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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20217K3161999-10-19019 October 1999 Forwards Amend 195 to License DPR-61 & Safety Evaluation. Amend Deletes Certain TSs Either No Longer Applicable to Permanently Shutdown & Defueled State of Reactor or Duplicate Regulatory Requirements CY-99-137, Notifies NRC of Intent to Apply Haddam Neck Plant 10CFR50 App B,Qa Program to Activities Related to Development of ISFSI at Haddam1999-10-12012 October 1999 Notifies NRC of Intent to Apply Haddam Neck Plant 10CFR50 App B,Qa Program to Activities Related to Development of ISFSI at Haddam DD-99-11, Informs That Time Provided by NRC Regulation within Which Commission May Act to Review Director'S Decision (DD-99-11) Expired & That Commission Declined Any Review.Decision Became Final Action on 9910041999-10-0808 October 1999 Informs That Time Provided by NRC Regulation within Which Commission May Act to Review Director'S Decision (DD-99-11) Expired & That Commission Declined Any Review.Decision Became Final Action on 991004 ML20212L1261999-10-0404 October 1999 Forwards Viewgraphs Presented by Licensee at 990923 Meeting with Nrc,In Response to Request ML20212D0341999-09-20020 September 1999 Expresses Appreciation for Accepting NRC Request for Tour of Haddam Neck Facility During on 991014.Invites R Mellor to Participate in NRC 1999 Decommissioninng Power Reactor Work- Shop:Nrc Insp Program at Decommissioning Power Reactors CY-99-111, Submits Clarification of Changes Made to Connecticut Yankee QA Program,Per Util 990810 Submittal.Change Will Be Submitted to NRC in Dec 1999 as Part of Annual Update1999-09-0202 September 1999 Submits Clarification of Changes Made to Connecticut Yankee QA Program,Per Util 990810 Submittal.Change Will Be Submitted to NRC in Dec 1999 as Part of Annual Update ML20211E8051999-08-20020 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-213/99-02 on 990420-0719.No Violations Noted.Completion of Corrective Actions for Spent Fuel Bldg Ventilation Issues Adequate ML20210J6021999-08-0202 August 1999 Informs That Info Re Orise Technical Survey Assistance to NRC at CT Yankee Is to Include Copies of Listed Documents CY-99-048, Forwards Cyap Rept CY-HP-0031,Rev 0, Bounding Dose Assessment for Offsite Radioactive Matls1999-07-29029 July 1999 Forwards Cyap Rept CY-HP-0031,Rev 0, Bounding Dose Assessment for Offsite Radioactive Matls CY-99-066, Forwards Revised Plan for Recovery of Licensed Matl from Offsite Locations.Completion of Implementation of Plan During Summer of 1999 Is Planned,Contingent on Support Extended by Property Owners,Weather & Uncontrolled Factors1999-07-20020 July 1999 Forwards Revised Plan for Recovery of Licensed Matl from Offsite Locations.Completion of Implementation of Plan During Summer of 1999 Is Planned,Contingent on Support Extended by Property Owners,Weather & Uncontrolled Factors ML20210C1491999-07-0101 July 1999 Responds to ,Which Responded to NRC Ltr & NOV & Informs That Engagement in Any Similar Wrongdoing in Future May Result in More Significant Enforcement Action. No Further Action Will Be Taken at This Time ML20209C3911999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards TS Page 6-3 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20195H1741999-06-15015 June 1999 Forwards Original & Copy of Request for Approval of Certain Indirect & Direct Transfer of License & Ownership Interests of Montaup Electric Co (Montaup) with Respect to Nuclear Facilities Described as Listed ML20195F9011999-06-0909 June 1999 Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp 50-213/98-06 on 990226. Util Did Not Agree with Disposition of Issue Cited as Severity Level IV Violation.Violation Will Be Noncited ML20195H3591999-06-0202 June 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp of License DPR-61.Corrective Actions:Disciplinary Actions Were Taken by Util Against Jm Foley & Individual & Departmental Emphasis Is Placed on New HP Stds & Expectations ML20207E9031999-06-0202 June 1999 Informs That NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Reorganized Effective 990328.As Part of Reorganization,Div of Licensing Project Mgt Created.Mt Masnik Will Be Section Chief for Haddam Neck.Organization Chart Encl ML20207B9301999-05-25025 May 1999 Responds to 990114 Correspondence Re Changes to Plant Defueled Physical Security Plan Rev 1 Submitted Under 10CFR50.54(p).Implementation of Changes Subj to Insp to Confirm Changes Have Not Decreased Security Plan ML20207G1761999-05-21021 May 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-213/99-01 on 980119-990419 & Closure of CAL 1-97-010.No Violations Noted.Conduct of Activities Associated with Control of Radiological Work at Haddam Neck Generally Characterized as Careful & Thorough ML20206R7221999-05-12012 May 1999 Refers to Investigation 1-97-031 on 970616-0718 & Forwards Nov.Investigation Found That Recipient Deliberately Did Not Follow Radiation Protection Procedures,Falsified Documents & Provided Incomplete & Inaccurate Info to NRC ML20206R7021999-05-12012 May 1999 Refers to Investigation 1-97-008 Conducted by Region I & Forwards Notice of Violation.Investigation Found That Recipient Deliberately Attempted to Conceal Release of Contaminated Video Equipment ML20206R8051999-05-12012 May 1999 Responds to 3 Investigations,Repts 1-97-031,008 & 1-98-008 Between 970314 & 980722 as Well as Insp Conducted Between 980720 & 1102.Forwards Synopsis of 3rd OI Investigation ML20206J2801999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards 1998 Annual Financial Repts for CT Light & Power Co,Western Ma Electric Co,Public Svc Co of Nh,North Atlantic Energy Corp,Northeast Nuclear Energy Co & North Atlantic Energy Svc Corp,License Holders CY-99-057, Forwards 1998 Annual Radioactive Effluent Rept for HNP, & Rev 10 to Remodcm. with Summary of Quantities of Solid Radwaste & Liquid & Gaseous Effluents,As Well as Summary of Assessment of Max Individual Dose1999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards 1998 Annual Radioactive Effluent Rept for HNP, & Rev 10 to Remodcm. with Summary of Quantities of Solid Radwaste & Liquid & Gaseous Effluents,As Well as Summary of Assessment of Max Individual Dose ML20206C8631999-04-28028 April 1999 Forwards Amend 194 to License DPR-61 & Safety Evaluation. Amend Authorizes Relocation of Requirements Related to Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation from TSs to Technical Requirements Manual ML20206A6871999-04-22022 April 1999 Informs of Completion of Review of Re Nepco in Capacity as Minority Shareholder in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp,Yaec,Myap & Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co ML20210V5221999-04-0808 April 1999 Discusses Continued Performance of Technical Assistance Activities for NRC & Environ Survey & Site Assessment Program (Essap) Survey Assistance at Cy IR 05000213/19960121999-04-0505 April 1999 Discusses NRC Insp Repts 50-213/96-12 & 50-213/98-04 on 961102-27 Re Airborne Radioactivity Contamination Event That Occurred in Fuel Transfer Canal & Reactor Cavity in Nov 1996.Notice of Violation Encl ML20205J7931999-04-0505 April 1999 Discusses NRC Insp Repts 50-213/96-12 & 50-213/98-04 on 961102-27 Re Airborne Radioactivity Contamination Event That Occurred in Fuel Transfer Canal & Reactor Cavity in Nov 1996.Notice of Violation Encl CY-99-042, Provides Info on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Haddam Neck Plant1999-03-31031 March 1999 Provides Info on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Haddam Neck Plant ML20206A6951999-03-29029 March 1999 Request Confirmation That No NRC Action or Approval,Required Relative to Proposed Change in Upstream Economic Ownership of New England Power Co,Minority Shareholder in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp,Yaec,Myap & Connecticut Yankee CY-99-024, Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-213/98-06. Corrective Actions:Meetings Were Held with Contractor Mgt, Disciplinary Action Against Worker Was Taken & Notices Alerting Workers to HRA Controls Were Posted1999-03-29029 March 1999 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-213/98-06. Corrective Actions:Meetings Were Held with Contractor Mgt, Disciplinary Action Against Worker Was Taken & Notices Alerting Workers to HRA Controls Were Posted B17697, Notifies NRC of Amount of Property Insurance Coverage, Effective 990401,for HNP & Mnps,Units 1,2 & 3,per Provisions of 10CFR50.54(w)1999-03-12012 March 1999 Notifies NRC of Amount of Property Insurance Coverage, Effective 990401,for HNP & Mnps,Units 1,2 & 3,per Provisions of 10CFR50.54(w) CY-99-032, Clarifies Info Re TRM Change Submitted with Re Proposed Rev to TSs on Seismic Monitoring1999-03-0909 March 1999 Clarifies Info Re TRM Change Submitted with Re Proposed Rev to TSs on Seismic Monitoring ML20207B6641999-02-26026 February 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-213/98-06 on 981103-990118 & Notice of Violation Re Locked High Radiation Area Doors That Were Found Unlocked by Staff.Security Program Was Also Inspected ML20204C6901999-02-22022 February 1999 Informs That Public Citizen Waives Copyright for 5th Edition of Nuclear Lemon So NRC May Reproduce for Purpose of Contributing to NRC Recommended Improvements to Oversight Process for Nuclear Power Reactors ML20203H9621999-02-17017 February 1999 Responds to to Dk Rathbun Which Forwarded Number of Questions from Constituent Re Spent Fuel Decommissioned Nuclear plants.NUREG-1628, Staff Responses to Frequently Asked Questions Re Decommissioning of NPPs Encl.W/O Encl CY-99-005, Responds to NRC 981221 RAI Re Amend 193 to License to Reflect Permanent Shutdown Condition of Plant.Licensee Withdrawing 981030 (CY-98-199) Request & Will Submit Corrections in Future Proposed Rev to TS1999-01-29029 January 1999 Responds to NRC 981221 RAI Re Amend 193 to License to Reflect Permanent Shutdown Condition of Plant.Licensee Withdrawing 981030 (CY-98-199) Request & Will Submit Corrections in Future Proposed Rev to TS CY-99-023, Provides Summary of Understandings Reached During 990108 Meeting Between Util & CT Dept of Environ Protection Re Dike Area Rainwater Reporting Protocol1999-01-28028 January 1999 Provides Summary of Understandings Reached During 990108 Meeting Between Util & CT Dept of Environ Protection Re Dike Area Rainwater Reporting Protocol ML20203H9711999-01-21021 January 1999 Requests Response to Concerns Raised by Constitutent M Marucci Re Spent Fuel at Decommissioned Nuclear Plants CY-99-002, Forwards Response to NRC 981203 RAI Re Proposed License Amend to Relocate Requirements for Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation from Section 3/4.3.3.3 of TS to Trm. Supporting TSs Encl1999-01-18018 January 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 981203 RAI Re Proposed License Amend to Relocate Requirements for Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation from Section 3/4.3.3.3 of TS to Trm. Supporting TSs Encl CY-99-010, Provides Special Rept Concerning Potential of Radiation Exposure Due to Hypothetical Explosive Attack to Facility. Without Encl1999-01-14014 January 1999 Provides Special Rept Concerning Potential of Radiation Exposure Due to Hypothetical Explosive Attack to Facility. Without Encl CY-99-009, Forwards Rev 1 to Haddam Neck Plant Defueled Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Rev Does Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 & 2.7901999-01-14014 January 1999 Forwards Rev 1 to Haddam Neck Plant Defueled Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Rev Does Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 & 2.790 ML20206R6051999-01-11011 January 1999 Ack Receipt of Submiting Sf Mgt Plan.Staff Has Reviewed Plan & Notes Plan to Store Sf in SFP Until DOE Takes Physical Possession of Fuel DD-98-12, Informs That Time Provided by NRC Regulation within Which Commission May Act to Review Director'S Decision DD-98-12 Has Expired.Decision Became Final Agency Action on 981211. with Certificate of Svc.Served on 9812221998-12-22022 December 1998 Informs That Time Provided by NRC Regulation within Which Commission May Act to Review Director'S Decision DD-98-12 Has Expired.Decision Became Final Agency Action on 981211. with Certificate of Svc.Served on 981222 CY-98-142, Forwards Proposed Rev 2 of Cyap QAP for Info & Approval of Exception Number 8 of App E of Cy Qap.Copy of Rev 2 Showing Changes from Rev 1 Also Included1998-12-22022 December 1998 Forwards Proposed Rev 2 of Cyap QAP for Info & Approval of Exception Number 8 of App E of Cy Qap.Copy of Rev 2 Showing Changes from Rev 1 Also Included ML20198R1321998-12-21021 December 1998 Forwards Insp Rept 50-213/98-05 on 980720-1102.No Violations Noted.Insp Completes Review of Licensee Actions Described in ,In Response to NOV & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties ML20198K8651998-12-21021 December 1998 Ack Receipt of ,Requesting Corrected Pages to Be Issued for License Amend 193,issued on 980630.Informs That Inconsistencies Found When Comparing Corrected Pages Submitted on 981030 & License Amend Application CY-98-201, Provides Clarification of NRC Staff SE for Amend 193 Which Approved HNP Defueled TSs1998-12-0303 December 1998 Provides Clarification of NRC Staff SE for Amend 193 Which Approved HNP Defueled TSs IR 05000213/19980041998-11-27027 November 1998 Forwards Special Insp Rept 50-213/98-04 of Licensee Performance During Reactor Coolant Sys Chemical Decontamination ML20195J3571998-11-19019 November 1998 Forwards Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10CFR50.54(w) & 10CFR140.Exemption Submitted in Response to 971007 Application & Suppls & 1218,requesting Reduction in Amount of Insurance Required for Facility 1999-09-20
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARCY-99-137, Notifies NRC of Intent to Apply Haddam Neck Plant 10CFR50 App B,Qa Program to Activities Related to Development of ISFSI at Haddam1999-10-12012 October 1999 Notifies NRC of Intent to Apply Haddam Neck Plant 10CFR50 App B,Qa Program to Activities Related to Development of ISFSI at Haddam CY-99-111, Submits Clarification of Changes Made to Connecticut Yankee QA Program,Per Util 990810 Submittal.Change Will Be Submitted to NRC in Dec 1999 as Part of Annual Update1999-09-0202 September 1999 Submits Clarification of Changes Made to Connecticut Yankee QA Program,Per Util 990810 Submittal.Change Will Be Submitted to NRC in Dec 1999 as Part of Annual Update CY-99-048, Forwards Cyap Rept CY-HP-0031,Rev 0, Bounding Dose Assessment for Offsite Radioactive Matls1999-07-29029 July 1999 Forwards Cyap Rept CY-HP-0031,Rev 0, Bounding Dose Assessment for Offsite Radioactive Matls CY-99-066, Forwards Revised Plan for Recovery of Licensed Matl from Offsite Locations.Completion of Implementation of Plan During Summer of 1999 Is Planned,Contingent on Support Extended by Property Owners,Weather & Uncontrolled Factors1999-07-20020 July 1999 Forwards Revised Plan for Recovery of Licensed Matl from Offsite Locations.Completion of Implementation of Plan During Summer of 1999 Is Planned,Contingent on Support Extended by Property Owners,Weather & Uncontrolled Factors ML20209C3911999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards TS Page 6-3 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20195H1741999-06-15015 June 1999 Forwards Original & Copy of Request for Approval of Certain Indirect & Direct Transfer of License & Ownership Interests of Montaup Electric Co (Montaup) with Respect to Nuclear Facilities Described as Listed ML20195H3591999-06-0202 June 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp of License DPR-61.Corrective Actions:Disciplinary Actions Were Taken by Util Against Jm Foley & Individual & Departmental Emphasis Is Placed on New HP Stds & Expectations CY-99-057, Forwards 1998 Annual Radioactive Effluent Rept for HNP, & Rev 10 to Remodcm. with Summary of Quantities of Solid Radwaste & Liquid & Gaseous Effluents,As Well as Summary of Assessment of Max Individual Dose1999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards 1998 Annual Radioactive Effluent Rept for HNP, & Rev 10 to Remodcm. with Summary of Quantities of Solid Radwaste & Liquid & Gaseous Effluents,As Well as Summary of Assessment of Max Individual Dose ML20206J2801999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards 1998 Annual Financial Repts for CT Light & Power Co,Western Ma Electric Co,Public Svc Co of Nh,North Atlantic Energy Corp,Northeast Nuclear Energy Co & North Atlantic Energy Svc Corp,License Holders ML20210V5221999-04-0808 April 1999 Discusses Continued Performance of Technical Assistance Activities for NRC & Environ Survey & Site Assessment Program (Essap) Survey Assistance at Cy CY-99-042, Provides Info on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Haddam Neck Plant1999-03-31031 March 1999 Provides Info on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Haddam Neck Plant ML20206A6951999-03-29029 March 1999 Request Confirmation That No NRC Action or Approval,Required Relative to Proposed Change in Upstream Economic Ownership of New England Power Co,Minority Shareholder in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp,Yaec,Myap & Connecticut Yankee CY-99-024, Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-213/98-06. Corrective Actions:Meetings Were Held with Contractor Mgt, Disciplinary Action Against Worker Was Taken & Notices Alerting Workers to HRA Controls Were Posted1999-03-29029 March 1999 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-213/98-06. Corrective Actions:Meetings Were Held with Contractor Mgt, Disciplinary Action Against Worker Was Taken & Notices Alerting Workers to HRA Controls Were Posted B17697, Notifies NRC of Amount of Property Insurance Coverage, Effective 990401,for HNP & Mnps,Units 1,2 & 3,per Provisions of 10CFR50.54(w)1999-03-12012 March 1999 Notifies NRC of Amount of Property Insurance Coverage, Effective 990401,for HNP & Mnps,Units 1,2 & 3,per Provisions of 10CFR50.54(w) CY-99-032, Clarifies Info Re TRM Change Submitted with Re Proposed Rev to TSs on Seismic Monitoring1999-03-0909 March 1999 Clarifies Info Re TRM Change Submitted with Re Proposed Rev to TSs on Seismic Monitoring ML20204C6901999-02-22022 February 1999 Informs That Public Citizen Waives Copyright for 5th Edition of Nuclear Lemon So NRC May Reproduce for Purpose of Contributing to NRC Recommended Improvements to Oversight Process for Nuclear Power Reactors CY-99-005, Responds to NRC 981221 RAI Re Amend 193 to License to Reflect Permanent Shutdown Condition of Plant.Licensee Withdrawing 981030 (CY-98-199) Request & Will Submit Corrections in Future Proposed Rev to TS1999-01-29029 January 1999 Responds to NRC 981221 RAI Re Amend 193 to License to Reflect Permanent Shutdown Condition of Plant.Licensee Withdrawing 981030 (CY-98-199) Request & Will Submit Corrections in Future Proposed Rev to TS ML20203H9711999-01-21021 January 1999 Requests Response to Concerns Raised by Constitutent M Marucci Re Spent Fuel at Decommissioned Nuclear Plants CY-99-002, Forwards Response to NRC 981203 RAI Re Proposed License Amend to Relocate Requirements for Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation from Section 3/4.3.3.3 of TS to Trm. Supporting TSs Encl1999-01-18018 January 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 981203 RAI Re Proposed License Amend to Relocate Requirements for Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation from Section 3/4.3.3.3 of TS to Trm. Supporting TSs Encl CY-99-009, Forwards Rev 1 to Haddam Neck Plant Defueled Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Rev Does Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 & 2.7901999-01-14014 January 1999 Forwards Rev 1 to Haddam Neck Plant Defueled Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Rev Does Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 & 2.790 CY-99-010, Provides Special Rept Concerning Potential of Radiation Exposure Due to Hypothetical Explosive Attack to Facility. Without Encl1999-01-14014 January 1999 Provides Special Rept Concerning Potential of Radiation Exposure Due to Hypothetical Explosive Attack to Facility. Without Encl CY-98-142, Forwards Proposed Rev 2 of Cyap QAP for Info & Approval of Exception Number 8 of App E of Cy Qap.Copy of Rev 2 Showing Changes from Rev 1 Also Included1998-12-22022 December 1998 Forwards Proposed Rev 2 of Cyap QAP for Info & Approval of Exception Number 8 of App E of Cy Qap.Copy of Rev 2 Showing Changes from Rev 1 Also Included CY-98-201, Provides Clarification of NRC Staff SE for Amend 193 Which Approved HNP Defueled TSs1998-12-0303 December 1998 Provides Clarification of NRC Staff SE for Amend 193 Which Approved HNP Defueled TSs CY-98-191, Provides Notification That Util Implemented Defueled Emergency Plan for HNP on 981001.Util Completed Annual Exercise Required by Subj Plan & 10CFR50.471998-11-0505 November 1998 Provides Notification That Util Implemented Defueled Emergency Plan for HNP on 981001.Util Completed Annual Exercise Required by Subj Plan & 10CFR50.47 CY-98-140, Provides Commitment to Maintain Water Chemistry Requirements in HNP Technical Requirements Manual1998-11-0202 November 1998 Provides Commitment to Maintain Water Chemistry Requirements in HNP Technical Requirements Manual CY-98-183, Forwards Revised License Amend 193 TS Pages to Correct Amend Number on Pages Not Changed by Amend 193.No Commitments Contained within Ltr1998-10-30030 October 1998 Forwards Revised License Amend 193 TS Pages to Correct Amend Number on Pages Not Changed by Amend 193.No Commitments Contained within Ltr CY-98-199, Forwards Listing of Corrections Made & Revised Pages for Proposed License Amend 193.Ltr Also Transmits Repaginated Pages for TS Index & Section 1,per Request of NRC Project Manager1998-10-30030 October 1998 Forwards Listing of Corrections Made & Revised Pages for Proposed License Amend 193.Ltr Also Transmits Repaginated Pages for TS Index & Section 1,per Request of NRC Project Manager CY-98-062, Updates Info of Historical Nature in Response to Both NRC Historical Review Rept & NRC Insp Rept 50-213/97-11 Open Items1998-10-28028 October 1998 Updates Info of Historical Nature in Response to Both NRC Historical Review Rept & NRC Insp Rept 50-213/97-11 Open Items CY-98-154, Forwards Sf Mgt Plan for Haddam Neck Plant.Plan Submits Info on Mgt & Funding for Program to Safely Store Sf Following Permanent Cessation of Power Operations Until Title Is Transferred to DOE1998-10-28028 October 1998 Forwards Sf Mgt Plan for Haddam Neck Plant.Plan Submits Info on Mgt & Funding for Program to Safely Store Sf Following Permanent Cessation of Power Operations Until Title Is Transferred to DOE CY-98-129, Provides Supplemental Info to 980629 Response to 2.206 Petition Questions on Spent Fuel Cooling Methods.Util Pending Commitment Made within Ltr Stated1998-10-14014 October 1998 Provides Supplemental Info to 980629 Response to 2.206 Petition Questions on Spent Fuel Cooling Methods.Util Pending Commitment Made within Ltr Stated CY-98-186, Provides Notification of Organizational Changes Which Affect Cyap.Organization Chart,Biographical Profile of K Heider & Revised Distribution List for NRC Correspondence,Encl1998-10-0202 October 1998 Provides Notification of Organizational Changes Which Affect Cyap.Organization Chart,Biographical Profile of K Heider & Revised Distribution List for NRC Correspondence,Encl CY-98-153, Forwards Final Response to NRC 961009 RAI Re Configuration Mgt Project at Plant.No New Commitments Made within Ltr or Attachment1998-09-30030 September 1998 Forwards Final Response to NRC 961009 RAI Re Configuration Mgt Project at Plant.No New Commitments Made within Ltr or Attachment CY-98-157, Responds to NRC Request That Cyap Submit Proposed License Amend to Include Fuel Storage Pool Water Chemistry Program within Haddam Neck Plant Ts.Cyap Considers That Amend Is Not Necessary for Listed Reasons.Procedure Encl1998-09-28028 September 1998 Responds to NRC Request That Cyap Submit Proposed License Amend to Include Fuel Storage Pool Water Chemistry Program within Haddam Neck Plant Ts.Cyap Considers That Amend Is Not Necessary for Listed Reasons.Procedure Encl B17440, Corrects Errors in Ltrs & 980225 Re semi-annual Fitness for Duty Performance Data for Jan-June 1998 & July-Dec 19971998-09-24024 September 1998 Corrects Errors in Ltrs & 980225 Re semi-annual Fitness for Duty Performance Data for Jan-June 1998 & July-Dec 1997 CY-98-151, Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-213/98-03.Corrective Actions:Root Cause Team Has Determined That Shift Managers Initial Reportability Decision Was Not Correct1998-09-21021 September 1998 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-213/98-03.Corrective Actions:Root Cause Team Has Determined That Shift Managers Initial Reportability Decision Was Not Correct ML20153G3891998-09-14014 September 1998 Informs That Union of Concerned Scientists Fully Supports Citizens Awareness Network Petition Filed Pursuant to 10CFR2.206,seeking to Revoke or Suspend License for Haddam Neck Nuclear Plant ML20154J9861998-09-11011 September 1998 Forwards for Service Upon Lj Callan,Jc Hoyle & Commission, Request for NRC to Revoke Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co License to Operate Haddam Neck Reactor Pursuant to 10CFR2.206 ML20154J9991998-09-11011 September 1998 Requests NRC Take Immediate Action to Revoke Util License to Operate Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Station Pursuant to 10CFR2.206 B17420, Forwards Semiannual fitness-for-duty Performance Data for Jan-June 1998,per 10CFR26.71(d)1998-08-31031 August 1998 Forwards Semiannual fitness-for-duty Performance Data for Jan-June 1998,per 10CFR26.71(d) CY-98-107, Forwards Decommissioning Cost Study for Connecticut Yankee Nuclear Power Plant. Adjustments to Cost Estimate Will Be Made as Necessary as Detailed Work Planning Progresses & Elements of Cost Estimate Periodically Reviewed & Updated1998-08-25025 August 1998 Forwards Decommissioning Cost Study for Connecticut Yankee Nuclear Power Plant. Adjustments to Cost Estimate Will Be Made as Necessary as Detailed Work Planning Progresses & Elements of Cost Estimate Periodically Reviewed & Updated B17384, Submits fitness-for-duty Program Rept for Investigations Re Unsatisfactory Performance Test Results,Per 10CFR26,App a, Subpart B,Section 2.8(e)(4).No New Commitments Are Contained in Ltr1998-08-20020 August 1998 Submits fitness-for-duty Program Rept for Investigations Re Unsatisfactory Performance Test Results,Per 10CFR26,App a, Subpart B,Section 2.8(e)(4).No New Commitments Are Contained in Ltr CY-98-141, Requests Postponement of Defueled Emergency Plan Exercise Until 980923.Ltr Contains No New Commitments1998-08-13013 August 1998 Requests Postponement of Defueled Emergency Plan Exercise Until 980923.Ltr Contains No New Commitments CY-98-145, Provides Remediation Plans for Offsite Location 9621.Work Associated W/Location 9621 Scheduled to Begin on 9808171998-08-13013 August 1998 Provides Remediation Plans for Offsite Location 9621.Work Associated W/Location 9621 Scheduled to Begin on 980817 CY-98-132, Provides NRC W/Addl Info on Plant Defueled Emergency Plan. Util Stores Resin Liners Inside Area Protected by Vehicle Barriers1998-07-31031 July 1998 Provides NRC W/Addl Info on Plant Defueled Emergency Plan. Util Stores Resin Liners Inside Area Protected by Vehicle Barriers CY-98-127, Provides Clarifying Info Re Spent Fuel Pool make-up Capability at Hnp.Conclusions Reached by NRC Staff in SER Contained in Issuance of License Amend 193 Not Impacted & & Remain Valid1998-07-30030 July 1998 Provides Clarifying Info Re Spent Fuel Pool make-up Capability at Hnp.Conclusions Reached by NRC Staff in SER Contained in Issuance of License Amend 193 Not Impacted & & Remain Valid CY-98-118, Informs NRC Staff That Rev 38 to Plant Emergency Plan Has Been Implemented1998-07-21021 July 1998 Informs NRC Staff That Rev 38 to Plant Emergency Plan Has Been Implemented CY-98-121, Responds to NRC Request for Addl Info on Recent Operational Events at Plant.Corrective Actions That Have Been Taken, Discussed1998-07-16016 July 1998 Responds to NRC Request for Addl Info on Recent Operational Events at Plant.Corrective Actions That Have Been Taken, Discussed ML20151Z0221998-07-10010 July 1998 Informs That R Bassilakis & Gejdenson Share Same Concerns Re Recent Incidents at Connecticut Yankee Reactor in Haddam Neck,Ct & Hope That NRC Address Concerns Promptly ML20236P0971998-07-0909 July 1998 Inquires About Truth of Cyap Having No Shift Compliment of Licensed Operators at Haddam Neck Reactor ML20239A0651998-07-0707 July 1998 Discusses 980620 Inadvertent Radwaste Discharge from Plant Reactor.Team of NRC Inspectors,Completely Independent of Region I,Requested to Investigate Region I Ability to Regulate Effectively 1999-09-02
[Table view] Category:UTILITY TO NRC
MONTHYEARB13622, Forwards Crdr Human Engineering Discrepancy Info for Plant1990-08-30030 August 1990 Forwards Crdr Human Engineering Discrepancy Info for Plant B13617, Requests NRC Revise Confirmatory Order for Plant to Specify New Completion Date of Cycle 16 Refueling Outage for Item II.E.1.2.Util Intends to Implement Design Change During Next Refueling Outage to Resolve Listed Issues1990-08-22022 August 1990 Requests NRC Revise Confirmatory Order for Plant to Specify New Completion Date of Cycle 16 Refueling Outage for Item II.E.1.2.Util Intends to Implement Design Change During Next Refueling Outage to Resolve Listed Issues B13615, Requests That 900705 Request for Amend to License DPR-61 Be Approved on Emergency Basis & That Temporary Waiver of Compliance from Tech Spec 4.4.6.2.1.g Be Given Until NRC Acts on Emergency Amend1990-08-20020 August 1990 Requests That 900705 Request for Amend to License DPR-61 Be Approved on Emergency Basis & That Temporary Waiver of Compliance from Tech Spec 4.4.6.2.1.g Be Given Until NRC Acts on Emergency Amend B13611, Forwards, Semiannual Radioactive Effluents Release Rept for Jan-June 19901990-08-16016 August 1990 Forwards, Semiannual Radioactive Effluents Release Rept for Jan-June 1990 B13595, Notifies NRC That Utils Volunteer to Participate in Emergency Response Data Sys Project for All Four Nuclear Units,Per Generic Ltr 89-15 & NUREG-13941990-08-14014 August 1990 Notifies NRC That Utils Volunteer to Participate in Emergency Response Data Sys Project for All Four Nuclear Units,Per Generic Ltr 89-15 & NUREG-1394 B13602, Submits Addendum to Plant Control Room Design Review Summary Rept,Per .Lists 10CFR50 App R-related Mods Outside Control Room That Could Not Be Reviewed Until After Final Implementation of Changes1990-08-14014 August 1990 Submits Addendum to Plant Control Room Design Review Summary Rept,Per .Lists 10CFR50 App R-related Mods Outside Control Room That Could Not Be Reviewed Until After Final Implementation of Changes B13580, Discusses Revised Tech Spec Conversion Program,Reflecting Conversion of Tech Spec to Westinghouse Sts.Future Upgrade of Tech Specs Should Be Conducted on Voluntary Basis Consistent W/Nrc Policy Statement1990-08-10010 August 1990 Discusses Revised Tech Spec Conversion Program,Reflecting Conversion of Tech Spec to Westinghouse Sts.Future Upgrade of Tech Specs Should Be Conducted on Voluntary Basis Consistent W/Nrc Policy Statement B13603, Withdraws 900731 Request for Temporary Waiver of Compliance W/Tech Spec 3.7.1.2 Re Inoperability of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps1990-08-0202 August 1990 Withdraws 900731 Request for Temporary Waiver of Compliance W/Tech Spec 3.7.1.2 Re Inoperability of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps B13601, Requests Temporary Waiver of Compliance from Tech Spec 3.7.1.2,allowing Plant to Remain in Mode 3 for Addl 14 Days Beyond Current Action Statement Limits W/One or of Two Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Inoperable1990-07-31031 July 1990 Requests Temporary Waiver of Compliance from Tech Spec 3.7.1.2,allowing Plant to Remain in Mode 3 for Addl 14 Days Beyond Current Action Statement Limits W/One or of Two Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Inoperable B13585, Provides Supplemental Response to Generic Ltr 89-19 Re Request for Action Concerning Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue A-47.Plant Procedures Modified to Provide Operability Verification of Steam Generator Protection Sys1990-07-26026 July 1990 Provides Supplemental Response to Generic Ltr 89-19 Re Request for Action Concerning Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue A-47.Plant Procedures Modified to Provide Operability Verification of Steam Generator Protection Sys B13571, Clarifies 900625 Tech Spec Change Request Re Limit of 160 Failed Fuel Rods for Cycle 16 Operation1990-07-19019 July 1990 Clarifies 900625 Tech Spec Change Request Re Limit of 160 Failed Fuel Rods for Cycle 16 Operation B13569, Forwards, Haddam Neck Plant Decommissioning Financial Assurance Certification Rept1990-07-18018 July 1990 Forwards, Haddam Neck Plant Decommissioning Financial Assurance Certification Rept ML20055E6791990-07-0606 July 1990 Responds to NRC Bulletin 88-008, Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Rcs. All Socket Welded Joints from Header Isolation motor-operated Valves to RCS for All 4 Loops Examined.No Recordable Indications Found ML20055D3461990-07-0303 July 1990 Responds to NRC Bulletin 90-001 Re Loss of Fill Oil Transmitters Mfg by Rosemount.Operability Determinations Performed & Documented for All Rosemount 1153 & 1154 Transmitters at Facility ML20055D7191990-06-29029 June 1990 Amends 900604 Rev 13 to QA Program B13564, Provides NRC W/Info Re Plant Pressurizer as follow-up to 900607 Meeting.Info Particularly Concerns Disposition of Three Indications on Pressurizer Inner Surface & Discussion of Resolution of Previous Indication1990-06-29029 June 1990 Provides NRC W/Info Re Plant Pressurizer as follow-up to 900607 Meeting.Info Particularly Concerns Disposition of Three Indications on Pressurizer Inner Surface & Discussion of Resolution of Previous Indication B13550, Responds to Generic Ltr 90-04, Request for Info on Status of Generic Safety Issues Resolved W/Imposition of Requirements or Corrective Actions. Implementation & Completion Tables for staff-imposed Requirements Encl1990-06-27027 June 1990 Responds to Generic Ltr 90-04, Request for Info on Status of Generic Safety Issues Resolved W/Imposition of Requirements or Corrective Actions. Implementation & Completion Tables for staff-imposed Requirements Encl B13364, Forwards Rev 19 to Modified Amended Security Plan.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790(a))1989-10-0505 October 1989 Forwards Rev 19 to Modified Amended Security Plan.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790(a)) B13376, Forwards Util Response to Generic Ltr 89-04 Re Guidance on Developing Acceptable Inservice Test Programs1989-10-0202 October 1989 Forwards Util Response to Generic Ltr 89-04 Re Guidance on Developing Acceptable Inservice Test Programs A08598, Provides Clarification of Util Position Re Emergency Notification Sys (ENS) & Health Physics Network (Hpn).Util Intends to Provide Two Separate Qualified Individuals for ENS & HPN Communications During Exercise Drills1989-10-0202 October 1989 Provides Clarification of Util Position Re Emergency Notification Sys (ENS) & Health Physics Network (Hpn).Util Intends to Provide Two Separate Qualified Individuals for ENS & HPN Communications During Exercise Drills B13375, Responds to Request for Addl Info Re Electrical Distribution Sys Design Associated W/New Switchgear Bldg.New Switchgear Bldg Provides Opportunity to Minimize Dependence on Motor Control Ctr 5 & Further Reduce Level of Risk1989-09-29029 September 1989 Responds to Request for Addl Info Re Electrical Distribution Sys Design Associated W/New Switchgear Bldg.New Switchgear Bldg Provides Opportunity to Minimize Dependence on Motor Control Ctr 5 & Further Reduce Level of Risk ML20248E4521989-09-29029 September 1989 Forwards Proposed Tech Spec Pages Omitted from 890728 Application for Amend to License DPR-61 Re Cycle 16 Reload B13374, Forwards Bimonthly Progress Rept 18 Re New Switchgear Bldg Const1989-09-27027 September 1989 Forwards Bimonthly Progress Rept 18 Re New Switchgear Bldg Const B13352, Requests Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10CFR50,App J to Assure That Containment Leakage During Design Basis Event Will Not Exceed Applicable Leakage Limits. Justification Encl1989-09-0808 September 1989 Requests Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10CFR50,App J to Assure That Containment Leakage During Design Basis Event Will Not Exceed Applicable Leakage Limits. Justification Encl A08170, Forwards Updated Schedules for Operator Licensing & Requalification Exams for Plants,Per Generic Ltrs 89-12 & 89-031989-08-30030 August 1989 Forwards Updated Schedules for Operator Licensing & Requalification Exams for Plants,Per Generic Ltrs 89-12 & 89-03 B13346, Forwards Tornado Missile Risk Analysis of Bleed & Feed & Auxiliary Feedwater Safe Shutdown Sys at Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Station, Per SEP Topics III-2 & III-4.A1989-08-30030 August 1989 Forwards Tornado Missile Risk Analysis of Bleed & Feed & Auxiliary Feedwater Safe Shutdown Sys at Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Station, Per SEP Topics III-2 & III-4.A B13351, Provides Clarifications of Util & NRC 890525 Insp Rept 50-213/89-200.Util Proposes to Extend Schedule for Completion of Sampling and Evaluation Program to 900930 & Valves That Fail Systematic Testing Will Be Replaced1989-08-28028 August 1989 Provides Clarifications of Util & NRC 890525 Insp Rept 50-213/89-200.Util Proposes to Extend Schedule for Completion of Sampling and Evaluation Program to 900930 & Valves That Fail Systematic Testing Will Be Replaced A08237, Confirms Receipt of Listed Invoices for Costs Incurred During Routine Insps1989-08-28028 August 1989 Confirms Receipt of Listed Invoices for Costs Incurred During Routine Insps B13340, Submits Results of Svc Water & Primary Auxiliary Bldg Equipment Operability Analyses Not Provided in 890428 Submittal of Results of ECCS Single Failure Analysis1989-08-24024 August 1989 Submits Results of Svc Water & Primary Auxiliary Bldg Equipment Operability Analyses Not Provided in 890428 Submittal of Results of ECCS Single Failure Analysis A08211, Ack Receipt of Listed Invoices for Cost Incurred During Routine Insps at Plants.Payment Will Be Made on 8909061989-08-22022 August 1989 Ack Receipt of Listed Invoices for Cost Incurred During Routine Insps at Plants.Payment Will Be Made on 890906 B13341, Forwards WCAP-12196, Svc Water Sys Design Basis Temp Increase to 95 F for Connecticut Yankee & Haddam Neck Plant, Per Request in Amend 112 to License DPR-61.Northeast Utils Svc Co Suppl to Rept Also Encl1989-08-21021 August 1989 Forwards WCAP-12196, Svc Water Sys Design Basis Temp Increase to 95 F for Connecticut Yankee & Haddam Neck Plant, Per Request in Amend 112 to License DPR-61.Northeast Utils Svc Co Suppl to Rept Also Encl B13339, Forwards Addl Info Re Util 881026 & 890306 Revised Tech Specs Requests,Per NRC Request.Existing 8 H Shift Frequency Does Not Provide Enough Latitude within 8 H Shift Whereas 12 H Shift Would1989-08-21021 August 1989 Forwards Addl Info Re Util 881026 & 890306 Revised Tech Specs Requests,Per NRC Request.Existing 8 H Shift Frequency Does Not Provide Enough Latitude within 8 H Shift Whereas 12 H Shift Would B13342, Provides Util Position Re Procurement of non-code Class Fasteners in ASME Code Class Applications from Mfg or Matl Suppliers,Per Util to NRC & Insp Rept 50-423/88-18.App B Program Assures Use of Equivalent Items1989-08-15015 August 1989 Provides Util Position Re Procurement of non-code Class Fasteners in ASME Code Class Applications from Mfg or Matl Suppliers,Per Util to NRC & Insp Rept 50-423/88-18.App B Program Assures Use of Equivalent Items A08186, Ack Receipt of Listed Invoices for Cost Incurred During Insps.Funds Will Be wire-transferred on 8908241989-08-0808 August 1989 Ack Receipt of Listed Invoices for Cost Incurred During Insps.Funds Will Be wire-transferred on 890824 B13336, Forwards Annual Occupational Exposure Rept 19881989-08-0808 August 1989 Forwards Annual Occupational Exposure Rept 1988 ML20247Q7691989-08-0303 August 1989 Forwards Rev 12 to QA Program Topical Rept B13323, Comments on Draft Reg Guide, Assuring Availability of Funds for Decommissioning Nuclear Reactors. Changes to Stated Phrases Re Certification Amounts Discussed1989-08-0303 August 1989 Comments on Draft Reg Guide, Assuring Availability of Funds for Decommissioning Nuclear Reactors. Changes to Stated Phrases Re Certification Amounts Discussed A08153, Advises That Payment for Invoices H1386,H1387,H1410 & H1411 Will Be wire-transferred on 890810,per NRC Instructions1989-08-0101 August 1989 Advises That Payment for Invoices H1386,H1387,H1410 & H1411 Will Be wire-transferred on 890810,per NRC Instructions B13321, Informs of Inability to Submit plant-specific Analyses for Util as Planned,Due to Delays Encountered in Completing Sensitivity & Break Spectrum Analysis.Meeting Between NRC & Util Representatives Arranged for 8908101989-08-0101 August 1989 Informs of Inability to Submit plant-specific Analyses for Util as Planned,Due to Delays Encountered in Completing Sensitivity & Break Spectrum Analysis.Meeting Between NRC & Util Representatives Arranged for 890810 A07974, Advises That No Agreements Restricting Employees to Inform NRC of Potential Safety Issues Exist,Per V Stello1989-07-31031 July 1989 Advises That No Agreements Restricting Employees to Inform NRC of Potential Safety Issues Exist,Per V Stello ML20248B7931989-07-31031 July 1989 Forwards Response to NRC Request for Addl Info Re Util 890421 Application for Amend to License DPR-61,revising Tech Spec 3.6, Eccs. Revised Tech Spec Also Encl B13307, Responds to Generic Ltr 89-06, Task Action Plan Item I.D.2 - SPDS - 10CFR50.54(f). SPDS for Plants Meet Applicable Requirements of Suppl 1 to NUREG-0737 & Consistent W/ Majority of Positions Provided in NUREG-13421989-07-21021 July 1989 Responds to Generic Ltr 89-06, Task Action Plan Item I.D.2 - SPDS - 10CFR50.54(f). SPDS for Plants Meet Applicable Requirements of Suppl 1 to NUREG-0737 & Consistent W/ Majority of Positions Provided in NUREG-1342 A08037, Responds to Generic Ltr 89-08, Erosion/Corrosion-Induced Pipe Wall Thinning. Plants Have Programs & Procedures in Place to Monitor Erosion/Corrosion for Both single-phase & two-phase Flow Sys1989-07-13013 July 1989 Responds to Generic Ltr 89-08, Erosion/Corrosion-Induced Pipe Wall Thinning. Plants Have Programs & Procedures in Place to Monitor Erosion/Corrosion for Both single-phase & two-phase Flow Sys A08007, Requests Extension of Deadline for Response to Generic Ltr 89-06, Task Action Plan Item I.D.2-SPDS-10CFR50.54(f), to No Later than 890721.Addl Time Needed to Allow for Completion of Thorough Internal Review of Response1989-07-12012 July 1989 Requests Extension of Deadline for Response to Generic Ltr 89-06, Task Action Plan Item I.D.2-SPDS-10CFR50.54(f), to No Later than 890721.Addl Time Needed to Allow for Completion of Thorough Internal Review of Response B13282, Forwards Response to 890501 Request for Addl Info Re Util Const of New Switchgear Bldg at Plant1989-07-10010 July 1989 Forwards Response to 890501 Request for Addl Info Re Util Const of New Switchgear Bldg at Plant A08093, Advises That Fourth Quarterly Installment of 1989 Annual Fees Will Be Wire Transferred on 890731 in Payment of Invoices H1146,H1222,H1190 & H1151,per 10CFR1711989-07-0707 July 1989 Advises That Fourth Quarterly Installment of 1989 Annual Fees Will Be Wire Transferred on 890731 in Payment of Invoices H1146,H1222,H1190 & H1151,per 10CFR171 A08111, Advises That Payment for 10CFR170 Fee Sent to Jm Rodriquez Re NRC Review of Rev 11 to QA Topical Rept1989-07-0707 July 1989 Advises That Payment for 10CFR170 Fee Sent to Jm Rodriquez Re NRC Review of Rev 11 to QA Topical Rept A07951, Responds to Suppl 3 to NRC Bulletin 88-008, Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Rcs. Issue Represents No Problem at Any Millstone Unit.Haddam Neck Valves Will Be Inspected for Leakage During Upcoming Refueling Outage1989-06-30030 June 1989 Responds to Suppl 3 to NRC Bulletin 88-008, Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Rcs. Issue Represents No Problem at Any Millstone Unit.Haddam Neck Valves Will Be Inspected for Leakage During Upcoming Refueling Outage B13268, Submits Addl Info Re 890425 Proposed Rev to Tech Specs Administrative Controls Section Concerning High Radiation Areas,Per NRC 890505 Conference Call1989-06-26026 June 1989 Submits Addl Info Re 890425 Proposed Rev to Tech Specs Administrative Controls Section Concerning High Radiation Areas,Per NRC 890505 Conference Call B13215, Advises That One Technically Qualified & Trained Individual Per Site Will Man Health Physics Network & Emergency Notification Sys Telephone Lines at Plants,Per NRC Ltrs1989-06-23023 June 1989 Advises That One Technically Qualified & Trained Individual Per Site Will Man Health Physics Network & Emergency Notification Sys Telephone Lines at Plants,Per NRC Ltrs 1990-08-30
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Text
I CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY B E R L I N, C O N N E CTIC U T P o. BOX 270 HARTFORD. CONNECTICUT 06141-0270 T ELE PHONE October 10,1986 Docket No. 50-213 B12288 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attn: Mr. Christopher I. Grimes, Director Integrated Safety Assessment Project Directorate Division of PWR Licensing - B U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ,
Washington, D.C. 20535 Gentlemen:
Haddam Neck Plant Integrated Safety Assessment Program Summaries of Public Safety impact Model Project Analyses In a letter dated July 31,1985,(I) the NRC outlined the scope of issues to be evaluated Neck Plant. inSubsequently,in the Integrated Safety Assessment a letter Program dated February (ISAP))for 14, 1986,(2 wethe Haddam identified a selected number 'of topics for which we would provide the Staff with public safety risk oriented analyses.
In order to facilitate the Staff review of our project analyses, we are providing the Staff, in Attachment 1, with a summary of the following project we have evaluated for public safety impact:
ISAP Topic No.1.21 " Regulatory Guide 1.97 Instrumentation" It is noted that since we have not completed our analyses of the entire set of ISAP projects, the public safety impact scores are to be considered preliminary at this time. Upon completion of our analyses of the entire ISAP project set, including all five attributes, we will review our analyses and revise our public safety impact results, if necessary, to assure consistency in the ranking of the ISAP projects.
(1) H. L. Thompson letter to J. F. Opeka, " Integrated Safety Assessment Program," July 31,1985.
(2) 3. F. Opeka letter to C. I. Grimes, " Integrated Safety Assessment Program Schedule for Implementation," dated February 14,1986.
00 8610220069 861010 i
hp PDR ADOCK 05000213 P PDR
. If you have any questions on this material, please feel free to contact my staff.
Very truly yours, CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY -
1iS.D
- 3. F. Opeka '
Senior Vice President 4 duob By: C. F. Sears Vice President
ISAP #1.21 Regulntory Guida 197 Instnauentition Safety Issue
-During an accident, it may be difficult for the operator to determine immediately what accident is occurring and therefore to determine the appropriate response. For this reason, reactor trip and.certain other safety actions (e.g., emergency core cooling actuation, containment isolation) have been designed to perform automatically during the initial stages of an accident. Instruraentation is also provided to indicate information about plant variables required to enable the operation of manually initiated safety systems and other appropriate operator actions. Adequate instrumentation to monitor plant variables and systems during and following an accident is necessary to minimize the risk to the public from operation of nuclear power plants.
Proposed Project Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2, " Instrumentation for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident," was issued in December, 1980 (Reference 1) to provide guidance concerning implementation of the instrumentation mentioned above. The proposed project at the Haddam Neck plant (Connecticut Yankee (CY)) involves the evaluation of all instrumentation designated for evaluation in ISAP as listed in Attachment No.1 of Reference 2, as well as the additional concerns specified in Reference 3. Each type of instrumentation is to be evaluated for one or more of the following: installation, instrument range determination, environmental qualification, seismic qualification, and redundancy. A summary of this instrumentation is given below:
- 1. Flow in High Pressure Safety Injection System
- 2. Main Steam Flow from Safety Relief Valves (Steam Generator Safety Relief Valve Status)
- 3. Radiation monitor for Vent from Steam Generator Safety Relief Valves or Atmospheric Dump Valve
- 4. Steam Generator Level
- 5. RCS T eold CONNECTICUT YAfEEE INTEGRATED SAFETY ASSESSMEf6 PROGRAM
- 6. Subcooled' Margin Monitor
- 7. Core Exit Temperature B. Containment Hydrogen Monitor
- 9. Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System
- 10. Steam Generator Pressure
- 11. RCS Makeup Flow
- 12. Containment Pressure 13, Neutron Flux
- 14. Containment Isolation Valve Position
- 15. Low Pressure Safety. Injection Flow Indication
- 16. Containment Atmosphere Temperature
- 17. Emergency Ventilation Damper Position
- 18. Containment Fan-Cooler Heat Removal Analysis of Public Safety Impact All of the instrumentation from the above list are analyzed individually in terms of safety in the following sections.
- 1. Flow in High Pressure Safety Injection System The safety significance of High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) System flow indication is that it might assist the operator in the event that HPSI flow needs to be regulated. Typically, HPSI System operation is at maximum flow. There is no capability to " throttle" the flow except for opening and closing MOV's not designed for such purposes. The CY Probabilistic Safety Study (PSS) (Reference 4) identified two potential uses of regulated HPSI flow. The first is following bleed and feed operation, where the charging system is unavailable thereby necessitating HPSI pump operation for the feed portion. The second is concerned with RCS make-up following RCP seal failure, again with charging unavailable. In both of these cases, the existence of HPSI flow can be verified through HPSI pump current indication CONNECTICUT YANKEE IEEGRATED SAFETY ASSESSMEE PROGRAM
and HPSI discharge valve position indication. There is only one dominant sequence from the CY PSS in which charging is unavailable and HPSI is required to_ perform either of the above functions. This sequence is initiated by the loss of motor control center 5 (MCC-5). MCC-5 is subsequently recovered, but primary integrity is lost due to a loss of RCP seal cooling (i.e., the loss of both charging and component cooling water). HPSI flow would then be required for RCS make-up. Even in this case, since HPSI flow can be verified using pump current and valve position indicators and primary system volume can be determined using pressurizer level indication and the Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System, actual HPSI flow indication is of no real additional benefit. However, for the purpose of quantifying a maximum potential benefit from the implementation of HPSI' flow indication, it is assumed that the human error probability associated with the start and operation of the HPSI pumps can be reduced from 3E-03 to 1E-03. Requantifying this' sequence with the reduced human error contribution results in a maximum core melt frequency reduction of 1.3E-07/yr. This frequency reduction occurs in release category "SLC".
From the Public Safety Impact Model the corresponding decrease in public risk is 0.007 man-rem over the remaining lifetime of the plant.
- 2. Main Steam Flow from Safety Relief Valves (Safety Relier Valve Status)
The proposed modification involves the implementation of indication to monitor main steam flow from the steam generator (SG) safety relief valves (SRV's) in order to determine SG SRV status. The safety significance of this instrumentation would be to assist the operator in identifying a stuck open SRV following a Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR). A benefit to safety from this indication can potentially be realized in two ways:
reduction in core melt frequency due to a higher reliability of identifying a stuck open SRV following a SGTR, and reduction in direct radiological release to the public due to a decrease in expected time to isolate a stuck open SRV following a SGTR. Both of these effects are evaluated below:
- a. Core melt frequency (CMF)
CONfECTICUT YAfEEE ItEEGRATED SAFETY ASSESSMEfff PROGRAM
Th2 pot;ntial reduction in CMF from the proposed instrumentation would occur through an increase in the reliability of an operator to identify and mitigate the consequences of a stuck open SG SRV following an SGTR prior to draining the refueling water storage tank (RWST). Identification of a stuck open SRV is comprised of two parts. First is knowledge of an SRV being open, and second is a check of SG pressure to ascertain that SG pressure is below the SRV reseat point. The proposed instrumentation serves only to assist operator recognition of the fact that an SRV is open. It does not, in itself, indicate that an SRV is stuck open. Currently, knowledge of an SRV being open would come from audible indication in the control room, since an SRV makes a tremendous noise when it is open. Such a noise, especially in the time frame considered (i.e. the operator has a
, minimum of 100 minutes to take action assuming five failed tubes),
would be quite recognizable to the operators and plant personnel.
Also, even if control room personnel were to somehow be unaware of an SRV opening, shortly after recognition of the SGTR, an auxiliary operator would be sent to the Terry Turbine room to isolate steam flow from the faulted SG. Due to the resulting noise inside the Terry Turbine room, it would be virtually impossible for the auxiliary operator not to be cognizant of the fact that an SG SRV is open.
Therefore direct indication of SRV status, or steam flow, would not noticeably increase operator reliability in identifying that an SG SRV is stuck open. As such, this modification would produce no significant reduction in core melt frequency.
- b. Direct radiological release Following a SGTR, a stuck open SG SRV will provide a direct radiological release path to the environment. Implementation of the proposed instrumentation might reduce this release by decreasing the expected time for an operator to identify the stuck open SRV and close the associated loop isolation valves (LIV's). From the previous discussion, an operator would determine that an SRV is stuck open based on awareness that an SRV is open combined with the recognition that SG pressures are all below the SRV reseat point. Even though the 4
CONNECTICUT YANKEE IfEEGRATED SAFETY ASSESSMEfE PROGRAM
operator has et least 100 minutes to close the LIV's before uncovering the core, he would typically recognize the situation and take action in no more than 30 to 45 minutes. Given the nature of the incident, and the fact that isolation of the faulted RCS loop is a secondary action, the quickest that the operator can be expected to take action, regardless of instrumentation, is on the order of 15 to 30 minutes.
Therefore, the maximum realistic reduction in direct radiological release time due to implementation of this instrumentation is one-half hour.
During the R.E. Ginna SGTR incident, the total whole body exposure rate for all individuals within 40 miles of the site was approximately 1 man-rem per hour (Section 8.6 of Reference 5), assuming the SG SRV was open for approximately ten minutes. Adjusting for CY's population density (Table D.1-2 of Reference 6) results in an exposure rate of approximately 2 man-rem per hour. The expression for the expected benefit from this modification is:
Expected benefit = (frequency of SGTR)(exposure rate)(decrease in recovery time)(remaining lifetime of the plant).
From the CY PSS (Section 2.0 of Reference 4), the frequency of an SGTR is 1.7E-02/yr. Therefore, the maximum expected benefit from implementation of this instrumentation is:
(1.7E-02/yr)(2 man-rem /hr)(1/2 hr)(20 yrs) = 0.34 man-rem.
- 3. Vent from Steam Generator Safety Relief Valves or Atmospheric Dump Valve The safety significance of this instrumentation would be to assist the operator in identifying a stuck open SRV following an SGTR. As such, the safety benefit of this proposed modification would be nearly identical to that of the proposed modification involving main steam flow from SRV's or SRV status.
- 4. Steam Generator Level CONNECTICUT YANKEE IEEGRATED SAFETY ASSESSMEE PROGRAM
Tmnlamanted
- 5. RCS Teold Tmnlamanted
- 6. Subcooled Margin Monitor Tmniamanted (see ISAP #1.13)
- 7. Core Exit Temperature Tmniamanted (see ISAP #1.13)
- 8. Containment H 2 M nitor See ISAP # 1.21
- 9. Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System Tmniemented (see ISAP #1.13)
- 10. Steam Generator Pressure This proposed modification incorporates expanding the range of the steam generator (SG) pressure indicators, as well as environmentally and seismically qualifying them, and making them redundant. Currently the pressure indication range is from 50 psig to 1050 psig. The purpose of SG pressure indication in the low range is to make the operator cognizant of the need to isolate the appropriate SG. Since it will be obvious to the operator to isolate an SG long before the pressure decreases to 50 psig, having the indicator register pressures down to atmospheric pressure (as currently recommended) would provide no additional benefit to safety. The current upper set point is 1050 psig, which is above the highest SG SRV set point. Given the capacity of the SG SRV's at CY, there is no need to CONfECTICUT YANKEE ItITEGRATED SAFETY ASSESSMEffr PROGRAM
increase the upper pressure set point above the current level. Therefore, no significant safety benefit would be realized from expanding the range of the SG pressure indicators. However, if the SG pressure indicators are to be environmentally qualified, it would probably be prudent to expand their range at the same time.
Installing redundant channels for the pressure indicators would be of little benefit. The unavailability of these indicators is insignificant compared to the human error probability that would accompany their usage.
Also, their most likely cause of failure, given the conditions in the scenarios of concern, would be due to an adverse environment or seismic event, which would probaoly disable all sensors.
In evaluating the need for environmental qualification, the safety significance of the SG pressure indicators is to allow the operator to identify a faulted SG following a steam line break (SLB) upstream of its main steam nonreturn valve (NRV). To determine the expected benefit from this modification, the assumption was made that the pressure indicators have a 1.0 failure probability given exposure to an adverse environment (i.e., an SLB inside containment). The potential benefit of this modification is also limited by the fact that the operators can use auxiliary feedwater flow indication as an additional aid in identifying the faulted SG. Since the auxiliary feedwater flow transmitters are in the turbine building they would not be subjected to an adverse environment following an SLB in containment. Requantification of the affected accident sequences from the CY PSS (Reference 4) reveals a reduction in core melt frequency of 1.2E-5/yr. Incorporating the appropriate release category values from the Public Safety Impact Model results in a reduction of 0.64 Man-Rem over the remaining life of the plant.
In evaluating the need for seismic qualification, the safety significance of the SG pressure indicators is again to allow the operator to identify a faulted SG following an SLB upstream of its NRV. The identification and isolation of the faulted SG is necessary to prevent diversion of auxiliary feedwater flow away from the three intact SG's. The situation of concern involves a seismic event which causes an SLB upstream of an NRV. However,
_7-CONtJECTICUT YAtlKEE ItEEGRATED SAFETY ASSESSMEffr PROGRAM
cy:n given a saismic cytnt of sufficient magnitude to cause such an SLB, auxiliary feedwater flow indication exists, which is already seismically qualified, that could instead be used to identify the faulted steam generator (since auxiliary feedwater flow will be significantly higher to the faulted SG). Therefore, there appears to be no need to seismically qualify the steam generator pressure indicators.
- 11. RCS Makeup Flow This proposed modification involves both extending the range and environmentally qualifying the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) makeup flow transmitters. The current range of these transmitters extends from 0 to 200 gpm. The primary safety benefit from makeup flow indication occurs during bleed and feed operation and high pressure recirculation.
However, the emergency procedures for bleed and feed operation specify maximum flow, so extending the transmitter range would have no safety benefit in this case. Also, while high pressure recirculation flow following a small or medium LOCA would exceed 200 gpm, current procedures just instruct the operator to use maximum flow, making ' knowledge of the exact flow immaterial. As such, no safety benefit would be realized by extending the range of these transmitters.
The CVCS flow transmitters are located in the Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB). Therefore, the primary concern from an environmental qualifying point of view is damage to the tramsmitters from high levels of radiation in the charging line. However, sequences involving charging do not result in high fuel damage unless there is a core melt, in which case charging flow regulation would be of no relevance. Another environmental qualification concern is a moderate energy line break that could lead to significantly elevated temperatures in the PAB. However, there is very little risk significance associated with these breaks since they are of very low frequency and none are postulated in which charging flow regulation would be either possible or of concern following their occurrence. As such, there is little need to environmentally qualify these transmitters.
CONNECTICUT YANKEE IEEGRATED SAFETY ASSESSMEE PROGRAM
120 Containment Prossuro There is no need to environmentally qualify the high range containment pressure transmitters since they are located outside of the containment and would be subjected to very limited radiation exposure.
- 13. Neutron Flux The safety significance of the neutron flux monitors is to alert the operators to initiate emergency boration in the event of an anticipated transient without scram ( AWS) . However, CY's emergency cperating procedures (References 7 and 8) clearly instruct the operator to emergency borate if the Rod Bottom Lights do not come on following a reactor trip.
Since these lights, if they fail, fail safe (i.e., unlit), they alone are sufficient to alert the operator as to the need for emergency boration.
(The probability of all rod bottom lights failing by spuriously transferring to the lit position,-coincident with failure to scram and failure of the neutron flux monitors is extremely low). The additional indication of neutron flux would only be of benefit should the operator fail to take the proper action in response to the unlit Rod Bottom Lights.
In this case, however, it is reasonable to assume that if the operator fails to respond to the Rod Bottom Lights, he will also fail to respond to the neutron flux monitors. As such, the neutron flux monitors appear to have no significant impact on public safety.
- 14. Containment Isolation Valve Position The safety significance of containment isolation valve position indication is to alert the operator to take action to secure a containment penetration in the event of failure of the isolation valve (s) to close automatically.
The modification considered here involves implementation of a redundant channel of containment isolation valve position indication. For this modification to have any impact on safety requires the following segaence of events: a severe accident which would lead to a radioactive release, in most cases rupture of one of the containment penetration lines, failure of 1 or 2 containment isolation valves, failure of the first channel of valve 9
CONNECTICUT YANKEE IIITEGRATED SAFETY ASSESSMEllr PROGRAM
position indication, and the operator has to know, and be able, to take corrective action. The frequency of this sequence of events is so insignificant that no real safety benefit would be realized. In. addition, as an insight from the CY PSS (Reference 4), the only containment
~
penetrations that could contribute significantly to the release following a severe accident are the containment purge inlet and exhaust valves, which are locked closed during normal operation. Therefore, this modification would have negligible impact on public safety.
- 15. Low Pressure Safety Injection Flow Indication The NRC recomends the implementation of flow indication (0-110 %) for the Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) System. However, since indication
, currently exists for LPSI pump current and for LPS1 m. charge (i.e., core deluge) valve position, indirect flow verification already exists. Also, since the LPSI system is never used for recirculation (where flow control would be necessary), but rather for injection (where maximum flow is always used), direct flow indication would be of 'no benefit, especially since there are no operator actions that could be taken even if no, or low, flow was detected. It has therefore been determined that this modification would have negligible impact on public safety.
- 16. Containment Atmosphere Temperature This project proposes to environmentally qualify the' containment temperature indicators and to increase the upper limit of'their range from 150 F to 400 F. However, none of CY's operating procedures refer to containment temperature for decision-making. All operator decisions that are concerned with containment environment are based on containment pressure. As such, containment atmosphere temperature indication has no effect on human reliability. Therefore, this modification would have negligible impact on public safety.
- 17. Emergency Ventilation Damper Position CONNECTICUT YANKEE I E EGRATED SAFETY ASSESSMEE PROGRAM
This modification involves upgrading the quality of the emergency ventilation damper position indication. For this indication to be of benefit to public safety requires a severe accident and breach of containment (most likely a LOCA outside containment leading to core melt),
a failure of the damper to transfer to the filter position, and impairment of the operator to take proper actions. The frequency of this serics of events is very low, and it nust also be noted that once a situation exists where the control room would be exposed to high radiation, there is very little the operator could do that would benefit public safety. It has therefore been determined that this modification would have negligible impact on public safety.
- 18. Containment Fan-Cooler Heat Removal This project proposes to incorporate two modifications: environmental qualification of the instrumentation used to monitor heat removal by the Containment Fan-Cooler Heat Removal System and installation of similar equipment in the control room. The control room at CY currently includes indication of Service' Water System (SWS) flow as well as indication of which containment air recirculation fans are running. This indicatiion can be used indirectly to monitor containment fan-cooler beat removal. Also, the safety significance of monitoring containment fan-cooler heat removal is to alert the operator of the need to initiate containment spray.
However, the initiation of containment spray is, per procedure, based entirely on containment pressure. Therefore, these modifications would have negligible impact on public safety.
Results The benefit to public 37Pety for each instrumentation modification is
- summarized in Table 1. iLe cumulative benefit of all the modifications is about 1 man-rem, recognizing that the modifications concerned with SG SRV Status and SG SRV rad monitors accomplish the same purpose. The reduction in core melt frequency and public risk correspond to a score of 1.2 on a scale of
-10 to 10.
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CONNECTICUT YANKEE INTEGRATED SAFETY ASSESSMENT PROGRAM
Referene n
- 1. Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2, " Instrumentation for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident," December, 1980.
- 2. Letter from W. G. Counsil to D. M. Crutchfield/J. R. Miller of NRC, dated May 31, 1984.
3 Letter from J. A. Zwolinski, NRC to J. F. Opeka, dated July 3, 1985.
- 4. J.F. Opeka letter to C.I. Grimes, "Haddam Neck Plant Probabilistic Safety Study - Summary Report and Results," Docket No. 50-213, dated March 31, 1986.
- 5. NUREG-0916, " Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Restart of R. G. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant," U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, May 1982.
- 6. NUREG/CR-2239, " Technical Guidance for Siting Criteria Development," Sandia National Laboratories, November 1982.
- 7. Connecticut Yankee Emergency Operating Procedure No. E0P 3.1-0, Rev. O, Emergency Response Procedures.
- 8. CY Functional Restoration Guideline, FR-S.1, " Response to Nuclear Power Generation /A1WS," HP-Rev. 1, September 1, 1983.
CONNECTICUT YANKEE IEEGRATED SAFETY ASSESSMEE PROGRAM
. . 'N)
Table 1. Safety Benefit of Reg. Guide 1.97 Instrumentation Modifications Risk Reduction CMF Instrumantation Modif'ications (Man-Rem) Reduction (v1 1 Se,gg HPSI System Flow I 0.007 1.3E-7 0 SG SRV Status I 0.34 Negligible O SG SRV Rad Monitor I 0.34 Negligible O SG Level E Implemented -- --
RCS T E,S,R Implemented -- --
cold Subcooled Margin Monitor RD,E,R See ISAP #1.13 -- --
Core Exit Temperature RD See ISAP #1.13 -- --
Containment Hydrogen Monitor I See ISAP #1.23 -- --
Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System I See ISAP #1.13 -- --
SG Pressure RD,E,S,R 0.64 1.2E-5 1.2 Makeup Flow RD,E Negligible Negligible O Containment Isolation Valve Positions R Negligible Negligible O LPSI System Flow I- Negligible Negligible O Containment Atmosphere Temperature RD,E Negligible Negligible O Emergency Ventilation Damper Position E,S Negligible Negligible O Containment Fan Heat Removal I,E Negligible Negligible O Neutron Flux E,S Negligible Negligible O Containment Pressure E Negligible Negligible O Notes: 1) Modifications are as follows:
I - installation RD - range determination E - environmental qualification S - seismic qualification R - redundancy CONNECTICUT YANKEE INTEGRATED SAFETY ASSESSMEffr PROGRAM