ML20203G580

Responds to Appeal Re Denial of Info Re FOIA Request for Documents Re Plant.Forwards Documents Listed on App

ML20203G580
Person / Time
Site:	07001193
Issue date:	07/24/1986
From:	Stello V NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:	Mary Johnson AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
References
FOIA-85-647, FOIA-86-A-70 NUDOCS 8608010318
Download: ML20203G580 (2)

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&s* ' prio ~ k UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION SVASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

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R 2 41986 Ms. Melody Johnson IN RESPONSE REFER RD 3, Box 126-R TO F01A-86-A-70 Dover, DE 19901 (F0IA 85-647)

Dear Ms. Johnson:

This is in response to your letter dated May 3,1986, in which you appealed Mr. Donnie H. Grimsley's letter dated April 11, 1986, which denied in part your Freedom of Information Act request for documents relating to the Kerr-McGee Cimmaron facility located in Crescent, Oklahoma.

Acting on your appeal, I have carefully reviewed th'e record in this' case and have determined that the previously withheld information will now be released.

Therefore, your appeal is granted.

The documents listed on the enclosed appendix are enclosed.

Sincerely,

/.

g Victor Stello', Jr.

Executive Directpr for Operations

Enclosures:

As stated 8608010318 G60724 J NS 4 6-A-70 PDR 1 )

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1 APPENDIX

1. 11/22/74 Memo to Thornburg from Hind Re: "Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp.-

Possibility of Diversion of Trigger Quantity of Plutonium (Docket 70-1193)" (5 pages)

2. 12/9/74 Memo to Davis from Keppler Re:

" Diversion Risk Analysis-Major Fuel Processing Facilities Docket No. 70-1193" (28 pages) e e

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1. o UNITED STATES

! 1 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

y WASHING TON, D. C. 20555

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Ms. Melody Carole Johnson RD 3, Box 126-R IN RESPONSE REFER Dover, DE 19901 TO F01A-85-647

Dear Ms. Johnson:

This is in response to your letter to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) dated August 22, 1984, in which you requested, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), copies of documents relating to a possible plutonium smuggling ring being operated within the Kerr-McGee Cimmaron facility located in Crescent, Oklahoma.

The FBI has asked that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (NRC) respond-directly -

to you regarding the eight NRC originated documents found in FBI files. ^ These eight documents are listed on the enclosed appendix. We are placing all of these records excluding number five, either in their entirety or in part in the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) in file folder F01A-85-647 in your name.

The record listed at number five has previously been placed in the PDR in response to F01A-79-272. Portions of documents one and two of the enclosed appendix contain information which identifies procedures for safeguarding licensed special nuclear material at a licensed facility or plant. This infonnation is considered commercial or financial (proprietary) information pursuant to 10 CFR 2.790(d) and is being withheld from public disclosure F.: pursuant to Exemption (4) of the F0IA (5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4)) and 10 CFR 9.5(a)(4) of the Commission's regulations.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 9.9 of the Commission's regulations, it has been determined that the information withheld is exempt from production or disclosure, and that its production or disclosure is contrary to the public interest. The persons responsible for this denial are the undersigned and Mr. John G. Davis, Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

This denial may be appealed to the NRC Executive Director for Operations within 30 days from the receipt of this letter. As provided in 10 CFR 9.11, any such appeal m"st be in writing, addressed to the Executive Director for Operations, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and should clearly state on the envelope and in the letter that it is an " Appeal from an' Initial F0IA Decision."

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Ms. Johnson During a recent telephone conversation with Nina Toms, you expressed your interest in reviewing any and all records pertinent to the Karen Silkwood incident. Ms. Toms explained that the NRC has made a voluminous amount of records relating to Karen Silkwood available for public inspection and copying at the PDR which is located at 1717 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20555. I am enclosing copies of responses to two earlier F0IA requests relating to Karen Silkwood listing the records which were released under these F0IA requests.

In addition, Ms. Toms has been informed that you are being given a computer printout by the PDR listing records publicly available at the PDR relating to Karen Silkwood. I am, therefore, enclosing a copy of a notice outlining procedures and charges for obtaining copies of records.

Sincerely, lc

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Donnie H. Grimsiby, Director.

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Division of Rules and Records Office of Administration

Enclosures:

As stated r:

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F01A-85-647 APPENDIX

1. 11/22/74 Memo to Ihornburg from Hind, subject: "Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp. - Possibility of Diversion of Trigger Quantity of Plutonium" (Docket No. 70-1193).

(5 pages) - NR 6-6-75

2. 12/09/74 Memo to Davis from Keppler, subject: " Diversion Risk Analysis - Major Fuel Processing Facilities Docket No. 70-1193 (28 pages) NR 6-6-75

3. 12/30/74 Memo to R.0: III Files from Peck, s'ubject: " Unusual' Incident Involving Uranium Pellets - Kerr-McGee Uranium Plant (4 pages) - 117-2629-48

4. 01/22/75 Region III Investigation Report, dtd. Dec. 19 & 20, 1974 (6 pages) 117-2696-6 and 117-2696-8

5. 02/20/75 Letter to Kelley from Gossick re: Kerr-McGee (2 pages)

NR 2-20-75 and NR 6-6-75 pt 6. 03/04/75 Sketch of KMC Cimmaron facility by SA L.J. Olson (1 page) 117-2696-20

7. 03/20/75 Memo to Hind from Ridgway, subject: K-M Inspections OSHA and NRC and OCAW (3 pages) NR 6-6-75

8. 06/06/75 Letter to Duffin from Thornburg, re: Kerr-McGee (2 pages) 117-2696-48 and NR 6-6-75 i

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.. {./FfEEDOW OF ., INFotAAATiou ACT/Do

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• V (q Melody Johnson 2 RD 3 Box 126-R g Dover,, DE. 19901

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August 22, 1984 A ~as- M 7 fes) f*

• Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D.C. 20535 Ninth Street and Pennsylvania Av To Whom It May Concern:

Pursuant 5 U.S.C. 552 to the Freedom of Information Act i of any inform,ation concerning the possibiliI y hereby re plutonium smuggling ring which operated with ty of a Cimarron Facility, owned by the Ker and housed in Crescent in the [f 1

in 1970 and closed inOklahoma.January ofThe 1975 facility openedr-McGee Corpo ask that you would include all appendices .

I also would .

other materials attached to the document annexes,(,) or must beIf you determine that some portions deleted, s.

remainder.

any I hereby such decisions. reserve myglegal ri htI request to appeal e that yo days, If you do not grant wish to discuss the matter, I. can above address. If youbeI should will consider m reached at the  ;

Your prompt considerationppreciated. would be aI am thanking 1

ssistance.

Sincerely,

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Melody Carole J anson g l U I'US 241984 MCJ:ks

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799 nOOSEVELT ROAD mm GLEN ELLYN. ILLINOIS 6o137

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HarldD.,7hhburg, Chief,FieldSupportandEnforcementBranch Dirch g te of Rc atory Operations, Headquarters ,

, KERR-MCGEE NUCLEAR CORPORATION - POSSIBILITY OF DIVERSION OF TRIGGER i4 QUANTITY OF PLUTONIUM (DOCKET NO. 70-1193) ,

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1 In response to George Smith's request of November 21, 1974, the following

,.f7 discussion concerning the rationale why RO:III concludes that no diversion of a trigger quantity of plutonium has occurred at the subject licensee's ,

.m plutonium facility is presented. .

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4 Safeguards regulations desigacd to strengthen existing requirements for M- the physical protection and material control of special nuclear material (en, , in plants and in transport rand protection of the plants were issued for *

,,; ,3 public comment in early 1973. These regulations which evolved from i, J extensive studies by the AEC staff, licensees, and other technical experts, ,

were published as eftective rules in Inte 1973 af ter considering the coments '

free i..dustry ...a U.= vublic. Kesulai.ivaii. iii 10 CFR 70 assid 73 required r;crr- l*

McGee to submit plans to Licensing stating how they were to comply with the physical protection (fixed site and intransit) and material control

< , regulations. After careful review and study by Licensing which included

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field. trips to the Kerr-McGee site, approved physical protection and material control plans and specific license conditions were finalized.

fJ The next step was to implement an inspection and enforcement program to assure

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that applicable requirements are met. The licc~nsce's degree of compliance

, , ; .4 with the material control requirements was determined by the chemists, auditors, Cl and statistician of the M&PP staff while physical security specialist of*the k.d M&PP staff were responsible for review of the licensee's impicmentation of

g. fixed site and intransit security requirements.

1 Mq b The Kerr-McGee security program include gpecial nuclear material detectors I located at th yersonnel exit next to t guard post, loading dock, and the sample window.

. Tests of thes detcetors uring inspections indicated no i malfunctions. The security p n also re ires an inspection of all[ packages]

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exiting the access area. This physical search is for. concealed SNM. Entrance

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. _ __f 2-November 22, 1974 Harold D. Thornburg, Chief .

of a 'vchicle into the protected area is restricted to business vehicles and

- '* is generally limited to those delivering or receiving SNM matcrials and No b trash. Each vehicle is examined for clearance prior to deporthre. Pertinent locks and .

7 personal vehicles are permitted in the protected area. The perimeter fen c keys are issued and controlled by Facility,S.ccurity. ' microwave intrusion sensors.j around the protected area is equipped with ~

The e gencyexitsoftheprocessingbui1Nngareprotectedbkntrusion Certain areas' within the processing building are protectdd by b

alarms. I These devices and procedures plus o'thers hen unoccupied.

r/M motio cetcetor n the security lan deter the version of' plutonium from the Kerr-McGee

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Kerr-McGee has not reported any breaches of the protective h

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measures which would indicate a diversion or attempted diversion.

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Physical security inspections were conducted in January 1972, January 1973,

%. W' ,! March 1974, May 1974, and September 1974. In general, Kerr-McGec's security

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program has been effcetivg, however, violations have been identified. The Hay'1974 inspection was our initial inspection of Kerr-McGee's Several violations implementation were identified, but .

F, ji - of the new physical security plan.

f~  ; theifollowup inspection in September 1974 Indicated that Kerr-McGee was

" tosponsive in correcting the violations. Only two items which did not re;rac:.nt ccca:;ity dcficicncies associated wiLL diveu,1uu were identified.

The material control systems assist'us in assuring that the physical q~ ; protection system used for safeguards has been successful in preventing diversion. The new material control requirements deal mainly with the y '-

j quality of measurements and evaluation of material unaccounted for (MUF)

.a quantitics. Recent inspections indicate that proper measurements of production t.. 4* material are being made by Kerr-McGee; however, additional effort on the part of Kerr-McGec is still needed to further refine their laboratory and ucighing C. ( standards programs in order to make their present measurement limits of error i4.' 4 '

programs and resulting calculations more accurate and precise by determining

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k.- the contribution of specific random and systematic errors. The most rccent

@$ Kerr-McGee limits The of crror calculations did g.19 of not "not include theseMUFmorewhen definit Kerr-McGee decisions a significant

.1 Jmcasurement crrors.

" l compared to the LDCF" would not have significantly changed to a "significant .

HUF.when compared to the LDUF" if the data had been included.

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}0-CFR-2.-7E0 INFORMATICN

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j Harold D. Thornb, , Chief -

November 22,_1974 Within the last nine months, Kerr-McGee has experienced two significant MUF  ;

quantitics. As a result of these larger than expected imbala.nce nurbers, l Kerr-McGec responded by curtailing production operations and immediately v started 'a new inventory. In both instances, an RO:III inspector observed the preparations for taking the inventory, the actual listing of the inventory, and finalization of the material balance numbers'. Both

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". reinventories resulted in MUF gains which would indicate that the first

' MUF imbalance was not due to a diversion of a significant quantity of plutonium. Further evaluation of the reinventory results showed that the

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MUF cains were mainly due to better measurccents of certain materials on M

WP 1 inventory and a more thorough cleanup of eqpipment. Our inspectors were satisfied with Kerr-McGec's reinventory ef forts in both instances. Another gauge of the adequacy of Kerr-McGee material control system is the gh cu=ulative MUF figure. For the FFTF contrac't period starting in mid 1973,

% the cumulative MUF is 1.9 kgs. Pu loss. This is not indicative of a real

.diversien. The constant material holdup quantity entered in the Kerr-McGee f(.j 1 records in June 1973 is still in the records. 'By license condition effective

.I in May 1974, the SNM contcat of essentially all material on inventory was to be based on measurementr. Since July 1974 Kerr-McGee has started a nondestructive (ND) measurement program which entails the use of ND techniques to measure this. holdup quantity contained in piping ~and equipment in the

,$.h ( production and recovery areas. This endeavor is unique to a plutonium

" prodvetion plant. Kerr-McGee hn:: been remism in not in=H totin; thiv getcu in a more timely manner. Prcliminary UD calculations indicate a significant portion of the holdup quantity on a measured basis. Also the small cummulative MUF number at this time can be considered.an indicator of the h accuracy of the estimated holdup quantity determined in mid 1973. With all considered, RO:III does not feel this holdup quantity problem has resulted in 2 -J.

an undected diversion of a t,ignificant quantity of material.

1 Our inspectiono have also indicated that no significant shipper-receiver differencer, has occurred.

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In considering material diversions, the suitabifity and availability of trigger

! quantitics of Kerr-McGee plutonium for bomb threat and radiological incidents W is mainly dependent upon material type, quantity of plutonium in specific items, g and material control procedures and physical protection requirements specific to that material type and quantity. RO:III is presently developing n " diversion Q path analysis" for the Kerr-McGee plutonium facility. This will assist us in h

'g establishing a definite response plan when a diversion of trigger quantitics of plutonium is suspected.

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November 22','1974 IIarold D. Thornbuis, Chief Using the abov6 rationale (Licencing process in establishing. physical protection and material control plans and their review and approval of

• such plans, and the RO routine and special inspection renults) there is no indication that a trigger quantity of plutonium has been divesLed trom t the Kerr-McGee plutonium facility.

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While it is also our opinion that the Kerr-McGee security and material control

plans for the protection of nucicar materials is adequate in light of current

. ~c1 assessment of credible threats, we recognize that no system of safety or '

U.j security can prevent all possible incidents or diversion schemes. '

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. . . . , DEC 9 1974

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• 4..: John C. Pavin, Deputy Director for Field Operations

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Directorate of Regulatory Operationo, Readquarters - . .

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DIVERSI0H RISK ANALYSIS - HAJOR PUEL PROCESSD;G FACILTIES f; f,j - . .

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p. . Ao requested in your m.o of Noveraber 10, 1974, sama subject, enclosed

.iu our prototyps divi .cion rich nnlysis for the Kcrr-McGee riutoniua

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Facility. Our evcluation contains reintivo factors (concealability,

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availability, etc.) which havo been estir.sted for thio ctudy.

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The fluni forn.st of the Reoponca P22ms vill r.ost likely require

- .licennocs to take .ccrtain actions presently not required by rer;ulation.

-- ~. If these actiens are that important, strong connideration should bc Civen to scending'apptcpriato licences or additional regulations. ,

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DIVERSION RISK ANALYSIS AND RESPONSE PLAM- * '

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.Kerr-McGee Npelear Corpora' tion i6 ; . .,

7 Kerr-McGee Center ,

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M. v -,,j Kerr-HeGee Nuc1' ear Corporation -

Cimarron Facility

..%[ Plutonium Fuel Plant ki- .

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Docket No. 70-1193 .

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License No. SNM-1174

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i Location of Facility. Physical Layout of Plant and Access Controls The Ketr-McGec Plutonium Plant is situated in a ruril area of her,an County, Oklahoma about four niles south of Crcccent, ten miles west of Guthrie and twenty-eight miles north of Oklahont. City. The. site 7"

v is one-half mile north of State Highway 33 and is-hordered on the M '

west by , State Highway 74.

The Plutonium Plant shares the same land tract as the Uranium PJant and the entire site is commonly identified as the Cimstron Facility.

J' (Sce Exhibit No.1) Encompassing the company-owned land is a peri-

' meter fence which deters the entry on company property by unauthorized h.

.cp persons. (See Exhibit No. 2) Employees e er the site proper through cic gate either controlled b card key or by surveillance fh. . '

. N i an outer vg of a guard. Employees park their vehicles nearby the plant in which

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they work. Visitors are not permitted to park within the outer fence .

,- line. They are allowed entry on foot af ter communicating via intercom

' with the guard at Post #2 in the Uranium Plant. Identification and e

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( ihitial registration is accomplished at Post #2.

n. m "i,i~ . A separate security fence surrounds the Plutonium Plant. This barrier y *

form the perimeter of the prutected aren and this barrier is protected'

. Y by microweveintrusionalarmsystem]. (See Exhibit'No. 3) The fence

. has emergency exit gates and a vehicuTd'r cate, all of which are locked and not operabic from outside the fence line. The presence of private vehicles within the protected area fence is prohibited.

m The pain entrance for the Pu Plant is or the south wall behind the W .;  !

security fence. The fenc4 entry gate is actuated electrically by the duty guard (Poct # 1 pithin the lob y (See Exhibit No. 4)

Pr or to entrance to the pbby, the employ a and visitors pass through a metal detecto h ,1f th W eetro Ejscare is negative, the guard f,T7 )/ Once in the f@ , i'i . .- [activatesan lectric striker loc. ntheentrydoor]icallyinspected 4- - lobby, lunch oxos, brief cases an packages are phys by the guard. Employees leave their lench boxes in the lunch room.

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' Vioitors are identified, the visiten is contacted and escort is pro-4,y,e vided. ,

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Within an enclosed corridor leading from the guard post to the office

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section ordin c losivesd?tector,]SNMportalmoattorandanothe j 'l Pb metal detcetor) ' aves the building through this corridor.cetronih Physical

" .ac he enters or c hi inspection of lunch boxes and handcarried articles is accomplished .by M a guard on egreco from the building through guard post #1.

The general office area for the Pu Plant is in the southwest ccction of the building. The c.aterial access arco (HAA) perimeter is interrupt Y

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g by two' doors leading to the' men's and mun's lock ypher lock rooms,respec-).

hose combination tively. These doors are equipped wit

\( is limited to ecployees who are t.uthorized access o ,within the }!AA.

The plant internals are separated as material balance areas (!!EA) and accountability records are maintained for cach }!BA. (See Exhibit No. 5)

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"'". ,' on the perimeter of the Pu Plant there are six emergency exits and

.:d j one material and n door, all of iich are locked from the inside On the west wall of the plant and equipped wit intrusion alarm j

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there is a door ing to an ai ek which is adjacent to thn shipping g

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.N , (dock ShW portal and monitwaste j,pppauw stygge thi1Mrtal..tr.cnito31s trailers. Jimmediately en posit;.oned irup.e air lock tobiew the portal remote, a$1' sed out o circuit TV camer as 4,.

yj monitor as well a th ntrusion-alarmedjfcor leading to the dock. The ,

P. ay guard at Post #1 has late visual surveillance capability trythe, event of an alarm of the; N}i monitor or alaru from the exit doorl

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I '. ,-l" 1eads to the dock. -

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's There is one other opening in the Pu Plant. on the[ east wall) f U

- sists of a pass-through air lock to permit the introduction o Plant samples into.the Pu Buildirig for spectrographic analy, sis. This

p, , ,e pass-through sample window is within the protecced area fence access y.I throughwhichiscontrolledby[electricstrikerlockactiviatedbythe

. guard at Post 01. ' License condition 9.3.2 (b) permits. the use of this pass-through win ow. The opening has been modified byia seriesInof baffle plates which preclude the transfer of materini to the outside.

m i addition,[anSN!!det ctor is' used "to assure that S!M is.not diverted O ..', ,

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[y.ry . ,

~ .

fi p ,

.. i-  ;. ,

,a .

,i [ ,,

y i

4,; ] .

g .

k; .

+ , '

M e n -.- --

2

'i"",,,,1,... . _ _ _ _ ^ *PH4A1

< e .- e e.

O *:h 30N.hU((h

.. + ~,

. ~

I HATERI AL POS'L. 3ED j - -

s ,

• 3 Licensed

• Possession j' .

Limit Usual Usual Licenced Inventory. , Forms ,

7'*- 1 Materini -

,and Form _ ,

360 kgs 300 kgs- Plutonium Nitra-Plutonium (PN)~200 g/l (239 principal- as oxide .

or other maximum. Pluto isotope) and Uranyl nitr compounds 5

(MN). Plutoniu if.]1 9 .. ,,'. *

-

• uraniua diu ns,u

'.. - '";Pu-U dioxide (H d ': -

NO pellets g...) '

g

' 'r , , ,

. H0 pins 71, .

. .A . .

vv .

2 as - scaled source Plutonium-238 2 ss j*

1 *

. sealed source Enriched Uranium [, 1050g,kU-235 0.0>20We.%

Od .

w ,w&&T'00 ym . -~ . -

, ,, e61 mg.-.. ;

~

Uranium-233

• 5 'as .-

Plutonium-242 c 1

- Urahyl nitrate

..1- Uranium, natural 3200 kas . .

Hixed nitrate if d .

H0 powders a .

'/'* H0 pellets I 'j .'. ,

H0 pins

1. ;, . 2 ' .

4M- o

%,:q .

• i VU

• s

• l 't (f,

'"}

.o

(

5

' . . 41 y f

>? . ,

J .

.d W

.O f

' r g g yg j k l I I u It I C #4 ,

- . - _ . ._, - - - . _ _ - , . . - ~ _ . - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ , - - - - . - _ _ . _ - _ . . . - - - - - - . - . , _ _ . - - - . __

n

. w , '~~

F7n 1-, , ,,

77,, ;- _o m7 l

( .

l

-. J -

l Security Plan _

.~

Salient Features to prevent diversion:

" 'I.I Outer perimeter fence to protect owner-controlle

' 2. .

I entry to the general site. Identification and registration of no j

3.

• (Uranium Plant Guard Office) prior to permitting further move-ment toward the Pu Plant

4.

• Security fence .Aor%bnd'iO. PIant a rotected area whose gates 3h, are locked or manned whenever open.

5. Isolation zone monitoring cyste> (micro-e vc alarm) protecting

}" -

6. .

perimeter of Pu Plant protected ~ area.E1cetric striker

@h B. .

Plant to control personnel access to protected ar M.tf A

. 7.

Physical 7

O.2 foot candle illumination Icvels.

.-r 7,1 C.

Access controlled by Guard at entry lobby of Pu Plant.

p ,

inspection'of handcarried articles prior to permitting further .

S. - ,

• movement into the building proper.

i. Electronic searches of individuals as they proceed'into building M]  :

p' 9' .

propes- (Explosives detector, ShH detector, lietal detector).

= 10. Cypher locks on entry portals of the material access area.

Y' Escort of visitors while within the area. ,

Intrusion alarms on all emergene.y exits of the materini access

• - 0 *

11. .

area.

C.d ' *

• hq - 12.

• Dual alarm annunciation stations for intrusion alarn -

, : f, gg ( ge 13.

visual and audible signals. Closed circuit television provid 2,j :]  ; j at west exit door in event of $1Q1 monitor alarm or i y- activation.

ycp 14. SN!! portal monitor at west exit door. Baffle plates

• 15. Smt detector on pass-through window air-lock.

within the pass-through window Jo preclude movement of ca

' ,c ,i to the outside.

j ,,  ;

16.

Personnel searches by electronic metal detector and Smt dete on 1 caving the material access area.

17. Phycical inspections of all materials leaving the material ac area for the office, shipment or burial are conducted No packageby is lleal Physics personnel for contamination cicarance.

permitted to exit the area without investigation of the conte Tool boxes required for maintenance are given piece by piece

,l. 3 *

.mds 18.

examination by both licalth Physics and the material storage vault,*

fabrication roon. and inspection and assembly room. *

19. Emergency power provided for alarm sycten. .

e me m,

. <*^Ef_7_.1.~

- . .- ..-..m.,

M ~IEid -

1.~ "'ON ,

. ~ _ . .

\

r 20. Twc, amed guards and 'an armed supc. .isor arc assigned.to tts 4

site on each shift.

21. Redundant e. cans of communication exist between guards and between the site and local law enforeccent agency.

s  % .

22. Procedures developed for responding to alarms,of intrusion

.I M - devices or elcetronic searching devices.

~

t t

i 23. Tests of intrusion alam system within specified time limit.

Tects of Sh*H dete:.cors, explosives end metal d.etectors are con-0' h* ducted daily. Physical barriers of protected area inspected

, 4 . daily.

q, .

j

24. Lists of personnel authorized entry into the material' access

. l, F. ,

- and vital areas is maintained by sucrds and supervisors. ' List is dated and revised each time a chznge occurs.

E- .

Identification badges issued.co authorized personnel, color

% . 25.

• coded to distinguish degree of accessi k.. ".

k. - . .

?.  !

• 1: 'd .

• t * '

.P .

1 -

r * ,,

• e l g. a j , .

w a

n..

W. ..

,w . .

. a g

• t .. .} * *. .

6a s. II .

=

/ -

t' .

Di ..

/

g p.g;-

, 1 MY1 pf . e 9}

,;n . . .

t 8

y .

t

^ '

hg u. f vg 6- .

i l

.= *

.. s  ;

-{ .

Assessment of Risk f features -

Security Plan - Description and analysis of effectiveness ,-- u Weaknesses identified. ii of The licensee security plan has been strengthened by impos t o sy a '

License Conditions by Licensing. d by RO:III. An in- .

physical protection inspections were conductedisclosed viointions r

.I. , ' spection of May 6-9, 1974,

'. , from the transition to Part 73 regulations and failure bto meet 11, b .'a .

licensing - prescribed dates for equipment installation and c

{j The nost recent follow-up inspection conducted on Septem rc 4 1974, disclosed that

,ation.

Tuoconsiderable progress violations, relating to Licensehad Con-been m 4, ingcorrective)ctions. According to the I'.' :J ditions, were disclosed during this inspection.lice

($'. *; F ,

The security plan and license conditions provide ifor i

an increas l acces,s

• 'b'

.J . .

degre area.

of protection as one approaches or enters th fence, the U-Plant e *

• g -

the Pu Plant walls, i.e. , tlw outer perimeterguard U,.r; .. .

monitoring cystc Q ,

'In addition, the ph sical barriers presented h bydoors erimeter t)he This, cons the Pu Plant and th i intrusion alarm systera on t eptable en det

. of the buildin@prov de ac ree armed security force personne1 3 dig 7ee of along with the presence ofthe site at all times prov des in Ia .

• f -

protection against undetected intrusion.

. {

ching H

O

• within the Pu Plant and strategically place itsearchesconductedbytheguard)

FW .e entry and t the dock area exit and the pass-devices]suppicment The availability of 101 detector ed 4.o deter diversion of SRI at through air-lock win ou are inte

{[W " )4 those point 2.

M . / d in that weakness in the searching for concealed SNH is prese d .d

~M \' 9 4

i N- "the electronic equipment has its limitations. Guide 5.7, there of Pu powder are calibrated to assure conformance to Regulatory f ii g ble if carried

. s 1,

v

; {1s the probability that less than .5 gram quant D ' -

out in clothing or in or on a person's body. M usabic Mp C consuming feat to carry out a sufficient cuantity of S g .ao an explosivet i

T .

records maintained in the Hatcrial Balance Areas It in u'ould d fI4 [ able shortages because of the frequency of inventories out i

ointed out, however, that an employee could obtain and carry

{'3 (d small sample quantitico that are highly contamina ,

wc-7 , .

e s

&n.Y,hTION

{ -}- -

~ , _ _

. threat could resultd/ ht d

Recently, RO:III was advised by the itors]using cmallLicensee samples of Securit tests were r.ade of thc[SKA portal monThese sampics consisted of .1 gr, i[ Pu powder cor.tained in plastic.The unchicided sampics were[ carr

( 2 gr and .3 3r. inside]

cking belt, onside.

The results

s. ) portal monitors in pants and shirt pockcts,of sho h '

N/ of the tests weres,

]l ( . Alarm Trcquenev

. j Quantity '

q '

' .1' gr .

'}

25%

%.., 3 ) . . ,

• f 75%

2 gr fij G ~

( ,

) .3 Er Verification of there reported test results has no .

95%

t been mad by -

T ) RO:III through inder endent testing. ir-lockarea)

?

}-Q[d n);

,.s . cE -

• Another potential weakness is presented in the vest aWaste

[ '

j the air-lock and thence '

1. l

6 w which leads to the dock.through i the ShHhisportalportal.monitor, The

)

CE.5 through the material-man door] lead ngis not use l sed circuit ecle- <

movement of waste through ShH theonShH monitoran his person, taking I~~

vision rovementto determine of waste the could[alarm cause.

conceivably ask an alarm caused by conceal

[,; * *

* ( advantage of the alarm caused by the vaste to min The westthe west dy *

, v possiblediversion]fwhichisusedforstorageofwasto.ealarm]andasecurity

~

(lg fence pro-

'c e , (N

• immobile vans, one oside of the yard is protecte g.g 3 fence. ntrolled area.

The N.6 / tecting the owner-controlled land. d area fence and both

%) - a

• , meters there is no " buffer" fence for'the ow l 7I', *,

sections are protected by[ active intrusion arecover t arminer of ShH ove it from out-

.lf thatanindividua1{couldthrowacmallcona north or cast fence sections and return later fuci to side of the fence. '

h final product,

'/ Also, with respect to the vest air-lock d area, t ewhich door mescu pino, are in scaled shipping boxes in bir -cagesOn mo C nine icct long.

, into the air-lock toward the material-man doorf the d through

~

ShH porta it] Per.:ennel j

l the " shine" of the $1H creates an alarm doantage of the

( even though the material is not directly mov

• e N &%t M 4.i50 -s-iidUsYe'ohMN

,f

30ffR17C0f tim' ':yF Y-spuriousalarmandattemptdiversion]fromtheplanttotheouter dockoryardareawhicharewithintheprotectedarea{ alarm-pro-tected perimeter fence.] If an opportunity presented itself,[ material fence sect 4ons for nossibic could be thrown over the north or cast .

pick up from outside these fence lines.

ith further respect to vaste or product removul through the west

• ir a lock, it is established procedure that all materini (:xiting the Uhile -

I plant be checked for contamination by llealth Physics p'crsonnel.

thisproceduremaytendtodeterdiversionoi[itemshiddeninvaste drums or shipping containers) there are no provisions for personal searching of the indivdiualfinvolved in material movement, other

.>j . '

than those who may have to exit through the'SNM monitor t'o reach the

'T h'

• work area. , Normally, several individuals are involved in each move-ment of, final product so personnel mobility may be limited by parsonal M[l ,

surveillanceofeachother.[Ifdiversionofmaterialthrownover On f3

. ,T "

the fence is made, collusion between employees would be required.

., j. 3 - .

pecasion, however, only one single individual usy be involved in waste C pemoval and his movemer.ts outside the plant build ng within the pro-tected area fence would not normally be observed. J vv 1] '

i L .

• 7 . .

/

..a :

.j .

,.'b ..

, f, , . . .,>$ . . ,.,

/

.g- ** i .

! d *

.' ./

%: n l

.\l fMT r

?' '

} 3

,p -

~.- .- - -

~.,

I 10 crn d.ic5 isr6R.VATldN-

/ l l .

- ( .~M4J J'f

[3 .' N. h 3 y..

ASST.SEEST OF RISK (See Exhibit No. 6)

Suitability and availability of materials. .

s.

He terdr1 Forms _ Available A list of material forms available at the X-M Plutonium Plant are listed below with the normal location within plant material balance A

' ..'a yi areas.

fg - The license permits plutonium oxides Theand otheralso license compounds and there-pert its 1050 grams pf j , ,

fore excludes plutonium as metal.of enriched uranium and this lim samples received from the Uraniur. Plan't nearby and other analytical -

dl / ,'

programs .

The Uranium Plant license permits only 350 gr of uranium h3 of enrichment Breater than 20Wt.% and atthe Therefore, present evaluation thereofisU-235' essentially E' h ,

nonc of this material on hand.

PO?j threat has been excluded in this study.

.o

. . After

• K-M receives plutonium nitrate in L-10 shipping containers.

...... reccipt these containers are stored in the vault' until they are needed for production. Average shipment is 40 Kgs Pu in about 23 containers of about 1700 g Pu each. Along with each shipment is a *3L container with 3g sampics of each Pu nitrate lot. '

The moved L-10 and containers weighed in CB are3A,moved.to a sacple taken Room and128 and transferred contents the 10 litertob CB 3H.

The bottle is rinsed and dried to obtain a tare weight and net

'~""? . weight to determinc any shipper-receiver difference.

f' .

> V. o

! * ' The Pu nitrate is then blended and cross blended with natural uranyl nitrate to give a 3 to 1 U/Pu ratio and crossblended to give a uni-The blend is stored in wall storage tanks encased in *

..- form mixture. .

the caut wall of the vault.

Qp * .-

...J Mixed nitrate is then coprecipitatedThe continuously filtrate is caught in CB SA, in a Room'128,.

ku and filtered in an open pan filter.

receiver CD Sb.

tank, pumped through a second filter 0.01 to roc Qg- 55-gallon drums. The liquid waste prior to cementing average l

grams per liter Pu.

'l The coprecipitated cake is transferred by hand from the pan filter to calciner boats, moved through a tunnel to CB 6A where it is intro-duced into the inert pas calcincr. Calcined mixed oxide is removed M) ' '

from the calciner in CB 6B and allowed to cool. Two.The sampics HO is the

, milled and blended in adjacent CB 5 in 10 F.g batthes. Blended MO p are taken from each batch.

'or 3 liter cons, placed in the portabic glovebox (GB) and the CB roved to Room 124 for polleting or in the vcult for temporary .

I gggf g

' 2 10 -

, _ _ _ ..~.,-.99 -

l 7..v e -- -

( s ,w. % s. . . - . .

storage. These op'E?ations are all carried wat in a.n enert atmos- .

phere.

In Room 124 the 2 or 3 liter cans moved from the portable GB into the' room GB. The MO powder is slugged into pellets, granulated

=r q to 20 mesh and collected in 2 liter cans and calcined again to adjust R 19, the 0/M ration. ,

.,c. ;

The reduced MO powder is then pressed into pellets, sintered, ground

] to size, and inspected. The certified pellets are placed in one-half q liter cons, moved through a tunnel into CB 18 located in Room 123 b_r. and stored there in vertical tubes located in the concrete base of

, - .- 'the GB. The average pellet veight 1s.1.2 g and contains 0.3 g Pu..

- .Each can of pellets contains about 1400 g Pu. Rejected pc11ets are

[f,,

K put into 1 liter cans and transferred to the vault or Room 127 for recovery. The cans average 2800 g Pu.

b.y ,a M;; Certified pellets are loaded into the cladding (110 in each pin) .

' and the cladding tubes welded closed. Each completed pin contains' about 42 g Pu. The 7 foot long pins are' moved through x-ray into

' - '- Room 121 where they g e cleaned, inspected and stored in vertical -

%) -

pipes buried in the concrete floor of the room. ,

M; i Ci One-hundred-twenty certified pins are placed in each Model 60 shipping container, 5040 g Pu, for shipment to the customer. The loaded Model

• 60 container weighs about 800, pounds. .

~

t22 Along with the numerous samples taken, many different types of wastes 5 .s are also generated during the processing. These will mainly contain (Wi', ' ;, various quantities and purities of the 3/1 uranium-plutonium mix..

Some HO wastes can be. recovered and recycled directly to the recycle feed tank. Most must be processed to purify them. Combustable vastes y* are burned and the ash collected in 220 gram batches and stored in 31

>> d

• 1-2 liter cans in the vault or dissolva.d along with other impure H0

'W wastes. The dissolved wastes are stored in vall storage tanks until sufficient inventory has been collected to economically operate the 7 1 anivent extration' system (SX). The dissolved waste is fed to the SX hc -

battery with pure mixed nitrate solution collected in vall storage d'

tanks. The waste solutions are processed through an ion exchanged

- system to remove almost all the plutonium and cent to the waste solid-

]T.g ification process. The dilute plutonium vastes, 0.01 g/l Pu, is mixed 9.% with cement in lined SS-gallon drums and these are stored in the locked The vaste trailer located at the west side of the Plutonium Facility.

drums weigh about 800 pounds and generally contain Icss than 2 g Fu. '-

M Other slightly contaminated dry wastes i.e. wipes, gloves, swabs, empty containers, etc., are also co11ceted in SS-gallon drums and

' .placed in the trailer for acorage until a shipment to burini is scheduled. These waste drums usually contain an average of 2 g Pu.

Occaccionally spent resin from the ion exchange must be disposed of and cemented drums of this material may contain up to 30 g Fu but weigh 800-1100 pounds.

in S 1-- ^ ^ l , ON ,.

1<i. .

lN' aT.**sMON

~' '

/ ~__

The large sice and weight of t'he 55-gallon sums and the small quantity of contained and difficult to recover plutonium make the thef t risk of these materials so low as to be ignored in this study. However, the dry waste drums could be employed to -

move other plutonium materials through the SNM detectors'to get s.

them outside of the facility. .

- Containers Normally Used and Average Contents

.% ) 2700 g Pu as'Pu nitrate (pun)

L-10 Shipping Container and 10 liter bottic 20 g Pu as Pu nitrate (pun)

L-3 or 6M Shipping Container (samples)

Model 60 Shipping Container (FFTF Pins) 5040 g Pu as H0 Pins y -

' Gallon Bottle (Lab Waste) 2 g Pe'- any (c' i -

. . 2600 g Po as Ho Powder (W .

3 liter cans 1730 g Pu.ar, MO Powder P. 2 liter cans 850 g Pu as MO Powder

. 1 liter cans 2800 g Pu as MO Pellets

-E 1 liter cans

• 1400 g Pu as H0 Pellets d;?," - 1/2 liter cans .

(Lab Recycle) 200 g Pu as pun p.; j1 liter bottle (samples) 50 g Pu as pun

. 0a s25 m1 bottle 70 g Pu MO Powder 25 m1 bottle * (samples) f#* '

(samples) 10 g Pu as pun 5 m1 bottle k{

i-j',

h*iG Material Balance Areas and Estimated Inventories C j .

~

Est. Inv.,* g Pu ,

tm Scrap Recovering, Room 127 11,800 l ; -j 4 MBA-11 600

• - Laboratory v 3j Vault 183,800 f"g ,

• MBA-12 MBA-13 Wet Ceramic, Room 128 , 60,000 Pellet Fabrication 5,000

.g.](

g, HBA-21,,

East Storage 200 "3 .

HBA-22 23,000 MBA-23 West Storage

1. $ , Fuel Pin Storage 16,000 -

g,' MBA-31 .. f 300,000 l

('k

' f

• .* ,e

- AConsidetu'sle variance cculd bi: expceted batucen the HEA iventories g.3 ,

at different times. 'g l gs .

l ..

. a p u d c T" ~ r k t, y si.:.- - - \

.  : sr

.,s.

., 4, ..

, e . .. ..

QL.2 -

~

I i f\ i ^

... -."s ~

% a A. '- I }l-nTION ,

l

~

• *' l'G CTC , .- ,3 ..MIO h - <

. '~~

. , (

Suitability of Haterial for ' Explosive Threat _

f 2 F.;;s Pu metal would be t is assumed that a trigger quantity, It is assumed that mixed required to pose an explosive thre h

- oxide and solution would also require refining and processing toAf

'- ' metal to provide an explosion.

- * . processing steps would be required to deve3 ope an explosive threat .

.i from the common material forms at X-H. .

gl Plutonium Nitrate Solution Mixed Nitrate Solution b,

Mixed Oxides ^

d * ' W m ,v... ~

. J 4) Pu-U Separation 1. Precipitation

q. *1. Dissolution 'f1*. 2. Calcination k a. Solvent Ext. Fluorination

%)N 2. Pu-U Separation b. Ion Exchange 3.

a. Solvent Extration 4. Reduction

b. Ion Exchange 2. Precipitation 5. Casting it Precipitation 3. Calcinatiori

3. 4. Fluorination

[f;y 9,'

- 4. ' Calcination 5. Reduction.to retal

5. Fluorination

6. Casting

6. Reduction to Metal

'j* .

7. Ca' sting 4 *

• 4 .

• ch of the processing steps would result in some less of 'plutoni e IH s.o the folle:.ing explosive suitability factors are based upon.

M* .

number of steps required in processing to an explosive device. .f

' ' Explosive Suitability Factor _

p? Plutonium Nitrate Solutions 1.2 1.25 i *: ~

• Hixed Nitrates Solutions Il8, 2 . 1.3 Hixed Oxides ,

Y4 l h Two other elements not included in the suitability factors are time and complexity. The more steps ' required to f abricate an explosive device would take time and also lead to the possible early de j@r@9 , ,

because of contamination spread. iduals

$ eg - .

outside the K-H organization is improbable, therefore, the indiv y , doing the processing would be reporting to wo Eg;. dl p.~ The above suitability factors are used to increase the amount of

• plutonium required for a trigger quantity.

Y * . -

I+

.d .

.=

. . Ic- C en n u wjng

R

~ AL 5

} ~ . - - . ,

'. I-Explosive Threat _ bility of the materiel, The explosive threat is based h container, upon thethesuita container size, the f' detection during a divercion.

9 '

the quantity of plutonium in eaccontainer weight ' -

d . The conta'iner concealability factor is 5 .

container as follows: . r

. Container Concealability Facto _

U,.Q' -

10.0 .

J. 4 . 0, .

i.'c u j Greater than 20 liters volume 3.0 v'. j j, .

Four liters to 20 liters volume, 2.0 y%

[ {

Three to four liters' volume 1.0 Mg 3

Two to three liters volume ' 0.1

!.fjzi j l One to two liters volume

' .i

! Less than one liter l- .;

h ore difficult to conceal,

~

.!' , The higher the f actor, t e m the total container weight k The container handling factor his based uponlarge heavy conta .

j and factors in the requirement that t ehan one ir.dividual to ha y requi,re mera t Container Handling Factor *

• container weight 50x2 2.0

,- - y ~

Greater than 50 pounds ~

1.5 i' Ten pounds to 50 pounds

.I 1.0 Ny  :' ' One pound to ten pounds Less than one pound carry. .

i .

The higher the factor, the more difficult tod upon the qu

%g'h g- The container detectability f actor ic basessibilities of detection .

g, contained plutonium and the resultant po-

/

,pH ,

' the SNM counters. Container Detectability Factor

'l~ . ' . 5.0 Greater than,10 grams Pu 2.0 '

' one to 10 grams Pu 1.0 O 4 am Pu 0.5

' 1,

'j},,,99c4alf..tg. ,srLess than one-hall" gram - 1 e

ibility of being detected.

g The higher the'f actor, the higher the poss t bility factors are summed

, for that particular The conceslability, handleability, and detec a i divert the cor i

for each container giving the diversion risk fac -__.-

container.

, - ~ - ~

q;h.L ..r"MTiun

W r = ~

n the risk factor is the pla location of the con-

[ Not include . ~

tainer. It would be more difficult to rer .c a container fres storage wells, some glove boxes or the vault without detection. I 11owever, all the containers are at some time in transit within the f

plant and during this operation the containers are considered -

l equally accessable.

I The threat from a critical device fabricated from the contents of each container is based upon the number of thef ts required to ob-4 . tain the modified trigger quantity and the detectability factorInof f;

3 'Il the container and is given as the inverse ratio in the tablo DN other words, the table indicates that the 1-liter can of MO pellets, ki - (.125) has the highest diversion r.ating for an explosive threat. . ,

Am .

A y;

% r _,,,g NV-U" ~

W._l m.r -

t,3 J .

._w s . -

% a - .

G J ,

~

we r>1 - . .

BtQ ' .

i M.

s . * '

,%.f_,; ' .. ,

y '. t l -

/

w. n. .c .

9.43 ,

(Id .j ' -

,5 .

5 .

)

i. #

10LF;.E7 N A M ON .

_ 15

. am 4 .

~

1D N( .

I.-N

. . , j -

I . J 4 ).r h t?"' g.. . ,.. . . g)ff r Suitability of Material Terms'for Radiolom. 1 Thrent_

f l

Criticality Threa_t_

The material suitability for a radiological threat has The bc'en divided threat of into two categories, criticality and contamination.

a criticality would require a finite quantity; the amount depending p The mini-

'j . ,

upon the ShH composition, configuration and surroundings.

.M mum critical masses for the various ShM forms available at. the isotopic content and optimum moderation and configuration is shown

• below.

~ **

Critical Mass, t Pu L (~ Material Forms _ .

A I , ,

.i .' .' 770 -

Mixed oxide powders as slurry

'{Fj:'d g Plutonium nitrate solutions 790 5.- - 830

/b' ? y%~

Mixed nitrate solutions MO Pins 6300 150 pins 6300 (2) 21,900

• • !1 3

~

Mo Pellets .

4 . ..' L The physiological threat from a critical'ity ' burst would be limited

. ,[ to a small area and therefore would harm only a small population.

f. . . The criticality would be of limited physiological effect as' compared-O" to an explosive device and the main threat would probab.ly be loss D ~.

of property through contamination.

The threat from a critical de'vice is then based upon the number of m ,' thefts required to obtain enough plutonium and the diversion risk

. ,A In other words, the table indicates the 3-l.1 , -

factor for each container.

~

1-liter can of MO oxide powder has the highest diversion rating for

($ f acriticalityradiologicalthreat] ,

Radiological Contamination C-pq

@W' c '? The suitability of plutonium or mixture of plutonium and S '

uranium for posing a radiological contamination threat is based .

upon the threat to human life from inhalation The or ingestion and the '

h

• loss or damage to property by contamination.

largest property ld be caused by

'M

, damage and possibly the greatest human threat woudisp 3 A release of this type would be similar to a population center.

Lstack release and the distribution of plutonium can be estimated.

The distribution from such a release would vary with particle sf ze,

..h . chape and density, release rate, windspeed, and spread of the result-ing cloud. The threat to human life would be greater near the release seined ~

.i '

point where concentrations are higher, while the 1oss of property The threat or cost of decontamination vould not vary significantly.

l l

l .

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M:. T1W -

&V varies with the quantity of plutonium releasu and the form in which it is released. For instance,Qhe release of pins or pellets would not pose a significant threat and the, release of liquids would not pose as significant a problem as fincipowder unless it was.rcleased .

by some type of atomizing equipment. -.

~

' .~ l p x)#W ,

y . ~ ,v In the case of soluable plutonium nitrate for instance, being put t into a water supply, the plutonium would be diluted, poly'acrized 1

and settle out on the bottom of the reservoir as would insoluable 3.?j

• j mixed oxide powders. The small amount of plutonium carried in the water supp3y would depend again upon the reservoir sist., particle g, sizes, etc. Such an instance would not be of a significant death gj -

threat, howevn , the reservoir and possibly all the mains and piping pC would eventually have to be replaced. ,

p.) .

b In either of the cases above, airborne dispersed or dispersal in the water supply would give only a limited threat to human life f

~.. - but the property loss or damage could be very large.

-: , The suitabilit'y of material for a contamiriation threat

• depends upon material type and is entegorized in the following table:

.--+ .

Suitability for Contamination h

M 5.0 4

t HO Powders Pu Nitrate

• 3.0 ('

' l.5

~

MO Pellets MO Fuel Pins 1.0 i:.3 )e . The higher the factor, the more suitable for contamination.

./

3 (OnehundredgramsPuisarbitrarily)takenastheradiologicalmassand

,,} the radiological threat then becomes the ratio of the radiological mass

.a y times material suitability to the diversion risk. -

j -

1.. Thetableindicatesthatthe(3-litercanofMOpowder(13.0)hasthe '

g , highest rating for a radiological contamination threat.

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N m 3 -

y 1 l S -

. 6 -

o 17 -

i

. 7"t WMW $

gr_,,,,,......~.- ,

Response p3!, .

i! (1) KUF in excess of LE4UF -

l Licensee Response: \l ,

- - ' (a) AIvine R0rIYf d $ As i e s'is'diiptilated in Part 70

... , or License Conditions.

(b) Re-evaluate all components of the material balance con-

4)

• tributing to the HUF and review security program for 4

devistions.

.1 (c) Conduct investigation and report in accordance with 10 CFR

$l'd 70.53.

(d) If MUF > 2.0 LD4UF, suspend operations and take a new inventory.

p ,.j ,

(e) Restart operations after app'roval of AEC. ,

~

(2) Security Incidents - Including Actual Sabotage

,lJ *, *

, v.i.

t '** " - Licensee Response:

g -

t. . ,

L . (a) Advise RO:III it: mediately - provide assessment of ' damage or potential threat to health and safety of public.

[4

. 'MI ., (b) Institute immediate fact gathering investigation.

M (c) Notify LLEA - request assistance if requited.

(d) Increase guard force r.ize to cope with situati'o n.

Increase in-plant surveillance measures.

(c) 7 RO:III Response:

T K :q (a) Advise RO:HQ and FBI of incident ,

j (b) Dispatch inspector to site.

(c) Keep RO:HQ apprised of developments.

r? *

(3) Sabotage Threats .

p' 3 s

.y '

Licensee Response: -

g-l "

i .

' (a) Institute emergency plan.

h- (b) Advise RO:III of threat.

(c) Notify LLEA and request assistance if required.

y' f' Increase size of guard force.

. (d)

(c) Conduct foot and vehicular patrols of site.

,E RO:III Response:

b (a) Advise RO:HQ and FBI of threat.

(b) Assess the adequacy of the licensee actions to cope with the threat. .

(c) If determined necessary, dispatch inspectors to the site. ,

e

• y 1 . r- n f are m m a s a v e n.g v., _

18 -

i

(d) p RO:UQ advised,of situation ,

(4) Civil or Labor Strife Licensee Response: ,

m (a) Advise RO:III of situation. 4

- i (b) Determine need for strengthening security force. ,

.h (c) Request support from LLEA if dceced necessary.

M. ,

(d) Increase in-plant surveillance.

RO:III Response: ,

(a) Advise RO:HQ of situation.

k.j .

(b) Ascertain adequacy of licensee actions to cope with the

(: .

situation.

, ,3 (c) If decced necessary, dispatch inspector to site.

7 .5 (d) Keep RO:HQ apprised of developments.

5y L* q jm (5) , Theft of Material - Known or suspected

• Licensee Respotfre:

3:. . 3 ,

4 .I , ,

@::- (a) Notify RO:III, FBI, and LLEA of incident.

{j, (b) If possible, ascertain form and quantity of missing 6 . tnaterial.

8 (c) If theft involves trigger quantity of material institute .

immediate inventory first of items of highest diversion ratings. Complete remaining parts of inventory. .

C- . (d) If less than trigger quantities, institute immediate in-ventory of all items.

M (e) Interview supervisors, workers ,. etc.*, who would be involved with the theft.

. . (f) Review security program itnplementation with particular attention *

.to checking of personnel monitors. -

~

• 4

'N .-

RO:III Response: . /

i p.0k (a) Notify RO:HQ of incident.

' ,,.i (b) DispatcJl Investigation / Inspection team to site. .

ft,'; (c) Interview persons knowledgeable of event.

i N'< (d) Assure adequacy of actions taken by licensee.

l (c) Keep RO:HQ apprised of developments.

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sciYity Nab.c'd in ..r ea t_

(6) Extorticn Threat -

Licensee Responsc: ,

(a) Notify RO:III of threat.

W v (b) Notify LLEA - request assistance if required by nature of '

threau.

I'

1. (c) Increase security force size.

i ~

(d) Step up protective patrol frequency.

(e) Increase in-plant surveillance. ,

. '(f) Conduct inventory if thrcat implies possible theft *

' of r.aterial according to highest diversion rating and E8 type of threat.

5,'d (g) If less than eight hours, inventory and check material of

$; ~';

highest diversion rating.

Uli.y (h) .If tiine permits, continue to inventory and check material 7.. . .,

of lower diversion rating, re t ,

c. RC:III Response: .

?-

(a) Advise ROiHQ of threat.

[$ '- (b) Evaluate licensee's, actions to assure their adequacy.

El,y;", ' (c) If substantive threat is posed, dispatch inspector to site. *

(d) Reep RO:HQ advised of developments. .

(7) Extortion __ Threat - General

' Licensee Response:

.W.Q

,'h' ' ~ (a) P.cepond to requests from RO:III for information.

(b) Conduct inventories by diversion rating as time allowed l

• to determine if any material is missing.

.NP7 RO:III Response:

ff d* ~

'h h ,.je.  ?

, (a) Upon receipt of Extortion threat notification from RO:HQ, .

telephonically contcet all affected licensees and request:

$' f l rit'M. (1) Information regarding any missing material according lM to diversion rating.

y: ,

(2) Information regarding any SNX in transit.

4 (3) Inventory by diversion rating to determine if any lf' ,1 .

material is missing.

,F2 (b) Keep RO:HQ advised of findings. _

u. OR ,,

' s (c) If extortion threat information is received from cource 8

f e

e M .

. . /

r otner than RO:HQ: .

(1) Advise RO:hQ of threat.

(2)

Contact affected licensecs by phone to in. quire regarding missing raterial according to-diversion rating.

(3) Request inforration regarding SNM shipments in '

U transit.

(4) Request inventory by diversion rating as time allows.

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