IR 05000313/1998006
| ML20237C934 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 08/18/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237C889 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-98-06, 50-313-98-6, 50-368-98-06, 50-368-98-6, NUDOCS 9808240255 | |
| Download: ML20237C934 (15) | |
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e ENCLOSURE 2 !
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket Nos.: 50-313;50-368 License Nos.: DPR-51; NPF-6 Report No.: 50-313/98-06;50-368/98-06
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Licensee: Entergy Operations, In J Facility: Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 Location: 1448 S. R. 333 Russellville, Arkansas 72801
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Dates: June 21 through August 1,1998 Inspectors: K. Kennedy, Senior Resident inspector .
S. Burton, Resident inspector 1 K. Weaver, Resident inspector Approved By: Charles S. Marschall, Chief Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information l
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l EXECUTIVE SUMMAR/
Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50 313/98-06; 50-368/98-06 This routine announced inspection inc;uded aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspectio Operations I
The use of informal markings on the side of the diesel fire pump Fuel Oil Day Tank T-29 to determine tank level and the lack of formal controls on these markings indicated an isolated weakness in the control of measuring test equipment (Section 02.1).
Fifteen licensed operators failed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 55 for maintaining an active license, and as a result, these operators stood control room watches with inactive licenses. The failure to satisfy the minimum shift manning requirements specified in the Technical Specifications (TSs) was determined to be a no response required violation of TS 6.2.2 (Section 05.1).
Maintenance
Unit 2 mechanics demonstrated a lack of familiarity with a job order (JO) in not recognizing that an ignition source permit was required to perform work on the charging system. Appropriate safety precautions were established for estab5shing a freeze seal and the work was performed in accordance with the work plan. Although some deficiencies were found with the work plan instructions, these deficiencies did not impact the Nork (Section M1.1).
Enaineerina
Engineering personnel demonstrated a lack of understanding of the Diesel Fire Pump P-6B system and the operating limits associated with this engine. The engineering support for this system was determined to be weak (Sectin . R.2).
Engineering personnel demonstrated good engineering foresight and communicated well with craft personnel in developing two options for the repair of an unisolable leak on an emergency feedwater (EFW) system drain line weld (Section E1.1).
Plant Support
- Maintenance personnel were knowledgeable on the licensee's controls for work involving potential ignition sources and properly implemented these controls (Section F1.1).
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- The failure to incorporate appropriate requirements and acceptance limits as specified l by the applicable design documents to demonstrate that the Diesel Engine P-6B would l perform satisfactorily in service was identified as an apparent violation of TS 6.8. (Section F1.2).
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Report Details Summary of Plant Status Unit _1 At the beginning of this inspection period, Unit 1 was at 100 percent power. On July 3,1998, power was reduced to approximately 85 percent for turbine governor valve testing and was returned to 100 percent power on the same day. The unit remained at 100 percent power through the end of the inspection perio Unit 2 x Unit 2 operated at 100 percent power throughout th e inspection perio I. ODerations 01 Conduct of Operations 0 General Comments (71707)
The inspectors observed various aspects of plant operations, including compliance with TSs, conformance with plant procedures and the Safety Analysis Report, shift manning, communications, management oversight, proper system configuration and configuration control, housekeeping, and operator performance during routine plant operations and the conduct of surveillanc During tours of the plant, the inspectors found that housekeeping was generally good and discrepancies were promptly correcte The conduct of operations was professional and safety conscious. Evolutions such as surveillance were well control!ed, deliberate, and pedormed according to procedure Shift turnover briefs were comprehensive.' Safety systems were found to be properly aligned. Specific events and noteworthy observations are detailed belo Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment 0 Unit 1 - Diesel Fire Pumo P-6B Material Condition Inspection Scene (71707)
During a tour of the Diesel Fire Pump P-6B room, the inspectors observed that the
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licensee installed a tygon tube to Diesel Fire Pump Fuel Oil Day Tank T-29 to serve as a
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temporary levelindicator. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's controls for this tygon tub _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - ._ --- _- _____- __ - __ __-_ __-__- - _
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2 Observations and Findinas During a walkdown of the Diesel Fire Pump P-6B room, the inspectors observed that the licensee installed a temporary level indicator on the Diesel Fire Pump Fuel Oil Day Tank T-29. This temporary level indicator consisted of a tygon tube, routed from a sample valve underneath the tank to the top of the tank. The sample valve normally remained closed and was only opened by operators to determine the level in the tan On the end of the tank were informal pencil markings indicating the height of the tank in inches. The tygon tube was installed to provide an indication of tank level since the permanently installed level indicator was inoperable. The licensee stated that attempts to repair Level Gauge LG 5213 were unsuccessful and, as a result, a plant change was being developed to replace the level indicator under JO 971329. Operators determined tank level using the tygon tube to satisfy the requirements of Procedure 1104.032, Revision 51, Supplement 2," Surveillance Test of Diesel Fire Pump P-6B." In addition, the temporary level indicator was used to take the Unit 1 daily operations log reading The logsheet noted that the tank level was to be taken using the temporary tygon tub The inspectors found that operators were knowledgeable of the operation of the temporary level indicator and that the sample valve was to be closed after the level attained. The inspectors also determined that the informal pencil markings on the side of the tank appeared to be accurate; however, the temporary tygon tube level gauge was not controlled in accordance with any procedure or work document. The licensee initiated Condition Report (CR) 1-1998-0596 to document the lack of formal controls on the temporary level gaug Conclusions The use of informal markings on the side of Fuel Oil Day Tank T-29 to determine tank level and the lack of formal controls on these markings indicated an isolated weakness in the control of measuring test equipmen Operator Training and Qualification 0 Units 1 and 2 - Licensed Operator Watchstandina Requirements Inspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's administrative controls for maintaining reactor operator (RO) and senior reactor operator (SRO) licenses active as required by 10 CFR 55.5 Observations and Findinas The operations departments for Units 1 and 2 have an administrative position which is I typically manned on day shift to assist the on-shift crews with administrative duties such !
as supervisory approval of JOs, tagging requests, approval of procedure changes, and {
surveillance acceptance criteria. This administrative position is referred to as the control !
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room supervisor - administrative (CRS-Admin). The CRS-Admin position, which the licensee requires be filled by an individual holding an active SRO license, as defined in 10 CFR Part 55.53(e), is normally stationed outside of the control room On July 9,1998, the inspectors determined that the licensee inappropriately credited the CRS-Admin position as one which satisfied the requirements of 10 CFR 55.53(e).
10 CFR 55.53(e) requires that, to maintain an active status, a licensee shall actively perform the functions of an RO or SRO on a minimum of seven 8-hour or five 12-hour shifts per calender quarter.10 CFR 55.4 states that " actively performing the functions of an operator or senior operator means that an individual has a position on the shift crew that requires the individual to be licensed as defined in the facility's TSs, and that the individual carries out and is responsible for the duties covered by that position." The inspectors found that the CRS-Admin position was not defined in the facility's TSs and, therefore, could not be considered as a watch station to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 55.53(e) for a licensed operator to maintain an active statu The inspectors found that Procedure 1063.008, Revision 26, " Operations Training Sequence;" Unit 1 Operations Directive OPD002, Revision 9," Operational and Watchstanding Standards;" and Unit 2 Operations Directive 2OPD014, Revision 4,
"Watchstation Proficiency," all irdicated that the CRS-Admin position was an acceptable
" Additional Position" allowed for SROs to maintain their license activ The inspectors questioned whether any individuals holding SRO licenses had taken credit for CRS-Admin watches to maintain their licenses active and whether or not these individuals had subsequently stood watch in the control room with an inactive licens The licensee conducted a review for the period betweer July 1,1997, and July 9,1998, and found that four Unit 1 SROs and five Unit 2 SROs had taken credit for standing watch in the CRS-Admin position to maintain an active license and, subsequently, stood control room watches that required an active SRO license. As a result, these individuals did not have active SRO licenses at the time they stood the control room watche The licensee also found that another position was inappropriately being credited as meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 55.53(e) for maintaining an active RO licens This position was the third RO position on shift responsible for performing inplant and control room support, tagging, surveillance, and assisting in log taking. The licensee found that between July 1,1997, and July 9,1998, one Unit 1 RO and five Unit 2 ROs had taken credit for standing the third RO position to maintain an active license and, subsequently, stood control room watches that required an active RO license. As a result, these individuals did not have active RO licenses at the time they stood the control room watche .
l Unit 1 TS 6.2.2 states, in part, "that each on duty shift shall be composed of the !
minimum requirements of Table 6.2-1." Table 6.2-1 requires two SROs and two ROs on watch when plant is above cold shutdown. Unit 2 TS 6.2.2.a states that "Each on duty ,
shif t shall be composed of at least the minimum shift crew composition shown in !
{ Table 6.2-1." Table 6.2-1 requires two SROs and two ROs cn watch when the plant is operating in Modes 1 - 4.10 CFR 55.53(e) states, in part, that, if a licensee has not been actively performing the functions of an RO or SRO, the licensee may not resume I
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activities authorized by a license issued under this part. The failure to meet the minimum shift manning requirements was determined to be a violation of TSs (50-313/9806-01; 50-368/9806-01).
On July 16, the licensee issued CR C-1998-0170 to document the findings, initiate a root cause evaluation, and develop corrective actions to prevent recurrence. The licensee also determined that the issue was reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73. The licensee determined that the root cause of the violation was inappropriate management decisions regarding the acceptability of the CRS-Admin and third RO positions for maintaining an active license due to misinterpretation of the regulations. These decisions were made in 1995. On January 12,1995, CR C-1995-007 documented that the third RO and CRS-Admin position could be utilized to maintain or reactivate a licens The licensee implemented the following corrective actions to correct the violation and prevent recurrMce: issued night orders to prevent potentially inactive watchstanders ]
from relieving the watch, reviewed logs for the previous 12 months to determine the extent of the potential deficiency, and notified affected personnel of their inactive statu The licensee's long-tean corrective actions, which were scheduled to be completed by October 1,1998, included revising procedures to remove the CRS-Admin and extra RO as pocitions that can be credited to maintain an active license and evaluating the need to conduct a search of regulations when making changes to procedures. The inspectors reviewed the proposed corrective actions and found them to be comprehensive and adequat c. Conclusions Fifteen licensed operators failed to meet tne requirements of 10 CFR Part 55 for maintaining an active license, and as a result, these operators stood control room watches with inactive licenses. The failure to satisfy the minimum shift manning requirements specified in the TSs was determined to be a violatio . Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Unit 2 - Freeze Seal and Removal of Relief Valve 2PSV-4878 l
! Insoection Scope (62707)
On June 23,1998, the inspectors observed Unit 2 maintenance personnel establish a )
! freeze seal for the removal and repair of Relief Valv.t 2PSV-4878. The relief valve, l which had previously been identified as leaking, protects the charging pump suction piping from refueling water tank overpressurization. The work was conducted in accordance with Work Plan 2409.588, Revision 0, " Freeze Seal For 2PSV-4878," and JO 0096936 _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
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b. Obsegations and Findinas The inspectors reviewed the JO and noted that an ignition source permit was required for the job because the charging system, which had the potential to contain hydrogen gas, would be breached. As preparations were being made to commence the work, the inspectors found that an ignition source permit had not yet been completed, although a blank permit was included with the work package. When asked, personnel performing the work were unaware that the JC required a permit and questioned the need for one since the activity did not involve welding or grinding. In response to the inspectors'
question, the maintenance personnel completed the ignition source permit prior to commencing wcrk as required. The failure to identify the requirement for an ignition source permit for the activity demonstrated a lack of familiarity with the JO prior to commencing work. The inspectors identified a minor discrepancy in the cover sheet that indicated an ignition source permit was not required while the JO instructions stated that one was required. Although otherwise thorough, the need for an ignition source permit was not discussed during the prejob briefin The inspectors identified several discrepancies with the work plan. Section 2 of the work plan stated that "the steps in this work plan may be worked simultaneously, in parallel, out of order, or n/a'd as long as the JO and safety precautions are followed."
The inspectors found that the work plan contained some steps that could not be worked out of order. Mechanics performed these steps properly in the required orde Section 3 of the work plan indicated that the pipe on which the freeze was to be applied could be assumed to be full of water. The justification for this assumption did not appear to be valid and the maintenance personnel did verify that there was water in the piping prior to establishing the freeze seal. Section 8.2.8 of the work plan provided .
information on how personnel could determine that the freeze seal was establishe l One indication provided was the presence of a frost band width of at least 1 - 2 inches 1 on each side of the freeze seal box. However, the inspectors found that Procedure 1025.025, " Unit 1 and Unit 2 Freeze Sealing instructions," stated that frost l
lines are not reliable indicators of freeze seal formation and should not be used for this I purpose. The inspectors observed that the mechanics utilized temperature to determine l when the freeze seal was formed and did not rely on the frost line j l
Mechanics established the freeze seal and removed the valve in accordance with the work plan. Appropriate safety precautions were observed, including the use of personnel safety equipment, continuous monitoring of the oxygen concentrations in the work area, availability of self-contained breathing apparatus in the area, and the presence of a plant safety inspector during the activit Conclusions Unit 2 mechanics demonstrated a lack of familiarity with a JO in not recognizing that an ignition source permit was required to perform work on the charging syste ,
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Appropriate safety precautions were established for establishing a freeze seat and the work was performed in accordance with the work plan. Although some deficiencies were found with the work plan instructions, these deficiencies did not impact the work.
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Ill. Enaineerina E1 Conduct of Engineering E Unit 2 - Reoair of Unisolable EFW Leak Insoection Scope (37551. 71707)
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On May 21,1998, while performing ccatainment building inspections in preparation to i restart Unit 2, the licensee discovered an unisolable leak on a 3/4-inch EFW system {
drain line. The leak was in the vicinity of the socket weld which connected the pipe for j Drain Valve 2EFW-1037 to the feedwater header and was unisolable from Steam )
Generator B. The licensee conducted a plant cooldown to repair the lea The inspectors observed repair activities associated with the unisolable EFW lea During this inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's operability evaluation and failure analysi Observations and Findinos The initial operability determination was conducted by operations and engineering personnel. The operating crew focused on the amount of leakage and did not consider that the extent of the condition was unknown and that the piping should have been considered inoperable. Subsequent engineering review of the condition recognized that the condition of the piping was unknown and that the piping was inoperable. Operators declared the piping inoperable and entered TS 3.6.1.1, " Containment integrity," which states, "Without primary containment integrity, restore containment integrity within one hour or be in hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />." Repairs were completed within the limits established by the limiting condition of operatio Engineering personnel reviewed the system configuration for potential causes and determined that the pipe and pipe hanger configuration potentially resulted in vibration induced failure. The licensee evaluated all similar design configurations and modified any configurations that had a similar potential for failure. Inspections of the additional drain lines showed no indications of leakage. On June 24, the inspectors reviewed the laboratory evaluation of the failed piping, which confirmed the licensee's preliminary root cause that the crack was vibration induce Code repairs were conducted in accordance with JO 00978874 and Plant Change Request 980628P201, Revision 0, * Modification to Drain Line of 2EFW-1037." The inspectors reviewed the design change and found it to be comprehensive. The change package contained two options which allowed flexibility in the repair. The options allowed for varying conditions at the weld socket that would be determined after removal
! of the existing pipe. The unisolable line was subject to the head of water in the feed riser that existed above the pipe tap. If the amount of water pressure was small, a i rubber pipe plug would be installed and the new fitting with a gate valve would be welded over the plug. The plug could then be removed through the gate valve. In the l
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event that the water pressure in the feed line was too high to allow use of the rubber plug, the licensee developed an option to use a steel plug and pipe cap. The design incorporating the gate valve was ultimately used. Engineering personnel demonstrated good engineering foresight and communicated well with craft personnel in developing two options for the repair of the leak.
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Engineering personnel demonstrated good engineering foresignt and communicated
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well with craft personnelin developing two options for the repair of an unisolable leak on an EFW system drain line wel IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 General Comments (71750) )
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During routine tours of the plant and observations of plant activities, the inspectors I
, found that access doors to locked high radiation areas were properly locked, areas were properly posted, and personnel demonstrated proper radiological work practice S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activitias-S1.1 Conduct of Security (71750)
The inspectors reviewed security measures and operations periodically throughout the inspection period and noted that they were properly implemented. On July 6, the inspectors reviewed the security shift surveillance schedule and found that all tours and inspections had been completed as required. Inspectors noted that adjustments to the schedulo had been made to cover for an unexpected absenteeism that occurred during the midcle of shift coverage. Schedule adjustments to cover watch stations for the absent security officer were appropriate. The inspectors observed proper personnel and package access controls, personnel searches, and appropriate application of temporary lighting on the site. The security officers interviewed were knowledgeable of procedural requirements, watchstanding responsibilities, and alarm response requirement F1 Control of Fire Protection Activities F1.1 Unit 2 - Review of lanition Source Permits a. Inspection Scoce (71750)
On July 29,1998, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's controls for the conduct of welding activities associated with JO 972714," Cut-out and Replace Local Sample Isolation Valves." Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's control of ignition sources during hot work and activities which breach plant systems that have the potential to contain hydrogen gas.
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8 Observations and Findinas The inspectors reviewed the ignition source permit for the activity and found, with the exception of a minor administrative error, that the permit was properly completed in accordance with Procedure 1003.006, Revision 5, " Control of Ignition Sources."
The inspectors interviewed the welding supervisor for the job and found that he was knowledgeable on the requirements of Procedure 1003.006. He stated that the procedure required the work area to be inspected and that the cognizant supervisor or his designee was required to sign the permit prior to the commencement of work. He also understood that the commencement of work was the time entered on the ignition source permi The inspectors also inquired about recent changes to the procedure. Welding and mechanical maintenance technicians were aware that any work that may create a spark was considered hot work, that maintenance on systems potentially containing hydrogen required a permit prior to commencing work, and that a sample for explosive gasses 1 was required upon breaching the associated system boundar f
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Maintenance personnel were knowledgeable on the controls for work involving potential ignition sources and properly implemented these control F1.2 Diesel Fire Pumo P-6B Surveillance >
a. Inspection Scope (37551. 61726)
On July 16,1998, the licensee conducted a surveillance of Diesel Fire Pump P-6B using Procedure 1104.032, Revision 51," Fire Protection Systems," Supplement 2,
" Surveillance Test of Diesel Fire Pump (P-6B)." The inspectors observed the test and reviewed the results of the tes b. Observations and Findinas On July 16, the inspectors observed the performance of Procedure 1104.032, which the licensee performed to demonstrate operability of Diesel Fire Pump P-6B. During review of the data that was recorded in Section 3.0," Acceptance Criteria," the inspectors found that the recorded temperature for Diesel Fire Pump P-6B Inlet Cooler E-163B was
- 217 F. The data sheet did not specify a value for the acceptable normal temperature range or the acceptance criteria. The inspectors subsequently reviewed Technical Manual C742.003 for Diesel Fire Pump P-6B and found that the maximum engine i coolant temperature should not exceed 200*F. The inspectors found that Section 2. l
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of Procedute 1104.032 contained a step to verify that engine coolant temperature on Temperature Indicator TI-5700 was relatively stable with temperatures of 180 - 225" The inspectors also found that Procedure 1203.009, Revision 18," Fire Protection System Annunciator Corrective Action," stated that,if cooling water temperature rises to
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200*F, the engine shall be shut down. The control room annunciator, which is supplied by Temperature Switch TS-3605 and has an alarm setpoint of 195"F, did not alarm during the surveillance on July 1 The inspectors questioned licensee personnel concerning the lack of acceptance criteria in Section 3.0 of the procedure for the engine coolant temperature, the discrepancy between the maximum temperature contained in Section 2.3.5 of the procedure and the maximum temperature stated in the technical manual, and the fact that the actual recorded inlet temperature was 217 F, which was 17'F higher than the maximum I temperature stated in the technical manual. The licensee initiated an investigation into the high inlet coolant temperature and declared the diesel fire pump inoperable on July 17. CR-1998-171 was initiated te document the condition. Unit 1 Safety Analysis Report. Appendix 9D, Section 9D.2.3.B requires the licensee to submit a special report to the Commission if the inoperable pump is not restored to an operable status within 7 day During troubleshooting and investigation activities, an attempt was made by the licensee to calibrate Temperature Indicator TI-5700, which was used to take the inlet coolant temperature during the surveillance. However, Temperature Indicator TI-5700 could not be calibrated and was found not functioning properly. The licensee installed a temporary temperature indicator, increased coolant flow to the engine by increasing the bypass flow around a strainer, and per'ormed the surveillance. On July 23, the engine coolant temperature was verif,ed to be within the proper operating range and the pump was declared operabl During subsequent interviews with the engineering personnel responsible for the diesel fire pump system, engineering personnel stated that they were unable to determine where the temperatures identified in Section 2.3.5 of Procedure 1104.032 came from and that no engineering evaluation or bases for the coolant temperature range could be found. The engineering personnel further stated that the higher engine coolant temperature observed during the surveillance was most likely due to reduced coolant flow to the engine caused by the recent procedural change to Procedure 1104.032 that closed the Inlet Strainer Bvpass Valve FS-3605-3, resulting in reduced coolant flow to the engine. TN licensee determined that strainers installed in the cooling water system as part of a moomW aerformed in 1987 were undersized, requiring the bypass valve to be maintained open w mvide sufficient flow to the engine. The licensee stated that the engineering calculations for the 1987 modification apparently had not accurately determined the required coolant flow for engine heat remova .
The inspectors determined that the engine cooling water temperature limits contained in Procedure 1104.032 did not reflect the limit described in the technical manual and the licensee did not have a basis for the procedurallimits. The failure to incorporate appropriate requirements and acceptance limits as specified by the applicable design documents to demonstrate that Diesel Engine Fire Pump P-6B would perform satisfactorily in service is an apparent violation of TS 6.8.1.f, pending inspector review of licensee corrective actions (50-313/9806-02).
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10 Conclusions The failure to incorporate appropriate requirernents and acceptance limits as specified by the applicable design documents to demonstrate that Diesel Engine Fire Pump P-6B l would perform satisfactorily in service was identified as a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, ' Test Control." Engineering personnel demonstrated a lack of understanding of the Diesel Fire Pump P-6B system and the operating limits associated with this engine. The engineering support for this system was determined to be wea V. Manacement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on August 4,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presente The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie i i
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ATTACHMENT PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED l Licensee l
C. Anderson, Unit 2 Plant Manager I H. Carpenter, Unit 1 Instrumentation and Control i R. Carter, Superintendent, Maintenance
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P. Dietrich, Manager, Unit 1 Maintenance R. Hutchinson, Vice President, Operations a D. James, Acting Director, Nuclear Safety j R. Lane, Director, Design Engineering !
M. Little, Unit 2 Assistant Operations Manager S. Pyle, Licensing Specialist
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T. Robinson, Engineering Programs T. Russell, Unit 2 Operations Manager D. Scheide, Licensing Specialist M. Smith, Manager, Engineering Programs J. Vandergrift, Director, Nuclear Safety D. Wagner, Quality Assurance Supervisor INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551: Engineering IP 617 Surveillance Observations IP 62, . . Maintenance Obsemations IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71750: Plant Support Activities ITEMS OPENED Opened 50-313;368/9806-01 VIO Failure to meet TS minimum shift manning requirements (Section 05.1).
50-313/9806-02 eel Failure to incorporate appropriate acceptance limits into sumeillance procedure (Section F1.2).
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. LIST OF ACRONYMS USED CR condition report '
CRS-Admin ; control room supervisor - administrative EFW : emergency feedwater JO job order-R reactor operator SRO- senior reactor operator TS Technical Specification .
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