFAO-7349) The inspector reviewed a maintenance report to the plant superintendent dated March 11, 1974.
Consultation with the Target Rock representative resulted in an 0-ring being replaced.
Subsequent tests confirmed that the 0-ring was faulty and the bellows was not leaking. The inspector stated that he had no further questions on this item.
10.
Plant Quality Assurance TVA described tha responsibility and function of the recently created plant QA staff.
The QA staff supervisor reports directly to the plant superintendent and is responsible for implementing the Office of Power quality assurance plan, verifying that all safety related equipment is operated and maintained properly and performs as designed, and scheduling of surveillance tests. At this time TVA is actively seeking two QA engineers to work in this function. A line of communication bypassing the plant superintendent to the next highest management level is available to the QA supervisor. TVA stated that the Office of Power site auditor will be on site full time in early September 1974.
11.
Fuel Handling Grapple Modification The inspector questioned whether the Unit 1 grapple had been modified to prevent sticking and a recurrence of the problem which occurred on Unit 2.
IVA replied that the grapple had been sent back to the vendor for modification.
12.
Core Spray Pump Suction Valves The inspector asked TVA if they planned to modify their core spray pump suction valves as was done on Unit 2 and described in a TVA letter to Dr. Knuth dated July 26, 1974.
TVA replied that this had not been decided, but that it was under consideration. The inspector will followup on this item in future inspections.
13.
Operator Coverage of Control Room The inspector questioned a DPP individual concerning the fact that the inspectors had noticed the licensed operator going behind the control panel when the reactor was operating and leaving the reactor controls unattended. He replied that this.ad occurred at times, because instruments and controls which were part of the standby gas treatment, building exhaust, radiation monitoring systems, etc., were located on the back of the panel. He stated that there were times when the operator had to go behind the panel to take action to prevent unnecessary
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. . - . RO Rpt. No. 50-259/74-6-I-4 scrams such as switching on.a reactor building exhaust fan to prevent excessive steamline tunnel, temperatures and thereby preventing a ~ reactor isolation and scram. The TVA individual pointed out that the Technical Specifications in Section 6.8.2 requires only that "a licensed operator shall be in the control room...." and does not - state that he must be in front of the panel at all times. The inspector stated the AEC's position that the licenstd operator must be at the control panel and this meant in front of the panel with it under continuous surveillance. The inspector stated that this would , be brought to the Browns Ferry p,lant management's attention.
(Details II, paragraph 2) i
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cs, *. . . . . . . R0 Report No. 50-259/74-6 II-I .i n, ,, DETAILS II Prepared by: Ad ? ((/c v i i:% 9 /t 3/ M Carl E/Alderson, Reactor Date Inspector, Nuclear Engineering Section, Facilities Test and Startup Branch Dates of Inspection: August 27-29, 1974 Reviewed by: 'f QI, W."C.
Seidle, CKief~ f/ Date Facilities Test and Startup Branch 1.
Persons Contacted Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Division of Power Production J. F. Groves - Assistant Plant Superintendent J. Teague - Electrical Engineer 2.
Operator Coverage of Control Room (Violation 74-6-I. A.)
While observing control room operations on August 27, 1974, the inspector noted that the assigned control room operator went behind the console several times while the facility was operating at approximately 600 MWe, On one such occasion the inspector checked his watch and noted that the operator went behind the console at 1455 hours and with the exception of a brief period (approximately thirty seconds to acknowledge an annunciator) did not return to the front of the console until 1505 hours. The principal inspector told licensee management that this would probably be considered a violation of the requirements of 10 CFR - 50, paragraph 50.54(k) and they stated that they would take prompt action to prevent recurrence of this situation.
3.
HPCI Trip Following Manual Initiation (BFAO 50-260/744-W) The inspector reviewed the licensee's follow-up action on this abnormal occurrence which involved tripping of the HPCI turbine on high steam flow following a tal initiation of the FPCI system.
The licensee concluded that t b trip was occuring due to the collapsing of steam as it contacted the cold steam lines downstream of the isolation valves. The HPCI turbine trip logic was modified to add a 3-second time delay to the trip initiatien signal under
c. n. . . . R0 Rpt. No. 50-259/74-6 II-2 MCR-395.
Review of this MCR revealed that it was not processed or approved in accordance with the requirements of Standard Practice BFA 28.
Specifically, the following discrepancies were noted: a.
Section Supervisors had not initiated the MCR.
b.
The required Attachment B, "Unreviewed Safety Question Determination," was not with MCR.
The required safety evaluation was not completed and reviewed c.
by the Plant Operations Review Committee prior to the work being accomplished.
d.
Initials on the MCR indicated that the package was complete; however, several of the required documents were not included in the package. While most of these documents were located in other plant files, the procedure requires that copies of all information, tests and drawings will be kept in the work package.
MCR-395 referenced MCR-345 and MCR-358 under which the same modifica-tion was accomplished on Browns Ferry Unit 1.
Licensee management stated that approval of MCR-395 without the required safety evaluation was based on the fact that the same modification had been accomplished previously on Unit 1.
The inspector reviewed MCR-345 and found the same discrepancies as noted in (b), (c) and (d), above. Additionally, MCR-345 did not indicate whether or not the modification would change system described in the FSAR as required.
This violation of procedure was pointed out to licensee management and they had already taken steps to correct the situation. The supervisor of the newly formed QA Section now reviews all MCR's for completeness before they are submitted to the Plant Operations Review Committee for review. Two recent MCR's were presented as evidence that the situation had improved. The inspector reviewed these MCR's and did not find any. - of the discrepancies noted above.
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. R0 Rpt. No. 50-259/74-6 III-l k>e/7 +- W DETAILS III Prepared By: R. F. Sullivan, Reactor Inspector Date Facilities Operations Branch Dates of Inspection: June 6, August 27-29, 1974 zo /Sd.
Reviewed By D m - F. J. Long, Chief G7 ' Dafe / Facilities Operations Branch 1.
Individuals 2ontacted J. F. Grooves - Assistant Superintendent A. M. Qualls - Assistant Operations Superintendent J. G. Dewease - Quality Assurance Section Leader
W. A. Roberts - Maintenance Supervisor J. J. Erpenback - Nuclear Engineer 2.
Reactor Scram of June 6, 1974 The inspector was at the site to observe a scheduled turbine trip test from 100% power. The test was to be conducted in accordance with startup test procedure No. 27 - Turbine Stop and Control Valve Trips.
An unplanned reactor scram occurred shortly before the turbine trip was to be conducted which caused a delay in the turbine trip test to a later date.
At the time of the scram, which was witnessed by the inspector from the control room, a portion of another startup test, No. 29 - Flow Control, was being conducted.
This involved determining plant response to st'ep changes in recirculation flow in increments of about 10% while operating along the full power load line.
Responses to both decreases and increases in flow had been demonstrated by the introduction of the, step changes into the master flow controller. The scram occurred ' following a step increase from about 93% power which produced a flux spike which reached the trip setting of the APRM sub-system. The flux recordings indicated that the level reached approximately 115% compared to the maximum trip setting of 120% permitted by technical specifications.
Operating personnel attributed the cause of the scram to too abrupt an increase in flow in combination with a conservative trip setting of the APRM's.
Flow recordings revealed that the response of "A" pump lagged behind "B" by about 4 seconds but then the rate of flow increase in "A" loop was 8 times that in "B" loop. Although the final evalulation of the test results was not complete test personnel suspected the problem was in the scoop tube positioners which was considered minor.
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.. R0 Rpt. No. 50-259/74-6 III-2 3.
Abnormal Occurrences Review The written reports, prepared by TVA, of 14 recent abnormal occurrences were examined by the inspector.
Four of these were selected for more detailed review to ascertain the adequacy of the occurrence description, of corrective action, of evaluation and review, and the extent of management participation. Administrative requirements for processing the occurrence reports were met including the application of management controls. No deficiencies were identified.
Three of the abnormal occurrences involved violations of technical specifications which were so identified by the licensee.
These three were: a.
BFAO-7440W reported that the radwaste monitoring channel was out of service for 1-1/2 hours on June 14, 1974, without providing a temporary monitor as required by technical specification 3.8.B.8.
No operations which could lead to an unusual release were kncun to have taken place during this interval. The inspector had no further questions.
b.
BFAO-7443W provided information concerning an updated calculation of ' the maximum average plannar linear heat generation rate (MAPLHGR) which exceeded limits following the taking of a full set of traversing in-core probe readings on July 17, 1974.
The caulculated MAPLHGR was 14.47 kW/ft as compared to the limit of 14.35 kW/ft provided in technical specification 3.5.I.
A control rod adjustment was effected promptly which reduced the MAPLHGR to 13.84 kW/ft. To prevent recurrence responsible engineers were instructed to maintain a more conservative margin between actual and limiting values of MAPLHGR. The inspector had no further questions.
c.
BFAO-7438W reported that during a test of the main steam isolation valves closure times on June 6, 1974, the "B" outboard value closed in 1.7 seconds. This was in apparent violation of the closing time requirement of greater than 3 seconds but less than 5 seconds as listed in technical specifications table 3.7.A. Corrective action included temporary isolation of this line from service while the cause was determined. Oil had leaked from the dashpot due to a damaged seal which was subsequently replaced. A subsequent test of the valve confirmed proper closing time.
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Inspection Report
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REGION II
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