IR 05000259/1974005
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UNITED STATES
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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION 9P2:TdTE OF REGILATCRY OPF,RATICu3
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4' 0 ptArHTAEE ST R E E. T. N OR T H er E S T AT L. & N T A. GE ORG e 4 30303 IJ7f t On AUG2 Bl4 RO Inspection Report No. 50-259/74-5 Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority 818 Power Building Chattanooga, Tennessee 37301 Facility Name: Browns Ferry 1 Docket No.:
50-259 License No.:
DPR-33 Category:
B2 Location:
Decatur, Alabama Type of License:
3293 Mwt, BWR (G-E)
Type of Inspection:
Routine, Unannounced Dates of Inspection:
May 7-10, 15-17, 29-31, 1974 Dates of Previous Inspection:
April 11-12, 1974 Principal Inspector:
W. S. Little, Reactor Inspector Facilities Test and Startup Branch Accompanying Inspector: J. K. Rausch, Reactor Inspector Facilities Construction Branch Principal Inspector:
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W.'S.firtle, Reactor /nspector
/ Date Facilities Test and Startup Branch Reviewed By:
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/! M R. C. Lewis, Senior Inspector Date -
Facilities Test and Startup Branch l
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MORROW 85-782 PDR
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RO Rpt. No. 50-259/74-5-2-SUMMARY OF FINDINGS I.
Enforcement Action Violations Certain activities under your license appear to be in violation of AEC requirements. These apparent violations are considered to be of category II severity.
Contrary to the requirements of Section 6.3. A. of the Technical Specifications the procedures used to perform maintenance on a condensate line were not adequate,resulting in the release of slightly contaminated water to Unit 3.
This was reported by TVA in abnormal occurrence report BFAO-7436 (Details I, paragraph 2)
II.
Licensee Action On Previously Identified Enforcement Matters Violations Not inspected.
III. New Unresolved Items 74-5/1 Install Correct Value Nameplate Nameplates showing the correct value rating must be installed on 1-inch Hancock valves.
(Section V and Details I, paragraph 3)
IV.
Status of Previously Identified Unresolved Items Not inspected.
V.
Unusual Occurrences
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A.
Potentially Underrated Valves TVA reported to the inspector on May 7, 1974, that some Hancock 1-inch valves were being used for design conditions which exceed the vendor's certified rating. Wall thickness measurements and calculations by TVA verified that-the valves were adequate.
TVA submitted a ten-day abnormal occurrence report which has been reviewed by RO:II inspectors.
(Details I, paragraph 3)
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RO Rpt. No. 50-259/74-5-3-B.
Main Steam Relief Valves O
TVA reported to the inspector that PCV-1-19 had been slow to'-
close on two occasions during startup testing. TVA's ten-day abnormal occurrence report BFAO-7426, dated May 15, 1974, has been reviewed and the inspector has no further questions.
(Details I, paragraph 4; Details II, paragraph 2)
C.
Torus Spray Hanger Failure Abnormal occurrence report BFAO-7431, dated May 24, 1974, has been reviewed and the inspector has no further questions.
(Details I, paragraph 5)
IV.
Management Interview The inspection results were discussed with H. J. Green, Plant Super-intendent', on May 10, 11, and 31, 1974.
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The items in Sections I, III and V were discussed.
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RO Rpt. No. 50-259/74-5 I-1
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DETAILS I Prepared by:
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g/Dats W. E. Little,
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Reactor Inspector Facilities Test and
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Startup Branch Dates of Inspection: bby 7-10, 15-17 and 10-31, 1974 Reviewed by: [.6.
[// M R. C. Lewis, Date Senior Inspector Facilities Test and Startup Branch 1.
Persons Contacted Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
Division of Power Production (DPP)
H. J. Green - Plant Superintendent J. F. Grove - Assistant Plant Superintendent J. W. Doty - Maintenance Engineer Division of Engineering Design (DED)
(Contacted by telephone on 5/9-10/74)
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L. Weber - Division of Engineering Design, QA M. Bressler - Division of Engineering Design
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L. Creosy - Division of Engineering Design
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R. Harris - Division of Engineering Design G. Pitzi - Division of Engineering Design Division of Construction (DEC)
I J. T. Walker - Mechanical Engineering Supervisor R. T. Olson - Mechanical Engineer
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R0 Rpt. No. 50-259/74-5 I-2 2.
Release of Condensate to Unit 3 DPP notified the inspector at the site on May 29, 1974 approximately 80,000 gals. had been lost from the condensate storage tank to the pipe tunnel, and that some of the liquid found its way into
Unit 3.
A gamma scan indicated 4X10 pc/ml liqu!.d activity and no detectable contamination was found on workers that had been drenched with the water. TVA stated that they did plan to run whole body counts on some of these workers.
This occurred while removing blanks from a condensate transfer line between Units 1 and 2.
DPP told the inspector that inadequate clearance and work procedures caused the incident, i.e.,
the pro-cedure did not require valve 1-HCV-2-747 to be closed before removal of the blanks.
The inspector stated that the use of inadequate procedures was in violation of 10 CFR 50, Append!.x B, Criterion V, as well as Section 63A of The Technical Specifications.
3.
One-inch Hancock Valves
On May 7,1974, DPP individuals told the inspector that a QA survey of Unit 2 installed equipment resulted in their questioning the design ratings of approximately 60 Hancock, one-inch, 600 lb. forged stainless steel globe valves. Due to this and the problems being experienced with one main steam relief valve, TVA decided to initiate an orderly shutdown and resolve these matters before further opera-tion. TVA's subsequent corrective action is described in the TVA abnormal occurrence report BFAO-7427, dated thy 11, 1974.
The inspector confirmed that the valve wall measurements on the valve sampled were greater than the minimum calculated (0.243 inches)
for the 1326 psi and 562*F of maximum cesign conditions. The inspector stated that the valve nameplates should be changed to show the correct rating, and TVA agreed to do this. The inspector stated that the nameplate change would become an unresolved item.
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Main Steam Relief Valve On May 7,1974, DPP personnel notified the inspector that PCV-1-19 had been found to close slowly on two occasions on May 5 and 7, 1974.
These occurrences are described in abnormal occurrence report BFAO-7426, dated iby 15, 1974.
The inspector reviewed the logbooks and the pertinent recorder charts
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to gain an understanding of what occurred, why it occurred, and why the problem couldn't have been identified sooner. Several things were found that contributed to the difficulty in identifying the problem:
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R0 Rpt. No. 50-259/74-5 I-3 (a) One of the two primary means of detecting leaking and open relief valves is the. exhaust temperature recorder. This is a 24 point recorder with a cycle time of two minutes making
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it adequate for detecting long term trends, but not tia'n'sients of <2 minutes duration.
(b) on May 5,1974, the exhaust temperature recorder showed that PCV-1-19 was leaking, but not definitely stuck open.
It, along with three other valves, had operated automctically and the temperature trace showed a slower cooldown on PCV-1-19.
c) During both occurrences the HPCI and RCIC were run; on May 6, they were run for a considerable length of time. These systems use approximately k the amount of steam released through a wide open relief valve. Part of the reactor pressure decrease would be caused by the operation of these systems.
Since there was no clear out indication that the relief valve was stuck open and they had never operated HPCI as long as they did on these occasions, they attributed the reactor pressure decrease to the operation of HPCI.
(d) Prior to the May 6, 1974, occurrence, the PCV-1-19 exhaust thermo-couple had been removed from the recorder because of instrument problems.
It was periodically monitored on a potentiometer.
Following the >by 6 trip, the operator was manually activating PCV-1-23 and PCV-1-24, and when the reactor pressure continued to decrease, he cycled these two valves in an attempt to seat them, if possibly they were stuck open. If he had recycled PCV-1-19, it might have reseated.
It was only af ter all data was assembled along with the charts and logbooks and analyzed on May 7,1974, that TVA felt that-PCV-1-19 was a major cause of the pressure reductions experi-enced on May 5 and 6, 1974. They initiated an orderly shutdown on May 7, 1974, to dissassemble the valve and look for any abnormalities.
(See Details II, paragraph 2)
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The inspector reviewed abnormal occurrence report BF A0-7426 and stated that he had no further questions.
5.
Torus Spray Header Hanger Failure TVA reported that 15 out of 16 hangers were found to have failed on bby 14, 1974. The inspector observed the search for udssing pieces on May 15-17,1974, and examined some of the failed bolts. The failures occurred apparently because the hangers were underdesigned. The inspector confirmed that the new stronger hangers had been installed prior to restarting Unit 1.
The inspector reviewed abnormal occurrence report BFAO-7431, dated May 24, 1974, and stated that he had no further question.
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R0 Rpt. No. 50-259/74-5 II-l
_d TIf//f7 DETAILS II Prepared By:
- L s K.' Raugt5K, Reactp/ Inspector Da'te acilities Section Facilities Construction Branch Dates of Inspection: May 9-11, 1974 J J/!/9 Reviewed By:
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~ Date J. C(Bryant, $dnior Inspector Facilities Section Facilities Construction Branch n.
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Individuals Contacted a.
Tennessee Valley Authority H. J. Green - Plant Superintendent J. F. Groves - Assistant Plant Superintendent W. A. Roberts, Jr. - Maintenance Supervisor T. B. Lee - Maintenance Engineer J. W. Doty - Maintenance Engineer b.
General Electric Company J. Widner - QA Representative c.
Target Rock Company J. Boccii - Engineer 2.
Malfunction of Pilot Operated Relief Valve One of the eleven Target Rock 6-inch by 10-inch p,ilot operated
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relief / safety valves installed on the Browns Ferry No.1 Plant displayed a longer than normal blowdown and some leakage upon reseat. The corrective action was to replace the valve with an identical one from the Browns Ferry No. 2 Plant.
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R0 Rpt. No. 50-259/74-5 II-2 The malfunctioning valve was disassembled under the surveillance of Target Rock, General Electric and TVA representatives with the writer present. Disassembly revealed that the pilot valve disc and seat leaked.
In addition, it was found that the bushing (pressed into the valve body) contained a burr just opposite the guide surface of the second stage stem. There was evidence that the burr contacted the stem during operation. Other marks on the bushing integral with the burr indicated that the condition was caused during manuf acture or assembly of the valve. The burr could not have been caused by any of the valve's parts.
The valve will be corrected and placed in storage as a spare.
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