IR 05000353/1987007
| ML20216F813 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 06/16/1987 |
| From: | Linville J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20216F784 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-353-87-07, 50-353-87-7, NUDOCS 8706300952 | |
| Download: ML20216F813 (12) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No. 87-07
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Docket No. 50-353 License No. CPPR-107 Category A
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Licensee:
Philadelphia Electric Company 2301 Market Street
Philadelphia, PA 19101 Facility:
Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2 Dates: May 11 - June 7, 1987 Inspectors:
R. A. Gramm, Senior Resident Inspector J. E. Kaucher, Resident Inspector Approved by:
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J C#Lfnville, C df Ddte /
actor Projec I Section 2A Inspection Summary:
Report for Inspection Conducted May 11 - June 7, 1987 (Report No. 50-353/87-07)
Area Inspected:
Routine inspection by the resident inspectors of work activities, procedures, and records relative to quality assurance and engineering deficiency report review, safety related components, electrical cable raceway, nondestructive examinations, piping and pipe supports, reactor pressure vessel and internals, electrical components and allegations.
The inspector reviewed' licensee action on previously identified items and performed plant inspection tours.
The inspection involved 144 hours0.00167 days <br />0.04 hours <br />2.380952e-4 weeks <br />5.4792e-5 months <br /> by the inspectors.
Results:
No violations were identified.
Several new NRC open items were identified involving clarification of flush data recording requirements (paragraph 1.0), the use of cable pull tension in excess of the maximum allowable (paragraph 5.a), resolution of discrepancies between motor control center and load center load lists (paragraph 5.b), and resolution of drawing discrepancies between vendor information for piping requirements associated with feedwater check valve air operator solenoid valves (paragraph 6.a).
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0706300952 O h h 53 PDR ADOCK O PDR G
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DETAILS
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i 1.0 Plant Inspection Tours The inspector observed in progress work activities, completed work, and j
plant status in several areas during inspection tours. Work was examined j
for defects and compliance with regulatory and licensee requirements.
Particular note was taken of the presence of quality control inspectors and quality control evidence such as inspection records, material l
identification, nonconforming material identification, housekeeping and equipment preservation. The inspector interviewed craft supervision, craft and quality control personnel in the work areas.
Observations are noted below:
The inspector performed a walk-through tour of the main Bechtel site
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warehouse. Adequate protection was provided for the stored compo-nents and access controls had been instituted.
The inspector observed the performance of QC receipt inspections for electrical
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flex conduit couplers (QCIR E-F2-10046-MRR-181905) and a valve
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operator motor (QCIR M-40-MRR-181700). A small amount of food debris was found in cubicles I6 and H11_which was immediately cleaned up by the Bechtel personnel. The inspector had no concerns.
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The inspector examined the-inprocess work activities.at a closure spool piece HBB-210-1-4A to the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI)' pump. The associated craft and QC personnel were interviewed and found knowledgeable regarding their activities.
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In process work activities on a small bore pipe SP-HCB-216-E17 was observed.
The craft adhered to the 400 degrees F maximum interpass temperature requirements.
The Valcor solenoid valve was found properly installed with respect to flow direction _ and socket weld engagement. The inspector had no concerns.
Inprocess work activities on instrumentatio.4 support JTR-51-04-16Q-A
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were observed.
The use of proper weld filler material was verified.
The diesel generator fuel oil transfer pumps were examined.
Pump
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20P514 was found to have the paint peeling off the pump casing and a long unsupported span of tubing was noted.
The inspector was presented previously issued Nonconformance Report (NCR) 11543 to abrasive blast clean the casings and to recoat with an approved coating.
The pump vendor was contacted by the licensee and verified that the tubing did not require an intermediate support clamp. The i
inspector had no concerns.
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-The fitup of a closure spool to a Residual Heat Removal (RHR) tie in to the recirculation system isometric DCA-205-3 was examined at
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Field weld 6.
The associated weld documentation was reviewed without questio y l
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i In process installation of pipe whip restraint PR24 was observed.
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The associated work package (C-289-PR-004) was reviewed.
The whip restraint installation was found proceeding properly and the use of i
proper filler metal was verified.
l The performance of an inprocess Preservice Inspection'(PSI) exam-
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ination of pipe weld ECB-211-2 field weld 3 was witnn sed. The inspector noted' proper application of the dye penetrant and cleaning of the weld surface.
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The inspector reviewed Startup Administrative procedure AD7.1 regarding conduct of pipe system flushes. The procedure stated'
that flushes would be performed with a flow velocity greater than'
the design velocity.
The licensee plans to provide data recording requirements for the flush activities.
No system flushes have been performed to date. This item.is unresolved pending licensee clarifi-cation of the flush data recording requirements.
(87-07-01)
The inspector. toured the battery rooms, emergency switchgear rooms,
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the control. room, and the cable spreading room.
Ongoing electrical installation activities were observed.
The associated work packages were reviewed.
The inspector had no concerns.
The piping system pressure test package for main steam hydrostatic
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. test 2M-RPV-02 was reviewed.
The scope of the pressure. test was from the outboard Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) to the main
stop valves and through the steam bypass valves to the condenser.
The test package was in accordance with ASME Section III NC-6000 and was found satisfactory.
The inspector walked the piping runs and examined the installation of_ temporary supports to replace permanent hangers that were removed to expose weld joints.
The test pump, relief valve and calibrated pressure gages were examined.
The inspector discussed the test conduct with the lead hydrostatic test engineer, the lead QC representative and the lead ANI.
The inspector had no concerns.
2.0 Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items l
a.
(Closed) Open Item (82-PT-01):
General Electric HFA type relays.
The problem with these relays developed from a failure to incorporate the correct gap and wipe settings.
Since HFA relays
~were initially manufactured with normally open contacts, the relays of concern were those which had been changed to normally closed.
The HFA relays used in safety-related systems at Limerick Unit 2 do not utilize normally closed contacts and are therefore not a concern.
The inspector verified that only normally open contacts are used in HFA relays in safety-related applications.
This item is close L,
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(Closed) Construction Deficiency (83-00-13).
Deficient catalyst beds in.COMSIP. gas monitoring systems.
In accordance with the recommendations of the manufacturer, replacement catalyst beds were ordered, received, receipt inspected and installed at Limerick Unit 2.
A vendor representative witnessed the installation of the i
replacement catalyst beds.
The inspector reviewed the material requisition, the receiving inspection report and the installation inspection report. This item is closed.
3.0 Licensee Action on IE Bulletins and IE Circulars
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The inspector reviewed licensee records related to the IE Bulletins and IE Circulars identified below to verify that:
the IE Bulletin er IE Circular was received and reviewed for applicability; a written response
was provided if required; and the corrective action taken was' adequate.
The following IE Bulletins and IE Circulars were reviewed:
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a.
(Closed) IE Circular 76-01:
Crane Hoist Control Circuit j
Mod _i fication s. A modified control circuit design for slow speed hoist capability _resulted in solenoid circuit arcing.
The licensee directed the crane supplier, Harnischfeger Corporation, to review the final hoist circuit design to assure that a similar control
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circuit _ design would not be' utilized.
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b.
(Closed) IE Circular 76-02:
Relay Failures - Westinghouse BF and BFD Relays. Bechtel and General E1ectric have instituted design and procurement measures to preclude the use of the subject. relays in
either NSSS or balance of plant systems, c.
(Closed)'IE Circular 76-04:
Neutron Monitor and Flow Bypass Switch
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Malfunctions.
Improper fabrication caused switch misalignment to-occur.
The subject model number 2940 switches have not been used in safety related applications'at Literick.
d.
'(Closed) IE Circular 76-05: Hydraulic Shock Suppressors.
Only mechanical type snubbers are used at Limerick.
e.
(Closed) IE Circular 77-05:
Fluid Entrapment in Valve Bonnets.
All gate valves supplied by General Electric.were designed to be installed with the stem in the vertical direction.
Four safety-related flexible disc gate valves' supplied by Bechtel have been installed.with.the valve stems below the horizontal position.
Procedure PMQ-500-05 was generated to ensure the four valves are exercised after_each hydrostatic test which will preclude water
' collection that can lead to valve binding during the system heatup process.
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(Closed) IE Circular 77'-12:
Dropped Fuel Assemblies at BWR Facilities.
The following actions were implemented by the licensee:
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Operations personnel were directed to minimize the number of
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fuel movements with grapple rotations exceeding 45 degrees.
GE recommendations in Service Information Letter (SIL) 109 on
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enhanced grapple design was implemented.
Interlocks were added to prevent inadvertent grapple opening or
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-grapple hoisting.
A redundant 150% capacity load brake was provided.
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Maintenance procedures were issued for periodic visual examin-
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ations of bolted joints.
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Procedures were issued to perform cable inspections for
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abnormal wear, to verify pruper lubrication, to check for weld defects, to assure member integrity, to check for loose bolting l
hardware, and to check Technical Specification required.
interlocks, g.
(Closed) IE Circular 77-13:
Reactor Safety Signals Negated During Testing. General Electric reviewed the system design and found the testing. circuit design would preclude the occurrence of a similar j
event.
Specific training was accomplished for operations personnel regarding system functions, system interactions and-Technical Specification requirements as recommended by the IE Circular.
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(Closed) IE Circular 78-04:
Installation Errors that could Prevent Closing of Fire Doors.
The licensee reviewed the plant design and found no horizontal sliding fire doors.
The fire dampers are the guillotine or trap door type that rely upon gravity for damper closure.
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(Closed) IE Circular 78-06:
Potential Common Mode Flooding of ECCS Equipment Rooms at BWR Facilities.
Bechtel performed a review of all floor drains that could result in common mode flooding.
The-floor drain-openings in the ECCS equipment compartments are restricted to limit the flow of water through the. drain.
The electrical power supplies to the associated compartment sump pumps
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were redesigned to provide electrical separation.
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(Closed) IE Circular 78-09: Arcing of General Electric Company NEMA Size 2 Contactors.
Bechtel and General Electric have instituted design and procurement measures to preclude the use of
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the Size 2 motor starter contactors at Limerick, k.
(Closed) IE Circular 78-11:
Recirculation Motor Generator Set Overspeed Stops. Appropriate system tests were developed for Unit 1 to verify the operation of the recirculation motor generator unit.
As the Unit 1 preoperational test procedures form the basis for the Unit 2 procedures, this concern will be resolved accordingly during system testin.-
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(Closed) IE Circular 78-12:
HPCI Turbine Control Valve Lift Rod Bending. General Electric' issued Field Disposition Instruction I
(FDI) 26/73030-1 to modify the linkage assembly. The closed FDI was reviewed by the inspector.
The licensee has issued a procedure to provide linkage examination for scale, rust and verification of linkage lengths.
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(Closed) IE Circular 78-13:
Inoperability of Service Water Pumps.
The safety related service water systems take a suction from'the spray pond.
The spray pond was designed to function during periods of maximum freezing.
The licensee reviewed the possibility for Frazil ice formation on the spray pond and found it unlikely because the spray pond is a non-flowing body of water.
Surface ice is pre-vented from entering the pump suction pits because of the relative location of the sluice gate and water surface.
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(Closed) IE Circular 78-14:
HPCI pump Turbine Reversing Chamber
Hold Down Bolting. General Electric issued FDI 32/73030-2 to
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replace internal cap screws which hold the steam reversing chambers in position.
The cap screws were replaced with ASTM A193 Grade B6 with Rockwell hardness of 28 or less.
The inspector reviewed the closed FDI.
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(Closed) IE Circular 78-15:
Tilting Disk Check Valves Fail to.
Close with Gravity in Vertical Position.
The licensee Mechanical engineering department reviewed all tilting disc check valves and found they were designed in accordance with the manufacturer recommendations.
Two Anchor Darling 30 inch check valves were used in a horizontal piping run in the spray pond pumphouse and were therefore satisfactory.
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(0 pen) IE Circular 78-16:
Limitorque Valve Actuators.
The inspector reviewed licensee correspondence that documented a total of 36 valves equipped with 3600 rpm motors on SMB-0/1/2/or 3 type operators that were susceptible to clutch wear failure. A number of operational precautions were recommended for manual operation of the clutching mechanism. The licensee was asked how the precautions were promulgated to the plant staff.
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(Closed) IE Circular 78-18:
UL Fire Test. The licensee reviewed the plant design and found that curbs were provided where appropriate to contain flammable liquid spills.
The licensee further ascertained that sprinkler heads were located to provide complete coverage of hazard areas and that fire detection devices were located in accord-ance with the HFPA requirements.
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(Closed) IE Circular 78-19: -Manual override of Safety System ~
' Actuation Signals.
The. licensee reveiwed NSSS and balance of plant system design. The containment isolation function could be' manually
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The bypass would be accomplished by.a locked bypass
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switch that is alarmed.
Operations personnel would be appropriately
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-(Closed)'IE Circular 79-05: Moisture' Leakage in' Stranded Wire
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Conductors. General Electric had designed the electrical system-j with sealed junction-boxes and/or'the use of environmentally quali-i fied heat' shrink tubing was specified.
Bechtel did not utilize any terminal'. boxes for Class.1E systems in the containment area.
The lic'ensee found.that sufficient design measures had been~
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established to preclude moisture incursion into the stranded wire conductors.
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(0 pen) IE' Circular.79-07: Unexpected Speed Increase of Reactor'
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. Recirculation MG Set Re'sulted in Reactor Power Increase. General Electric committed'that the. scoop tube positioner circuit. drawings would be. revised to reflect.the two fuse configuration. -Operations procedures-were amended to include a warning statement regarding.
- fuse removal.. The inspector could not verify the completion of licensee actions with respect to placing warning signs.on the scoop tube controller cabinets regarding the consequences of removing,the fuses from the circuit, u.
_(Closed).IE Circular.79-10:
Pipefittings Manufactured from.
' Unacceptable Material.
Bechtel determined that Tube Turns Lot
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W6719, 41 inch elbows.had been used in three safety related systems.
U.S. Steel performed spark, Brinnel hardness tests and r.hemical verifications to assure correct material properties of the elbows in question.
Bechtel additionally contacted the' vendors'for diesel-generator, CRD hydraulic system and the hydrogen recombiners.to assure that no questionable Tube Turn material was utilized on those components.
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(Closed)'IE Circular 79-11:
Design / Construction Interface Problem, l
The. Limerick reactor systems are designed in a slide along rather-than a mirror image configuration which led to problems at other projects.
The licensee reviewed the Architect Engineer (AE) and Nuclear. Steam Supply System (NSSS) design interface procedures and found them adequate.
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(Closed) IE Circular 79-12:.-Potential Diesel Generator Turbocharger
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Problem.~ ~The licensee ~ evaluated the concerns on the EMD diesel generator lubrication system.
The Limerick Colt-Fairbanks Morse i
model No. 3 TD8 was found to have features, such as a normal start prelube pump operation, that could preclude a similar problem.
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(Closed) IE Circular 79-13:
Replacement of Diesel Fire Pomp Starting Contactors.
The Cummens industrial fire pump starting contactors were replaced with a new 217588 magnetic switch which would rectify the deficient condition.
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(Closed) IE Circular 79-17:
Contact Problem in SB-12 Switches on
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General Electric Metalclad Circuit Breakers.
The licensee found
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that no GE metalclad circuit breakers are utilized in safety related systems.
The Limerick metalciad circuit breakers are manufactured by ITE and do not include GE SB-12 switches.
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(Closed) IE Circular 79-18:
Proper Installation of Target Rock Safety-Relief Valves.
Bechtel Specification M-103 includes
_ provisions which limit the extent of insulation installation on the relief. valves.
The air operatcr diaphragms were replaced with silicone /Nomex material which requires a 6 year-replacement cycle.
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(Closed) IE Circular 79-19:
Loose Locking devices on Ingersoll-Rand Pump Impellers.
Bechtel and General Electric reviewed the use of Ingersoll-Rand pumps in safety related systems and found that pump models A, W, WD and WDF were not utilized. All other Ingersoll-Rand pumps were reviewed by project angineering personnel to assure that adequate locking devices were provided on the impellers, bb.
(Closed) IE Circular 79-20:
Failure of GTE Sylvania Relay, Type PM Bulletin 7305, Catalog SU12-11-AC with a 120V AC Coil.
Bechtel and General _ Electric have instituted design and procurement measures to i
preclude the use of the subject relay in either NSSS or balance of plant systems.
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(Closed) IE Circular 79-22:
Stroke Times for Power Operated Relief Valves.
This circular was not applicable to Boiling Water reactors.
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(Closed) IE Circular 79-23: Mutor Starters and Contactors Failed to Operate Bechtel and General Electric have instituted design and procurement measures to preclude the use of the Gould NEMA size 3 starters with date codes between 7822 and 7935.
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(Closed) IE Bulletin 76-02: General Electric relay coil failures.
This bulletin re'ates to General Electric HFA, HGA, HKA and HMA relay t'/res.
Of these, only HFA and HMA types are used at Limerick Unit 2 in safety-related applications. The licensee has verified that all HFA and HMA relays presently installed in safety-related systems do not contain nylon coil spools identified by General l
Electric as the source of the relay failures. The inspector
performed an audit of installed relays to verify the use of f
acceptable model and date code HMA and HFA relays. This item is closed.
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The inspector reviewed the following documents regarding instrumentation design and installation.
Instrumentation Installation Details, M-830, Rev. 123
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Quality Control Instruction, I-1.10, Rev. 3, Installation of
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i Instruments Design' Specification 8031-M-248, Rev. 4, Nuclear Instrument Valves
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and 3 Valve Bypass Manifolds Instrument Piping Class Specification, M-830-G006, Rev. 7
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Instrument Isometric EJ-52-01-08A, Core Spray Pump Discharge
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pressure indicator PI-52-209C The inspector verified that the design of the instrument installation for.
safety related pressure indicator PI-52-209C (core. spray pump discharge pressure) met the requirements of M-830, including:
materials, valving, layout, orientation to process line, proper fittings and specific vendor requirements.
The inspector performed a walkdown of the completed instrument installation for Core Spray Pump 2C local discharge pressure indicator (PI-52-209C), and verified the following attributes:
tubing bend radii, ovality requirements, torquing of all support bolts, instrument model, instrument ID tag, tracibility of root valve and flex hose, instrument
location, instrument clearance, proper supports and tubing slope, tightness of compression fittings, installation dimensions and current calibration of the torque wrenches.
The inspector identified no items of concern.
5.0 Electrical Cable and Raceway I
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The following documents were reviewed by the inspector regarding cable pulling and design data:
Cable Pulling Tension Calculation E-587, Rev. O I
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Cable Pulling Tension Calculation E-590, Rev. 0
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Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram E-29, Rev.10 for 440 Volt
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Safeguard Load Centers D214, D224, D234, and 0244
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Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram E-24, Rev. 7, Safeguard l
Load Center Tabulations
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Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram E-59, Sheet 1 of 2, Rev. 3,
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Safeguard MCC Tabulations for D214-D-G, D224-D-G, 0234-D-G and D244-D-G.
The inspector reviewed calculations E-587 an'd E-590 including verificati<in.of input data, raceway segment design layout and i
comparison of calculated tension to design allowable tension. A
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field walkdown of both cable runs was performed to verify the-
installed configuration with the cable pulling tension calculation i
data, i
The inspector witnessed the two machine pulls associated with calculations E-587 and E-590. The inspector verified the proper markings on the cables for divisional identification, size of cable and cable manufacturer, and also verified the acceptability of the cable condition, including _ protection of cut ends.
The inspector verified.the proper routing of the cables _in accordance with the pull card, the use of approved lubricants, bend radii _not exceeded, proper use of edge softeners _and tie. downs, cleanliness of tray and conduit, and proper documentation of QC activities.
During the conduct of the cable pull associated with calculation E-590 the inspector observed a sustained tension of 2400 lbs, on i
segment AB of the pull. The calculated maximum allowable tension is 1552 lbs. A Nonconforming Material Installation Conditional-Release was obtained to continue the pull, and Bechtel field engineering prepared a nonconformance report (NCR 11958) for resolution of this item.
Additionally, minimum bend radius criteria was not adhered to in two cases:
(1) during the feeding of cable into a pull box the
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minimum bend radius criteria was violated for a short time period
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and (2) as installed bend radius for several of the cables in pull
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box 2B5055-J1 do not meet minimum bend radius criteria. These items were added to NCR 11958 for resolution.
The items associated with NCR 11958 are unresolved pending final resolution and review by the inspector (87-07-02).
b.
During review of E-24 and E-59 the inspector determined that the total of the loads listed on the MCC tabulation (E-59) are greater than the loads listed on the load center Tabulation (E-24) for the
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individual MCC's.
The inspector questioned why two design documents
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contain different design data for the same MCC.
The inspector was informed that Bechtel has performed calculations which evaluate the MCC connected loads for various operating conditions and determine
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the worse case loaded condition.
These values are then listed on
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the load center tabulation for each MCC. This item is unresolved pending review of the Bechtel Calculations (87-07-03).
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6.0 Safety Related Components The inspector-performed a visual inspection of the feedwater system-a.-
isolation check valves 2F074A and 2F0748, including the air operators and 3-way solennid valves.
Nuclear Boiler P&ID, M-41, Rev. 1, sheet 4 of 6 and QAD-M-41, Rev. O, sheet 4 of 6 both show thel 3 way-valves piped in~ series. However, the as installed configuration is in parallel.
Further, the vendor print (Atwood Morrell P-116-1-21) and Vendor-Instruction Manual (P-116-48) show the 3 way valves piped in parallel.
The responsible design agent, General Electric, has stated that the 3 way valves-should be. piped in series as shown on the Bechtel P&ID and QAD, even..though the Bechtel reviewed and approved
. vendor l print shows the valves in parallel.
PEC0 QA has prepared a:
Finding Report (2G-640) to Bechtel Construction -for resolution of-this inconsistency. Although the 3 way' valves are not safety related they do' impact the operation of safety related components, and the failure of a vendor..to implement the required design shows a deficiency in the interface between vendor and design agent.
This item is' unresolved pending resolution of the Finding Report (87-07-04).
b.
The inspector reviewed the following documents with regard to the
. installation of. core spray pump 2C.
Equipment Work Package 2C-P206-A
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Construction Aid Document CAD-1, Procedure for Installation of
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Pump Internals
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. Core' Spray P&ID, M-52, Sheet-4 of 4, Rev. 2 The inspector witnessed the following work in progress:
Installation of the discharge head'onto the last stage casing,
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including the installation of the tab washers and nuts and final torquing to 450 ft. lbs.
Raising the pump out of the shell
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Cleaning of seating surfaces and final inspection Placing of the gasket between the shell flange and discharge
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head plate Installation of the cap screws and final torquing to 450 ft.
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Installation of the motor onto the discharge head plate
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Proper documentation of QC activities The inspector identified no items of concer [
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.7.0 Piping and Pipe Supports The inspector witnessed in process work on the installation of the safety
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related Emergency Service Water (ESW) supply lines for the diesel
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I generator jacket water heat exchanger.
The following documents were reveiwed:
Work Package WP-HBC-292-1, Rev. 1
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FCN's LP844, LP847, LP840, LP782, LP889, and LP890
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Piping Isometric Drawing HBC-292-1, Rev.15,. Sheets 1 and 2 l
Activities observed included welding of root pass on FW59 in bay A, joint
. cleanliness, joint fitup and alignment, proper filler materials and electrodes, appearance of weld deposit, use of proper welding procedures, evidence of quality control inspection and documentation of quality i
records, 8.0 Unresolved' Items
.l Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to j
ascertain if it is acceptable, a violation, or a deviation.
Unresolved items were discussed in paragraphs 1, 5 and 6.
9.0 Exit Meeting
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The NRC resident inspector discussed the issues and findings in this report with members of the licensee's staff on a weekly basis, and at an exit meeting held on June 5, 1987.
Based on discussions held with licensee representatives on June 5, 1987, it was determined that this report does not contain information subject to 10 CFR 2.790 restrictions.
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