IR 05000353/1987010

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Insp Rept 50-353/87-10 on 870608-0712.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Work Activities,Procedures,Records Re Reactor Pressure Vessel internals,safety-related Components & Radiographic Operations
ML20236D951
Person / Time
Site: Limerick Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 07/22/1987
From: Linville J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236D937 List:
References
50-353-87-10, NUDOCS 8707310144
Download: ML20236D951 (8)


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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report No. 87-10 Docket No. 50-353 License No. CPPR-107 Category A Licensee: Philadelphia Electric Company 2301 Market Street Philadelphia, PA 19101 Facility: Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2

! Dates: June 8 - July 12, 1987

Inspectors: R. A. Gramm, Senior Resident Inspector J. E. Kaucher, Resi nt Ins ctor Approved by:

J Am [

. Linville, Chief '

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e ctor Projects, Sect' 2A Inspection Summary: Report for Inspection Conducted June 8 - July 12, 1987 l (Report No. 50-353/87-1 I Area Inspected: Routine inspection by the resident inspectors of work activities, procedures, and records relative to reactor pressure vessel l internals, safety related components, instrumentation and radiographic o p t.ra ti o n s .

The inspector reviewed licensee action on previously identified items and I performed plant inspection tours. The inspection involved 57 hours6.597222e-4 days <br />0.0158 hours <br />9.424603e-5 weeks <br />2.16885e-5 months <br /> by the  ;

inspector Results: No violations were identifie i No new NRC open items were identified during this inspectio l

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DETAILS .

i 1.0 _ Plant Inspection Tours

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The inspector observed in progress work activities, completed work,.and plant status in several areas during inspection tours. Work was examined for defects and compliance with regulatory and licensee requirement Particular note was taken of the presence of quality control inspectors and quality control evidence such as inspection records, material identification, nonconforming material identification, housekeeping and equipment preservation. The inspector interviewed craft supervision, craft and quality control personnel in the work areas. Observations are noted below:

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The inspector observed inprocess welding on small. bore pipe SP-HBC-241-El weld 10. The proper electrodes were used to complete the closure weld. The inspector had no concern Inprocess work activities on a diesel generator silencer support were observed. The inspector reviewed drawing XRE-2XH-H31 and associated redlines. The slotted hole connections to allow for thermal growth were verifie An uncapped discharge nozzle was found on the suppression pool spray ring header at azimuth 160. The licensee promptly taped the opening when notified of the condition. The cap had been removed to facilitate a visual examination of the spray sparger interior in accordance with Field Deviation and Disposition Request HH2-438 The inspector reviewed the results of the offsite Bechtel Quality Assurance Management audit which was conducted on May 11 through May 15, 1987. No significant findings remain outstanding from that audit and the inspector had no concern .0 Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items (Closed) Construction Deficiency (78-00-01): Seismic gaps between containment and adjacent structures. The licensee mapped the seismic gap dimensions for the Unit 2 buildings. Nonconformance !

Report 2843 and Quality Control Inspection Report C-36-QC-G-1

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documented some locations that were out of tolerance. The gaps were evaluated by Bechtel engineering and found acceptable. While the rodofoam had compressed more than expected, the minimum gap dimension was at least 1.7 times the expected relative seismic displacement between the structures. The inspector also reviewed Management Corrective Action Report # 17, Significant Deficiency Report # 4, and Bechtel letter BLP 17797 that documented the calculations of the structure interactions. This item is close __ - - _ _ .

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, (C bsed) Construction Deficiency (78-00-04): Circumferential surface cracks in flued head fitting The twelve defective flued heads were returned to the vendor for rework. This item has been previously reviewed in NRC Inspection Report 50-352/84-14. This item is close (Closed) Unresolved Item (79-06-02): Core support plate ruste Nonconformance Report 3611 was issued to document the surface rus General Electric directed, via Field Deviation and Disposition Request HH2-205, that the rust be removed by wire brushing. In July 1986 the rust was removed. The inspector examined the installed core support plate and saw no signs of rust. This item is close d. (Closed) Construction Deficiency (84-00-12): Damaged sluice gate stems. Nonconformance Report 9963 documented the bent gate stem condition for gates HV12-0038 and HV12-003D. The gate stems were scrapped and replaced. The addition of limit switches to prevent excess force on the stems during gate suating, the addition o washers under the stem guide support brackets and the installation of a pipe locknut on the upper end of the stem was reviewed during NRC Inspection 353/84-11. This item is close e. (Closed) Unresolved Item (86-10-02): Control Rod Dr'.ve (CRD) ,

lateral restraint beam installatio PECD Finding T.eport 2N-524 was

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reviewed. General Electric evaluated the effects of bolt torque on j the connection adequacy and found that a sufficient factor of safety i existed to accommodate the potential reduced preload. General Electric further concluded that bolt slip against the sides of the slotted holes would still provide sufficient structural load carrying capacity and the deflection would not affect the CRD system performance. This item is close f. (Closed) Violation (86-21-05): Shop welds on the Residual Heat Removal heat exchanger support were not in accordance with the Bechtel design. Nonconformance Report 11583 was' issued to document 3 the actual weld length on the gusset plates. Engineering evaluated i the structural capacity of the welds and found the welds acceptabl l Bechtel drawing C-196 and the associated shop drawings were reviewed for additional discrepancie Several other cases were found and ,

evaluated by Bechtel engineering and the inspector was informed that drawing C-196 was revised accordingly. Bechtel engineering reviewed an additional 58 shop structural drawings to identify if further errors existed relative to the original Bechtel desig The variations found were minor in nature and did not affect the load carrying capacity of the structures. This item is close g. (Closed) Violation (87-02-06): Maintenance of portable rod oven temperatur Bechtel issued Nonconformance Report 11738 to document the three instances where the portable ovens were deenergized in the fiel The situations were evaluated by Welding Engineering and the

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l weld joints did not actually require the issuance of the E7018 i electrodes in portable ovens. The involved welders and their l supervisors were reinstructed on the handling and care of portable i rod oven A site training bulletin was issued to all applicable I personnel to reaffirm the controls on portable rod ovens. The inspector has detected no further problems during recent plant tours. This item is close I (Closed) Unresolved Item (87-07-01): System flush data recording i requirements. Startup Administrative procedure AD7.1 was revised to require that flow rates, or other parameters from which flow rates can be established, shall be recorded during flush performanc This item is close (0 pen) Violation (87-02-04, 87-02-05 and 87-02-08): In a letter dated June 4,1987 Philadelphia Electric Company provided planned corrective and preventive actions to the violations contained in NRC Inspection Report 87-02 involving construction activities not performed in accordance with applicable requirements. The response has been reviewed and found acceptable. The verifications of the PECO actions will be accomplished in future NRC Inspection (0 pen) Violation (87-04-03): In a letter dated June 24, 1987 Philadelphia Electric Company provided planned corrective and preventive action to the violation contained in NRC Inspection Report 87-04 involving inadequate protection of installed equipmen The response has been reviewed and found acceptable. The verifications of the PECO actions will be accomplished in future NRC inspection .0 Reactor Pressure Vessel Internals Work activities in the undervessel area were observed. Traveler Package 2-203T which pertains to the installation of the Control Rod Drive (CRD) insert and withdraw lines was reviewed. In particular the following documents were reviewed:

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Joint Process Control Sheet for attachment of the insert and j withdraw lines to the CRD flang l l

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Special Process Control Sheet for flatness gage checks on the I'

CRD housing bottom flange fac Special Process Control Sheet for CRD housing flange face I machinin l The inspector had no concerns on the quality record l l

The inspector observed General Electric QC perform a dial gage l flatness check on housing 26-59 and 56-43. The instruments were verified to be properly calibrate l

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. The inspector visually examined work completed on the core spray line brackets; shroud support plate manway installation; and low pressure coolant injection nozzles at the shrou No concerns were identifie .0 Safety Related Components The inspecter observed the delivery of two Residual Heat Removal pumps into the Reactor Building. The inspector was informed that pump 28-P202 was defective due to a bearing problem. Nonconformance Report 12137 was reviewed that documented a chip in the last stage bearing on the pum The pump vendor was investigating the cause of the defec The inspector accompanied Bechtel Quality Control.during a pre-cleanliness check of the pump and discharge casings. The craft were observed while cleaning the shaft. Work Package 2D-P202-A was reviewed and found to provide detailed directions for the pump assembly. The inspector observed rigging operations and setting the pump into the pump shell. The work operations were properly controlled and the quality control personnel were found technically knowledgeable of the installation requirements, a

No violations were identifie J 5.0 Piping and Pipe Supports l l

l The inspector reviewed the following documents concerning the installation of temperature elements in the wetwell:

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Specification 8031-C-2, Furnishing Detailing, Fabricating, Delivering and Erecting the Primary Containment Liners

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Drawing C-276, Reactor Building Units 1 and 2 Liner Plate Requirements General Outline

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Drawing E-1289, Raceway Layout, Containment - Unit 2, Wetwell Plan _

Above Elevation 217'-0".

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Eight completed temperature element installations and four in process installations were inspected. The attributes reviewed included attachment welds to containment liner plates and downcomers, location, labeling of conduit and instruments, proper protection of completed instruments, alignment of temperature element support tube and documentation of QC inspection No concerns were note .0 Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary The inspector examined the recirculation suction line weld to the reactor pressure vessel safe end (isometric VRR-2RS-2A field weld A1). A visual examination of the pipe interior surface identified a questionable amount

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of ID weld reinforcement. The ASME code subsection NB-4426.2 and General Electric specification 22A2284/MPLB32-3010 limit the reinforcement to 5/32 inch. Bechtel QC was asked to examine the condition for acceptabilit The weld had not yet been presented for normal QC inspection. Bechtel determined tha the reinforcement was within the ASME code allowable limi j i

The inspector reviewed a series of informational radiographs that had I been shot of weld VRR-2RS-2A Weld A The progressive radiographs had j detected incomplete fusion which was repaired by the craft. The final radiographs for code acceptability have not yet been sho Review of the film in the area of the questionable buildup showed acceptable density variatio The inspector discussed with Bechtel piping QC the requirements to perform examinations of the recirculation loop weld interior surface General Electric requires liquid penetrant and visual examinations of accessible surfaces. Bechtel reviewed the Loop A recirculation weld I records and ascertained that four weld ID surfaces had been previously examine No violations were identifie .0 Instrumentation and Controls The inspector witnessed activities involved with replacement of missile protection for the newly installed Emergency Service Water (ESW) System supply piping for the diesel generators. The following documents were reviewed:

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Work Package C-678-MP-214A

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Field Change Request CS-1491

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CFOM: 2-6586, a description of the ESW modification including Unit 1 interface requirements

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ESW modification safety evaluation

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Drawing C-678, Diesel Generator Building #2 Pipe Tunnel Wall Elevations The inspector observed welding of missile protection in bay A including joint cleanliness, joint fitup and alignment, proper filler materials and electrodes, appearance of weld deposit, use of proper welding procedures, evidence of quality control inspection and documentation or quality record The inspector also compared the as-built condition of the missile barrier to the work package specifications including the O to 1/4" gap requirement between the pipe and the barrie No items of concern were identifie . _ _ _ . __________________a

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! The inspector reviewed completed instrument installation for PSL-251 (safeguard piping fill pump pressure switch). During the inspection it was noted that the instrument tubing connection to the process .

line root valve was disconnected and not tagged. It was determined I that the connection was broken to install a temporary connection for hydrostatic testing of the fill line pipin Review of the Pressure Test Work Data Sheet showed that the test engineer had not authorized this connection to be broken because the instrument line had been i installed subsequent to the test engineer walkdown of the system to 1 determine test boudnaries. The inspector checked QC records and found that an Inspection Record (FJ-52-01-09K-658-1) had been opened and had identified that the instrument line connection to the root l valve would have to be broken and proper restoration would need to be J witnessed. The unapproved removal of QC accepted instrument lines is not in accordance with existing project procedures. However, the significance of this occurance is diminished by the fact that the QC l program was able to identify and control the reinstallatio PECO )

has revised the Pressure Test Work Data Sheet to more clearly specify the requirements for procedural identification of removal and instal-lation of QC accepted components. Additionally, PECO has provided l formal training to both crafts and test engineers on procedures I governing removal and reinstallation of QC accepted components for j testing. This item is considered close .0 Radiography i During the period of this inspection (June 17, 1987) an Order (EA 87-52)

was issued against United States Testing Company, Inc. concerning radiation safety practices, certification of radiographer, training records and other records associated with the conduct of radiograph U.S. Testing conducts the majority of radiography at Limerick Unit The thrust of the order as it pertained to Limerick Unit 2 was that j radiographic operations were to stop until the U.S. Testing Corporate Radiation Safety Director (RSD) was assigned to the Limerick site as the responsible Radiation Safety Office Radiography could then continue as long as the U.S. Testing Radiation Safety Director was assigned to Limerick or until such a time as a new Limerick site specific Radiation ,

Safety Officer (RS0) was certified by the U.S. Testing Corporate .'

i Radiation Safety Director. Certification was to consist of 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> of training given by the RSD, compliant with the requirements set forth in the U.S. Testing Radiation Safety Program Manual and notification to NRC Region V that these requirements have been satisfie '

The U.S. Testing RSD arrived at Limerick to assume the duties of RSO on June 17, 1987. Radiography was conducted on June 18, 1987, but was not conducted on June 19 e d 20, 1987. The U.S. Testing RSD conduced the required 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> o' training for the new Limerick RSO and other members of the U.S. Testing staff on June 18 and 19, 1987, and certification was made to Region V on June 19, 198 .

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The inspector discussed with both U.S. Testing and PECO the contents of the Order and contacted the USNRC Region V Regional Administrator for clarification of the requirements of the Order concerning continuance of radiography at Limerick. The inspector interviewed the U.S. Testing RSD and other members of the U.S. Testing staff at Limerick concerning the !

contents of the order and the safe conduct of radiography during part of the 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> of training conducted by the U.S. Testing RSD. The training consisted of a review of the applicable sections of 10 CFR and the Testing Radiation Safety Program Manual and procedures. No formal lesson plan, student guide or instruction guide were used during the training session. The training conducted appears to have met the requirements of the Orde i 9.0 Unresolved Items '

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to i ascertain if it is acceptable, a violation, or a deviatio Unresolved 1 items were discussed in paragraph .0 Exit Meeting The NRC resident inspector discussed the issues and findings in this I report with members of the licensee's staff on a weekly basis, and at an exit meeting held on July 10, 198 Based on discussions held with licensee representatives on July 10, 1987, it was determined that this report does not contain information subject to 10 CFR 2.790 restriction i l

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