Information Notice 1988-76, Recent Discovery of a Phenomenon Not Previously Considered in Design of Secondary Containment Pressure Control

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Recent Discovery of a Phenomenon Not Previously Considered in Design of Secondary Containment Pressure Control
ML031150101
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Crane
Issue date: 09/19/1988
From: Rossi C
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-88-076, NUDOCS 8809130350
Download: ML031150101 (8)


UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C.

20555

September 19, 1988

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 88-76: RECENT DISCOVERY OF A PHENOMENON NOT

PREVIOUSLY CONSIDERED IN THE DESIGN OF

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT PRESSURE CONTROL

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

This information notice is being provided to alert addressees to a recent

discovery of a phenomenon not previously considered in the design of the

secondary containment pressure control system, which could cause the secondary

containment pressure to rise above allowable values. It is expected that reci- pients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and

consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, sugges- tions contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

In Licensee Event Report (LER) 87-065-00, dated November 10, 1987, Niagara

Mohawk Power Corporation, licensee for Nine Mile Point, Unit 2 (NMP 2), noti- fied the NRC that the NMP 2 secondary containment had not been maintained at

the required subatmospheric pressure at higher building elevations because

of a phenomenon not considered in the design of the secondary containment

pressure control system.

At NMP 2, the instruments that measure the differential pressure (delta P)

between the interior of the secondary containment and the atmosphere sense

pressure at an elevation of approximately 265 feet (near the bottom of the

building).

The delta P at the upper portion of the building (at an elevation

of 435 feet) is obtained by taking into account the interior and exterior

static pressure gradients between the elevations. The design of the system

did not take into account the temperature-induced difference in the pressure

gradients inside and outside the secondary containment. Whenever the outside

temperature is lower than the temperature maintained in the secondary contain- ment, the vertical pressure decrease at the higher elevation outside the

secondary containment is greater than the pressure decrease inside the secon- dary containment because of the higher density of the colder air.

rem

1

350 7

s-/

IN 88-76 September 19, 1988 The calculated values for reactor building delta P as a function of outside air

temperature at an elevation of 435 feet demonstrate this effect (Table 1).

For

outside temperatures lower than reactor building temperatures, pressure differ- entials between the inside and outside of the building at upper elevations were

calculated to be less negative than the allowable value of -0.25 inch water

gauge (WG).

The installed instrumentation was insufficient to accurately

determine reactor building differential pressure at higher elevations.

Discussion:

In a postulated accident, the secondary containment structure, which is nor- mally maintained at a pressure lower than atmospheric, and supporting systems

would collect and process radioactive material that may leak from the primary

containment. Whenever an outward positive pressure exists across the secondary

containment boundary, the leakage prevention function of the secondary contain- ment is assumed to be negated and all primary containment leakage is assumed to

be released directly into the environment.

Under these circumstances, the

offsite dose limits stated in 10 CFR Part 100 for fission product releases

from postulated accidents could be exceeded.

As stated in Branch Technical Position (BTP) CSB 6-3 (NUREG-0800), a "positive"

pressure in this regard is defined as any pressure greater than -0.25 inch WG,

to conservatively account for wind loads and the uncertainty in pressure meas- urements. In addition to these factors, the problems at NMP 2 show that the

effect of delta P gradients caused by low outside air temperatures can be an

important factor in the design of the secondary containment pressure control.

Because its density is higher, cold air exerts more force per increment of

elevation than warm air.

Thus, while maintaining the -0.25 inch WG differ- ential pressure in lower portions of the secondary containment, the delta P

decreases at higher elevations and becomes ."positive" as demonstrated in

Table 1. It should also be noted that this effect increases as humidity

increases in the reactor building.

Subsequent to discovery of this phenomenon, the licensee took several cor- rective actions.

The setpoint on the delta P pressure transmitters was reset

from 0.33 inch to 0.76 inch vacuum WG.

The licensee's analysis indicated that

this would assure a delta P of at least 0.25 inch vacuum WG at upper elevations

for a temperature differential of 850F between reactor building interior and

exterior. A modification was also initiated to relocate the delta P elements

to the roof of the reactor building.

After completion of this modification

the delta P setpoint would be reset to the original value of 0.33 inch vacuum

WG. With implementation of this modification, a minimum delta P of 0.25 inch

vacuum WG would be established in the reactor building. A considerably larger

delta P in the lower elevations of the reactor building would occur on days

with low outside temperature.

IN 88-76 September 19, 1988 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC

regional office.

Charl es .:ogsi, D ~rector

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact:

Jack Kudrick, NRR

(301) 492-0871 Attachments:

1. Table 1 -

Effect of Outside Temperature on Reactor

Building Delta P

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Attachment 1

IN 88-76

September 19, 1988 TABLE 1

EFFECT OF OUTSIDE TEMPERATURE ON REACTOR BUILDING DELTA P

OUTSIDE TEMPERATURE

(OF)

REACTOR BUILDING DELTA P*

(inches water gauge [WG])

85

60

40

20

0

-20

-0.25

-0.17

-0.10

-0.03

+0.06

+0.15

  • Reactor building delta P at elevation 435 feet with -0.25 inch (water gauge)

measured at elevation 265 feet; building temperature at 850F, 0% humidity.

Attachment 2

IN 88-76

September 19, 1988 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information

Date of

Notice No.

Subject

Issuance

Issued to

88-75

88-74

88-73

88-72

88-71

88-70

88-69

Disabling of Diesel

Generator Output Circuit

Breakers by Anti-Pump

Circuitry

Potentially Inadequate

Performance of ECCS In

PWRs During Recirculation

Operation Following a LOCA

Direction-Dependent Leak

Characteristics of

Containment Purge Valves

Inadequacies in the Design

of dc Motor-Operated Valves

Possible Environmental

Effect of the Reentry

of COSMOS 1900 and

Request for Collection

of Licensee Radioactivity

Measurements Attributed

to That Event

Check Valve Inservice

Testing Program

Deficiencies

Movable Contact Finger

Binding in HFA Relays

Manufactured by General

Electric (GE)

9/16/88

9/14/88

9/8/88

9/2/88

9/1/88

8/29/88

8/19/88

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

All holders of OLs

or CPs for W and

B&W-designed nuclear

power reactors.

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors, fuel

cycle licensees, and Priority 1 material licensees.

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

88-48,

Supplement 1

Licensee Report of Defective

Refurbished Valves

8/24/88

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

88-68 Setpoint Testing of Pres- surizer Safety Valves with

Filled Loop Seals Using

Hydraulic Assist Devices

8/22/88

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit

IN 88-76 September 19, 1988 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC

regional office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact:

Jack Kudrick, NRR

(301) 492-0871 Attachments:

1. Table 1 - Effect

Building Delta

2. List of Recently

of Outside

P

Issued NRC

Temperature on Reactor

Information Notices

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR

LCEfXrr-'-"1 CHBerlinger

09Ka 88

\\9/07/88

  • C/PSB:DEST:NRR*'SAD/DEST:NRR

JCraig

AThadani

07/07/88

07/08/88

  • RPB:ARM

TechEd

07/13/88

  • D/DEST:NRR

LShao

07/11/88

  • OGCB:DOEA:NRR

BMann

07/06/88

  • PSB:DEST:NRR

JKudrick

07/07/88

IN 88-XX

September xx, 1988 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC

regional office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact:

Jack Kudrick, NRR

(301) 492-0871 Attachments:

1. Table 1 - Effect

Building Delta

2. List of Recently

of Outside

P

Issued NRC

Temperature on Reactor

Information Notices

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
  • OGCB:DOEA:NRR *PSB:DEST:NRR

BMann

JKudrick

07/06/88

07/07/88 D/DOEA:NRR

C/ B:DOEA:NRR

  • RPB:ARM

CERossi

CHBerlinger

TechEd

09/ /88

09/07/88

07/13/88

  • C/PSB:DEST:NRR*SAD/DEST:NRR
  • D/DEST:NRR

JCraig

AThadani

LShao

07/07/88

07/08/88

07/11/88

IN 88-XX

July xx, 1988 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC

regional office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact:

,

Attachments:

1. Table 1 - Effect

Building Delta

2. List of Recently

Jack

(301)

Kudrick, NRR

492-0871 of Temperature on Reactor

P

Issued NRC Information Notices

OGCB:DQEA:NRR

BMann 75 i44

07/6 /88 D/DOEA:NRR

CERossi

PS b

NRR

/

NRR

JKudn k

JTN

07/1

8

8

/88 C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR

CHBerlinger

07/ /88 SAD/DEST:N

ATh34ani I'

07/K /88 RPB:ARM

TechEd

07//3/8,N

D/DES~kNK

07t/88