IR 05000263/1998099
| ML20237E471 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 08/26/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237E467 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-263-98-99, NUDOCS 9808310297 | |
| Download: ML20237E471 (7) | |
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Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant
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SALP 14 Report 50-263/98099 I
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INTRODUCTION I
The. Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) process is used to develop the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) conclusions regarding a licensee's safety performance. Four functional areas are assessed: Plant Operations, Maintenance, Engineering, and Plant Support. The SALP report documents the NRC's observations and insights regarding performance and communicates the results to the licensee and the public, it provides a vehicle for clear communication with licensee management that focuses on plant performance relativo to
- safety risk perspectives. The NRC utilizes SALP results when allocating NRC inspection resources at licensee facilities.
This report is the NRC's assessment of the safety performance at the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant for the period of July 21,1996 through July 18,1998. An NRC SALP Board, composed of the individuals listed below, met on July 23,1998 to assess performance in accordance with the guidance in NRC Management Directive 8.6, " Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance."
Board Chairperson Marc L. Depas, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Region 111 Board Members Cynthia A. Carpenter, Director, Project Directorate lil-1, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Steven A. Reynolds, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety, Region 111 11.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS A.
. Plant Operations Overall performance in the area of plant operations was good. Operational activities were characterized by strong management involvement, good teamwork, and conservative decision-making. The refueling outage was executed well with an appropriate emphasis on shutdown risk and personnel performance. Operator performance during non-routine activities was excellent
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with few personnel errors. However, some problems were noted with operator performance during routine operational activities and self-assessment activities by the line organization were limited or not completely effective.
Shutdown risk strategies were conservative and their effective implementation reduced risk during outages. A strong safety focus was evic..it in management's decision to shut down to repair a leaking safety relief valve and to replace inade(uately sized torus suction strainers, as well as in the decision to delay reactor startup to thoroughly investigate the cause of a crack in a control rod drive withdrawal line. Operations management fully supported training which contributed to excellent operator training results. Effective management oversight resulted in few i
operator errors during the 1998 refueling outage and four forced outages during this assessment l
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Overall, pedormance in response to off-normal conditions was excellent. Good communication and teamwork were evident during reactor trips, infrequent operations, and pre-evolution
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briefings. Activities which could distract the operators were minimized. Frequently, additional
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operators were assigned to the control room panels for independent verifications, as appropriate.
The few problems that occurred during shutdowns and startups were promptly identified and prioritized for resolution. Operational evolutions were performed in a deliberath manner through
' disciplined adherence to procedures. An exception to the otherwise excellent performance in
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l response to off-normal conditions was noted late in the assessment period when operators and l
their supervisors misread an abnormal procedure step during a condenser vacuum transient.
l This resulted in a failure to manually scram the reactor for turbine protection.
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Operators promptly identified equipment problems, and with few exceptions, worked closely with l
maintenance and engineering personnel to ensure that actions were initiated to effectively l
correct them. This contributed to excellent equipment availability and reliability. As an example, an operator's questioning attitude led to the identification of a failed bus insulator for the -
1R transformer, which could have caused a loss of offsite power condition. Some equipment
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problems, however, were not documented upon identification which resulted in delayed
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resolution or acceptance of degraded equipment performance. For example, the failure to initiate l
a condition report or work order for a discrepant reactor building differential pressure indicator j
resulted in a 5-day delay in correcting the equipment problem.
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The conduct of routine operations did not reflect the same level of discipline and vigilance that
existed during non-routine evolutions. Concems with control room panel attentiveness were l
highlighted early in the assessment period. After the NRC identified that a safety-related pump l
had been operating for 46 hours5.324074e-4 days <br />0.0128 hours <br />7.60582e-5 weeks <br />1.7503e-5 months <br />, unnoticed by three operating crews, a management meeting was held in May 1997 to discuss NRC concems with panel attentiveness. The effectiveness of subsequent corrective actions was limited as evidenced by continued NRC-identified panel attentiveness and attention-to-detail problems. On a number of occasions, operators were unaware of equipment status or that equipment parameters were outside specified ranges. For L
example, operators did not recognize that steam chase area temperatures exceeded procedural limits until identified by the NRC. Although equipment operability was not affected by the increased temperature condition, it demonstrated that panel awareness concems still existed. In addition, some inconsistencies were noted with the manner in which annunciator alarms were
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communicated among crew members. In contrast, improvements were noted in the use of three-way repeat-back communication techniques, particularly during surveillance testing activities.
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Operators were sensitive to procedure adherence expectations. Procedural discrepancies that were identified during evolutions and operational activities were generally resolved through the g
l temporary procedure change process. Operators and their supervisors also demonstrated an
. excellent questioning attitude during their review of infrequently used procedures. For example, during a review of the torus drain-down and reflood procedure, a shift manager identified an undesirable flow path between the torus and condensate storage tank. However, over-reliance on training to compensate for the lack of detailed procedures and/or not requiring some routine operating procedures to be in-hand when in use resulted in a safety-related pump operating l
L without motor bearing cooling and a fire pump operating without a discharge flow path.
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Self-assessment activities by the line organization were informal and were limited to individual follow up of issues and events identified through the condition reporting process or industry-communications. Generation Quality Services personnel were effective in identifying some Technical Specification interpretation problems and provided good oversight of outage activities.
However, concems with the conduct of routine operations were revealed through events or were identified by the NRC.
' The performance rating in Plant Operations is Category 2.
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Maintenance Overall performance in the area of maintenance continued to be excellent. Effective work planning and control, excellent interdepartmental teamwork and communications, experienced and qualified craft personnel, strong system engineering support, and active management oversight contributed to the excellent material condition of plant equipment. Self-assessment activities were effective in identifying potential problems and a conservative approach was taken in the resolution of identified problems. However, some minor problems were nuted with procedural adequacy.
Equipment was maintained in a condition to support safe operation of the plant as reflected in high equipment availability and reliability. Repair work was initiated promptly and conducted effectively, resulting in a very small and stable backlog of corrective maintenance work orders.
Priority work and control room deficiencies received appropriate management and engineering staff attention. Equipment failures which led to Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for i
Operation were infrequent and corrective actions were prompt.
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Refueling and maintenance outage activities were well managed with few personnel errors and no challenges to shutdown safety. For example, the torus suction strainer replacement forced outage was conducted in a conservat;ve and controlled manner with excellent use of probabilistic risk assessment concepts for determining the safety impact of emergent work and minimizing shutdown risk. Also, the use of a shutdown probabilistic risk assessment in scheduling and planning refueling outage activities was a strength.
The overall quality of maintenance work was excellent. Maintenance and testing activities were conducted in accordance with procedures and in a quality manner such that the activities were usually completed correctly the first time. Pre-job briefings were thorough and maintenance personnelwere experienced and knowledgeable of plant systems and procedures and of their assigned tasks. First-line supervisors provided good oversight of field activities. System engineering support for corrective maintenance and surveillance testing activities continued to be j
a strength.
Programs goveming the conduct of maintenance and surveillance testing activities, including
' inservice inspection and testing as well as preventive maintenance activities, were generally very good. However, proper execution of activities was heavily dependent on the skill-of-the-craft
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because of the lack of detailin maintenance instructions and work packages. This contributed to
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minor problems such as the inadvertent automatic start of an emergency d!esel generator and l
the movement of a heavy load on the refueling floor without a proper evaluation.
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Corrective actions for ident:f',ed hardware and programmatic problems were timely and effective.
q For example, corrective actions in response to the discovery of a through-wall crack on a control
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rod drive withdrawalline were comprehensive and conservative. Regarding self-assessment l
l efforts, quality assurance organizations provided independent assessments of maintenance
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activities which were thorough and performance-based.
The performance rating in Maintenance is Category 1.
C.
Enaineerina Overall performance in the area of engineering was excellent. System engineers were knowledgeable of assigned systems and actively engaged in resolving system performance issues. Management was effective in ensuring an appropriate level of quality and safety focus in engineering and technical support activities. Actions to address significant design change and safety evaluation problems identified in the previous assessment period and in the early part of this assessment period were effective. Engineers identified a number of engineering-related deficiencies and the resolution of most issues was timely and conservative. However, the
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resolution of some issues identified by engineers through the review of generic communications
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' was not timely.- The technical adequacy of surveillance test procedures improved as a result of corrective actions to address concems identified earlier in the assessment period.
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l The overall approach to identifying and addressing engineering-related issues was conservative.
l This was exhibited in the review of a potential net positive suction head design discrepancy i
l identified at another utility and in the decision to immediately replace discrepant carbon steel j
components in the torus suction strainers. Management also ensured that engineering and J
l technical support activities were guided by the proper safety focus as evidenced by the prompt
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response to an increasing temperature trend on a safety relief valve tailpipe and the thorough.
I investigation into the cracked control rod drive withdrawal line event.
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Significant problems with design change and safety evaluation processes were identified in the I
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previous assessment period and in the early part of this assessment period, some of which were considered for escalated enforcement action. These problems included inadequate
.10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations, a lack of rigor in performing and reviewing calculations, and i
incomplete details in some modification packages. Corrective actions, such as revising the
safety evaluation program and conducting extensive training, were implemented. These actions were effective in addressing the identified problems. Safety evaluations and associated screenings were thorough with one notable exception. A safety evaluation screening was not performed when a temporaryjumper/ bypass was installed in the keep-fill portion of the core spray and residual heat removal systems. Although a subsequent screening concluded that a 10 CFR 50.5g evaluation was not needed, this event demonstrated a weakness in the Jumper / bypass process.
Overall, engineering support to other plant organizations was excellent. System engineers were
~ knowledgeable of assigned systems and were actively involved in addressing equipment-related problems. For example, the system engineer provided excellent oversight during the installation of the torus suction strainers and also identified material discrepancies. Engineers provided technically sound operability evaluations for identified degraded equipment conditions such as the operability evaluation to address potential cracking of control rod drive withdrawal and insert lines during normal operation. System engineer support to corrective maintenance and surveillance testing remained strong.
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Engineers identified a number of engineering-related deficiencies during the reactor power uprate project, while svaluating industry events, and through questioning attitudes. For example, an engineer determined that the calculation for the condensate storage tank level swapover of the suction valves for the high pressure coolant injection and reactor core isolation cooling systems did not consider the potential for voriexing. As a result, a Technical Specification amendment was submitted to correct non-conservative setpoints. The resolution of identified safety-related problems was conservative and timely. As an example, after considering the potential effect of debris on the torus suction strainers, engineering personnel recommended a plant shutdown to replace the strainers. However, the resolution of some less significant issues identified by engineers through the review of generic communications was not timely. For example, an
~ engineer determined that preventive maintenance was appropriate for butterfly valves after
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reviewing NRC Information Notice 84-04, " Failure of Elastomer Seated Butterfly Valves Used Only During Cold Shutdown"; however, actions to implement this recommendation were not initiated.
Concems regarding the technical adequacy of surveillance tests were identified by the NRC in the eariy part of this assessment period. Corrective actions to address these concems were comprehensive and were appropriately prioritized. Considerable improvements in the technical adequacy of surveillance tests were noted late in the assessment period. However, a process weakness with respect to procedure changes necessitated by Technical Specification amendments was recently identified by the NRC.
. Assessments of engineering performance were good. As a result of a self-assessment of the control room ventilation system, potential problems with having a negative pressure atmosphere during normal operation were identified. The Operations Committee also provided strong and technically challenging reviews. The committee performed extensive reviews of equipment readiness and the status of outstanding issues before reactor startups from the refueling outage and extended torus strainer replacement outage.
The performance rating in Engineering is Category 1.
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Plant Support j
Overall performance in the plant support area continued to be excellent. Radiation protection personnel effectively controlled radiological conditions and minimized radiation dose during both outage and operational activities. The programs for the handling, storing, and shipping of radioactive materials were well implemented. Chemistry personnel demonstrated very good i
analytical capabilities, maintained excellent water quality, and effectively monitored process and
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effluent instrumentation. Security force performance, procedures, and training were excellent.
However, concems with the vehicle barrier system, protection of safeguards information, and the j
reliability of the security computer system were identified. The emergency preparedness program remained in an effective state of readiness, as the emergency response facilities / equipment were well maintained, key personnel demonstrated appropriate knowledge of i
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respor,sibilities, and an emergency plan activation in October 1996 was effectively implemented.
The fire brigades performed well in three observed fire drills.
The radiation protection program was wellimplemented. Emphasis on as-low-as-is-reasonably-
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l achievable planning and effective radiological controls contributed to low radiation doses for both
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operational and outage activities. For example, the residual heat removal pump seal
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replacement and reactor water cleanup system modification and maintenance activities were well I
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planned and controlled, resulting in minimal worker dose and few personnel contamination events. Radiation protection technicians provided excellent job coverage and effectively enforced good radiation-worker practices for drywell and refuel floor work which also contributed
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to low collective radiation dose for outage activities. However, plant personnel failed to perform
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an adequate radiological evaluation which resulted in a personnel contamination event during an
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l Instrument calibration activity. In addition, isolated examples of material crossing radiation
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boundaries, radiological postings covering large areas, and outdated radiation' surveys were identified. The programs for radioactive material handling, storage, and transportation were f
implemented in accordance with new regulatory requirements. Also, the radioactive waste i
systems and associated facilities were well maintained, and plant personnel responsible for shipping activities were adequately trained and qualified. The radiological environmental monitoring program was well implemented and plant effluents did not have a detectable environmentalimpact. The testing and inspections of plant filtration systems were performed well; however, radiation protection personnel were challenged by the need to make repeated temporary changes to some plant filtration testing procedures, implementation of the respiratory protection program was effective and the equipment was well maintained; however, an issue regarding respiratory certification of control room operators with beards was identified.
Implementation of the chemistry program continued to be a strength, in particular, plant water quality and the condition of fuelintegrity were excellent. The material condition of the radiation monitors was excellent and chemistry personnel were proactive in using the data acquisition system to monitor various chsmistry and effluent parameters. For example, chemistry personnel monitored discharge canal radiation levels and proactively responded to an increasing trend prior
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- to receiving a control room alarm. in-line chemistry monitoring instrumentation was well maintained. The performance of chemistry personnel, assessed through various comparison programs, was very good, but an issue regarding the use of instruments with uncorrected biases was identified. Chemistry personnel demonstrated the capability to successfully collect and analyze samples from the reactor coolant and drywell atmosphere post-accident sampling system.
Performance in the area of security continued to be strong and consistent, with excellent security force performance noted during the NRC Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation inspection. Self-assessment efforts within the security organization were multi-faceted, aggressive, and effective in identifying problems. Self-assessment findings were effectively monitored and addressed. The security training program was significantly strengthened, which
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contributed to sustained good performance by the security force and effective oversight of security activities by supervisors. Although maintenance support for security equipment was
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timely and effective, a concem developed with the reliability of the security computer system. In addition, weaknesses were noted with aspects of the vehicle barrier system and protection of safeguards information.
The emergency preparedness program was maintained in an effective state of operational
' readiness. In particular, emergency response facilities and equipment were well maintained and
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- management support for the program was apparent. Emergency response personnel were
knowledgeable of responsibilities and emergency procedures. In an actual emergency plan activation in October 1996, the emergency plan was effectively implemented with proper classification of the event. During the 1997 emergency preparedness exercise, the ability to j
implement the emergency plan was again demonstrated.
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l There was no routine fire protection inspection performed during this assessment period. The fire brigades performed well in three observed fire drills., and audits identified minor program l-deficiencies.
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L The pedormance rating in Plant Support is Category 1.
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