ELV-02543, Forwards Reply to Notice of Violation & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty Re Unsecured,Unprotected & Unattended Safeguards Info Per Insp Repts 50-424/90-27 & 50-425/90-27

Forwards Reply to Notice of Violation & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty Re Unsecured,Unprotected & Unattended Safeguards Info Per Insp Repts 50-424/90-27 & 50-425/90-27

ML20070F262
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	02/28/1991
From:	Mccoy C GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT (OE)
References
ELV-02543, ELV-2543, NUDOCS 9103080209
Download: ML20070F262 (6)

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C. K. McCoy vtee,euxm w e,v Georgia Power vnae,wa February 28, 1991 " " ' " " " " " " "

ELV-02543 0846 Docke't Nos. 50-424 50-425 Director, Office of Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory. Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen:

V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT REPLY TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF civil PENALTY Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, Georgia Power Company submits the enclosed reply to the results identified in Inspection Report Nos. 50-424/90-27 and 50-425/90-27 where safeguards information was found unsecured, unprotected or unattended. A transcription of the violation precedes GPC's response, and a check in the amount of $50,000 is enclosed in response to the civil penalty.

Mr. C. K. McCoy states that he is a Vice President of Georgia Power Company and is authorized to execute this oath on behalf of Georgia Power Company and that, to the best of his knowledge and belief, the facts set forth in this letter and enclosure are true.

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY By: .

_C. K. McCoy Sworntoandsubscribedbeforemethis8_fdayof Mt , 1991.

( WA Notnty Public CKH/AFS/gm

Enclosure:

Violatian 50-424/90-27 and 50-425/90-27, GPC Response and Check for Civil Penalty xc: (see next page)

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a GeorgiaPower d U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Director, Office of Enforcement ELV-02543 Page 2 c(w): Georaia Power ComoanY Mr. C. K. McCoy Mr. W. B. Shipman Mr. R. M. Odtm Mr. P. D. Rushton NORMS U. S. Nuclear Reoulatory Commission Mr. S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator Mr. D. S. Hood, Licensing Project Manager, NRR Mr. B. R. Bonser, Senior Resident inspector, Vogtle Document Control Desk i

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ENCLOSURE V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 REPLY TO A NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY NRC INSPECTION _ REPORT NOS. 50-424/90-27_AND 50-425/90-27 AND GPC RESPONSE "During.an NRC_ inspection conducted on October 16-17, - 1990,- a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the ' General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1990), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposes to-impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234'of the Atomic Energy-Act of 1954, as amended (Act),

42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205- The particular violation and associated civil penalty are set forth below:

10 CFR 73.21(a). requires, in part, that Safeguards Information (SGI) be protected against unauthorized disclosure, and that licensees esteblish and maintain an information protection system that includes certain measures to protect SGl.

'10 CFR 73.21(d)(2) requires, in part, that while_ unattended, SGI-shall be stored in a_ locked security storage container.

Contrary to the above, the lit.nsee failed to provide adequate protection for documents and materials containing Safeguards Information as evidenced by the following examples:

1. On August 29, 1990, an unlocked and unattended container used to store SGI was discovered by a Southern Co9any Services employee in the Vogtle Project Engineering Support Office-dccument. file room, located in Birmingham, Alabama,

2. On October 11, 1990, unsecured and unattended documents containing SGI

, relating to trair.5 9 tasks were found in the Security Training Office, Vogtle Electric. Generating Plant,

3. 0n October.16, 1990, two elementary drawings of the Vogtle security power supply containing SGI were found unsecured ano_ unattended in the Vogtle Project Engineering Office, Birmingham, Alabama.

4. On October __19, 1990, four documents.containing Safeguards Information were found unsecured and unattended in the Security Training Office, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.

5. On' November 9, 1990, aperture cards containing SGI werr discovered unmarked i and unprotected as SGI in the offices of-Document Contrei, Vogtle Electric Generating P1 ant.

This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement III).

Civil Penalty - $50,000."

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' 4' ENCLOSURE (CONT!NVED)

REPLY-T0 A N0lir.E-0F VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY NRC-INSPEc. TION REPORT NOS, 50-424/90-27 Atl0 50-425/90-27 MD GPC RESPONSE Malision or Denial of the Violation The violation occurred as stated except for clarifications to the cited exanplos listed below.

Exuole.) -

On October 17, 1990, instead of the cited date of.0ctober 16, 1990, two

, elementary drawings of the Vogtle security power supply containing safeguards information were found unsecured and unattended in the Southern Com)any Services (SCS) Vogtle Project Engineering Office in Birmingham,

-Al a )ama.

Examole 5

- On November 9, 1990, aperture cards containing safeguards information were discovered unmarked and unprotected as safeguards information in the Engineering Satellite Office on the third floor of the Service Building, and not in the VEGP Document Control Office as stated in the cited violation.

It is noted that all five examples cited were licensee identified and reported in Licensee Event Reports 50-424/1990-07S, 08S, 10S for cited examples-1, 2, and 5, while examples 3:and 4 were recorded on the VEGP Safeguards Event Log for the Fourth Quarter 1990 A Reason for the Violation

- The reason for the violations cited in examples 1, 2, and 4 was cognitive

- personnel error. The reason for the occurrences cited in examples 3 and 5 was programmatic / procedural inadequacies. The root cause of the continuing problems

. is attributed to personnel error and procedural inadequacies. Items which have contributed to the recurrence of this problem are listed below.

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1. Lack of sensitivity and adequate procedural guidance for controlling.

safeguards information during construction and startup.

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2. Olffering degrees of interpretation of safeo9ards information categorization criteria.

3. No specific guidance given to determine which person / organization had the authority to categorize a document as safeguards.

4. A relatiVely high turnover-of individuals making safeguards information categorizatica determinations leading to a lack of consistency in safeguards categorization.

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1 ENCLOSURE (CONTINVED)

REPLY TO A NOTICE Of VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF civil HNALTY NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-424/90-27 AND 50-425/90-27 MiD .GPCJESPONSE Corrective Steos That Have Been_Taken and the Result. Achieved

1. Once safeguards information was found to be unsecuredi unprotected or unattended, audits were immediately conductcd and in all cases it was determined that no material was missing.

2. The individuals determined to be responsible for the shfeguards left unsecured, unprotected and unattended have been counseled.

3. A letter from the Vice President huclear and A/E Project Managers describing the responsibilities for proper safegucrds informa+, ion control has been sent to amployees at the site, and at corporate ed A/E Offices. This letter also emphasized that individuals will be held personally accountable for any safeguards information control incidents.

4. The appropriate site, VEGP Corporate Office, 500, and Bechtel procedures have been revised to include adequate guidance on retrieval of previously issued copies of documents which an *ecategorized as safeguards information.

5. A safeguards information review task force was appointed an November 30, 1990, to serve as a review and advisory group to the Vice President, Nuclear, in the implementation of a safeguards program designed to establish a baseline for the VEGP safeguards information control pragram. This effort includes determination of whether documents are properly classified and properly stored. Two members of this task force are from the Hatch and Farley Projects to provide expertise from outside the Vogtle Project, The Farley member is also a participant on the NUMARC Security Working Group.

6. Guidelines for safeguards document categorization have been developed for use by those conducting the ongoing reviews described in GPC letter ELV-02507 dated Februar) 11, 1991. An outside ccnsultant ves employed to assist GPC in developing these guidelines and conducting training for the members of the review team and classification team.

7. The number of containers containing safeguards information has been reduced and the number of individuals having access to this information has been reduce'i .

Corrective Steos Which Will Be Taken to Avoid Further Violation

1. A comprehensive review of documents has been implemented to ensure proper safeguards categorization. The overall focus of the review is to establish a baseline of safeguards material for VEGP. This review is scheduled to be completed by March 31, 1991.

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ENCLOSURE (CONTINUED)

REPLY TO A NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF civil PENALTY NRC INSPECTION REPORT-NOS. 50-424/90-27 AND 50-425/90-27 j; AND GPC RESPONSE

2. Georgia Power Company is in the process of auditing vendors who supply safeguards information for security-related hardware to ensure this information. is properly controlled at the vendors' offices. This effort is i- scheduled to be completed by March 31, 1991. To date the two major vendors which supply secL71ty-related hardware to VEGP have been audited. The audits determ M d ; hat the r vendors have acceptable safeguards information '

control programs. No audit i hdings were issued, but some program-enhancements were wggested to the auditors.

An expanded review of occumsnts in areas off project is in process. This 3.

I review includes the site, SCS Offices in Birmingham, the Corporate Offices .

in Birmingnam, and the 8echtel Offices in Gaithersburg to ensure no safeguards 'nfors tion exists in these uncontrolled storage locations. This effort is scheduled to be completed by March 31, 1991. -

l Date When Full Comoliance Fill Be Achieved For the cited examples full compliance was achieved on November 9,1990, with the discovery and proper disposition, of the unsecured safeguards information aperture cards. ,

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