IR 05000247/2011009
| ML111320311 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 05/13/2011 |
| From: | Doerflein L Engineering Region 1 Branch 2 |
| To: | Joseph E Pollock Entergy Nuclear Operations |
| Shared Package | |
| ML111320311 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2016-0148 IR-11-009 | |
| Download: ML111320311 (28) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGU LATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
475 ALLENDALE ROAD
SUBJECT:
INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT 2 - NRC TEMPORARY TNSTRUCTTON 2515/183 INSPECTlON REPORT 05000247 1201 1009
Dear Mr. Pollock:
On Aprit 27,2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) cg1p_19199 an inspection at lndian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 2, using Temporary lnstruction 25151183, "Followup to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Event." The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results which were discussed on April 28, 2011, with you and other members of your staff.
The objective of this inspection was to promptly assess the capabilities of Indian Point Nuclear Generiting Unit 2 to respond to extraordinary consequences similar to those that have recently occurred a-t tne Japanese Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station. The results from this inspection, along with the results from this inspection performed at other operating commercial nuclear planis in the United States will be used to evaluate the United States nuclear industry's readiness to safely respond to similar events. These results will also help the NRC to determine if additional regulatory actions are warranted.
All of the potential issues and observations identified by this inspection are contained in this report. The NRC's Reactor Oversight Process will further evaluate any issues to determine if they are regulatory findings or violations. Any resulting findings or violations will be documented by the NRC in a separate report. You are not required to respond to this letter. Inaccordancewith 10CFR2.390of theNRC's"Rulesof Practice,"acopyof thisletter and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.qov/readinq-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
sincerelY'
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Lawrence T. Doerflein, Chief /
II Engineering Branch 2 l Division of Reactor Safety Docket No.: 50-247 License No.: DPR-26 Enclosure: Inspection Report No. 05000247 12011009 cc Mencl: Distribution via ListServ
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
f R 0500024712011009;0411812011 - 0412712011; Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 2;
Temporary Instruction 25151183 - Followup to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Event.
This report covers an announced Temporary Instruction (Tl) inspection. The inspection was conducted by two resident inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.
INSPECTION SCOPE
The intent of the Tl is to provide a broad overview of the industry's preparedness for events that may exceed the current design basis for a plant. The focus of the Tl was on
- (1) assessing the licensee's capability to mitigate consequences from large fires or explosions on site,
- (2) assessing the licensee's capability to mitigate station blackout (SBO) conditions,
- (3) assessing the licensee's capability to mitigate internal and external flooding events accounted for by the station's design, and
- (4) assessing the thoroughness of the licensee's walkdowns and inspections of important equipment needed to mitigate fire and flood events to identify the potential that the equipment's function could be lost during seismic events possible for the site. lf necessary, a more specific followup inspection will be performed at a later date.
INSPECTION RESULTS
All of the potential issues and observations identified by this inspection are contained in this report. The NRC's Reactor Oversight Process will further evaluate any issues to determine if they are regulatory findings or violations. Any resulting findings or violations will be documented by the NRC in a separate r,eport.
03.01 Assess the licensee's capability to mitigate conditions that result from beyond design basis events, typically bounded by security threats, committed to as part of NRC Security Order Section 8.5.b issued February 25, 2002, and severe accident management guidelines and as required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.54(hh). Use Inspection Procedure (lP) 71111.05T, "Fire Protection (Triennial)," Section 02.03 and 03.03 as a guideline. lf lP 71111.05T was recently performed at the facility the inspector should review the inspection results and findings to identify any other potential areas of inspection. Particular emphasis should be placed on strategies related to the spent fuel pool. The inspection should include, but not be limited to, an assessment of any licensee actions to:
Licensee Action Describe what the licensee did to test or inspect equipment.
a. Verify through test or The licensee identified equipment (active and passive) utilized for implementation of 8.5.b actions inspection that and any additional equipment used in Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGS). The equipment is available scope of the equipment was defined as that equipment specifically designated for B.5.b or SAMG and functional. Active mitigation (i.e., special hoses, flttings, diesel driven pump, etc.). Permanent plant equipment (i.e.,
equipment shall be in situ equipment) was not considered in the scope, since it is normally in service, subjected to tested and passive planned maintenance, and/or checked on operator rounds. Passive equipment within the scope equipment shall be was walked down, inventoried, and inspected. The licensee reviewed the last test of the 8.5.b walked down and pump and determined it was completed satisfactorily.
inspected. lt is not expected that permanently installed Describe inspector actions taken to confirm equipment readiness (e.9., observed a test, reviewed equipment that is tested test results, discussed actions, reviewed records, etc.).
under an existing regulatory testing program be retested.
The inspectors walked down and evaluated the adequacy of installed and portable equipment staged explicitly for implementation of the mitigation strategies. The types of equipment examined This review should be included: interior fire water supply piping and hose stations; portable pump and associated suction done for a reasonable and discharge hoses, adapters, and tools; portable radios and communications devices; and sample of mitigating equipment lockers and associated tools. The inspectors' review included field verification and strategies/eq uipment.
inventory checks of standby and staged equipment, and compatibility of the portable equipment with installed systems. ln addition, the inspectors evaluated the staging/storage locations of 8.5.b related eouioment to ensure the survivabilitv and availabilitv of equipment. The inspectors also reviewed and discussed with responsible station personnel the results of any field testing of equipment performed to validate its applications in the postulated scenarios. Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the Supplemental Information Attachment to this report.
Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.
The licensee identified no gaps in the ability to implement these actions. The licensee did identify several enhancements and wrote condition reports (CR) for those enhancements.
The inspectors concluded that overall the required equipment is available and functional.
However, as a result of the NRC inspection, the inspectors identified an unresolved item for Entergy not ensuring the operability of the containment hydrogen recombiners as required in Technical Requirements Manual Section 3.7.F, "Post Accident Containment Venting System."
Specifically, Entergy had not performed testing as described in UFSAR Section 6.8.5, "Post Accident Hydrogen Control Systems - lnspections and Tests," each refueling outage. The test was last performed in accordance with Procedure 2-CY-3610, "Passive Hydrogen Recombiner Inspection and Testing," in April 2006. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as CR-lP2-2011-2017. This issue is an unresolved item (URl 0500024712011009-01) to determine if failing to perform this test is more than minor. Details on this unresolved item will be documented in NRC lR 0500024712011003.
Describe the licensee's actions to verify that procedures are in place and can be executed (e.g.
Licensee Action walkdowns, demonstrations, tests, etc.)
b. Verify through The licensee identified those procedures utilized to mitigate the consequences of a B.5.b event or walkdowns or SAMG scenario. Procedures dealing with permanently installed equipment with an associated demonstration that surveillance test were walked through in a table top format to ensure the procedures are procedures to implement executable. For procedures involving non-permanently installed equipment, or equipment without the strategies associated surveillance tests, the licensee performed walkdowns to ensure the procedures are executable.
with 8.5.b and 10 CFR 50.54(hh) are in place Describe inspector actions and the sample strategies reviewed. Assess whether procedures were and are executable.
in place and could be used as intended.
Licensees may choose not to connect or operate permanently The inspectors examined the station's established guidelines and implementing procedures for the installed equipment 8.5.b and SAMG mitigation strategies. The inspectors assessed how the licensee coordinated during this verification. and documented the interface/transition between existing off-normal and Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) with the mitigation strategies. The inspectors assessed the licensee's This review should be capabilities by conducting a review of the licensee's walkdown activities. The inspectors selected done for a reasonable a number of mitigation strategies and conducted plant walkdowns with a licensed operator and sample of mitigating responsible plant staff to independently assess: the adequacy and completeness of the strateg ies/eq uipment.
procedures; familiarity of operators with the procedure objectives and specific guidance; staging and compatibility of equipment; and the practicality of the operator actions prescribed by the procedures, consistent with the postulated scenarios. Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the Supplemental Information Attachment to this report Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.
The licensee determined the B.5.b and SAMG procedures are executable and written to the expected level of skill and training of the personnel who would be implementing the procedures.
The licensee identified no gaps in the ability to implement these actions. The licensee did identify several enhancements and wrote CRs for those enhancements.
Based on their review, the inspectors determined that overall strategies and procedures are executable.
Describe the licensee's actions and conclusions regarding training and qualifications of operators Licensee Action and support staff.
c. Verify the training and The licensee identified the training/qualification requirements for operators for the implementation qualifications of of actions needed to mitigate a 8.5.b related event, and for the implementation of actions needed operators and the for the SAMGS. The licensee identified the personnel required to implement these actions support staff needed to including operations, fire protection, security, offsite responders, engineering, and emergency implement the response organization (ERO) personnelto ensure training was complete and current.
procedures and work instructions are current Describe inspector actions and the sample strategies reviewed to assess training and for activities related to qualifications of operators and support staff.
Security Order Section 8.5.b and severe accident management The inspectors examined the introductory and periodic/refresher training provided to operations guidelines as required by personnel and ERO personnel required to implement the B.5.b mitigation strategies and SAMGs.
10 cFR 50.54 (hh).
The inspector's review consisted of examination of training presentations, lecture notes, and training records, as well as, interviews with station personnel. Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the Supplemental Information Attachment to this report.
Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.
The licensee identified no gaps or enhancements in this area.
Based upon the inspectors' review of formal training, interviews, and observations of plant staff during the walkdown of mitigating strategies in the field, the inspectors concluded that overall B.5.b training provided by Entergy staff was appropriate and consistent with industry guidelines.
Describe the licensee's actions and conclusions regarding applicable agreements and contracts Licensee Action are in place.
d. Verify that any The licensee verified that the relevant support agreements, memoranda of understanding, and applicable agreements contracts were in place to support accident mitigation. These included contracts with municipal and contracts are in fire departments and vendors. The licensee assured the agreements from the municipalfire place and are capable of departments and other commitments for various pieces of support equipment required to meeting the conditions implement the strategies were in place and active.
needed to mitigate the consequences of these events.
For a sample of mitigating strategies involving contracts or agreements with offsite entities, describe inspector actions to confirm agreements and contracts are in place and current (e.9.,
confirm that offsite fire assistance agreement is in place and cunent).
This review should be done for a reasonable sample of mitigating The inspectors verified that the licensee had in place a current Indian Point Fire and Emergency strategies/eq uipment.
Medical Services Response and MutualAid Plan with off-site agencies to provide assistance in mitigation strategies. The inspectors talked to personnel at a sample of local municipal fire stations to verify that they had, and understood the requirements of the Indian Point Fire and Emergency Medical Services Response and Mutual Aid Plan. In addition, the inspectors verified they had adequate equipment as required for the mitigating strategies. Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the Supplemental lnformation Attachment to this report Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.
The licensee identified no gaps or enhancements in this area.
Based on their review, the inspectors concluded that overall agreements and contracts are in place and appropriate for the strategies evaluated.
Document the corrective action report number and briefly summarize problems noted by the Licensee Action licensee that have significant potential to prevent the success of any existing mitigating strategy.
e. Review any open No issues were identified by the licensee that posed a significant potential to prevent the success corrective action of any existing mitigating strategy. The licensee did identify one material condition documented in documents to assess CR-lP2-2011-1534 associated with the city water line to the spent fuel building and repaired the problems with mitigating condition under work order (WO) 215667. The licensee verified other strategies were in place in strategy im plementation lieu of this city water line. The licensee identified no additional gaps in the ability to implement identified by the these actions. The licensee also identified several enhancements and wrote CRs for those licensee. Assess the enhancements.
impact of the problem on the mitigating capability CR-IP2-2011-01467 was written to capture the need to evaluate the beyond design basis aspect and the remaining of simultaneous 8.5.b events on both units. In particular, Entergy identified that compliance with capability that is not the original 8.5.b order, resulted in less than the anticipated amount of equipment to implement impacted.
mitigation strategies if certain B.5.b events occurred on both units simultaneously.
Based on independent walkdowns and CR reviews, the inspectors concluded none of the issues had a significant impact on implementing the existing mitigating strategies.
03.02 Assess the licensee's capability to mitigate station blackout (SBO) conditions, as required by 10 CFR 50.63, "Loss of All Alternating Current Power," and station design, is functional and valid. Refer to Tl 25151120, "lnspection of lmplementation of Station Blackout Rule Multi-Plant Action ltem A-22" as a guideline. lt is not intended that Tl 25151120 be completely reinspected.
The inspection should include, but not be limited to, an assessment of any licensee actions to:
Describe the licensee's actions to verify the adequacy of equipment needed to mitigate an SBO Licensee Action event.
a. Verify through The licensee identified the equipment utilized/required for mitigation of a SBO. The licensee walkdowns and identified that most SBO equipment is permanently installed plant equipment which is tested and inspection that al monitored through routine surveillance tests. For equipment that is not permanently installed, the required materials are licensee conducted walkdowns of this equipment to ensure the equipment was adequate and adequate and properly properly staged. The licensee then reviewed surveillances/tests and the testing performance staged, tested, and frequency for the identified equipment to ensure equipment was tested satisfactorily.
maintained.
Describe inspector actions to verify equipment is available and useable.
The inspectors assessed the licensee's capability to mitigate SBO conditions by conducting a review of the licensee's walkdown activities. In addition, the inspectors selected a sample of equipment utilized/required for mitigation of a SBO and conducted independent walkdowns of that equipment to verify that the equipment was properly aligned and staged. The sample of equipment selected by the inspectors included, but was not limited to, the SBO diesel generator and the cross-tie to the Unit 3 SBO diesel generator. The inspectors also reviewed recent tests and maintenance for a sample of SBO equipment. Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the Supplemental Information Attachment to this report.
Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.
The licensee concluded that the SBO materials were adequately staged, tested, and maintained.
The inspectors concluded that the overall required materials to mitigate SBO conditions were adequately staged, tested, and maintained.
The inspectors identified a minor deficiency, in that Entergy did not periodically verify backup nitrogen bottle pressure to ensure there was adequate pressure to operate the atmospheric dump valves, as required by plant design. Entergy entered this issue into their CAP as CR-lP2-2011-1959 and, as an immediate corrective action, implemented a special log to record the bottle pressures until a permanent procedure change is made. The inspectors determined this was a minor issue because the actual bottle pressures were verified to be greater than the minimum required pressure during the inspection period. The inspectors reviewed immediate and proposed actions, including their assessment and prioritization, and concluded they were reasonable.
Licensee Action Describe the licensee's actions to verify the capability to mitigate an SBO event.
b. Demonstrate through The licensee identified the procedures required for response to a SBO. Permanently installed walkdowns that equipment under a surveillance requirement was walked through in a table top format to ensure proced ures for response procedures can be executed. For procedures and actions dealing with non-permanently installed to an SBO are plant equipment or equipment not tested under a surveillance requirement, procedure walkdowns executable.
in the field were performed by the licensee to ensure procedures can be executed. The licensee reviewed the initial and requalification training of operations personnel on SBO.
Describe inspector actions to assess whether procedures were in place and could be used as intended.
The inspectors assessed the licensee's capabilities by conducting a review of the licensee's walkdown activities. In addition, the inspectors selected several sections of a sample of the procedures walked down by the licensee and walked those down to independently verify the licensee's conclusions and ensure the procedures are executable. The inspectors also reviewed the timed test to ensure the SBO diesel can be started and provide power to safety related loads in the time required to mitigate an event. The inspectors further reviewed the training for operations personnel on SBO procedures. Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the Supplemental Information Attachment to this report.
Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.
The licensee determined the SBO procedures are executable and written to the expected level of skill and training of the personnel who would be implementing the procedures. The licensee also identified several enhancements and wrote CRs for those enhancements.
Based on their review, the inspectors concluded that the overall SBO procedures are executable.
03.03 Assess the licensee's capability to mitigate internal and external flooding events required by station design. Refer to lP 71111.01, "Adverse Weather Protection," Section 02.04, "Evaluate Readiness to Cope with External Flooding" as a guideline. The inspection should include, but not be limited to, an assessment of any licensee actions to verify through walkdowns and inspections that all required materials and equipment are adequate and properly staged. These walkdowns and inspections shall include verification that accessible doors, barriers, and penetration seals are functional.
Describe the licensee's actions to verify the capability to mitigate existing design basis flooding Licensee Action events.
Verify through The licensee identified the equipment (i.e., penetration seals, floor drains, sump pumps, flood walkdowns and alarms) utilized/required for mitigation of internal and externalflooding. The licensee then inspection that all conducted walkdowns of this equipment to verify that flood protection measures were satisfactory.
required materials are Flood procedures dealing with permanently installed plant equipment covered by a surveillance adequate and properly test were walked-through in a table top format. For procedures and actions dealing with non-staged, tested, and permanently installed plant equipment or equipment not tested under a surveillance requirement, maintained.
the licensee performed field walkdowns to ensure equipment and materials were adequate to implement flood protection procedures.
Describe inspector actions to verify equipment is available and useable. Assess whether procedures were in place and could be used as intended.
The inspectors assessed the licensee's capabilities by conducting a review of the licensee's walkdown activities. ln addition, the inspectors selected several sections of a sample of the procedures walked down by the licensee and walked those down to independently verify the licensee's conclusions and ensure the procedures are executable. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of the flood protection equipment testing and maintenance. Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the Supplemental Information Attachment to this report.
Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.
The inspectors concluded that all required materials are adequate and properly staged, tested, and maintained to respond to an internal or external flood within the plant's design basis. While no operability or significant concerns were identified, the licensee identified several enhancements and the inspectors identified an issue with the frequency of performance of the structural inspection for the intake structure, which includes the circulating water pumps bays and the safety-related service water pump bays. Specifically, a portion of the structural maintenance rule inspection for the intake structure, the circulating water pumps bays and the safety related service water pump bays, was not performed within the 5 year required interval or within the 25o/o grace period, and there was no planned date for this inspection. Enterqy wrote CR-lP2-2011-2006 for this issue. This issue is an unresolved item to determine if failing to perform this inspection is more than minor. (URl 0500024712011009-02) Details on this unresolved item will be documented in NRC lR 0500024712011003.
The licensee also initiated the appropriate condition reports for the other identified issues for further assessment and resolution, as listed in the Attachment to this report. The inspectors reviewed the associated condition reports and determined that the licensee's initial responses, including their assessment and prioritization, were appropriate. The inspector plans to review the licensee's future actions relative to the intake structure inspection as part of normal baseline activities.
03.04 Assess the thoroughness of the licensee's walkdowns and inspections of important equipment needed to mitigate fire and flood events to identify the potential that the equipment's function could be lost during seismic events possible for the site. Assess the licensee's development of any new mitigating strategies for identified vulnerabilities (e.9., entered it in to the corrective action program and any immediate actions taken). As a minimum, the licensee should have performed walkdowns and inspections of important equipment (permanent and temporary) such as storage tanks, plant water intake structures, and fire and flood response equipment; and developed mitigating strategies to cope with the loss of that important function. Use lP 71111.21, "Component Design Basis Inspection," Appendix 3, "Component Walkdown Considerations," as a guideline to assess the thoroughness of the licensee's walkdowns and inspections.
Describe the licensee's actions to assess the potential impact of seismic events on the availability Licensee Action of equipment used in fire and flooding mitigation strategies.
a. Verify through The licensee identified the equipment utilized/required for mitigation of fire and flood events. The walkdowns that all licensee performed walkdowns to assess the ability of this equipment to withstand a safe required materials are shutdown earthquake (SSE). The licensee included items of non-seismic design and construction, adequate and properly and the walkdowns assessed the capability of these items to withstand a SSE. Some of the items staged, tested, and that were non-seismic by design were judged by qualified engineers to be capable of surviving the maintained.
SSE earthquake. For equipment judged not likely to survive a SSE, the licensee identified mitigating strategies.
Describe inspector actions to verify equipment is available and useable. Assess whether procedures were in place and could be used as intended.
The inspectors conducted multiple walkdowns, both independently and in conjunction with licensee personnel, of important equipment needed to mitigate fire and flood events to identify the potentialthat the equipment's function could be lost during a seismic event. This equipment included, but was not limited to, B.5.b contingency response equipment staged throughout the site; SBO equipment; fire protection and suppression equipment; and flood detection and mitigation equipment. Licensee flood and fire mitigation procedures were reviewed to verify usability. Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the Supplemental Information to this report.
Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee. Briefly summarize any new mitigating strategies identified by the licensee as a result of their reviews.
The inspectors determined the licensee meets the current design and licensing bases for B.5.b, fire protection, and flooding. For equipment judged by Entergy as not likely to survive a SSE, the licensee identified a mitigating strategy as an alternate method to cope with the loss of the fire suppression or flood protection function. Entergy also determined that the site response to a flooding event would not be compromised by a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). The licensee identified a number of potential vulnerabilities regarding firefighting following a SSE. The potential vulnerabilities stem from the fact that the fire protection system in non-safety related buildings, buried / underground flre headers, fire pumps, and the city water makeup supply are not seismically designed which could result in a loss of portions of the fire protection system following a SSE. The licensee documented these vulnerabilities in CR-lP2-2O11-1681. The licensee's preliminary mitigation strategies involve the immediate response by the onsite fire brigade and supplemental support, as necessary, by the Indian Point Fire and Emergency Medical Services Response and Mutual Aid.
Additionally, Entergy staged submersible pumps in a common U1 location, which was determined to be seismically robust (i.e., likely to withstand an earthquake).
In reviewing seismic vulnerabilities associated with this Tl, the inspectors identified additional conditions that are outside the design and licensing basis that could present a challenge during a seismic or other event. Specifically:
1. Generally, reactor sites were not required and did not implement mitigating actions to cope with an SBO in conjunction with a seismic event; and 2. During beyond design basis events, in which the SAMGs direct depressurizing the PWR containment, conditions could exist in which mitigation equipment is damaged due to elevated containment pressures and potentially prevent containment depressurization and/or isolation.
Generic issues associated with SBO and SAMG are currently under review by an NRC task force following up on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station fuel damage event. A condition report, CR-IP2-2011-1467, was generated by the licensee as a part of their inspection to evaluate acquiring additional equipment to mitigate beyond design basis vulnerabilities Meetinqs 4OAO Exit Meetino The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Joseph Pollock and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on April 28, 2011.
Proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection was returned to the licensee. The inspectors verified the inspection report does not contain proprietary information.
A-1
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Entergv Personnel
- J. Pollock, Site Vice President
- K. Brooks, Shift Manager
- R. Burroni, Manager - System Engineering
- J. Dinelli, Manager - Operations
- T. McCaffrey, Manager - Design Engineering
- B. McCarthy, Assistant Operations Manager
- V. Myers, Supervisor, Engineering
- T. Orlando, Director - Engineering
- S. Prussman, Specialist - Nuclear Safety/License lV
- R. Robenstein, Superintendent - Simulator
- M. Tesoriero, Manager - Programs and Components
- A. Vitale, General Manager - Plant Operations
- R. Walpole, Manager - Licensing
- A. Williams, Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations
- W. Wittick, Supervisor, Engineering
Nuclear Reoulatorv Commission
- P. Cataldo, Senior Resident Inspector - lndian Point 3
- C. Cahill, Senior Reactor Analyst, NRC Region I
- W. Schmidt, Senior Reactor Analyst, NRC Region I
Other
- G. Tarvell, Fire Protection Specialist, Department of State (New York)
LIST OF ITEMS
OPENED OR CLOSED
Opened
- 0500024712011009-02 URI Intake Structure Maintenance Rule Inspection (Section 03.03a)