IR 05000352/1993023

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Insp Repts 50-352/93-23 & 50-353/93-23 on 930907-14. No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Radiological Controls Program Enhancements,Qa Oversight Activities & Contamination Control Program
ML20059F630
Person / Time
Site: Limerick  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 10/25/1993
From: Bores R, Nimitz R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20059F623 List:
References
50-352-93-23, 50-353-93-23, NUDOCS 9311050019
Download: ML20059F630 (17)


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-U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i

REGION I

Report Nos. 50-352/93-23 50-353/93-23 Docket Nos. 50-352  ;

50-353 License Nos. NPR-39 NPR-85 Licensee: Philadelphia Electric Company Corresnondence Control Desk ,

. P.O. Box 195 '

Wayne. PA 19087-0195 Facility Name: Limerick Nuclear Generating Station. Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Limerick. Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted: September 7-10 and 14.1993 .

Inspector: M ld25)43  :

R. L. Nimitz, CHF, Senior Radiation Specialist date Approved by: / _&Y  %& /dMd793 ores, Chief [Ea itiel Radiation ' dat'e

'rotection Secli n ,

Areas Inspected: This inspection was a routine announced inspection of the radiological controls program. Areas reviewed during the combined inspection were important to health end safety and included action on previous findings; radiological controls program enhancements; quality assurance oversight activities; radiological controls performance during the 1993 Unit 2 refueling outage; the contamination control program including the circumstances surrounding the - ,

identification of high levels of Na-24 contamination identified in Unit 2 on August 19, 1993; 1 radiological controls during the unscheduled Unit 1 outage; and preparation and planning for the '

proposed receipt of fuel from the Shoreham Nuclear Generating Statio On September 8,1993, a Management Meeting was held with representatives of Philadelphia Electric Company (PECo), Long Island Power Authority (LIPA), and NRC management and staff. The meeting was held to discuss the licensee's proposed receipt of fuel from LIPA's

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Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. The meeting was open to the public and members of the public were in attendanc PDR ADOCK 05000352 G pyg ,

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Results: Overall, the results of the inspection indicated that an appropriate level of management attention was directed towards understanding the root causes of the radiological controls events >

that occurred in late 1992 and early 1993. The inspector identified that appropriate efforts were on-going to enhance training and improve procedures in response to the events, in addition, the inspector noted that actions were taken to improve the effectiveness of evaluations of self-

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identified events in order to further enhance performance in the area of radiological control '

The inspector's review indicated that very good radiological controls were implemented for the unscheduled Unit 1 outage; QA oversight was very good; no unplanned exposures or intakes ,

occurred during the August 19,1993, Na-24 contamination event; and good planning and preparation was on-going for the receipt of fuel from Shoreham. One non-cited violation was '

identified which involved identification of examples of contaminated material outside the radiological controlled area with low levels of contamination. The licensee took appropriate i corrective action for this scif-identified matter. As a result, and consistent with the guidance of the NRC's Enforcement Policy, a non-cited violation was issued for this matte i f

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DETAILS Individuals Contacted During Inspection Licensee Personnel -

  • R. Boyce, Plant Manager
  • K. Borton, Engineer-Licensing
  • G. Murphy, Manager Radiation Protection
  • J. Risteter, Manager Radiological Engineering
  • G. Stewart, Engineer-Experience Assessment
  • J. Kanter, Manager-Experience Assessment
  • K. Cenci, Manager-Radwaste
  • R. Tomlinson, Manager-Services Training
  • R. Friteuley, Manager- Maintenance NRC Personnel
  • N. Perry, NRC Senior Resident
  • C. Anderson, Chief, Reactor Projects 2B, NRC Region I .

The inspector also contacted other licensee individuals during the course of this -

inspectio .0 Purnose and Scope of Inspection The inspection was a routine announced inspection of the radiological controls progra Areas reviewed during the inspection were important to health and safety and included the following:

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action on previous findings

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radiological controls program enhancements

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quality assurance oversight activities

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radiological controls performance during the 1993 Unit 2 refueling outage

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the circumstances surrounding the identification of high levels of. Na-24 contamination in Unit 2 on August 19,1993

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radiological controls during the unscheduled Unit 1 outage

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preparation and planning for the proposed receipt of fuel from the Shoreham Nuclear Generating Statio In addition, a management meeting was held with the licensee on September 8,1993, at the NRC Region I Office, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the licensee's planning and preparation for the licensee's proposed receipt

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of fuel from the Shoreham Nuclear Generating Station. A summary of the meeting and ;

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meeting attendees are provided as Attachments 1 and 2 respectivel ; Action on Previous NRC Inspection Findings i (Closed) Violation (50-352/92-26-01) l The licensee did not inform workers of radiological conditions in work areas in the Unit ,

1 drywellin July 1992. The inspector reviewed this matter relative to the corrective and - '

preventative actions outlined.in the licensee's December 28, 1992 response to this ,

violation. The licensee implemented the corrective and preventative actions specified l'

therein. These actions included development of a special procedure for entry into the '

drywell at power, and inclusion of the incident in continuing training. This violation is closed (Closed) Violation (50-352/92-26-02)

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The licensee did not perform adequate radiation surveys to support work activities in the Unit 1 drywell in July 1992. The inspector reviewed this matter relative to the corrective !

and preventative actions outlined in the licensee's December 28,1992, response to this violation. The licensee implemented the corrective and preventative actions specified therein. These actions included development and implementation of a special procedure to specify controls for work in the drywell with the reactor at power and inclusion of the event in continuing training. This violation is close ,

! (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-352/92-26-03)  :

NRC to review the licensee's evaluation of radiation dose rate levels encountered by ,

personnel during their traversing of the Unit 1 drywell in July 1992 to get to their work locations. The inspector's review indicated that the licensee evaluated the radiat:on dose

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rates and determined that no unusual dose rates were present in areas traversed by the '

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workers on their way to their work locations. This unresolved item is close .4 (Closed) Violation (50-353/93-04-01)

The licensee did not perform adequate radiological surveys, as required by 10 CFR 20.201, during traversing incore probe work at Unit 2 on January 27, 1993. The inspector reviewed this matter with respect to the corrective and preventative actions ;

outlined in the licensee's May 14, 1993, response to this violation. The inspector's review indicated the licensee implemerr j the corrective and preventative actions specified therein. These actions incluced develepment of special guidelines for radiologically significant work activities. The guidelines require an evaluation of the

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magnitude of the potential hazard to ensure appropriateness of radiological controls for the wor Guidelines were developed for radiological controls job coverage for traversing incore probe work, radiography, control rod drive exchange, and removal of items from the spent fuel storage pool. The licensee also provided continuing training on the event. In addition, the licensee developed health physics job performance ,

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standards. Standards developed were job coverage t.nd survey documentation. . This ,

violation is close .5 (Closed) Violation (50-353/93-04-02)

The licensee did not inform workers as to the presence of high levels of contamination present under the Unit 2 reactor vessel on January 27,1993. The inspector reviewed '

this matter relative to the corrective and preventative actions. outlined in the licensee's ,

May 14,1993, response to this violation. The inspector's review indicated that the licensee implemented the corrective and preventative actions specified therein. The inspector's review indicated that the licensee counseled appropriate individuals, revised applicable maintenance procedures to include lessons learned from the event, and developed job coverage guidelines for this work activity. The licensee also included this -

event in continuing training. In addition, the corrective actions identified relative to

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Violation 50-353/93-04-02 are applicable to this matter. This violation is close .6 (Closed) Violation (50-352/93-04-03)

The licensee's maintenance personnel did not adhere to procedures in that they did not -

properly prepare for traversing incore probe work activities at Unit 1 on May 31,1992,

to allow time for proper health physics review of the work activity. The licensee was not required to respond to this violation in that corrective actions taken and associated ,

with Violation No. 50-352/92-26-01 (discussed above) were adequate to prevent recurrence. This violation is close .7 (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-352/93-04-04)

The NRC will review the circumstances surrounding, and licensee corrective actions associated with, draining of the Unit 1 Regenerative Heat Exchanger on February 8, 1993. As a result of the draining, radiation levels on a small section of the heat exchanger increased from 700 millirem /hr to about 1600 millirem /hr. Radiation '

protection personnel, controlling access to the room, were not aware that the heat exchanger had been drained or the subsequent increase in dose rates following the l draining.

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During inspection 50-352/93-09, the inspector met with the licensee's Plant Manager and .

Radiological Engineering Supervisor and was briefed on the circumstances surrounding the draining of the regenerative heat exchanger on February 8,1993. The inspector noted that, based on the preliminary discussions, no unplanned radiation exposures occurred. Personnel who entered the area were provided continuously indicating -

radiation dose rate survey meters and alarming dosimeters, and meetings were held after the identification of the increased dose rates to bring the changes to appropriate j personnel's attention. Radiological controls personnel provided positive access control to the regenerative heat exchanger cubicle during the period ofincreased dose rates. The i area was locked and the radiation protection personnel maintained the key i I

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During the current inspection (50-352/353/93-23), the inspector independently reviewed *

radiation survey information, radiation work permits, procedures, and discussed the draining with cognizant pe-onnel. The inspector also reviewed the radiological occurrence report and evaluation of the February 8,1993, event. The inspector concluded that communication weaknesses between radiological controls personnel and ;

operations personnel were encountered which resulted in the radiological controls technicians, who were controlling access to the cubicle, not being aware that the ~ neat exchanger was to be drained. Once the increased radiation dose rates were identified by a radiological engineer, this individual did not notify the technicians controlling scess of the increased radiation dose rates until about three hours later. The inspedor noted i

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that no unplanned exposures occurred, the RWP for the area was suspended, and meetings were held with cognizant personnel to discuss the changed conditions and communications concerns. The heat exchanger was subsequently filled with water to reduce radiation dose rates for additional work evolutions on the heat exchanger. A radiological occurrence report was written as well as an event investigation rep: rt. The licensee subsequently wrote Clearance Guide 18 to provide additional guidance negarding draining of systems. In addition, the radiological engineer was counseled, an/ the event i was included in continuing training where the weaknesses in communic . tion were highlighte The inspector's review indicated that once the elevated dose rates were identified, the room should have been re-posted as a " Locked High Radiation Area" instead of a "High :

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Radiation Area" as identified in the license's procedures (Procedure HP-215). The inspector noted that this matter was identified by the licensee, was promptly corrected, ,

and had minor safety significanc Based on the above review the inspector concluded that licensee took appropriate and timely corrective actions to preclude recurrence of this matter. This item is clos 9

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3.8 (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-352,353/93-17-02)

The licensee was not able to demonstrate that the method for determining curie loading l of resin radwaste shipments adequately quantified the total radioactivity present. Also, j it was not apparent that the curie loading calculation for radwaste shipment No. 93-10 l was correct. The licensee subsequently provided information demonstrating that the technique used to quantify total curie loading was adequate. The licensee inter-compared two separate curie loading calculations which used resin sampling and analysis data and ;

dose rate data for determination of curic loading. The licensee did identify an area for j enhancement associated with performing separate calculations for resin liners which i contain layered resin from different waste streams. The licensee also demonstrated that the calculation performed using the dose rate from the Dottom of shipment No. 93-10 was ;

conservative. This item is close l l

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4.0 Outage Performance The inspector reviewed performance in the area of radiological controls for the Unit 2 '

second refueling outage (early 1993). The evaluation of the licensee's performance in this area was based on discussions with cognizant personnel and review of- i documentation. Areas reviewed were aggregate personnel radiation exposure, internal and external exposure controls, and personnel contamination The inspector's review indicated that the licensee met the ALARA Exposure Goal

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established for the outage. A total exposure of 147 person-rem was sustained as compared to an outage goal of 160 person-rem. The inspector's review indicated that the exposure goal was reasonable and that the licensee appropriately minimized aggregate ,

personnel exposure despite the presence of fuel failure The inspector's review indicated there were no unplanned external exposures during the refueling outage. There also were no significant intakes of airborne radioactivity during  !

the Unit 2 second refueling outage despite the presence of fuel failures and a Unit 2

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undervessel contamination event that occurred on January 27,199 The licensee sustained 90 personnel contaminations during the outage as compared to an ,

established goal of 100. The inspector's review indicated that the majority of personnel contaminations identined were minor in nature and of no radiological safety significanc Based on the above information, the licensee provided good control of personnc'. l exposures during the outag No violations were identifie .0 Organi7ation and Staf6ng [

The inspector reviewed the organization and staffing of the on-site radiological controls organization. The review was with respect to criteria contained in applicable Technical i Specifications and licensee administrative document The inspector evaluated licensee performance in this area by review of applicable documentation, discussions with cognizant individuals, and independent observation of

on-going work activities during tours of the facilit The following observations were made:

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The license re-aligned the organization to provide for enhanced supervisory oversigh '

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The position of Assistant Health Physicist was eliminated. However, in April 1993, the licensee obtained a temporary assistant Health Physicist to support and assist in program improvement A sever.th supervisor was added to the radiation protection organization. The individual rlli ng the new position is responsible for coordination of training ,

activities and coordination of radiological occurrences report The licensee provided supervisory developmental training for all supervisors that supervise hourly worker A radiation protection supervisor was assigned to interface with maintenance first- ,

line supervisory personnel to resolve maintenance personnel concerns and enhance communication ,

Based on the above review, the licensee has taken action to enhance the performance of the on site radiological controls organizatio ,

No violations were identifie , Audits. Technical Monitoring and Radiological Occurrences The inspector reviewed the licensee's audits and technical monitoring of the radiological controls program. The review was with respect to criteria contained in Technical Specification 6.4. The inspector also reviewed the adequacy and effectiveness of  ;

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corrective actions taken on problems self-identified by the licensee during review of radiological occurrence The evaluation of the licensee's performance in this area was based on discussions with .

cognizant licensee personnel and review of selected audits and technical monitoring reports performed by the licensee since the previous inspectio The following documents were reviewed:

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Audit A0764523, Dosimetry, Bioassay and Respiratory Protection, performed ,

August 2-25,1993 (draft)

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Technical Monitoring Reports LMR-93-0224 and LMR93-0209 The inspector also reviewed an audit performed at the licensee's Peach Bottom Station in July 1993. The audit evaluated the licensee's implementation of the revised 10 CFR

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Part 2 The audits and Technical Monitoring efforts were considered to be of good quality. The inspector concluded that the licensee implemented generally a very good radiological ,

controls audit program.

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u 7.0 Program Enhancements k

In approximately the past year and a half, the licensee experienced several radiological controls events that indicated weaknesses in control of radiological work activities and communications. The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions taken in response to the observed weaknesses. The following observations were made:

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In response to these matters, the licensee enhanced training of personnel to make them aware of the identified weaknesses and the need to properly communicate within and external to their departments, as appropriat The licensee revised and updated procedures, as appropriate, to enhance control of work activities and inter and intra departmental communications (e.g.,

development of Clearance Guide 18 regarding draining of systems).

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The licensee reorganized the on-site radiological controls organization in order to enhance supervisor oversight of on-going activities. An additional supervisor was added to the organization. In addition, supervisors were provided enhanced

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supervisor development trainin Personnel were sensitized to the need to examine the Peach Bottom Station and other industry counterparts in order to identify and react to potential problems or concerns before they are identified at the Limerick Statio Action was taken to develop extensive job history files and maintain industry technical literature within the radiological controls group (e.g., Information Notices).

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A consultant was hired to review the January 27,1993, traversing incore probe event and recommend program enhancements, as appropriate, relative to the event and in light of the upcoming implementation date (January 1,1994) of the revised 10 CFR Part 2 '

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The licensee reviewed radiological occurrence reports and developed an action

! plan to respond to declining performance trend '

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A health physics continuing improvement program was implemented as a result l of perceived declining performance in the health physics program. About 180 items had been identified for review. The program includes numerous objectives including objectives to establish awareness and ownership of programmatic !

weaknesses within the health physics (HP) organization and objectives to enhance the communication and teamwork among the HP staff and the plant work groups.

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The inspector's review indicated the licensee took a number of actions to enhance control !

af radiological work activities and communication .;

8.0 External and Internal Exoosure Controls >

The inspector reviewed the implementation and adequacy of radiological controls at i*

Limerick Units 1 and ;

The evaluation of the licensee's performance was based on discussions with cognizant personnel, independent inspector observations during tours of Limerick Units 1 and 2, 3

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observations of on-going work activities, and review of documentation. The inspector's review principally focused on review of outage activides at Limerick Unit The inspector toured the radiologically controlled areas ref the plant and independently :

reviewed the following elements of the licensee's external and internal exposure control program:

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posting, barricading and access control, as appropriate, to Radiation, High .

Radiation, and Airborne Radioactivity Areas;

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High Radiation Area access point key control-

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personnel adherence to radiation protection procedures, radiation work permits, I and good radiological control practices;

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use of personnel contamination control devices;  ;

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use of dosimetry devices;

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use of respiratory protection equipment (as appropriate);

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installation, use and periodic operability verification of engineering controls to minimize airborne radioactivity; 4

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records and reports of personnel exposure;

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adequacy of radiological surveys to support pre-planning of work and on-going work; and

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timeliness of analysis of airborne radioactivity samples including supervisory review of sample results; -

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adequacy of supply and performance checks of survey instrument The review was with respect to criteria contained in applicable licensee procedures and 10 CFR 20, Standards for Protection Against Radiatio >

The inspector's review indicated the licensee implemented effective radiological controls for the work activities reviewe The following observation was made:  ;

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As part of programmatic enhancements to the radiological controls program, the ,

licensee developed and implemented a radiological controls coverage sheet. The

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sheet was attached to active radiation work permits. The sheet provided specific guidance regarding expected coverage requirements by radiological controls technicians. This was considered a good initiative. The inspector noted however, that the sheet was not controlled or incorporated into the licensee's administrative control program for forms. The licensee's representatives indicated this matter would be reviewe No violations were identifie .0 Radioactive Material Control and Contamination Control The inspector reviewed the adequacy and effectiveness of radioactive material, contaminated material, and contamination controls at Units 1 and The following matters were reviewed:

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personnel frisking practices;

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use of proper contamination control techniques at work locations, including control of hot particles;

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posting and labeling (as appropriate) of contaminated and radioactive material;

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efforts to reduce the volume of contaminated trash including steps to minimize introduction of unnecessary material into potentially contaminated areas; and

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adequacy of contamination surveys to support planning for and support of on-going wor The evaluation of the licensee's performance in this area was based on independent observations by the inspector and discussions with cognizant personne The inspector's review indicated the licensee implemented a number of enhancements to the contamination control program over the past year. The enhancements were as follows:

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The licensee obtained and placed in service multiple personnel contamination monitors at exits of radiological controlled area The licensee also obtained and placed in service small article monitors to monitor small tools and other articles removed from the radiological controlled are In addition, the licensee installed closed circuit television camera at the main exits of the radiological controlled area +

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The licensee's Plant Manger provided for communication of station contamination l control policy to all plant workers.

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The inspector's review indicated these were very good initiatives to enhance contamination control effort The inspector's review of contamination control matters identified that the licensee had self-identified (ROR No. 92-40), in August and September of 1992, instances of surve meters and other material (e.g., tools) with low level fixed contamination outside the radiological controlled area. The areas were the Health Physics Instrument and Control -

Repair Facility, the Health Physics Instrument Storage Facility, the Health Physics Instrument Issue Facility, and selected tool rooms. The licensee immediately controlled the areas as radiological controlled areas, the instruments were moved to approved storage locations, and routine surveys of storage area outside the radiological controlled area was initiated. The licensee's radiation protection supervisors subsequently ,

performed direct observation of technicians performing release surveys to re-qualify them. Also, all appropriate technicians were instructed in the problems identifie Control of release of material from the radiological controlled areas were enhanced as discussed above.

i The inspector considered this matter a licensee identified violation of contamination control procedures in that Technical Specification 6.11 requires radiation protection procedures to be adhered to and radiation protection procedure HP 810 (Revision 8)

required material to be properly surveyed prior to removing it from the RCA. - As result, t the inspector evaluated the licensee's actions relative to the criteria for non-issuance of a Notice of Violation, as specified in the NRC Enforcement Policy. Based on the above discussed corrective actions, the licensee took appropriate corrective actions and this matter is considered a non-cited violatio The following area for improvement was identified:

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The licensee established procedures for monitoring hot particle areas. The procedure guidance was not clear as to the need (if appropriate) to survey personnel protective clothing upon egress of personnel from a hot particle zon The inspector noted that hot particles on protective clothing worn by personnel ;

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could present external exposure concerns. The licensee indicated this matter would be reviewe No violations were identifie . Sodium-24 (Na-24) Contamination Event 10.1 f2sneal

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The inspector reviewed the circumstances and licensee evaluations associated with identification, on August 20,1993, of Na-24 contamination of isolated sections of the Unit 2 Turbine Building (217' elevation) and sections of the Control Structure Hallway

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(217' elevation). The contamination was identified during radiation protection follow-up of personnel contamination alarms sustained by personnel during their attempts to exit the radiological controlled area on the morning of August 20, 1993. A total of-10 personnel contaminations occurred. With the exception of contamination.of a pant leg, all alarms indicated contamination on the bottom of shoes. No contamination was identified outside the radiological controlled area .

The licensee used high specific activity Na-24 (@ 1 millicurie) on the evening of August .~

19, 1993, for calibration of the flow venturis on the Unit 2 feedwater trains. The vial containing the Na-24 exhibited contact radiation dose rates of about 3,000 R/hr and was determined to exhibit significant contamination not previously encountere .2 Findings The inspector reviewed the following matters associated with this event:

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previous performance of this task

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adequacy and implementation of radiological controls procedures

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implementation and adequacy of the various radiation work permits used to provide radiological controls for the activity

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adequacy of pre-job planning and preparation

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radioactive material control

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posting, barricading, and access controls as appropriate

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adequacy of radiological surveys including contamination, radiation, and airborne radioactivity

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training and qualification of personnel

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monitoring of personnel radiation exposure

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radiation exposure dose assessments, as appropriate, associated with Na-24 contaminatio implementation of ALARA controls

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licensee knowledge of industry events associated with this activity and implementation of appropriate precautions to preclude recurrence The evaluation of the licensee's performance in this area was based on review of applicable licensee procedures, radiological surveys, tours of the areas, and discussions with cognizant personne The inspector's review indicated that the licensee had performed this activity on six previous occasions and that, overall, the licensee provided very good radiological controls for this work activity. The licensee appropriately incorporated lessons learned from industry events. Applicable procedures were adhered to. The inspector's review indicated that there was no intake of radioactive material and external radiation exposure had been properly monitored. Effective ALARA controls were implemented. No unplanned personnel exposures (external or internal) occurred.

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The inspector noted that the Nuclear Quality _ Assurance Group implemented technical -

monitoring of the planning and preparation of the quality, including proper .

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implementation of the radiation work permit progra The following areas for enhancement were identified:

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Licensee evaluations of the floor contamination indicated that the contamination -

encountered exhibited hot particle characteristics (i.e., small particles). The licensee immediately implemented hot particle survey techniques (i.e., large area ,

maslin smears). The inspector noted that during actual preparation and use of the Na-24 on August 19, 1993, normal contamination (disk smears) techniques had been used and apparently did not detect the hot particle nature of the - !

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contamination. Consequently, increased surveys, and controls (e.g., hot particle buffer zones) were not implemented which would have enhanced control of spread :

of contamination outside the posted contamination areas. The inspector's review -

identified a need to implement hot particle controls during preparation and use of the Na-24. The licensee had also identified the need to implement hot particle !

controls for future injections and indicated future injections would use hot particle survey techniques. Industry experience had not identified apparent hot particle -

controls concerns with this activity. The licensee contacted the vendor who provided the Na-24 to alert them to the contamination. The contamination was inside a shield and not accessible to personnel handling the package in which the Na-24 was transporte ,

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1 Plannine and Preparation for Proposed Fuel Receipt  :

The inspector reviewed the licensee's planning and preparation for the proposed receipt 1

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of fuel from the Shoreham Nuclear Generating Station. The evaluation of the licensee's

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performance was based on discussions with cognizant licensee personnel including training personnel, and review of procedures including shipping and receipt procedure !

The inspector's review indicated the licensee was performing appropriate planning and preparation for receipt of Shoreham's fuel. The following observation was made:

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The licensee performed dry runs with an actual shipping cask that would be used !

for the shipments. Critiques were held after the dry nms to identify areas for ,

enhancemen Action items were identified in the areas of housekeeping, j training, manpower applications, techniques and coordination; equipment modification; procedure upgrades; and safet No violations were identifie )

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12.0 Station Tours  !

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The inspector toured the station periodically during the inspection. The . inspector considered overall housekeeping to be generally very goo The following matter was brought to the licensee's attention:

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During tours of the reactor building, the inspector noted that floors were being -

grit blasted to clean the top surface. The grit blasting apparently used metallic fines to clean the surface. The inspector's tour of the area resulted in small metal fines being lodged in the soles of his shoes which resulted in tracking of fines to other locations. The inspector questioned this matter relative to the licensee's housekeeping program. The licensee's station manager immediately suspended the activity pending evaluation of it relative to applicable station housekeeping requirement .0 Exit Meetings l

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Section 1.0) on September 14, 1993. The inspector summarized the purpose, scope and findings of the inspectio The licensee acknowledged the finding i

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Attachment I to NRC Combined Report Nos. 50-352/93-23; 50-353/93-23 Management Meetine Summary 1.0 Purpose of Meeti A Management Meeting was held at the NRC Region I Office, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, on September 8,199 The meeting was a combined management meeting attended by representatives of Philadelphia Electric Company (PECo), the Long Island Power Authority (LIPA), and

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members of NRC management and staff. The meeting was open to the public and members of the public were in attendance. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the planning and preparation (by both licensee's) for transfer and receipt of slightly irradiated reactor fuel from LIPA's Shoreham Nuclear Power Station (Shoreham) to PECo's Limenck Nuclear Generating Station (Limerick).

2.0 Attendees The attendees of the September 8,1993, meeting are identified in Attachment 2 of this repor !

The meeting was open to the public and members of the public were in attendanc .0 NRC Comments NRC management opened the meeting by identifying the purpose of the meetin .0 Licensee Comments The licensee's representatives (LIPA and PECo) described the planning and preparation for the transfer of the slightly irradiated fuel from Shoreham to Limerick. Topics covered during the meeting included procedure development, personnel training and qualification, dry runs, quality assurance oversight, and schedul .0 Concluding Remarks NRC management stated that, based on the presentation and previous and on-going inspections, the licensees provided an appropriate level of planning and preparation to safely transfer the fuel from Shoreham to Limeric ,

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t Attachment 2 to NRC Combined Report Nos. 50-352/93-23; 50-353/93-23 ,

Attendees of the September 8.1993. Management Meeting .

Philadelphia Electric Company D. R. Helwig, Vice-President, Limerick R. Scott, Project Manager M. Krich, Manager, Limerick Licensing J. Flanagan, Plant Services-Limerick R. Kinard, Emergency Planning-Chesterbrook J. W. Jones, Public Affairs Jang_111and Power Authori.ty C. Giacomazzo, President- Shoreham Decommissioning Project A. Bortz, Resident Manager-Shoreham Station R. Bonnifield, General Counsel J. P. Harris, Nuclear Training Coordinator and Emergency Preparedness Coordinator S. Schoenwiesner, Licensing and Regulatory Compliance Manager R. Patch, Nuclear Quality Assurance Department Manager R. Youngeblood, Fuel Disposition Production Section Hea Nuclear Regulatory Commission C. W. Hehl, Director Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards, NRC Region I W. Pasciak, Chief, Facilities Radiation Protection Section, NRC Region I E. C. Wenzinger, Chief Reactor Projects Branch, No. 2, NRC Region I ,

C. J. Anderson, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2B, NRC Region I R. L. Nimitz, Senior Radiation Specialist, NRC Region I N. Perry, Senior Resident Inspector, Limerick Station T. Easlick, Resident Inspector, Limerick Station F. Rinaldi, Project Manager, Limerick, NRR C. Pittiglio, Project Manger, NMSS Others J. Howard, Senior Regulatory Affairs Representative, New York Power Authority E. Skechan, Field Services Project Manager, General Electric Company R. Pinney, Nuclear Engineer, New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and Energy

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