IR 05000003/2022001
| ML22144A338 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 05/25/2022 |
| From: | Anthony Dimitriadis Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Reactor Health Physics Branch |
| To: | Trice K Holtec Decommissioning International |
| References | |
| IR 2022001 | |
| Download: ML22144A338 (15) | |
Text
May 25, 2022
SUBJECT:
HOLTEC DECOMMISSIONING INTERNATIONAL, LLC, INDIAN POINT ENERGY CENTER UNITS 1, 2 AND 3 - NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS.
05000003/2022001, 05000247/2022001, AND 05000286/2022001
Dear Mr. Trice:
On March 31, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection under Inspection Manual Chapter 2561, Decommissioning Power Reactor Inspection Program, at the permanently shutdown Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2 and 3. The inspection examined activities conducted under your licenses as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations, and the conditions of your licenses. The inspection consisted of observations by the inspectors, interviews with site personnel, a review of procedures and records, and plant walk-downs. The results of the inspection were discussed with Mr. Richard Burroni, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff on April 25, 2022, and are described in the enclosed inspection report.
Within the scope of this inspection, no violations of more than minor significance were identified.
In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if any, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.
To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction.
Current NRC regulations and guidance are included on the NRC's website at www.nrc.gov; select Radioactive Waste; Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities; then Regulations, Guidance and Communications. The current Enforcement Policy is included on the NRC's Website at www.nrc.gov; select About NRC, Organizations & Functions; Office of Enforcement; Enforcement documents; then Enforcement Policy (Under 'Related Information'). You may also obtain these documents by contacting the Government Printing Office (GPO) toll-free at 1-866-512-1800. The GPO is open from 8:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. EST, Monday through Friday (except Federal holidays). No reply to this letter is required. Please contact Katherine Warner, Senior Health Physicist at (610) 337-5389 if you have any questions regarding this matter.
Sincerely, Anthony Dimitriadis, Chief Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Reactor Health Physics Branch Division of Radiological Safety and Security
Docket Nos. 05000003, 05000247, and 05000286 License Nos. DPR-5, DPR-26, and DPR-64
cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ
Enclosure:
Inspection Report Nos. 05000003/2022001, 05000247/2022001, and 05000286/2022001 w/Attachment
Anthony M.
Dimitriadis Digitally signed by Anthony M. Dimitriadis Date: 2022.05.25 10:04:47 -04'00'
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC (HDI)
Indian Point Energy Center Units 1, 2, and 3 (IP-1, IP-2, and IP-3)
NRC Inspection Report Nos. 05000003/2022001, 05000247/2022001, and 05000286/2022001,
An announced routine decommissioning inspection was completed on March 31, 2022, at Indian Point Units 1, 2, and 3. A combination of on-site and remote inspection activities were performed over this period. The inspection included a review of design changes and modifications, problem and identification and resolution, safety culture, fire protection, spent fuel safety, decommissioning performance and status, occupational radiation exposure, radioactive waste treatment, solid radioactive waste management, and transportation of radioactive materials. The inspection consisted of observations by the inspectors, interviews with site personnel, a review of procedures and records, and plant walk-downs. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRC's) program for overseeing the safe decommissioning of a shut-down nuclear power reactor is described in Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2561, Decommissioning Power Reactor Inspection Program."
Based on the results of this inspection, no violations of more than minor significance were identified.
REPORT DETAILS
1.0 Background
IP-1 was a pressurized water reactor that was granted a 40-year Operating License in 1962 and was permanently shut down in 1974. Pursuant to the June 19, 1980 Commission Order Revoking Authority to Operate Facility and the Decommissioning Plan for Indian Point Unit No. 1, approved by the NRC in an Order, dated January 31, 1996, the reactor remains in a defueled status.
On February 8, 2017, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy) notified the NRC of its intent to permanently cease power operations at IP-2 and IP-3 by April 30, 2020, and April 30, 2021 respectively subject to operating extensions through, but not beyond 2024 and 2025 (Agencywide Documents and Access Management System (ADAMS) Accession Number ML17044A004). On May 12, 2020, Entergy certified cessation of power operations and the permanent removal of fuel from the IP-2 reactor vessel (ADAMS Accession Number ML20133J902). On May 11, 2021, Entergy certified cessation of power operations and permanent removal of fuel from the IP-3 reactor vessel (ADAMS Accession Number ML21131A157). On May 13, 2021, the NRC notified Indian Point that the NRC would no longer perform its oversight activities in accordance with the Operating Reactor Assessment Program and that oversight would be conducted under the provisions outlined in IMC 2561 Decommissioning Power reactor Inspection Program (ADAMS Accession Number ML21132A069). On May 28, 2021, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. informed the NRC of the successful purchase and sale transaction closing of the Indian Point facilities to Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC (ADAMS Accession No. ML21147A553). On May 28, 2021, the NRC issued license amendments transferring Indian Point Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3 facility licenses from Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. to Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC; Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC; and Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC (ADAMS Accession No. ML21126A004).
IP-1 and IP-2 are physically contiguous and share systems, such as the integrated liquid waste system and the air handling system; and facilities, such as the chemistry and health physics laboratories. Liquid waste from IP-3 will be transported to and processed in at IP-1.
IP-1 also contains radioactive waste processing facilities that provide waste processing services for all units. Radiological effluent limits are met on an overall site basis and specific operating limits and surveillance requirements for effluent monitoring instrumentation, including stack noble gas monitoring, are discussed in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM).
IP-1 was inspected under the Actively Decommissioning (DECON), No Fuel in the Spent Fuel Pool category and IP-2, and IP-3 were inspected under the Active Decommissioning (DECON), Fuel in the Spent Fuel Pool category during this inspection period. The categories of decommissioning are described in IMC 2561.
2.0 Active Decommissioning Performance and Status Review
2.1 Inspection Procedures 37801, 40801, 60801, 71801, 83750, 85103, and 86750
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed on-site decommissioning inspections on January 18 - 20, 2022 and March 21 - 24, 2022, supplemented by in-office reviews and periodic phone calls. The inspection consisted of observations by the inspectors, interviews with site personnel, a review of procedures and records, and plant walk-downs.
The inspectors conducted document reviews and interviews with plant personnel to determine if IPEC procedures and processes were adequate and in accordance with the regulations and guidance associated with 10 CFR 50.59, and to determine if changes made by IPEC under 10 CFR 50.59 required prior NRC approval.
The inspectors assessed the implementation and effectiveness of IPECs corrective action program (CAP) by reviewing a sampling of issues, non-conformances and conditions adverse to quality into the CAP. The inspectors reviewed a representative selection of CAP documents to determine if a sufficiently low threshold for problem identification existed, if follow-up evaluations were of sufficient quality, and if IPEC assigned timely and appropriate prioritization for issue resolution commensurate with the significance of the issue. The inspectors interviewed the CAP Manager and Employee Concerns Program Manager, as well as interviewing several employees working in the plant to assess safety culture.
The inspectors reviewed IPECs programs for the safe wet storage of spent fuel. The inspectors performed walk-downs of the spent fuel pool (SFP) and associated support systems to assess material condition, configuration control, and system operation. The inspectors accompanied a non-certified operator on his rounds in select areas of Unit 3, including the fuel storage and auxiliary buildings. The inspectors observed several fuel movements and inspections at Unit 3. The inspectors toured the Unit 2 and 3 control rooms and fuel storage buildings and interviewed certified fuel handlers (CFHs) to determine if SFP system instrumentation, alarms and leakage detection monitoring were adequate to assure the safe storage of spent fuel. The inspectors interviewed employees and reviewed a sample of SFP boron sample results for Units 2 and 3 to determine if chemistry parameters were within the limits of IPECs license commitments and if the samples were taken at the technical specification required frequency. The inspectors interviewed employees to evaluate the fuel movement process to determine if fuel moves were made in accordance with technical specification parameters and site procedure requirements. The inspectors reviewed IPECs maintenance rule basis documents for the defueled condition to determine if structures, systems, and components (SSCs) were adequately scoped into the maintenance rule program.
The inspectors reviewed documents and interviewed plant personnel to assess the licensees effectiveness of its decommissioning fire protection program and to determine if it was maintained and implemented to address the potential for fires that could result in the release or spread of radioactive materials. The inspectors performed plant tours to assess field conditions and the storage of combustible materials.
The inspectors attended select management meetings and several decommissioning planning meetings, including Plan-of-the-Day meetings, CAP screening meetings, and management review committee meetings. Inspectors reviewed documentation and met with IPEC management and discussed financial assurance, staffing, status of decommissioning and upcoming activities, among other topics to verify whether the licensee was conducting activities in accordance with regulatory and license requirements. The inspectors performed several plant tours to assess field conditions and decommissioning activities by assessing material condition of structures, systems, and components, housekeeping, system configurations, and worker level of knowledge or procedure use and adherence.
These tours included Units 2 and 3 vapor containments and fuel storage buildings. The inspectors observed select pre-job briefs, including for a steam generator secondary side entry and Unit 2 reactor head vent line removal work and associated work activities with the vent line work.
The inspectors observed activities, reviewed documentation, and interviewed personnel associated with occupational radiation exposure to evaluate the licensees protection of worker health and safety. The inspectors conducted a number of site walk-downs, including radiologically controlled areas, to examine and verify radiological postings, airborne and contamination controls, and locked high radiation doors and gates. The inspectors reviewed radiation work permits (RWPs), and As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA)work plans to determine if radiation work activities were pre-planned effectively to limit worker exposure. The inspectors observed radiation protection (RP) technicians perform work activities to determine if implementation of radiological work controls, training and skill level were sufficient for the activities being performed.
The inspectors examined the programs, processes, procedures, and records related to the MC&A of SNM. This program is specified in 10 CFR 74.19, with the objective of preventing the loss or misuse of SNM. This included a detailed review of major SFP evolutions since the last inspection, the most recent annual physical inventory, the relevant Department of Energy (DOE)/NRC 741 and 742 forms, an inspection of the SFP, and a walkdown of all item control areas with the SNM Custodian. The inspectors observed (by smart-sampling)the storage of fuel and non-fuel SNM in the SFP and then compared the storage to technical specification requirements for criticality control to the locations as documented in the MC&A physical inventory records.
The inspectors reviewed selected activities and documentation associated with the possession, processing, storage, and shipment of licensed radioactive material. The inspectors observed surveys of a shipment from IPEC and the loading of railroad cars in preparation for transport. The inspectors also reviewed work packages for select recent shipments of radioactive waste. Additionally, the inspectors toured radioactive waste handling and storage areas in Unit 1.
b. Observations and Findings
The inspectors determined that the reviewed 10 CFR 50.59 screenings and evaluations had been properly performed. The inspectors determined that selected changes under 10 CFR 50.59 did not require prior NRC approval and safety reviews were performed for design changes and modifications in accordance with applicable regulatory requirements, license conditions and the Decommissioning Safety Analysis Report.
One item reviewed of note is the IPEC engineering evaluation and 10 CFR 50.59 screening of the vapor containment equipment hatch enlargement activities, including EC IPC-2021-017 for Unit 2 and EC IPC 2021-018 for Unit 3. During this inspection period, IPEC completed enlargement of the equipment hatches and installation of roll up doors at Units 2 and 3 to support onloading and offloading of equipment and debris for decommissioning activities. Section 4.2.3.2.2 of the Unit 2 DSAR discusses radiation monitor R44 and section 4.2.3.1 of the Unit 3 DSAR discusses R-14 and R-27, which monitor the plant vent for radioactive releases. The licensees screening of the activity stated that the enlargement of the equipment hatch would not compromise the ability to detect gaseous radioactive releases because a negative pressure differential is maintained within the plant radiological controlled area. The screening discusses how no airflow would travel outward of the enlarged equipment hatch area, but rather only travel inward to containment from the outside. The licensee intends to review the procedures surrounding the ventilation flow in containment to maintain negative pressure differential within the radiological controlled area. The licensee developed an issue report (IP3-0051) on potential enhancements for controlling the method for opening exterior roll-up doors. Additionally, the licensee was continuously monitoring and taking periodic samples of the potential release pathway by the enlarged opening. Furthermore, the licensee has procedures in place to reduce the potential for airborne contamination with each job and is collecting daily smear surveys and weekly hot particle surveys at the roll-up door entrance and have not found contamination at the time of the inspection. The enlargement activities are considered a major decommissioning activity as defined under 10 CFR 50.2. The inspectors also assessed planned modifications to Unit 3 Backup SFP Cooling and Skimmer equipment (EC IPC-2021-014) as well as proposed modifications to the Unit 3 SFP pump suction piping. These modifications are being pursued in support of moving fuel out of the SFP and into dry cask storage. Inspection of these activities is ongoing and will continue to receive NRC oversight.
The inspectors determined that issues had been identified, entered into the CAP, and evaluated commensurate with their safety significance through document review, interviews, and observation of several management review committee meetings. The inspectors determined that IPEC had performed activities described in the DQAP as appropriate. In particular, the inspectors focused on ensuring that corrective actions that were assigned work orders resulted in the work being completed. The inspectors interviewed a number of site personnel and contractors and determined that the site had a positive safety culture and workers felt comfortable bringing issues up to their managers.
The inspectors reviewed select recent IRs regarding fire protection, including IP-00277, IP-00255, and IP-00352. IP-00352 described a fire that occurred in December 2021 during hot work on the Unit 3 equipment hatch cylinder where a piece of poly-sheeting caught fire and the posted fire watch immediately extinguished the fire. The inspectors reviewed and verified the licensees evaluation, which concluded that there was no release of radioactive material. Immediate corrective actions included a stand down with work crews and a rereview of all work areas. The inspectors verified that appropriate corrective actions were taken or are planned and will continue to monitor corrective actions and any further fire issues at the site during subsequent inspections. The inspectors noted that IPEC had properly evaluated operating experience from other decommissioning sites.
The inspectors determined that IPEC had safely stored spent fuel in wet storage. The inspectors observed adequate material condition of both spent fuel pools, and their supporting cooling systems. The inspectors verified that the criticality controls in the SFP had been adequately managed and maintained, and SFP chemistry and cleanliness controls had been adequately implemented. The inspectors determined that surveillance requirements for water level, area radiation and temperature of the SFP were adequate as well as alarm/detection capability. The inspectors verified surveillance requirements for water level, area radiation, leak detection, and temperature of the SFP were adequate as well as alarm/detection capability and that procedures provided guidance to restore SFP water level if required. The inspectors also determined that the operations rounds were adequate and satisfied the associated technical specification requirements for the SFP.
The inspectors determined that Indian Point has adequately scoped in SSCs necessary to be in the maintenance rule. The inspectors note that these include the physical structure both spent fuel pool pits not to include the liners and the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) pad. The inspectors reviewed the high-risk briefing sheet and radiological surveys associated with an exploratory dive into the spent fuel pool and the ALARA plan, defueled safety assessment expected for plant risk, and other documentation associated with two more planned dives associated with work planned on the spent fuel pool cooling system.
The inspectors noted that during this inspection period, the site continued preparations for future reactor vessel internals segmentation activities, including continued enlargement of the equipment hatch at Unit 2, preparatory activities necessary prior to installing platforms on steam generators and isolating the reactor coolant system loops. The inspectors note that for the areas of the plant toured, the material condition and housekeeping was adequate. The inspectors noted workers were knowledgeable and adhered to plant procedures and work plans and pre-job briefs were thorough and highlighted specific safety concerns.
The inspectors verified that sampled RWPs and ALARA plans, including respiratory protection evaluations, were implemented and were effective in limiting worker exposure, and occupational dose was appropriate for the scope of the radiological activities performed. The inspectors determined that Radiation Protection (RP) staff effectively controlled work activities, used appropriate instruments for the surveys, and survey records were clear and complete.
The inspectors observed workers performing surveys of Unit 3 steam piping to verify the appropriate methods used for control, survey, and release from these areas are sufficient to prevent the unintended release of radioactive materials from the site, including adequate knowledge on how to respond to an alarm. The inspectors reviewed the associated free release survey plan for the Unit 3 steam piping as well as the survey plan for the Unit 2 and Unit 3 containment blocks. The inspectors note that the plan followed the approach outlined in Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Assessment of Materials and Equipment Manual (MARSAME), NUREG 1575, Supplement 1, January 2009. MARSAME provides a framework for statistical approaches to establish sampling frequencies that utilizes release criteria defined by the user. In this case, the licensee established release criteria in relation to background levels (e.g., less than or equal to two times background for the scan with the Micro-R meter) which is stated to be based on existing procedure EN-RP-121 Radioactive Material Control, Revision 17. The licensee indicated that the areas in which the surveys were being done have very low background levels (about 200 cpm). The inspectors reviewed the procedure EN-RP-121 Radioactive Material Control, Revision 17, and note that Section 5.6 of the procedure indicates that materials should have no detectable radioactivity for it to be considered for free-release. This implies that the release criteria should be at minimum detectable levels. The minimum detectable level is influenced by the background levels, so it is important that these surveys be conducted in areas with low background values, so that the minimum detectable levels are adequately low. The inspectors noted that if the blocks are kept on-site for continued use, such as shielding, they would either be required to be resurveyed prior to free release from site or resurveyed in accordance with their future final status survey plan if they are to be left on-site.
The inspectors determined that MC&A program records were complete, comprehensive, and maintained in accordance with regulations and site procedures. Routine reports of SNM inventory and mass-balance to the U.S. DOE and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) were made as required. Item control areas (ICAs) were posted and had adequate access control. The program of SNM security seals was adequately maintained.
The inspectors verified that selected radioactive waste shipping paperwork was properly completed, and site personnel were knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities as required. The inspectors determined that radioactive waste shipped for disposal at land disposal facilities was properly classified, described, packaged, marked, labeled and was in proper condition for transportation for the sample reviewed.
c. Conclusions
Based on the results of this inspection, no violations of more than minor safety significance were identified.
3.0
Exit Meeting Summary
On April 25, 2022, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Richard Burroni, Site Vice President, and other members of the IPEC organization. No proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
- J. Fleming, Vice President, Regulatory Affairs
- R. Burroni, Site Vice President
- F. Spagnuolo, Decommissioning Manager
- M. Johnson, Regulatory Assurance Manager
- W. Wittich, Senior Licensing Specialist
- G. Delfini, Engineering Supervisor
- K. Elliott, Fire Protection Engineer
- W. OBrien, Radiation Protection Supervisor
- R. Fucheck, Chemistry and Radiation Protection Manager
- A. DeNully, Chemistry and Environmental Supervisor
- C. Bohren, Operations Manager
- J. Johnson, Certified Fuel Handler
- P. Louie, Non-Certified Operator
- S. Malinski, Civil Engineer
- R. Passalugo, Waste Controls Specialist Representative (Contractor)
ITEMS OPEN, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
None
PARTIAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Audits and Reports
21 Engineering Programs Audit SAT, June 28, 2020
IPEC-2021-I-16, Operations and Technical Specifications Internal Audit Checklist
IPEC Annual Physical Inventory Report 2019, August 22, 2019
IPEC Annual Physical Inventory Report 2020, August 25, 2020
IPEC Annual Physical Inventory Report 2021, August 17, 2021
Engineering Change Documentation
EC-IPC-2021-017, Process Applicability Determination for the Unit 2 Enlarged Access Opening in
Vapor Containment, November 2, 2021
IPC-2021-017, Controlled Decommissioning Equipment Change Package (CDECP) for Unit 2 VC
Hatch Enlargement, November 2, 2021
EC-IPC-2021-018, Process Applicability Determination for the Unit 3 Enlarged Access Opening in
Vapor Containment, October 7, 2021
IPC-2021-018, Controlled Decommissioning Equipment Change Package (CDECP) for Unit 3 VC
Hatch Enlargement, October 7, 2021
EC-IPC-2021-023, Removal of Engdahl Model PAR 400 Peak Recording Accelerographs From
Steam Generator, Reactor Coolant Pump, and Pressurizer, Revision 0
IPC-2021-002, Liquid Waste Truck Fill in RAMS to Support Phase 1, Revision 0
IPC-2021-007, Installation of Gabion Wall (Wire Rock Basket) on Exterior Fuel Storage Building
Wall, Revision 0
IPC-2021-014, Removal of Unit 3 Backup Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Skimmer System
Equipment, Revision 0
Procedures
0-NF-203, Internal Transfer of Fuel Assemblies and Inserts, Revision 27
2-CY-2625, General Plant Systems Specifications and Frequencies, Revision 32
3-CY-2625, General Plant Systems Specifications and Frequencies, Revision 17
DSP-RA-001, Corrective Actions Program, Revision 0
DSP-WC-DC-100, Decommissioning Work Control Process, Revision 3
EN-LI-100, Process Applicability Determination, Revision 30
EN-MA-119-02, General Material Handling, Revision 3
EN-NF-104, Special Nuclear Materials Program, Revision 009
EN-NF-200, Special Nuclear Material Control, Revision 14
EN-NF-201, Special Nuclear Material Reporting, Revision 10
EN-NF-202, Tamper Proof Seals for Special Nuclear Material, Revision 6
EN-RP-131, Air Sampling, Revision 17
EN-RP-141, Job Coverage, Revision 9
EN-RP-503, Selection, Issue and Use of Respiratory Protection Equipment, Revision 8
EN-RP-121 Radioactive Material Control, Revision 17
IP-SMM-OM-001, Decommissioning Phase 1, Translation Procedure, June 24, 2021
IP-SMM-OU-104, Shutdown Risk Assessment, Revision 20
Condition Reports Reviewed
CR-IP2-2021-00089
CR-IP3-2021-00241
CR-IP3-2021-00891
CR-IP2-2019-04609
CR-IP2-2020-01671
IP3LO-2019-00149
Condition Reports Generated from Inspection
Licensing Bases Documents
Indian Point 2 Defueled Safety Analysis Report, Rev. 0
Indian Point 3 Defueled Safety Analysis Report, Rev. 0
Indian Point Nuclear Generating Plant No. 2 Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications and
Bases, Amendment 294
Indian Point Nuclear Generating Plant No. 3 Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications and
Bases, Amendment 270
NL-20-076, Revision of Commitment Related to Nuclear Reactor Safeguards Interim
Compensatory Measure - Section B.5.b Issue Regarding Spent Fuel Dispersal,
November 2, 2020
Work Orders
2838974
Miscellaneous
21 Tamper-Proof Seal log, various
ALARA Plan, RWP# 20223050, Canopy Seal Cutting Project, February 17, 2022
ALARA Plan, RWP# 20223057, Diving Operations and Support in FSB, March 15, 2022
Boron Sample results Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool, March 14 and 21, 2022
Boron Sample results Unit 3 Spent Fuel Pool, February 22 and March 21, 2022
Draft Timeline for Spent Fuel Pool Cooling engineering change
Email correspondence between IPEC and Enbridge, March 10, 2022
Email correspondence between IPEC and Enbridge, March 14, 2022
High Risk Briefing, RWP# 20223057, March 15, 2022
Radiological Survey, Unit 3 Fuel Storage Building Spent Fuel Pool Suction Box, February 24, 2022
Radiological Survey, Unit 3 Fuel Storage Building in Pool Underwater Survey Ladder and Platform
Dive Area, March 15, 2022
Radiological Survey, 34 Steam Generator Secondary Moisture Separator Assembly,
March 22, 2022
Radiological Survey, Reactor Head Vent Removal, Map #10A - VC, March 23, 2022
Shipment Package for Shipment #SR-2771-0019, Shipping date, March 15, 2022
Supplemental Maintenance Rule Basis Document for Unit 2 Systems Following Permanent
Shutdown and Defueled, Revision 1
Supplemental Maintenance Ruel Basis Document for Unit 3 Systems Following Permanent
Shutdown and Defueled, May 15, 2021
TEDE-ALARA Evaluation Number 2022-001, February 8, 2022
IPEC-RPT-21-002, Free Release of Units 2 and 3 Containment Blocks, November 9, 2021,
Revision 0
IPEC-RPT-22-003, Free Release of Units 3 Steam Piping, March 7, 2021, Revision 0
MRC Agenda, March 22, 2022
MRC Agenda, March 24, 2022
Work Order and Issue Screening Meeting Agenda, March 23, 2022
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
Agencywide Document Access Management System
As Low As Reasonably Achievable
Corrective Action Program
Certified Fuel Handler
Certificate of Compliance
Department of Energy
Defueled Safety Analysis Report
Decommissioning Quality Assurance Program
Entergy
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
Holtec/HDI
Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC (HDI)
Item Control Areas
IMC
Inspection Manual Chapter
Material Control and Accounting
IP
Inspection Procedure
Indian Point Energy Center
IP-1
Indian Point Unit 1
IP-2
Indian Point Unit 2
IP-3
Indian Point Unit 3
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Radiation Protection
Radiation Work Permit
Structures, Systems, and Components
Spent Fuel Pool
TS
Technical Specifications