IR 05000352/1994023

Insp Repts 50-352/94-23 & 50-353/94-23 on 940927-1031. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations, Maint,Surveillance,Engineering,Plant Support & Safety Assessment & Quality Verification

ML20149H326
Person / Time
Site:	Limerick
Issue date:	11/10/1994
From:	Anderson C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20149H306	List: IR 05000352/1994023 ML20149H301 ML20149H313
References
50-352-94-23, 50-353-94-23, NUDOCS 9411220123
Download: ML20149H326 (34)

Text

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I I

1 Report No ,

94-23 l I

Docket No I l

License No NPF-39 NPF-85 ,

l Licensee: PECO Energy j Correspondence Control Desk P.O. Box 195 Wayne, Pa 19087-0195 Facility Name: Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection Period: September 27, through October 31, 1994 Inspectors: N. S. Perry, Sesior Resident Inspector T. A. Easlick, Resident Inspector

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Approved by: -

/ o- // k CliffoM J. Anderson, Chief Date Reactor Projects Section No. 2B 9411220123 941109 PDR ADOCK 05000352 O PDR

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Limerick Generating Station Report No. 94-23 & 94-23 Plant Operations Operator response to a Unit 2 scram on October 19, 1994, was excellen I

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Additionally, the debriefing with the operator that inadvertently deenergized l the safeguards bus was very thorough (Section 1.2). Activities associated ,

. with a Unit I load drop on October 8,1994, were properly controlled and '

l supervised (Section 1.3). In one instance, the Shift Manager, acting as the l Emergency Director, did not classify an event based on selected categories and 1 most severe Emergency Action Level (EAL), in that, an Unusual Event (UE) !

declaration was not made after being informed that the dose assessment ;

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indicated that the projected offsite dose was in excess of an EAL for a UE; i this resulted in a cited violation (50-353/94-23-01). The violation is of j concern because even after a similar event occurred in May 1994, the Shift Manager was placed in a position where he had to make a decision between two conflicting pieces of information, in order to make an emergency classification. Prior corrective actions were not adequate to prevent the i September 1994, event and misclassification by the Shift Manager (Section 1.4). There was excellent coordination of the Unit 1 flux tilt testing activities between the operators and the reactor engineers. Additionally, appropriate use of a second verifier for proper rod selection was observed during performance of the testing (Section 1.5).

Maintenance Observed maintenance activities were well controlled and executed by qualified and knowledgeable personnel. Additionally, the activities were coordinated very well between the appropriate work groups (Section 2.1). PECO Energy has revised and implemented an effective Foreign Material Exclusion (FME) program, l which includes comprehensive procedures that cover all activities that could l introduce foreign material into safety systems, as well as balance of plant systems (Section 2.2).  ;

i Surveillance Excellent procedural compliance, good communications between the work sites, appropriate use of a second verifier, and good management oversight were observed during performance of surveillances. Problems encountered during a ,

Unit I reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) surveillance were properly I identified and quickly corrected. This showed a very good safety perspective I concerning a system that is important to safety (Section 3.0). l Enoineerino i To date, engineering response to a self-identified problem with the main ,

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control room fuel zone indicated water level has been both expeditious and I comprehensive (Section 4.0).

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l Plant Succort An instance where the Unit 2 6C feedwater heater was placed in service and the room was not properly posted as a high radiation area will remain unresolved pending NRC review of the circumstances concerning two other past events and the associated corrective actions, and review of the root causes and ,

corrective actions for the most recent event Unresolved Item (50-353/94-23-02) l (Section 5.1). Good coordination of personnel entering and leaving the protected area was observed during the recent open house (Section 5.2).

Safety Assessment and Ouality Verification In general, discussions held during a Nuclear Review Board (NRB) meeting were open and with safety was a primary concern. The NRB was found to be meeting its responsibilities as defined in the technical specifications (Section 6.0).

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I SUMMARY

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• NEEDS - COMPLETED WITH EXCEPTION OF QUALITY-TO-THE-LINE

• NEEDS PROVIDED A MODEL ON WHICH WE CAN SUCCESSFULLY PATTERN FUTURE CHANGES

• AFTER NEEDS, SEVERAL CHANGE INITIATIVES WERE INSTITUTED TO REAP THE BENEFITS

. OF CHANGING BUSINESS CONDITIONS

• PRIOR TO VSIP/VRIP, NGG HAD SCHEDULED A RE-ENGINEERING STRATEGY FOR 199 OUR PARTICIPATION IN VSIP/VRIP PERMITTED US TO MOVE THIS STRATEGY UP THREE MONTHS

• STAFFING LEVELS WITHIN RANGE OF HIGH PERFORMERS

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