IR 05000254/1997010
| ML20217Q157 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 08/22/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217Q145 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-254-97-10, 50-265-97-10, NUDOCS 9708290235 | |
| Download: ML20217Q157 (17) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION lli Docket Nos:
50 254; 50-265 License Nos:
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- Report No:
50-254/97010(DRS); 50 265/97010(DRS)
Ucensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company Facility:
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Units 1 and 2 Location:
22710 206th Avenue North
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Cordova,IL 61242
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Dates:
,lona 0 through July 25,1997 Inspector:
H. A. Walker, Reactor Engineer Approved By:
M. A. Ring, Chief, Lead Engineers Branch Division of Reector Safety
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-9708290235 970822 PDR ADOCK 05000254 e
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Quad Cities Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50 254/97010(DRS); 50-265/97010(DRS)
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This inspection was conducted to review engineering activities to resolve problems associated with the replacement of the emergency diesel generator (EDG) air start motors on EDGs U 2 and U 1/2 during the Unit 2 refueling outage (02R14). Due to weaknesses noted during the review, the inspection was expanded to verify proper implementation and utilization of the design change and the alternate parts evaluation programs. Corrective
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action on significant problems identified by licensee personnel was also reviewed.
Overall, the performance of engineering in the handling of the specific issues reviewed was ineffective. The decision to investigate the cause of the failure of the U-2 EDG to start af ter installation of the replacement air start motors was good; however, the actions taken to investigate and resolve the problems appeared to be disorganized and informal. Problem resolution was complicated by the failure to conduct adequate testing following actions to correct dimensional problems on the replacement motors.
improper applicatior, of the alternate parts replacement program allowed the installation of
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different safety significant parts where the safety functions of related equipment were affected. Actions taken on problems noted in this area were not adequate to prevent repetition. Early in the inspection, engineering management's approach to the issues was ineffective. Near the end of the inspection, however, the licensee had taken steps to correct some of the problems and ensure proper use of the design change and alternate parts evaluation processes.
Three violations of NRC requirements were identified with two violations including multiple
examples, in the first violation, two instances were noted where the alternate parts evaluation process was inappropriately used and alternate parts were installed without using the required design change process. In the two noted instances, the replacement parts food during testing and would not have performed the required safety-related
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functions. In the second violation, adequate testing was not performed following changes made to the EDGs to verify that the equipment would perform the required safety related functions. The third violation documented two instances where the actions taken to correct engineering related problems were inadequate or untimely.
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Report Details
IM. Engineering The inspector reviewed engineering activities involved in the resolution >f problems associated with the replacement of the emergency diesel generator (EDG) air start motors with a new type motor. In addition, the utilization of the alternate parts evaluation (APE)
program for replacement parts was reviewed to verify that tha program was properly implemented and that design changes were properly identified and controlled. Significant problems were noted in this area.
E1 Conduct of Engineering
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E 1.1 Emelgency DientLGangrator Air Start Motor Failures Background on May 9 1997, the U 2 EDO failed to start during post maintenance testing.
Previous rm.intenance work on the U 2 EDG involved the #eplacement of the installed model 150BMPDR89 (roferred to in this report as model 89) alt start motors with model 160BMPDR88 (referred to in this report as model 88) motors, which were of a later design. Use of the new model motors was approved by Procurement Engineenng on APE O 1997 0023-00, The supplier of the replacement air start motors had stated that, although internal changes had been made to the new motors, the form, fit and function of the motors remained the same.
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The licensoo assembled a team to investigate the cause of the failure. Af ter troubleshooting, the cause of failure was determined to be improper engagement of the starter pinion gear and the EDG ring gear. This problem, referred to as starter motor pi'Sn gear abutment, was caused by both internal and external tolerance difforene - in the model 88 replacement motors. Testing and informal trouueshooting, led by the system engineer, were performed to determine if the
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clearance problern could be resolved.
The corrective action was to install spacers approximately 1/4 inch thick between the model 88 air start rnotor flange and the EDG to increase the osp between the flywheel and the pinion gear. This would ensure proper a!ignment of internal air ports so that, if pinion gear abutment occurred, air could still flow to the air operated start valve. Air would then be allowed to flow through the start valve to turn the engine. On May 17,1997, after spacers were installed in both the U 2 and U 1/2 EDGs, the EDGs were declared operable.
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lasneallon.Ssong The inspectors reviewed licensee actions taken during maintenance, troubleshooting and problem resolution associated with the change in the EDG air start motors for the U 2 and the U 1/2 EDGs. This included a review of records, procedures and discussions with licensee personnel.
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Dhaarvations and Findinga
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After reviewing inittel licensee actions on the EDO air start motor problems, the NRC
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inspectors notified licensee personnel that the use of the new model 88 air start
motors appeared to be a design change ud that the design change process should
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be used. Wuh the functional differences between the old model start motors and
the new model motors, the exceptions to the design change process, listed in Section 4.6.6 of Nuclear Operations Division Procedure NEP-04-01, " Plant Modifications," Revision _4, which allowed the use of the APD process, no longer i
applied in spite of inspector observations, licensee personnel continued to use the APE process for resolution of air start motor problems and insisted that a design change was not necessary.
Invostigation of the cause of the f ailure continued under the leadenblp of the
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system engineer. Maintenance and other licensee personnel were ut,e<l or were
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consulted as needed. The cause of the failure was determined to be dimenslunal differences between the model 88 and model 89 air start motors. These differences caused a failure of the EDO to start when improper engagement of the starter pinion gear and the EDG ring gear (pinion gear abutment) oacurred. The design change process was not used even though the cause of the failure indicated that the fit of
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the two models of the start motors was not the same and a new type of failure was 1.wolved.
i The failure to adequately implement design control measures for replacement of the
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EDO air start motors with a new type motor when significant dimensional differences existed which resulted in the installation of spacers, is an example of a violation of Criterion lit of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, " Design Control" l
(254/265/97010 01a(DRS)).
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- The lack of design controls caused some significant probioms in the investigation
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and resolution of the EDG elr start motor problems. Some of the design change
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controls, which appeared to be missing from the EDO air start motor activities are listed below:
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Significant involvement of experienced design engineers in the problem
Investigation and resolution.
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Required design changes provided by experienced and quellfied design engineers.
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Independent checking, review and verification of design work by experienced and qualified design engineers
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Appropriate 10 CFR 50.59 safety screenir.gs or evaluations 5.
Designation of appropriate post modification testing including approved test procedures with acceptance criteria and provisions for formalized test records.
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Controlled and appropriate changes to vendor manuals as required.
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Formalized documentation of actions taken.
Problems involving the lack of design controls are discussed in the following paragraphs.
50.59 dMety Evaluations / Screenings - Appropriate 50.59 safety evaluations or screenings by personnel trained in 50.59 evaluations were not performed. The inspectors noted that the change in the air start motors had resulted in a new type failure which would result in a decrease in the rollability of the EDGs. Because 50.59 safety evaluations or screenings were not performed, the possibility of unroviewed safety questions, due to the now type failure, could exist. This issue was not addressed. This matter was discussed with licensoo personnel who stated that the now type failure was not an unreviewed safety question. The statement was made without a formal review or evaluation. Since licensee action on the problem included refurbishment and installation of the originally installed model 89 air start motors, the safety evaiuation is no longer an issue for the EDG air start motors.
Licenseo personnellator stated that the APE process included a 50.59 screening so a separato s.;teening was not considered necessary. The inspectors noted that the APE review did not appear to include an adequato 50.59 screening and that the review did not appear to meet the requirements of Comed Nuclear Station Work Procedure NSWP A 04, "10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation Process," Revision O.
Subsequently, the NRC was provided with a letter from the licensco's Chief of Regulatory Programs, dated July 25,1997, which clarified the licerisco position in this area. The letter stated that the APE review was not a 50.59 screening or evaluation.
Post Modification / Maintenance Testing - On May 10,1997, with model 88 air start
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motors and mounting spacers installed on the U 2 EDO, a monthly surveillance test was conducted satisfactorily and the EDG was declared operable. On May 18, 1997, af ter the same test, the U 1/2 EDG was declared operable. Specific post modification or maintenance tests were not conducted to verify that the installation of the spacers was effective in resolving the increase in starting failures caused by the motor replacement. The surveillance testing was inconclusive because the addition of a new type failure would decrease tl.a relint)ility of the EDG to an unacceptable level and, although, in most cases, the EDG would start for the tests, the tests would not verify that EDG reliability requircm. As would be met.
in responso to inspectors' questions, licensee personnel stated that there were no written test proceduros, other than the surveillance procedures, but the system engineer's informal troubleshootin0 field notes were proof that the spacing and alignment problems had boon corrected and that additional testing was not required.
The inspectors reviewed the informal system engineer's trouble shooting notes. The notes were incomplete and disorganized and some errors were noted in addition, there were no specified test requirements, no acceptance criteria and no requirements for documented records of test results. After discussing the notes with the system engineer, the inspectors concluded that the informal notes were not acceptable as objective evidence that the EDGs would perform as required.
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The failure to provide required testing to demonstrate that the replacement diesel air start motors would perform satisfactory in service is a violation of Criterion XI of 10 CFR 50, Appendix 0, " Test Control" (254/205/97010-02(DRS)).
EDU monthly surveillance tests were conducted satisfactorily and the U 2 EDO was declared operable on May 10,1997. The U 1/2 EDO was declared operable on May 18,1997. Both machines had the model 88 air start motors and spacers installed. As previously stated, no tests were conducted to demonstrate that the EDGs would properly perform required safety related functions with the revised air start motor configuration. On June 12,1997, af ter subsequent investigation of NRC concerns, EDGs U 2 and U 1/2 were determined to be inoperable, with the model 88 air start motors installed, due to inadequate testing. Refurbished rnodel 89 motors were installed and, af ter testing, both EDGs were declared operable on June 18,1997.
The inspectors noted that Section 3.9 of the Quad Cities Technical Specifications required a seven day limiting condition for operation for an inoperable EDG and if the EDO could not be restored to operability, then the affected unit was required to be shut down. Unit 1 was operating at near full power from May 18 through June 18, 1997, a period of approximately 31 days, with the model 88 air start motors installed on the EDGs. The U 1/2 EDO, which was required for Unit 1 operation, was considered operable until June 12,1997, when the EDG was declared inoperable. The inadequate testing was performed on May 18,1997, and was the reason the U 1/2 EDG was considered operable. The issue of EDG operability was discussed with licensee personnel who stated that the ability of the EDG to perform required safoty related functions existed during this period of time. The inspectors have no further concerns in this area provided that the actions taken in response to the testing violation ensure adoquato post modification / maintenance testing in the future.
Vendor Manual Changes Af ter troubleshooting and measurements were completed on the replacement air start motors, licensee personnel decided that shims or spacers should be installed as a solution to the air start motor dimensional problem.
The supplier of the air start motor was c.ontacted about the start motor problems and the proposed solution. The vendor concurred with the proposed solution.
Licensee personnel prepared and incorporated a change into the General Motors Electro-Motive Division Vendor Manual for the EDGs, " Maintenance Manual for 645E4 Turbocharged Engino," VETIP Binder # C0115 to cover the use of the now motors. The methods used for the vendor manual change did not appear to be consistent with the controls described in procedure OCAP 0450-03, "VETIP Process Control," Revision 10. The actual changes were made by scanning the affected pages of the EDG Vendor Manualin the area describing the air start motors into an electronic word processing system. The wording was then changed by licenseo personnel so that the changes appeared to have been made by the vendor.
Although the changed portions were identified as a change and were senctioned by the vendor, the changes were not an official manual update provided by the vendor.
The vendor manual changes appeared to be used by licensee personnel to replace the design change process. The inspectors were concerned that this did not appear
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to be an appropriate method to make vendor manual changes or design changes cince independent reviews were not required.
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Conchslona Engineering performance in support of the EDGs' air start motor replacement investigation and corrective action was weak. Many of the actions involved in the resolution of the EDG starting problems were handled informally and a number of minor items, some of which are not discussed in the report, Indicated poor engineering performance. A number of the actions taken appeared to be prompted by NRC questions or concerns. Uconsee personnel appeared to be more concerned about justifying previous actions than changing to a proper conservative engineering approach. These conclusions aro based on the following.
The APE process was not appropriate for the change in the air start motors even though the approach was initially based on information from the supplier. It was evident that a design change was involved when functional and dimensional differences were noted between the model 88 and the model 89 motors. License personnel did not change to a design change process even though spacers were necessary to be f abricated and installed to correct dimensional problems. Changes to the vendor manual were initiated and made by the licensee based on Informal field measurements. Post maintenance / modification testing was not performed to verify that the problem had been corrected. The EDGs were declared operable based on a monthly surveillance test and the system engineer's informal trouble shooting field notes.
E1.2 Action taken on EDG Air Start Motor Reolacement a.
IDspection Scang The inspectors reviewed licensee actions taken, after the May 8,1997, failure of EDG U 2, to investigate the cause and correct similar problems identified during the investigation for both U 2 and U 1/2 EDGs. This portion of the inspection included a review of records and procedures as well as discussions with cognbant licenseo personnel, b.
Qhatyations and Findinas The f ailure of the U 2 EDG to start af ter the model 89 air start motors had been replaced with model 88 motors was determined to have been caused t'y differences between the model 88 and model 89 motors. Licensee personnelindicated that engineering field notes were the only documents containing details of some of the early troubleshooting and cause investigation activities af ter the May 8,1997 U 2 EDG f ailure.
Action to determine the cause of the failure and actions to ensure that the EDGs would reliably perform their safety-related functions were not well organized.
Approximately 10 days af ter the U 7. diesel failure, the model 88 air start motors were installed on U 1/2. At this time, licensee testing was insufficient to demonstrate that problems with the use of the model 88 air start motors were
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solved. Attempts to use the rnodel 88 motors with shims or spacers to compensate for dimensional problems, were later abandoned and the model 89 air start motors were refurbished, installed and successfully tested on June 18,1997. Solution of the air start motor problem on the EDGs required a total of 41 days.
The failure to promptly identify and correct significant conditions adverso to quality and take actions to preclude repetition is an example of a violation of Criterion XVI of 10 CFR 50, Appendix 0, " Corrective Action" (254/265/97010 03a(DRS)).
A root cause analysis team was organized to perform a detailed investigation into the causo and to recommend actions to be taken to provent repetition of the problem. The report had not been issued on July 25,1997, the last day of the inspection, and recommended actions to correct the causes of the problems were not known.
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Concluslous Ti.e inspectors concluded that correctivo action on the EDG air start motor problems was not well organized and was not adequate to provido prompt action to correct the EDG problems. Problems with the to e model 88 air start motor still have not been resolved. To increase engineerird WA!4ws, training has been provided as to what constitutes a design change and W $a APE process could be used.
Repetitive examples of inappropriate use of the APE process, noted during the
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E1.3 Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchancer Relief Valve in order to verify proper utilization of the APE process. the inspectors selected a sample of APES for review. APE M930030008-01, der.ed May 23,1994, authorized the replacement of the residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchanger relief valve using an alternate valve, a,
lataitction Scong The inspectors reviewed APE M930030008-01 and as sociated records, including problem identification forms (PlFs), as well as applicatile procedures.
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Qbservations and Findinag On April 5,1997, residual heat removal heat exchangor ralief valvo 21001 165A failed and was replaced with a different typo of relief valve. The use of an alternate (different type) relief valve was not considered a design change and APE M930030008-01, dated May 23,1994, was used to nuthorize the change, even though the replacement valve, type 1910MC-1 XLS324 (liquid trim), was not the same type as the installed valve, type 1910MC 1-XMC324 (vapor trim).
During testing after installation the replacement valve failed to re-close. Licensee personnel thought that a defective valve had been installed; therefore, the replacement valve was removed and a second relief valve of the same type was installed. This valvo also failed to re-close during testing. After subsequent review, the replacement
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valve was determined to be unsultable for the RHR heat exchanger relief valve application.
The APE process was used for the change, even though the replacement valve was not the some type as the installed valve and the performance parameters were dilforent. The re closing pressure requ'rements for the two valves were different and were not verified prior to replacement. Since the two valves functioned differently, the replacement involved e design change and the APE process was inappropriate. The failure to use the design change process for the change of the RHR heat exchanger relief valve is another example of a vlotation of Criterion lli of 10 CFR 50, Appendix 0, * Design Control' (254/205/97010-01b(DRS)).
The required design functions discussed in Sectior. E1.1 of this report, such as 50.59 scroonings and evaluations, applied to the RHR heat exchanger relief valve replacement as well, c.
Conclutl0Ds Engineering performance in the use of the APE process was poor and some engineers and engineering management did not fully understand when the APE process was allowed to be used. Late in the inspection, licensee management took steps to train engineering personnelin this area to provide better understanding and consistent application.
E1.4 AcilDD_taken on RHR Healfachangaflellef Valve ReolacDment a.
In1ReCllon Scoon Since the April 5,1997, u of the RHR heat exchanger relief valve appeared to be a previous incident invo ;.1g the improper use of the APE, the inspectors reviewed the cause investigations and corrective actions recommended and taken.
Records were reviewed and actions and concerns were discussed with licenseo personnel, b.
Qhagrygtlons and Findinan On April G,1997, the residual heat removal heat exchanger relief valve 21001 105A failed and was replaced with a different type of relief valve, which had been authorized for use on APE M930030008 01, dated May 23,1994. Since the two valves functioned differently, the installation of the replacement valve was inappropriately authorized by the approved APE. The replacement valve fallod during testing after installation.
A root cause team, composed of six members and a team leader, was organized to determine the cause of the protlem and to recommend appropriate corrective action. The inspectors reviewed the team report.
The cause of the failure, as stated in the root cause analysis team report, was determined to be "the misapplication of a relief valve." The inaccurate Procuremont Engineering APE M930030008, which was the reason the unsuitable relief was installed, was not addressed as a cause and actions needed in this area were not addressed. in
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addition, the inspectors determined that APE M93003OOO841 was not canceled and a review had not been made to datermine if other relief valves had inadequate APES because of the f ailure to review required reset pressure. Licensee personnel lator stated that these actions to prevent a repetition of the problem had been completed and that two other replacement relicf valves had inodoquate APES.
The failure to take adequate action to accurately determine the cause of the relief valvo replacement problem and to take the necessary actions to prevent recurrence is an exarnple of a violation of Criterion XVI of 10 CFR 50, Appendix 0, ' Corrective Action" (254/205/07010-03b(DRS)).
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CDDCkal0DS The inspectors concluded that the uso of the AEP process was inadequate for replacement of the different relief valves and that the valvo change was a design change, it appeared that the design chango process was not used in order to expedito the replacement. As a result, several design change requirements such as a required 50.59 scrooning or evaluation were not completed. Repetitive examplos of inappropriate uso of the APE process indicated a significant weakness in this area.
E4 Engineering Staff Knowledge and Performance E4.1 Jnadcquale Engincorina Staff Knowledge of the Deslan Chnnae Proccas a.
Inspacilon.ficono The inspectors reviewed the methods used by engineers to address design change issues as well as the application of the APE proct.:s. Discussions were hold with licensoo engincors, including engineering management, as to the methods that should be used for parts replacement and what constituted design changes, b.
Qbgervationn and Findinos During the review of the replacement of the EDG air starter motors as described in Section E1.1 of this report and the RHR heat exchanger relief valve as described in Section E1.3 of this report it was evident that the design change process was not being properly used, in both of the above cases the parts woro not "like for like" replacements and the replaccments would not work as installed. The APE process was used even though the design change process appeared to be required.
During discussion of those issues with licensee engineers, it appeared that some engincors were not knowledgeable of what constituted a design change and the design change process at the Quad Cities plant. This was illustrated in the case of the EDG air start motor replacement, when a number of ongineers continued to express the opinion tha? a design change was not necessary and that the issue was handled properly even though the failure had occurred and considerable offort was required to modify the air start motors so that they would work properly. Near the end of the inspection, training sessions were hold for engineers to ensure that
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licensee engineers would better understand the design change process, what constituted a design change and the appropriate processes to be used, c.
ConcJuhlont Based on the inspection results, the Inspectors concluded that the APE process appeared to be used to expedite work and reduce engineering design effort. The knowledge of engineers as to what constituted design changes was poor. In addition, at least one APE indicated that neither the preparer nor the reviewer were thoroughly f amiliar with the equipment or the critical performance pararneters. Near the end of the inspection, Plant Management initiated training sessions for engineers to improve knowledge in this area.
E7 Ouality Assurance in Engineering Activities E7.1 Qualliy Control Review of EDG Air Start Motor Problems a.
Insacction Scong During the review of the problems with the new typo EDG air start motors, the inspectors reviewed PlF # Q1997 02590, dated June 5,1997. This PIF was written by a QC inspector who reviewod the problems with the air start motor i
replacement. The PlF was discussed briefly with the initiator.
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Oh3ALYDiloBs and Findinas Tho QC review appeared to be thorough and many of the findings and concerns documented in the PlF were the same concerns which had been noted by the NRC inspectors. Licenseo personnel stated that PlF # Q1997 02596 was closed end that the included problems and questions noted were turned over to the root cause investigation team for follow up and resolution. The inspictors were concerned that this PlF was closed before appropriate corrective actions were completed.
The inspectors did not receive information on actions that were taken on the identiflod issues, however, this information should be included in the Root Cause Team Report when the report is issued.
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Conclusions The review of the EDG eir start motor problems by OC appeared to be thorough and several significant problems were identified and documented. This QC surveillance, however, was completed almost a month af ter the EDG failure on May 8,1997, and appeared to be prompted by NRC concerns in this area.
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V. Management Meetings
X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on July 11,1997, with subsequent telephone conversations on July 22,23 and 25,1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented and did not identify any items discussed during the exit as proprietary.
During the inspection, licensee personnel identified detailed manufacturing dimensional drawings of the EDO air start motors as proprietary. Details of these drawings are not discussed in this report. No other proprietary information was identified.
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PARTIAL UST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensaa A. Chernick, R*gulatory Assurance Supervisor D. Cook, Operations Manager D. Craddick, Systems Engineering Manager R. Fairbank, Executivvi Assistant to the Site Vice-President J. Garrity, Design Engineering Manager J. Hoeller, Independent Safety Engineering Supervisor J. Hutchinson, Site Engineering Manager S. Laughlin, Diesel Systems Engineer E. Kraf t, Site Vice President W. Lipscomb, Work Control Superintendent L. Pierce, Station Manager K. Ward, Regulatory Assuranen M. Wayland, Maintenance Superintendent innerscil Rand G. Bartlett, Program Manager - Engine Starting Systems
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551: Oncito Engincoring IP 37550: Engineering Support l
f(EMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED Oncu 50 254/265 97010 01 A VIO Failure to use the design change process for a change to a new model EDG air start motor (Section E1.1).
50-254/265 97010 01B VIO Failure to use the design change process for a change to a new type valve for the RHR heat oxchanger relief valve (Section E1.2).
50 254/265 97010-02 VIO Failure to perform required testing to verify that the new EDG air start motors would perform required safety functions (Section E1,1),
50-254/265 97010-03A VIO Failure to take adequate and timely corrective action to correct problems in the change to a new model air start motors for the U 2 and the U 1/2 EDGs (Soction E2.1.1).
50-254/265 97010-038 VIO Failure to take adequate corrective action to correct problems in the change in the RHR heat exchanger relief valve (Section E2.1.2).
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED APE Attornate Prirts Evaluation EDG Emergency Diesel Generator PlF Problem Identification Form RHR Residual Heat Removal
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UCENSEE DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS REVIEWED DURING THE INSPECTION The following is a list of licensee documents reviewod during the inspection, including documents prepared by others for the licensee. Inclusion on this list does not imply that NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety, but, rather that selected sections or portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overallinspection effort. NRC acceptance of the documents or any portion thereof is not implied.
Nucleadtation Work Procedurga
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NSWP-A 04, "10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation Process," Revision O.
Nuclear Ooerations Division Proafdutta e
NEP-04 00, "Roadmap Design Changes," Iluvision 2.
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NEP 04-01, " Plant Modifications," Revision 4.
NEP 04 02, " Exempt Changes," Revision O.
NEP 07-04, "VETIP Process Control," Revision O.
- NEP-08-01, " Engineering Change Notices," Revision 1.
- NEP 08-03, " Document Change Requests," llovision 1.
- ND.1100, "Roadmap Integrated Procurement Guideline," Revision O.
- NEP-11-01, " Procurement and Use of items for Repair and Replacement of Safety Related and Regulatory Related Equipment," lievision 2.
Quad Cities Plant Procedures e
OCAP 0400 03, "Setpoint/ Scaling Change lloquest," Unit %, Revision 5.
OCAP 0440-01, " Engineering Requests," Unit 1 (2), Revision 9.
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OCAP 0450-03, "VETIP Process Control," Unit 1 (2), Revision 10.
OCAP 0460 01, " Plant Design Change Process," Unit 1 (2), Revision 5.
- ELQblem Identification Forms e
PIF 971433 Replaced relief RV 21001 195A failed to rescat during test.
- PIF Q1997-02222 - the Unit 2 emergency diesel generator failed to start on the first try af ter new air start motors were installod.
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PlF Q1997 02344 - EDG eir start hose issued through stores without proper evaluation.
- PIF Q1997 02666 - Shlms were required to be added to the U 1/2 and U 2 diesel air start motors.
- PlF 01997-02622 ~ Unapproved Vendor Used for Safety Related Purchase Order.
- PlF Q1997 02649 Support System for diesel.
- PlF 01997 02666 ~ Bushing on pinion to shaft on alt start motor rebuilt at f actory was loose.
- PlF Q1997 02688 - Diesel Air Start Motor Purchase Order Exception.
- PlF 01997 02724 - EDO ASM Design Change without a 10CFR50.59 Review, PlF Q1997 02725 - EDG alt start motors installed without a design change, o
o PlF 01997 02731 - EDG parts evaluation appears to be incomplete, o
PlF Q1997 02732 - EDO event investigation.
- PIF Q1997 02778 Part Evaluation for Non Safety Related Valves.
- PlF 01997 02780 - Engineering Assurance Group review of parts evaluation.
- PIF Q1997 02782 Engineering Assurance Group review of parts evaluation.
PlF Q1997 02850 - Part Evaluation for RHRSW HX Relief Valve Replacement was
inappropriate and the design change process should have been used.
Alternate Part Evaluations e
0 91026416 - Approves both an "O" ring for RHR pumps and a shaf t nut for both RHR and core spray pumps.
- Q 910264 21 Impeller purchased for the RHR pumps with a new assigned Manufacturer's Si number.
0 92 003 0452-00 - Change in the manufacturer of ball bearings for a Limitorque e
operator motor shaf t, e
- M 93 006-0008 00 - Use of a different type of relief valve to replace the original residual heat removal heat exchanger relief valve 21001 165A failed and was replaced with a different type of relief valve, which had been authorized Valve, relief; 4 x 6 inch, SI 782A29.
e.
O,93 003 011100 Change in manuf acturer's part number for a MCC motor -
starter for the RHR Service water pump 2D cooler fan B motor.
..
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,
.
Q 04 0069 01 - Hancock 800 Class Globe Valve used as a replacement for a Hancock 600 Class Globe Valve.
O 95 0124 00 - Use of a model SLPC 281 pro 9rammable indicating contro: lor in
place of a model SLPC 271 controller.
- O 1997 0023 00 Use of the Model 88 EDG air start motors in place of the model 89 rnotors.
Makttenanco_WatkEnnunia
970034975 01 - Remove and replaco relief valve 21001 165 A.
- 970052803 01 - EDG U 2 failed to start on first try. Troubleshoot and inspect.
- 970052803 02 Troubleshot and topalt EDG 2 failure to start.
- 970052803 03 - Replace starting air motors.
970055597 Install shims in air start motors to got 1/4 inch gap.
- EnkinenIhaEcaucits ER9701820 Evaluate discrepancy on cold set lift pressure.
ER9701820 Evaluate discrepancy on cold set lif t pressure.
- ER9703120 -- Replace Air Start Motors.
- ER9703400 EDG Air Starter Design / Installation Differences.
Vendor Manual and thangu Maintenance Manual for 645e4 Turbochar00d Engino, Revision 2.
o VETIP Authorization Form # 1820 dated May 30,1997. (Change to the EDG
Maintenanco Manual for the chango to the now model air start motors.)
- VETIP Change Roquest Form # 1886, dated July 10,1997. This change eliminates the #1820 change, Ucenso Event Reoort 97 005 - The Unit 2 and Unit M Emer9ency Diesel Generators were Declared inoperable Due to a Parts issue with the Air Start Motors.
Eyitem Engineer's Field Nolos on Troublettinoting of Reolacement Air Start Motois 17