ML20211F449

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Forwards Ltr from Ja Miller,Dtd 990819,which Notified State of Iowa of Deficiency Identified During 990810,Fort Calhoun Station Biennial Exercise.One Deficiency Identified for Not Adequately Demonstrating Organizational Capability
ML20211F449
Person / Time
Site: Fort Calhoun Omaha Public Power District icon.png
Issue date: 08/25/1999
From: Good G
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To: Gambhir S
OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
References
NUDOCS 9908300339
Download: ML20211F449 (7)


Text

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  • "*% UNITED STATES y & NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 5 f REGloN IV J

[ 611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, sulTE 400

,,g, ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-8064 August 25, 1999 S. K. Gambhir, Division Manager Nuclear Operations Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 Adm. -

P.O. Box 399 Hwy. 75 - North of Fort Calhoun Fort Calhoun, Nebraska 68023-0399

SUBJECT:

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY IDENTIFIED DEFICIENCIES

Dear Mr. Gambhir:

Enclosed is a copy of a letter from Mr. John A. Miller, Regional Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region Vil, dated August 19,1999, which notified the State of Iowa of a

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deficiency identified during the August 10,1999, Fort Calhoun Station biennial exercise. I j

One deficiency was identified for not adequately demonstrating the organizational capability )

and resources to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and {

sheltered areas (Harrison County Emergency Operations Center). )

We request that you assist off-site officials with corrective actions as necessary and track the state's corrective actions for this deficiency. Please keep this office informed of the status of resolution of this issue.

If you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Mr. Harry A. Freeman at (817) 860-8239.

Sincerely, OLit -

1 Gail M. Good, Chief Plant Support Branch ,

l Division of Reactor Safety Docket No.: 50-285 License No.: DPR-40

Enclosure:

As stated 9908300339 PDR 990825 F ADOCK 05000285 i PDR l

Omaha Public Power District cc w/o enclosure:

Mark T. Frans, Manager Nuclear Licensing Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 Adm.

P.O. Box 399 Hwy. 75 - North of Fort Calhoun '

Fort Calhoun, Nebraska 68023-0399 James W. Chase, Division Manager Nuclear Assessments Fort Calhoun Station -

P.O. Box 399 Fort Calhoun, Nebraska 68023 J. M. Solymossy, Manager - Fort Calhoun Station Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station FC-1-1 Plant i P.O. Box 399 Hwy. 75 - North of Fort Calhoun Fort Calhoun, Nebraska 68023 Perry D. Robbson, Esq.

Winston & Straw, 1400 L. Street, N.n.

Washington, D.C. 20005-3502 Chairman Washington County Board of Supervisors Blair, Nebraska 68008 Cheryl K. Rogers, Program Manager Nebraska Health and Human Services System Division of Public Health Assurance Consumer Services Section 301 Centennial Mall, South P.O. Box 95007 Lincoln, NE 68509-5007 Training, Exercises, & Evaluation Branch Chief i FEMA Region Vil l 2323 Grand Blvd., Suite 900 i Kansas City, Missouri 64108 2670 I

r Omaha Public Power District DISTRIBUTION w/coov of letter:

DCD (A045)

Fort Calhoun Resident inspector RWharton, NRR Project Manager (13 E16)

HAFreeman, DRS/PSB RITS Coordinator RIV File DRS Action item File (Hodges)

DISTRIBUTION w/o coov of lette' Regional Adrninistrator-DRP Director DRS Director DRS-PSB Branch Chief (DRP/0)

Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)

Project Engineer (DRP/C)

T. Essig (NRR/DIPM) (MS: 12 H2) -

C. A. Hackney, SLO

(

l l

DOCUMENT NAME: S:\DRS\DRSLTRS\ FEMA.MLD\ FEMA 99DLTR.FCS.WPD To receive copy of document, Indicete in box: "C" = Copy without enclosures *E' = Copy with enclosures "N" = No copy RIV:PSB E C:DRS\PSB HAFreeman:nh'$ GMGood C.W 08/2y/99 08 @ /99 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY l

E Omaha Public Power District DISTRIBUTIObl w/coov of Jetter:

W~ Vfb)g Fort Calhoun Residennnspector RWharton, NRR Project Manager (13 E16)

HAFreeman, DRS/PSB RITS Coordinator RIV File DRS Action item File (Hodges)

DISTRIBUTION w/o coov of letter:

Regional Administrator DRP Director DRS Director DRS-PSB Branch Chief (DRP/C)

Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)

Project Engineer (DRP/C)

T. Essig (NRR/DIPM) (MS: 12 H2)

C A. Hackney, SLO DOCUMENT NAME: S:\DRS\DRSLTRS\ FEMA.MLD\ FEMA 99DLTR.FCS.WPD To receive copy of document, Indicate in bor: 'C' = Copy without enclosures *E' = Copy with enclosures *N' = No copy RIV:PSB E C:DRS\PSB l l HAFreeman:nh'% GMGood C.W 08/2y/99 08f)4/99 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY SCM30

j Federal Emergency Management Agency Region Vil

, ,> 2323 Grand Blvd., Suite 900 Kansas City, MO 64108-2670 AUG 19 r0 l

l Ms. Ellen Gordon Administrator lowa Emergency Management Division Hoover State Office Building Level A Des Moines, Iowa 50319

Dear Ms. Gordon:

SUBJECT:

Deficiency Observed at the August 10,1999 Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station Full Scale Exercise - Response Due: August 30,1999 The purpose of this letter is to officially inform your office of the one Deficiency ,

identified during the August 10,1999, full-scale exercise of the state and local l radiological emergency response plans for the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station.

This issue was discussed at the post exercise participants briefing on August 11, 1999. The Deficiency is assessed against the following facility:

Harrison County Emeraency Operations Center Objective number 17. the organizational capability and resources to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas, was not adeauately demonstrated. resulting in a Deficiency. The following specific concem was identified:

After the Site Area Emergency notification was received at 0909, the protective action decision was made to evacuate subarea 10. Although subarea 10 was ordered evacuated, three access control points were left uncontrolled for 21/2 hours. This would have allowed individuals to access subarea 10, potentially resulting in them becoming contaminated.

This is believed to be the result of the plan not clearly defining the responsible official for access control. When the Site Area Emergency and protective action was decided, the Sheriff was not in the Emergency Operations Center but downstairs in his office. At this point, assistance in manning and operating access control points had not been requested of the State Highway Patrol. It was apparent that the absence of the Iowa State Patrol had an effect, evidenced by discussions between the Sheriff

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l and Engineer as to whether local assets were available to establish access control points. The Sheriff and staffin the Forward Command i Post did establish one access control point but did not consider the three other access points into the area. When the Highway Patrol did arrive at l

the Forward Command Post, the Sheriff briefed them and then left the l area, not remaining to coordinate the Patrol's activities as would be appropriate as the primary responsible official. The Highway Patrol did not review beyond the status of the briefing to verify the adequacy of access control points already established or determine if other roads , j should be identified for closure. The actions by the Sheriff in tuming his primary / lead responsibility for traffic and access control over to the i Highway Patrol is not in accordance with the plan.

The General Emergency notification was received at 1109 and the i protective action decision was made to expand the evacuated area, to include part of subarea 13 and subarea 14, all access control points were appropriately covered. Thus, the ability to identify, man and operate j access control points was demonstrated. It was noted that by the time of j l the General Emergency, the Highway Patrol had arrived and had taken over primary responsibility for access control. However, this does not resolve the lack of timeliness indicated by being 21/2 hours late. Further, this is inconsistent with the Plan, which indicates the Sheriff as the primary responsible official for access control.

The Harrison County plan is inconsistent regarding who has lead authority for establishing traffic and access control points. Page ll-J-4, paragraph 3.c. and Attachment A-2, states that the Sheriff has primary responsibility j for access control. However, pages ll-A-3, paragraph B.3. and ll-A-4, i paragraph D.2., do not indicate primary responsibility but rather a  !

coordination responsibility for the Sheriff, the Highway Patrol and the County Engineer. In addition, the Sheriff and County Engineer have

! responsibilities that are nearly identical (NUREG-0654, J.10.1.) j Remedial Actions Required: The Hanison County plan must be revised to  ;

I clearly indicate what agency has the primary responsibility for traffic and l

access control. Furthermore, the plan must be changed to reflect assistance in traffic and socess control by specific county and state agencies.

Based on the appropriate closure of all roads surrounding the evacuated area during the General Emergency, with the Highway Patrol taking the lead, it is  !

evident that access control can be acccirpushed to protect the health and

! safety cf the public. Therefore, a remedial exercise is not required at this time. However, there must be training on the plan as to lead responsibilities and training provided to that lead agency.  ;

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Draft plan and procedure changes to correct this Deficiency must be submitted to this office no later than November 5,1999, and all plans and procedures must be approved no later than December 12,1999. j in accordance with 44 CFR 350.9(d) and the FEMA Radiological Emergency '

Preparedness Exercise Manual (FEMA-REP-14), September 1991, we have thoroughly reviewed and discussed this issue with FEMA Headquarters, the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and appropriate FEMA Region Vil Regional '

Assistance Committee members. FEMA REP-14, page C.16-1 defines a l Deficiency as " . . . a demonstrated and observed inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant." Because of the potentialimpact of Deficiencies on the public health and safety, they are required to be corrected within 120 days after the exercise through appropriate remedial actions, including remedial exercises, drills, plan changes, or other actions.

Please provide a response to the proposed remedial actions listed above by August 30,1999. My Radiological Emergency Preparedness staff is available to provide assistance in achieving resolution to this issue. Should you have any questions, please contact Connie Wisniewski at (816) 283-7013.

1 Sincerely, I Ai!

Regional Director i ec: Vanessa Quinn, PT-CR-RP Deborah Mauldin, PT-CR-RP Charles Hackney, NRC IV Carl Simmons, OPPD