IR 05000263/1997016
| ML20198L748 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 12/22/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198L746 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-263-97-16, NUDOCS 9801160108 | |
| Download: ML20198L748 (15) | |
Text
., . l o !
'
'
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
'
REGION lil
.
Docket No: 50 263' !
License No: DPR 22 ;
Report No: 50 263/97016(DRS)
Licensee: Northern States Power Corporation Facility: Monticello Nuclear Power Plant Location: 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401 Dates: November 18 21,1997 Inspectors: James Foster, Senior Emergency Preparedness Analyst Thomas Ploskl, Emergency Response Coordinator Ann Marie Stone, Senior Resident inspector Steve Ray, Senior Resident inspector, Prairie Island Scott Thomas, Resident inspector, Prairie Island Dave Wrona, Resident inspector Geoffery West, Radiation Specialist Approved by: James R. Creed, Chief, Plant Support Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety M 3
-_ _
- . _- - -
,
.
.
l l
.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY {
Monticello Nuclear Plant NRC Inspection Report 50 263/97016 l
This inspection consisted of evaluation of performance during the plant's biennial exercise of the Emergency Plan by regional emergency preparedness inspectors and resident inspector staff from Monticello and Prairie Islan Plant Sugnort Overall performance during the 1997 Emergency Preparedness exercise demonstrated that onsite emergency plan implementation was adequate, Licensee personnel demonstrated their ability to implement the plan by correctly classifying scenario emergencies, notifying offsite agencies of the classified events, activating emergency facilities, providing protective action recommendations when warranted, and taking accident mitigation actions, Interfacility transfers of command and control of event response were orderly and timel * Performance of the Control Room Simulator crew was effective. The Shift Manager and Shift Supervisor exercised proper command and control over the operators. The crew detected reactor events and took proper actions, Operator actions indicated a detailed understanding of plant events. (Section P4.1.b.1)
- Overall, the Technical Support Center staff's performance was very effective. The Emergency Director made effective use of his staff to provide information, projections, and suggestions. He evaluated their inputs and then made rapid decisions which were then plainly communicated. Mitigation activities were weil prioritized. (Section P4.1.b.2)
- Performances of Operational Support Center management and staff were very competent. (Section P4.1.b.3)
. The overall performance in the Emergency Operations Faclilty was good. However, the lack of sufficient criteria for identifying the loss of the fuel clad fission product barrier in the Emergency Classification Guidelines led to a brief delay in declaring a General Emergency (Section P4.1.b.4)
. Field monitoring teams performed well, and exhibited efficient and timely checking and loading of equipment, as well as proficient operation and knowledge of their survey instruments. The teams generally accomplished their asclgned tasks; however, some were slowed down considerably by problems with communications, equipment handling, and maps (Section P4.1.b.5)
+ Performance demonstrated during the Recovery phaso of incident response, demonstrated after a scenario " time jump," was acceptable. Recos ery discussions observed in the Technical Support Center and Emergency Operat'.ons Facility were 1 adequate. (Section P4.1.b.6)
1
. . . - . - . - .
i-
'
.
l
.., j l
!
.
- The soonerio was adequately challenging, and specifically designed to provide greater i realism. Overall exercise control was very good. (Section P4.1.b 7) i
+- The licensee's self assessment was comprehensive and closely mirrored the NRC j evaluation team's conclusions. (Section P4.1.b.8) l
,
- Event classifications were correct. However, there was a delayed declaration of the !
General Emergency. Offsite notificet!ons and offsite protective action recommendations l were correct and timely.- Inplant activities were well thought out and well coordinate l
- Transfers of command and control were appropriately coordinated. (Section P4.1.c)
!
,
f b
!
.
b
!
i e
!
t
'
r
,
I f
.
u
- 3-
,
L
$
,, -- . .-= , ,,w,,_ - -- -- - , 7 c- - - - -- * ,-g - - y -.n , .3- , - y y ..,-y- y
- .-. _ -. - - _ - - __- - - -- .. - _ _ - - - _ - . . _ _ - _
.,
.
!
.
Report Details l IV. PlanL5 upped P3 Emergency Preparedness Procedures and Documentation P Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenario (82302)
The inspectors reviewed the 1997 exercise objectives and scenario and determined that they were acceptable. The scenario provided an appropriate framework to support demonstration of the licensee's capabilities to implement its emergency plan. The scenario included a radiological release and several equipment failures. The 1997 scenario was specifically designed for greater realis P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness P Evaluated Blennial Emergency Preoaredness Exercise
- Inspection Scoce (82301)
On November 19,1997, the licensee conducted a biennial exercise involving very limited offsite participation. The 0 .te of Minnesota and local counties had petitioned the Federal Emergency Management Agency and were granted approval of an exemption from exercise participation based on actual emergency facility activations during the last two years. This exercise was conducted to test major portions of the onsite emer0ency response capabilities. The emergency response organization and emergency response facilities were activate The inspectors evaluated performance in the following emergency response facilities:
- Control Room Simulator (CRS)
- Operational Support Center (OSC)
- Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
- Offsite Field Monitoring Teams (FMTs)
The inspectors assessed the licensee's recognition of abnormal plant conditions, classification of emergency conditions, notification of offsite agencies, development of protective action recommendations, command and control, communications, and the overallimplementation of the emergency plan. The inspectors also assessed the licensee's performance during the Recovery phase of incident response in the TSC and EOF In addition, the inspectors attended the post-exercise critiques in each of the facilities and the subsequent controller critique, to evaluate the licensee's self.
l assessment of exercise performance, t
i l
___ .- _ _ _ _ _- __
-
. . . .
'
l .
. Emmgency Resoonse Facil!tv Oksgyations and Findings Control Room Simulator (CRS)
Performance of the CRS crew was effective. The Shift Manager (SM) and Shift Supervisor (SS) exercised proper command and control over the operators. The crew detected and evaluated reactor events and generally took proper actions. Operator actions indicated a detailed understanding of plant events. Periodic updates, given by the SM, were effective in giving background information, current conditions, and desired goal The CRS crew implemented procedures in a timely manner. Operators utilized their procedures, including abnormal operating procedure, emergency operating procedures, alarm response procedures, and emergency plan implementing procedures, proficientl The inspectors identified one instance of operator error. During performance of single control rod scramming, the operator inadvertently scrammed the wrong rod. The operator properly notified the SS and SM of the mistake, who in turn contacted the Nuclear Engineer for guidance. Prompt corrective action was taken as directed by the Nuclear Engineer, and the crew was able to continue with the single rod scrammin The event was handled properly, and had little impact on the exercise scenari Communications between the CRS crew were adequate. * Repeat backs" were used most of the time throughout the exercise. The initial notifications to the State and the NRC were made within the expected time frame. Event notification message forms and verbal messages to State and the NRC were completed in a detailed and timely manner. The CRS crew promptly made the initial event classification and properly classified the event as an ' Alert."
Plant public address announcements properly advised the plant staff of event classifications and areas to avoid due to hazardous conditions. The announcements properly included the reason for the classificatio The transfer of command and control duties of the Emergency Director (ED) from the SM to the Plant Manager was orderly and timely. Communicators reported to 1 4 CRS in a timely manner and established communications with the TSC. Appropriate information, was passed between the CRS and TSC. Later in the exercise, CRS personnel advised TSC and EOF staff of their conclusion that plant conditions warranted a General Emerger y classificatio Technical Sucoort Center (TSC)
Overall, the TSC staff's performance was very effective. The TSC was staffed in a timely and orderly manner. The TSC Technical Dimetor assumed ED authority from the SM about eight minutes after the Alert was declared. The ED rapidly established control over TSC activities and conducted the first of several update briefings with the TSC staff within two minutes of assuming authority. The TSC staff's performance throughout the
1
_
-- . _ _ - . . . - - - . - -_- - -
.. . !
event was professional and calm. Communications were clear and teamwork was effective. Noise levels in the TSC were generally lo # The TSC staff briefings were frequent and effective. The ED gave adequate
.
notifications to the staff of upcoming briefings and indicated his expectations for the .
types of Information to be presented. TSC staff members were well prepared for briefings and presented their information in a very efficient manner. The ED presented a succinct summary of the information provided at the end of each briefing. The ED ;
'
requested that phone calls be discontinued during the briefing sessions, which contributed to their effectiveness, but also delayed some information reaching the TSC from other area The turnover of responsibilities for offsite communications, offsite assessment, and protective action recommendations to the Emergency Opurations Facility was conducted in an especially controlled manner and was extremely effective. The ED -
geve adequate time for his staff to prepare for the tumover and directed them to insure that no offsite notification activities were ongoing at the time of turnove ,
The ED made effective use of the TSC staff to provide information, projections, and suggestions. He evaluated their inputs and then made rapid decisions which were then plainly communicated. The ED was clearly in charge of the facilit The TSC staff made good use of their resources, effectively tracked plant status, repair teams, offsite conditions, and other relevant information. They performed their tasks
) efficiently and anticipated Information that would be needed by the ED. Personnel and
'
equipment resources in the TSC were adequate with the exception that there were not enough self reading dosimeters availabl The TSC staff and ED properly prioritized mitigation tasks and made action decisions that were well supported technically. At times, there were deficiencies in communicating :
these decisions. The ED decided the single rod trip test procedure did not need to be performed during the reactor shutdown. He asked the superintendent of nuclear engineering to prepare a " Volume F Memorandum" (temporary procedure change) to delete the requiremern. However, that decision was not passed on to the CRS operating crew and they proceeded with the rod trip testing. This had little effect on the shutdown sequence, b.3 OpeIational suooort Center (OSC)
The overall performance of OSC management and staff was generally competent, despite some examples of Inconsistent communication which d;d not impact OSC effectivenes The OSC was fully staffed and operational very quick.y following the Alert declaration. A personnel status board was effectively used to trad the ava_IlaWj of personnel to participate in the emergency response teams. The e erson t sk Ns board was an excellent tool which enabled OSC management to occurat6.iig personnel by s 6
- _- . - - -
- . - . . --
-- .
., .
.
disciplines. Personnel proceeded in a controlled, organized manner to the accountability card reader when the Site Area Emergency was declared and accountability was require Status boards were consistently maintained and effectively used to track changing plant conditions, priority work orders, status of emergency teams and work accomplishe This information was effectively communicated to OSC personnel during the periodic briefings. The OSC director maintained appropriate command and control of the facility, in general, communication between the OSC and TSC was adequate. However, on two occasions, unclear communication resulted in som', confusion. In one case, OSC management was not aware of the inadequate reactor building differential pressure concern until about 35 minutes into the scenarlo. This lack of information did not impact OSC effectiveness since a response team was directed by OSC managers through the CRS to verify secondary containment Integrity (the team was aware of the task, but not the reason for the task).
Secondly, there was some confuslon with respect to the positions of the reactor building and turt>lne building railway doors. The OSC director received instruction from TSC personnel to send a response team to close these doors. As the OSC members were organizing a team, they received notification that a Radiation Protection Technician (RPT), assigned to the TSC, had been sent out for this task. As a result, the OSC did not form another team, in reality, the RPT was assigned to check door status, but not to close doors found open. Within a few minutes, the confusion regarding the instructions given to the RPT was resolved. OSC management established another team to close the doors. The offsite release may have been somewhat reduced if these doors had been closed earlier. This delay had minor impact on the licensee's respons The priority assigned to each emergency response team by the TSC's Technical Director was clearly understood and communicated to OSC personnel. Maintenance and Operations managers reviewed emergency work orders with the response team members to ensure understanding of each equipment problem and the assigned tas RPTs were present during the briefings and provided updated area radiological condition information. When an RPT was not assigned to accompany the emergency response teams, the RPTs provided instructions to obtain monitors, to observe continuous area radiation monitors on route to the job location, and to leave the job site if any alarms were receh ;d, Also, the teams effectively used hand held radios to maintain communication with OSC management. Teams were adequately debriefed on their return, b.4 Emergency Ooerations Facility (EOF)
The overall performance in the EOF was very good. However, the lack of sufficient criteria for identifying the loss of the fuel clad fission product barrier in the Emergericy Classification Guidelines led to a brief delay in declaring a General Emergenc . . . - ..
_ _
. /' ,
. \
Plant personnel staffed the near site EOF in an efficient and orderly manner following the Alert declaration,in accordance with procedures. After discussions with the TSC's ED and after verifying that all EOF functional teams were ready to perform their responsibilities, the EOF's Emergency Manager (EM) assumed overall command of the licensee's event response within an acceptable 65 minutes of the Alert declaratio The Technical Support Supervisor (TSS) and his staff effectively used the Safety , :
Parameter Display System and communications with the CRS and TSC to remain aware of plant conditions. Noteworthy changes to p' ant conditions were quickly recognized and reported to the EM. The bases of the decisions to commence reactor shutdown and to place the Reactor Water Cleanup System out of service were well understoo Reference documents were effectively used to assess degraded plant equipment, such es the inoperable Train "A" of the Standby Gas Treatment System. Potentially relevant Emergency Classification Guidelines (ECGS) were thoroughly reviewe Upon receiving indications of main steam line leakage and abnormally high main steam line radiation levels, the EM declared a Site Area Emergency at 10:12 A.M., although several members of the technical support staff advised that these conditions could warrant a General Emergency declaratio General Emergency ECG Number 28.B. " Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers with a Potential Loss of 3rd*, most applicable to the scenario, contained a single indicator of a loss of the fuel clad fission product barrier, that being reactor coolant activity In excess !
of 300 microcuries per gram lodine 131 dose equivalent. Since coolant activity levels had been considerably less than this value, the EM was uncertain of the need to declare a General Emergency, although additionalIndicators of a loss of the fuel clad barrier were contained in the Alert ECG Number 6. This delayed the General Emergency declaration by approximate!y 20 minutes. This delay had minor impact on the scenario or the quality of the licensee's responses. The lack of sufficient indicators in ECG Number 28.B for determining the loss of the fuel clad fission product barrier was an Inspection Followup item (50 263/97016-01).
After further review of available data and additional discussions with the ED, the TSS, and the Radiation Protection Shift Supervisor (RPSS), the EM correctly declared a General Emergency and issued a procedurally correct Protective Action Recommendation at 10:31 A.M. New information available during classification discussions included an initial report of an offsite radiological release from one of the licensee's radiological monitoring teams and an essessment that a main steam line radiation monitor's reading was about 6.5 times gieater than when the reactor was at 100 percent powe State, county, and NRC officials were initially notified of the Rite Area Emergency and General Emergency declarationc in an adequately detalled and timely manner, Besides special discussions associated with event reclassifications, the EM effectively shared information with EOF staff by conducting periodic briefings that required inputs from all functional group leaders. Status boards were also kept up to date with
-_
D 8 i
meteorological, radiological, and offsite dose projection information. However, the EOF's status boards and briefings did not include detailed information on the higher priority actions chosen for implementation by the ED in order to attempt to stabilize or mitigate degraded onsite condition The EOF Coordinator effectively ensured that the EOF's habitability was maintained and that EOF staff were issued personal dosimetr The Field Team Coordinator and Communicator effectively directed the movements of the Monticello Plant's two offsite radiological monitoring teams, which were later augmented by two teams of RPTs from the Prairle Island Nuclear Generating Plant and drivers from the Monticello Plant. The offsite teams' reports and locations were accurately posted on status boards and a map. The teams demonstrated the capability to locate and track the simulated plume. Deployment of the two teams comprised of Prairie Island Plant personnel was delayed for about 30 minutes due to the unavailability of drivers. This had no appreciable impact on performing field measurement The EOF's Emergency Notification System Communicator was unable to contact the NRC Operations Officer via the FTS 2000 telephone, but successfully used a commercial telephone. The licensee identified an error in the procedure associated with making event reports to the NRC Operations Officer. The p.ocedure incorrectly included the number "8" as the first number needed in order to get an outside line, However, the procedure properly contained a primary and backup telephone number, b.5 Field Monitorina Teams (FMTs)
The field monitoring teams performed well, and exhibited efficient and timely checking and loading of equipment, as well as proficient operation and knowledge of their survey instruments. The teams generally accomplished their assigned tasks quickly and correctly. However, the teams did experience problems which slowed their response time and ability to quickly find sample locations. They were slowed down considerably by problems with communications, equipment handling, and maps. Additionally, some survey results were of questionable validity because of map inaccuracle The teams were activated when an Alert emergency classification was declared and assembled in a timely manner after signing in on the appropriate Radiation Work Permit (RWP) and acquiring dosimetry. The teams, each of which consisted of a driver and a technician, quickly assembled their equipment and prepared their vehicles. The teams coordinated well during equipment preparation, packing, and loading, and followed applicable procedures carefully. Survey gear was battery-checked, source-checked, and set to appropriate ranges before beginning travel. The teams established communications with the OSC from this location and then proceeded to travel to assigned points under OSC directio The field monitoring teams had difficulty establishing initial radio contact with the OSC from their starting location. This was due to the presence of high voltage lines near that
,
location. Team members spent 7-8 minutes trying to establish clear contact with the
!
1
. - . .
,
,
,
OSC before deciding to try cellular phone communications. This backup system was also difficult to initiate because neither the teams nor the OSC had the phone numbers of their counterpart's cellular phones. Thus, the teams had to transmit this information over the troublesome radio link before they could finally establish contact. None of the exercise participants atternpted to walk away from the building (and thus the high-voltage lines) to improve radio reception or use in vehicle radios to increase transmission power and rang Once communications had been established and the teams departed, communications were fairly reliable. However, one of the teams continued to use their hand held radio unit even though the in vehicle unit, which would likely exhibit better performance, was availabl One of the team's technicians reported *100 counts below background," and other misleading results. The use of repeat backs by the participants, however, ensured that the results were understood correctly, it was observed that OSC and EOF personnel did not relay any plant status Information to the teams or provide information regarding the plume's direction, progress, and emergency classificatio During deployment, the teams adequately accomplished their ass'gned tasks and appeared to be very familiar with their survey instruments. The teams visited various sites several times and reported radiation readings back to both the OSC and the EOF (after control had been transferred there). Radio discussions were concis The field monitoring team using a new minivan had problems handlinC the various pieces of equipment at their disposal. Specifically, the technician was required to navigate with two large maps, use the hand held radio for communications, and operate two survey instruments while traveling. Because there were no restraints to fasten a survey meter, one unit had to be kept from falling off of the dashboard by the driver, who was otherwise occupied with driving in unfamillor areas and on icy roads. The absence of compartments to put all of this equipment in made attention to the survey meter quite dhbit for the technician. Finally, the use of the hand held radio unit by the technician, as opposed to use of the in vehicle radio by the driver, increased the number of items that had to be handled. Subsequent discussion with licensee personnel indicated that provisions for equipment storage and securing were planned, but had not yet been implemente Both teams had difficulty finding their present locations and their ass!gned destinations because their maps did not accurately reflect the roads in the area. The controller's maps were also inaccurate. Thus, the teams were uncertain at times whether they had reported survey results for the right map coordinates. These problems could potentially delay definition of a radioactive plume. Field monitoring team problems with communications, equipment handling, and maps was an inspection Followup Item (50-263/97016-02)
~ J
_
'.
-
.
b.6 Recoverv Discussions
Performance demonstrated during the Recovery phase of incident response, demonstrated after a scenario " time jump," was acceptable. Recovery discussions observed in the TSC and EOF were adequate. Procedure A.2-602 * Event Termination or Recovery" was utilized to guide the overall discussions. Procedure A.2-811, * Event Termination or Recovery in the EOF * was utilized in the EO After initial consideration of the criteria necessary for dec'.aration of the Recovery phase, participants indicated that they would not enter recovery entil more information on plant status was known Participants also indicated that discussion and agreement from the State, county, and the NRC would be solicited before declaring the Recovery phase of emergency response. Participants were made aware that the NRC would want failed equipment not necessary for safe shutdown " quarantined" (not repaired or modified, so they could participate in fault root cause determination).
Recovery discussions observed in the TSC were adequate. The ED gave the staff about 15 minutes to establish a preliminary list of short term and long term recovery actions and each group was able to present several well thought out sugge.4tion Some preliminary priorities were discussed but detailed development of issues was not an exercise objectiv The exercise was terminated following the establishment of short and long term planning with regard to affected plant equipment and offsite issues. Recov'ry discussions were worthwhile in educating personnel in the relevant procedure's use, b.7 Scenario and Exercise Control The inspectors made observations during the exercise to assess the challenge and realism of the scenario and to evaluate the control of the exercis The inspectors determined that the scenario was adequate to test basic emergency capabilities and demonstiate onsite exercise objectives. The scenario was challenging with respect to demonstrating how rapidly plant conditions can degrade to warrant a General Emergency declaration. The scenario was specifically designed to provide more realis Overall control of the exercise was very good. No controller prompting and exercise control problems wem identified. The controllers provided information as appropriate when requested by player The inspectors noted that personnel accountability was delayed slightly because controllers and evaluators did not participate in the electronic accountability process, but were placed on a list of excepted personnel. The security group leader had to cross reference the exception lisi with the list of people not electronically accounted for to complete the accountabilit l
,
I
. _ _ _ _ . _ ____ .. _ _ . _
, .
,
j
. Licensee Self Critiques Facility critiques including participants and controllers were held immediately after
' termination of the exercis .
All participants were encouraged to provide feedback and numerous enhancement suggestions were presented. The critiques were self critical and comments provided by controllers, evaluators and participants were constructive. Follow up actions to resolve discrepancies or concerns were ir.itiated. The deficiencies noted by the controllers and participants were conulstent with the NRC'd observations with only minor exception The conclusions of the controller critique generally mirrored the NRC evaluation team's conclusions. The licensee's overall snif assessment was effectiv Overall Conclusions The exercise was a competent demonstration of the licensee's capabilities to implement the emergency plan and procedures. Event classifications were correct and, with the exception of the delayed declaration of the General Emergency, timely. Offsite notifications and offsite protective action recommendations were correct and timel Inplant activities were well thought out and wel! coordinated. Transfers of command and control were appropriately coordinate The lack of sufficient criteria for identifylog the loss of the fuel clad fission product barrier in ECG Number 28.B leo to a delay in declaring a General Emergency associated with an unmonitored radiological release having uncertain duration and magnitud The licensee's overall self assessment was considered very effectiv P8 MiscellaneoM EP lesues (Closed) Ooen llam.263/95007-02: There was extensive simulation of radiological surveys, use of protective equipment, and performance of tasks (this caused unrealistically rapid completion of tasks). During the current exercise, there was little or no observed simulation of radiological surveys, use of protective equipment or performance of tasks. This item is close (C_losed) OD0Dl tem 263/95007-03: Several communications problems with field teams, with some information not being clearly understood. During the current exercise, communication with field teams was adequate after initial establishing of contact with the EOF This itrm is close [ Closed) Ooen item 263/95007-04: Scenario data provided to field team controllers was inconsistent, and in some cases, lacked information. During the current exercise, scenario data for field monitoring teams was well detailed, and controllers were able to -
Interpolate between scenario values when necessary. This item is closed,
l J
' .;
'
,
,
V. Management Meetings X.1- Exit Meeting Summary
-- The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on November 21,1997.- The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. Licensee personnelindicated that actions would be taken to clarify emergency classification guidance in EAL Guideline 28, and enhance inaps provided for field monitoring
" team us The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be cone dered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie .
I
.
x -
,_
.
q
,
PARTIAL LIST OF. PERSONS CONTACTED i
.
l B. Day, Training Manager .
M. Hammer, Plant Manager T. LaPlant, Emergency Preparedness ,
D. Modesitt, Shift Manager 1 R. Roy, Emergency Preparedness ,
'
J. Windschill, General Supsrintendent, Radiation Prcy vt INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 82301 Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors )
IP 82302 Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenaries for Power Reactors l
l ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED !
Ooene ;
263/97016-01 IFl Clarification needed to Emergency Action Level Guideline 28, 263/97016-02 IFl Field monitoring team problems; communications, equipment l handling, and map l GQ!Htd 263/95007-02 IFl Extensive simulation of exercise activitie /95007 03 IFl Communications problems with field team ,
263/95007-04 IFl Inconsistent scenario data provided to field team controller ,
'I u gs um u _ ii uu. mi ieuunumi
- t ..
.
.
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
' CFR Code of Federal Regulations
- CRS Control Room Simulator DPR- Demonstration Power Reactor DRP ' Division of Reactor Projects DRS Division of Reactor Safety EAL Emergency Action Level ECG - Emergency Classification Guideline ED Emergency Director
, ECG Emergency Classification Guideline EM Emergency Manager EMT Emerg6ncy Monitoring Team )
Emergency Notification System
'
- EOF Emergency Operations Facility EPIP-- Emergency Plan implementing Procedure
ERDS - Emergency Response Data System ERO Emergency Response Organization
- FMT Field Monitoring Team IFl Inspection Followup item IP Inspection Procedure NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRR- Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation OSC Operational Support Center PAR Protective Action Recommendation PDR NRC Public Document Room RCS Reactor Coolant System RPT Radiation Protection Technician RPSS Radiation Protection Shift Supervisor RWP Radiation Work Permit SM Shift Manager SS Shift Supervisor TSC Technical Support Center
<
m a 15 l