IR 05000482/1999002
| ML20205L860 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 04/09/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205L857 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-482-99-02, 50-482-99-2, NUDOCS 9904140323 | |
| Download: ML20205L860 (15) | |
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ENCLOSURE t U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket No.: 50-482 License No.: NPF-42 Report No.: 50-482/99-02 Licensee: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation i Facility: Wolf Creek Generating Station Location- 1550 Oxen Lane, NE Burlington, Kansas Dates: February 7 through March 20,1999 Inspectors: F. L. Brush, Senior Resident inspector B. A. Smalldridge, Resident inspector l J. F. Melfi, Project Engineer, Branch E
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Approved By: D. N. Graves, Chief, Project Branch B ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information i
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9904140323 990409 PDR ADOCK 05000482 G PDR !
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l EXECUTIVE SUMMARY l
Wolf Creek Generating Station l NRC Inspection Report No. 50-482/99-02 Operations
- The operators' response to the failure of Emergency Diesel Generator A was prompt and thorough. The shif t supervisor exhibited very good supervisory oversight. The control room staff was attentive to plant parameters during troubleshooting and maintenance activities (Section 04.1).
Maintenance
- On October 29,1998, the licensee identified that since January 16,1996, operators l had failed to correctly test a portion of the automatic level control circuitry of the emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer system. The licensee determined the root cause of the event to miscommunications between engineering and operations personnel. The failure to correstly test the fuel oil transfer circuitry was a violation of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.1. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC l Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance improvement Request 98-3230 (closure of LER 98-06) (Section M8.1).
- On May 5,1998, the licensee failed to place the refueling water storage tank channelin bypass during the analog channel operational test. This was a violation of Technical Specification 3.3-3, Action 16. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This l violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance improvement l Request 98-0486 (closure of LER 98-03) (Section M8.2).
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- On January 28,1999, the licensee failed to include Valve EGV-0105, component cooling l water to the excess letdown heat exchanger, in the locked valve program or monthly valve position verification surveillance procedure. This was a violation of Technical l Specification 4.7.3.a. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in !
the licensee's corrective action program as Performance improvement Request 99-0258 (closure of LER 99-01)(Section M8.3).
Enoineerina
- The configuration change package and 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation to encapsulate a small leak on the component cooling water system were thorough. The design appeared to be robust (Section E1.1).
. On December 7,1998, the licensee discovered the installation of an inoperable snubber on a main steam isolation valve which was a violation of Technical Specification 4. The licensee determined that the valve was operable with the defective snubber installed. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation,
. consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance improvement Request 99-0037 (closure ( . LER 98-10) (Section E8.2).
Plant Support
. A contract worker entered the radiological controlled area without current radiation worker training. The licensee determined that the root cause of the event was personnel error by a health physics technician. The technician issued dosimetry :o the worker even though the computer based training record flagged the training as not current. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance improvement Request 99-0327 (Section R4.1).
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Report Details
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Summarv of Plant Status The plant began the inspection period on February 7,1999, at 100 percent power. On February 9, the licensee reduced power to 91 percent to allow the repair of a tube leak in low pressure Feedwater Heater 1 A. The licensee returned the plant to 100 percent power the following day. On February 20, the licensee again reduced power to 91 percent for repair of an additional tube leak in low-pressure Feedwater Heater 1 A. The licensee returned the plant to 100 percent power the following day. The plant operated at essentially 100 percent power the remainder of the report perio l. Operations 01 Conduct of Operations 0 General Comments (71707)
The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety conscious. Plant status, operating problems, and work plans were appropriately addressed during daily turnover and plan-of the-day meetings. Plant testing and maintenance requiring control room coordination were properly controlled. The inspectors observed several shift turnovers and noted no problem O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
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O Enaineered Safety Feature System Walkdowns (71707)
l The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following engineered safety l features and vital systems:
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! * Auxiliary feedwater system;
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. Emergency Diesel Generators A and B.
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Equipment operability, material condition, and housekeeping were acceptabl Operator Knowledge and Performance i
04.1 Operator Response to Emelqem; Diesel Generator A Failed Surveillance Test l
l Inspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors observed the operators' response when Emergency Diesel Generator A failed Surveillance Test STS KJ-015A, " Manual / Auto Fast Start, Sync & Loading of Emergency Diesel Generator NE01," Revision .
2-b. Observations and Findinos During performance of Surveillance Test STS KJ-015A, Emergency Diesel Generator A failed to develop an output voltage. The shift supervisor exhibited very good supervisory oversight following the diesel failure. The licensee entered the appropriate Technical Specification action statements and performed the verification of offsite power surveillance procedure. The licensee also contacted the load dispatcher to minimize the potential fo any offsite electrical grid disturbances. The shift supervisor was aggressive in assigning resources to troubleshoot the problem. The control room staff exhibited good communications while responding to the failur The inspectors observed the control room during portions of the troubleshooting and maintenance activities over the next 2 days. Control room personnel maintained good awareness of plant parameters. Various operations personnel held good prejob 1 briefings. The shift supervisors provided good oversight. The inspectors did not have any significant concerns with the operators' response to the failur The licensee determined that a diode in the exciter voltage regulator circuit had shorte As a result, a protective fuse blew due to overcurrent. This prevented the generator from developing an output voltage. A second diode failed during postmaintenance l
testing following replacement of the first diode and fus The licensee had installed the diodes in the circuit in June 1998 to suppress surges in the Emergency Diesel Generator A exciter circuit. The surges caused the generator volt-amperes-reactive to change unexpectedly when the generator was paralleled to the grid. The licensee had performed an operability evaluation and determined that the
- diesel generator was operable, even with the presence of the voltage surges. After
- analysis of the exciter circuits, the licensee concluded that the surges were due to l electromatically induced voltages and installed the diodes to reduce the voltage surges and subsequent changes in volt-amperes-reactive. The diodes were also installed in the )
Emergency Diesel Generator B exciter circuits, even though that machine did not exhibit the same voltage surge I Following the diode failures, the licensee removed the diodes from both emergency l I
l diesel generators and satisfactorily tested both machines. Both diesel generators were
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l satisfactory surveillance testin The licensee was conducting an in-depth engineering and root cause analysi s to determine the cause of the surges and the diode failures. The review of this engineering and root cause analysis is an inspection followup item (50-482/9902-01). Conclusions l The operators' response to the failure of the Emergency Diesel Generator A was prompt and thorough. The shift supervisor exhibited very good supervisory oversight. The control room staff was attentive to plant parameters during troubleshooting and maintenance activitie i i
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-3-08 Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901)
0 (Closed) Licensee Event Reports 50-482/97-026-00. 01: moving heavy loads in d I
containment over equipment required for safe shutdown. During a previous refueling outage, the licensee moved heavy loads over the one operable residual heat removal train. This was reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), any event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. Shutdown cooling could have been lost if the heavy load had fallen and disabled the operable residual heat removal train. The licensee's corrective actions included reviewing the heavy loads analysis and revising the appropriate refueling outage procedures. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and have no further concern . Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance i
M1.1 General Comments - Maintenance l Insoection Scope (62707)
The inspectors observed o revit wed portions of the following work activity:
- Work Order 99-207303-001 Install encapsulation on a leak in the component cooling water syste Observations and Findinos The inspectors identified no substantive concerns. The work observed was performed with the work package present and in active use. The inspectors observed supervisors and system engineers monitoring job progress, and quality control personnel were present when require I M1.2 General Comments - Surveillance j i Inspection Scoce (61726)
The inspectors observed or reviewed all or portions of the following test activities:
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- Test Procedure STS JE-Ot>3, " Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil System Train A j Test," Revision 9; j
= Test Procedure STS KJ-015A, " Manual / Auto Fast Start, Sync & Loading of )
Emergency Diesel Generator NE01," Revision 8; J l - Test Procedure STS IC-615A, " Slave Relay Test K615 Train A Safety injection," ,
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Test Procedure STS IC-211B, " Actuation Logic Test Train B Solid State Protection System," Revision 2 Observations and Findinas The surveillance testing was conducted satisfactorily in accordance with the licensee's approved programs and the Technical Specifications. Diesel Generator A failed Procedure STS KJ-015A when the generator did not develop an output voltage. The licensee's response to the event is discussed in Section 04.1 of this repor Surveillance Test STS 1C-211B is discussed in Section M1.3 of this repor M1.3 Surveillance on Solid State Protection System Insoection Scope (61726)
The inspectors observed the licensee perform Surveillance Procedure STS 1C-2118,
" Actuation Logic Test Train B Solid State Protection System," Revision 2 Observations and Findinas The instrumentation and control technicians used repeat backs when following the procedure steps. The licensee and inspectors identified a problem with step 8.7.8 of the procedure when the technicians placed the selector switch to Position 1 and pushed the test switch. No lamps illuminated and the technicians verified that, at the completion of the step, all lamps were extinguished. The lamps should have illuminated when the test button was pressed. The licensee continued to Position 2 and the results were the sam The technicians then questioned these results and halted performance of the surveillance. The licensee depressed the test switch a second time, with the selector switch in Position 1, and all the lights illuminated. On the second attempt, the licensee ensured that the test switch push-button was fully depresse l The technicians performing the test were not normally assigned to this task. The i technicians were knowledgeable on the procedure and equipment, but the procedure l step was unclear in that step 8.7.8 did not provide guidance on what constituted l
satisfactory performance of the step. The licensee initiated a procedure change to l enhance step 8.7.8 and initiated Performance improvement Request 99-0627 to !
document the problem and corrective action j The inspectors reviewed the performance improvement request and considered the !
licensee's corrective actions appropriat j i
' Conclusions The solid state protection system surveillance activity was performed as required. A procedure problem was revealed during the performance of the test. The ,
instrumentation and control technicians quickly recognized and corrected the proble l
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-5-M2.1 Review of Material Condition Durina Plant Tours Insoection Scope (62707)
The inspectors performed routine plant tours to evaluate external plant material conditio Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed very few material condition problemc. In general, where equipment deficiencies existed, the deficiencies were previously identified by the licensee for corrective action. The licensee aggressively responded to problems with tube leaks in Feedwater Heater 1 M2.2 Control Room Ventilation System Walkdown j Inspection Scope (71707)
l The inspectors performed a detailed walkdown of the control room ventilation system.
, Observations and Findinas
The inspectors observed that the system was aligned properly, and the raverall material .
l condition of the system appeared good. Tne inspectors noted two minor items during i i
l the walkdown, a missing plug on one duct and some minor packing leakage on one
cooling water valve. The inspector reviewed the fourth quarter system health report l which documented that the system was performing well. The only item noted was some l high discharge pressure oscillations with two of the air conditioning units. The license.-
l defined an action plan to address the oscillation I The inspectors reviewed the system's surveillances and found tha; ihey had been performed within the required time frame. For Surveillance Test STS PE-002, " Charcoal Adsorbent Sampling f6r Nuclear Safety Related Units," the charcoal did not pass the acceptance criteria. The licensee wrote Performance improvement Request 98-0042 and replaced the charcoa Conclusions The control room ventilation system was operable and the material condition and associated documentation were adequate. One recent surveillance test on charcoal adsorption was unsatisfactory, but the licensee resolved this by replacing the charcoa M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902' )
M8.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Reports 50-482/98-006-00: failure to correctly test a portion of the automatic level control circuitry of the emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer
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. system. On October 29,1998, the licensee discovered that a portion of the fuel oil transfer system for both diesel generators was not being tested in accordance with i
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.6-l Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.1. The surveillance test
, was performed while the emergency diesel generators is operating. As a result, a l portion of the automatic circuit was bypassed since the fuel oil transfer pump was I running. The pump runs whenever the associated diesel was operating. The licensee l - then performed the surveillance while the emergency diesel generators were stopped.
! The level control circuitry functioned as required.
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engineering and operations personnel. The licensee implemented a corporate l communication plan since the event. Although the plan was not implemented directly as
- a result of the event, the licensee determined that the plan's communications requirements were the appropriate corrective actions. The failure to correctly test the fuel oil transfer circuitry was a violation of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a. . This Severity LevelIV violation is being treated as a
! noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance improvement Request 98-3230 (50-482/9902-02).
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M8.2 1plosed) Licensee Event Report 50-482/98-00J-QQ: refueling water storage tank level
! channel analog channel operational test did not meet Technical Specification l requirements. On May 5,1998, the licensee determined that, when the level channel l was in test, the channel was # a tripped condition which was contrary to Tech 0 cal l Specificatinn Table 3.3-3, Action 16. Action 1f 'equired ~ at the licensee byr.A the l channel w.~n it was in test. Due to the design of the circuitry, the test could r.J c l
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performed if the channel was actually placed in bypass. The licensee requesta m.:
was granted a Technical Specification change to allow up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to place tha i
channel in bypass after it was placed in trip. The inr.#ctors reviewed the licensee's i corrective actions and have no further concerns.
l The licensee failed to place the refueling water storage tank channel in bypass as required during the analog channel operational test. This was a violation of Technical i Specification 3.3-3, Action 16. This Severity LevelIV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This
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Request 98-0486 (50-482/9902-03).
- M8.3 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-482/99-001-00: component cooling water manual l
valve was not included in the locked valve program or monthly valve position verification surveillance procedure. On January 28,1999, the licensee identified that the Technical l Specification 4.7.3.a requirement for component cooling water Valve EGV-0105, l component cooling water to the excess letdown heat exchanger, position verification j was not being met. This condition had existed since initial plant startup. On L February 10,1999, the licensee made a containment entry and verified that Valve EGV-l 0105 was open as require The safety significance of this issue was very low. The licensee reviewed the component cooling water valve lineup check performed following the Fall 1997 refueling outage. The valve was verified open at that time and f emained open since then. The l
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failure to include Valve EGV-0105 in the locked valve program or monthly valve position verification surveillance procedure was a violation of Technical Specification 4.7. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance improvement Request 99-0258 (50-482/9902-04).
Ill. Enaineerina E1 Conduct of Engineering E1.1 Review of Modification Packaaes Insoection Scope (37551)
The inspectors reviewed Configuratien Change Package 08019. The package implemented a temporary design chan0e to encapsulate a small leak on the component l cooling water system. The inspectors reviewed the following documents:
. Configu' ration Change Package 08019, Revision 0;
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. Regulatory screening (10 CFR50.59 evaluation); and
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. NRC letter authorizing Wolf Creek to use ASME Section XI Code Case N-416-1, l dated Septernber 16,1994.
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l The inspectors observed that the configuration change package was thorough. The
! licensee used the appropriate code case to make the configuration change. The inspectors observed that the licensee followed the requirements of the code case while meing the modification. The 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was thorough. The design appeare . to be robust. The inspectore observed portions of the modification installation and had no concern Conclusions The configuration change package and 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation to encapsulate a small leak on the component cooling water system were thorough. The design appearcd to be robust. The inspectors had no concerns with the modification or its installatio E8 ' Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92903)
E8.1 (Closed) Inspection Followuo item 50-482/9711-04: control room ventilation isolation radiation monitors response time. The Updated Safety Analysis Report, Table 7.3-7, listed a response-time requirement for the control room radiation monitors to isolate the control room ventilation system. However, Technical Specification Sections 3.3.2 and
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-8-3.3.3.1 do not have a response-time requirement for the monitors. The licensee performed Unreviewed Safety Question Determination 59 iP-0034, Revision 0, to determine if deleting the requirement from the Updated Safr ty Analysis Report was an unreviewed safety question. The licensee determined that celeting the requirement was not an unreviewed safety question. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's determination and have no further concern E8.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Rt oort 50-482/98-10-00: installation of a snubber with a defective part resulted in a historical violation of Technical Specification 3.7.8. In January 1996, Technical Specification 3.7.8 was moved to the Updated Safety Analysis Report. On September 10,1990, after a failed test and subsequent evaluation by the snubber vendor, a Part 21 report was issued conceming inadequate staking of the end rod in the end plugs of the snubber. The licensee sent 17 out of the 18 affected snubbers to the vendor for testing, and the last snubber was evaluated as "use-as-is" until replacemen )
I As part of a snubber reduction program, this snubber was subsequently removed, refurbished, and functionally tested on February 6,1992. However, the defective part was not replaced and on March 12,1993, this snubber was installed on a main steam isolation valve. On December 7,1998, the licensee replaced the defective snubbe The licensee determined that, if the snubber had failed while in service, the affected main steam isolation valve would ha'. e remained operabl l The installation of an inoperable snubber on a main steam isolation valve was a violation of Technical Specification 3.7.8. The licensee determined that the valve was operable with the defective snubber installed. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance improvement Request 99-0037 (50-482/9902-05).
E8.3 (Closed) Violation 50-482/9813-02 (EA 98-273): failure to perform a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation when a component of the postaccident sampling system was removed from servic The Severity Level IV violation listed below was issued in Notices of Violation prior to the March 11,1999, implementation of the NRC's new policy for the treatment of Severity Level IV violations (Appendix C of the Enforcement Policy). Because the violation would have been treated as a noncited violation in accordance with Appendix C, it is being closed in this repor This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance improvement Request 98-0276.
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l IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 General Comrnents (71750)
The inspectors observed health physics personnel, including supervisors, routir.ely i
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touring the radiologically controlled areas. Licensee personnel working in rarhologically controlled areas exhibited good radiation worker practice Contaminated areas and high radiation areas were properly posted. Area surveys posted outside rooms in the auxiliary building were current. The inspectors checked a sample of doors required to be locked for the purpose of radiation protection and found no problem R4 Staff Knowledge and Performance R4.1 Contract Radiation Worker Entered the Radioloaical Controlled Area Without Current Trainina > Insoection Scopa_{717Q The inspectors revietved the licensee's response when a contract worker entered the l
radiological controlled area without current trainin Observations and Findinas On February 3,1999, health physics personnel issued dosimetry to a contract worke On February 4 the worker entered the radiofogical controlled area. Later in the day on February 4, the licensee identified that the worker's radiological training was not curren The licensee initiated Performance improvement Request 99-0327 to document the event and corrective action The licensee determined that the root cause of the event was personnel error by a health physics technician. On February 2,1999, the worker completed a computer based general employee training course which contained a segment on radiological orientation. The worker then went to the health physics dosimetry office to obtain dosimetr l When the health 'sica technician checked the worker's training record, the computer flagged the training as not current. The health physics technician then attempted to contact a training instructor, as allowed by procedure, to verify the workers training status. The instructor was not available to ascertain the worker's training status. The health physics technician left a voice mail message requesting the work,er's training record l L
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-10-The health physics technician then asked if the worker completed the required trainin The worker told the technician yes. The worker had been badged at the Wolf Creek plant prior to the 1997 refueling outage. The worker stated that he assumed that the general employee training he completed the previous day was all that was required since it contained a radiological segment. The health physics technician accepted the worker's answer and issued dosimetry. Radiation worker training in addition to the general employee training is required for issuance of dosimetr On February 4,1999, the training instructor listened to the voice mail from the health physics technician and checked the worker's training status. The instructor determined that the worker's training was not current and informed the health physics departmen The licensee pulled the worker's dosimetry and restricted the worker's access to the radiological controlled are The licensee's corrective actions included:
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The health physics technician was counseled on management's expectations for following procedures and maintaining a questioning attitude,
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A memorandum was issued to all health physics personnel regarding the expect itions for issuing dosimetry, and
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The practice of allowing oral verification of training will no longer be allowe CFR 19.12, instructions to workers, requires that all individuals who in the course of employment are likely to receive in a year an occupational dose in excess of 100 millirem shall be instructed in the health protection problems associated with exposure to radiation and/or radioactive material, in precautions or procedures to minimize exposure, and in the purposes and functions of protective devices employe However, since a contract worker was issued dosimetry and entered the radiological )
controlled area without current radiological worker training, this was a violation of 10 i CFR 19.12. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section Vil.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement l
Policy (50-482/9902-06). l
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c. Conclusions A contract worker entered the radiological controlled area without current radiation worker training. The licensee determined that the root cause of the event was personnel error by a health physics technician. The technician issued dosimetry to the worker even though the computer based training record flagged the training as not current. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the )
licensee's corrective action program as Performance improvement Request 99-032 ;
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l X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to me s of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on March 19,199C .he 'ensee acknowledged the findings presente The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials e .2 mined during the l
inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie .
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SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee M. J. Angus, Manager, Licensing and Corrective Action G. D. Boyer, Chief Administrative Officer i
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J. W. Johnson, Manager, Resource Protection O. L. Maynard, President and Chief Executive Officer B. T. McKinney, Plant Manager R. Muench, Vice President Engineering S. R. Koenig, Manager, Performance improvement and Assessment C. C. Warren, Chief Operating Officer
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED i IF 37551 Onsite Engineering IP 61726 Surveillance Observations IP 62707 Maintenance Observations
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IP 71707 Plant Operations l
IP 71750 Plant Support Activities ;
- IP 92700 Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor
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! IP 92901 Followup - Operations I l lP 92902 Followup - Maintenance l l lP 92903 Followup - Engineering l l lP 92904 Followup - Plant Support {
IP 93702 Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors
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k ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED
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- 50-482/9902-01 IFl Review engineering and root cause analysis regarding l diode failures in emergency diesel generator exciter circuit i
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(Section O4.1) i
- 50-482/9902-02 NCV Failure to correctly test a portion of the automatic level control circuitry of the emergency diesel generator fuel oil i transfer system (Section M8.1)
50-482/9902-03 NCV Refueling water storage tank level channel analog channel operational test did not meet Technical Specification requirements (Section M8.2)
50-482/9902-04 NCV Component cooling water manual valve was not included in the locked valve program or monthly valve position verification surveillance procedure (Section M8.3) ..
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-2-50-482/9902-05 NCV Installation of a snubber with defective part resulted in a historical violation of Technical Specification 3. (Section E8.2)
50-482/9902-06 NCV Contract radiation worker entered the radiological controlled area without current training (Section R4.1)
Cf.gsed 50-482/9902-02 NCV Feiture to correctly test a portion of the automatic level control circuitry of the emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer system (Section M8.1)
50-482/9902-03 NCV Refueling water storage tank level channel analog channel operational test did not meet Technical Specification requirements (Section M8.2)
50-482/9902-04 NCV Component cooling water manual valve was not included in the locked valve program or monthly valve position verification surveiUance procedure (Section M8.3)
50-482/9902-05 NCV Installation of a snubber with defective part resulted in a historical violation of Technical Specification 0. (Section E8.2)
50-482/9902-06 NCV Contract radiation worker entered the radiological controlled area without current training (Section R4.1) 1 50-482/97-026-00,01 LER Moving heavy loads in containment over equipment required for safe shutdown (Section O8.1)
50-482/98-006-00 LER Failure to correctly test a portion of the automatic level control circuitry of the emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer system (Section M8.1)
50-482/98-003-00 LEF1 Refueling water storage tank level channel analog channel operational test did not meet Technical Specification requirements (Section M8.2)
50-482/99-001-00 LER Component cooling water manual valve was not included in the locked valve program or monthly valve position verification surveillance procedure (Section M8.3)
50 482/98-010-00 LER Installation of a snubber with defective part resulted in a historical violation of Technical Specification 3. (Section E8.2) l l 50-482/9711-04 IFl mirol room ventilation isolation radiation monitors I l
esponse time (Section E8.1) )
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. 50-482/9813-02 VIO Failure to perform a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation when a EA 98-273 component of the postaccident sampling system was removed from service (Section E8.3)
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