IR 05000263/1999001
| ML20207H528 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 03/11/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207H521 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-263-99-01, 50-263-99-1, NUDOCS 9903160020 | |
| Download: ML20207H528 (16) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGIONlil.
Docket No:
50-263
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License No:
DPR-22 -
Report No:
50-263/99001(DRP)
Licensee:
Northern States Power Company Facility:
Monticello Nuclear Generating Station Location:
2807 West Highway 75 Monticello, MN 55362 Dates:
January 12 through February 22,1999 inspectors:
S. Burton, Senior Resident inspector D. Wrona, Resident inspector Approved by:
Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief
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Reactor -Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects
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9903160020 990311 PDR ADOCK 05000263 G
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Monticello Nuclear Generating Station NRC Inspection Report 50-263/99001(DRP)
This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection.
Operations The high pressure coolant injection system responied as expected to the Group IV
' isolation signal received unexpectedly during surveillance testing. Operators correctly implemented the abnorrnal procedure for the Group IV isolation. The licensee made a four-hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.77., and initiated a condition report associated with this event. (Section O1.2)
Operators demonstrated good communications, control room demeanor, and procedure
use when emergency operating procedures were implemented on a loss of reactor building negative pressure. (Section 01.3)
. Inspectors identified a minor failure with maintaining the service water radiation monitor
system configuration as required by procedure when operators did not restore the system to a normalline-up upon completion of system flushing. (Section O1.4)
The material condition of the residual heat removal (RHR) system was good. The
adequacy of general housekeeping for "B" RHR pump room came into question when a partially burned swipe was found under the 14 RHR pump motor heater. The cognizant system engineer promptly addressed the operability issue concerning 14 RHR pump and the other RHR equipment discrepancies that were identified. Operations took adequate actions to address the plant house-keeping issues. (Section O2.1)
AAaintenance The inspectors observed the maintenance, isolation restoration, and post-maintenance
testing associated with work order 9903983, " Install New Diaphragms into Scram Solenoid Pilot Valves," and identified no deficiencies. The inspectors observed a minor inconsistency between the order in which steps were performed and what was procedurally expected during performance of activities specified in Surveillance 0081,
" Control Rod Drive Scram insertion Time Test." There was no safety significance associated with this issue. (Section M1.3)
Enaineerina in general, the summaries in the Monticello periodic " Report of Changes, Tests, and e
Experiments," provided sufficient detail to determine that the licensee's conclusion that the changes did not involve unreviewed safety questions was reasonable.
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Plant Suooort i
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Radiation protection activities associated with the inadvertent contamination and
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. subsequent decontamination of the fuel pool ventilation duct work were thorough.
l Technicians demonstrated good exposure minimization practices during event initial response and radiation work permit planning. Effective communications were observed l
during the pre-job briefing associated vdth decontamination activities. (Section R1.2)
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Report Details Summarv of Plant Status The Unit operated at essentially 100 percent power for the inspection period, except for a load i
drop on January 16 and 17 to approximately 75 percent for about 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to support routine turbine and main steam isolation valve testina.
1. Operations
Conduct of Operations i
01.1 General Comments (71707)
The inspectors observed various aspects of plant operations, including compliance with Technical Specifications (TS); conformance with plant procedures and the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR); shift manning; communications; management
oversight; proper system configuration and configuration control; housekeeping; and
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operator performance during routine plant operations, the conduct of surveillance tests, and plant power changes.
The conduct of operations was professional and safety conscious. Evolutions, such as surveillance tests and plant power changes were well controlled, deliberate, and were performed in accordance with procedures. Shift turnover briefings were comprehensive and were typically attended by the operations superintendent, and representatives from scheduling, security, instrument and control, electrical, and mechanical maintenance.
Housekeeping was generally good and discrepancies were promptly corrected. Safety systems, including verification of containment penetration valve alignments and portions of the residual heat removal (RHR) and high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) systems i
were found to be properly aligned. Specific events and noteworthy observations are i
detailed below.
01.2 Group IV isolation Durina HPCI Testina a.
Inspection Scope (71707)
l During HPCI surveillance testing per Surveillance Procedure 0255-06-IA-1, Revision 40,
"HPCI System Test with Reactor Pressure at Rated Conditions," a Group IV isolation signal was generated after a high steam flow signal was received. As a followup, the inspectors interviewed operators, reviewed control room recorders, control room logs and Operations Manual Section, Abnormal Procedure C.4-B.4.1.D, Revision 3," Primary
. Containment isolation-Group 4."
b.
Observations and Findinas The Group IV isolation signal resulted in the closure of the HPCI steam line isolation valves, MO-2034, and MO-2035. The inspectors determined that the HPCI system responded as expected to the Group IV isolation signal and the operators correctly implemented abnormal procedure C.4-B.4.1.D.
The licensee made a four-hos. event notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii) due to the activation of an engineered safety feature (the Group IV
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isolation). The licensee initiated condition report 99000470,"HPCI Group IV lsolation During 0255 Surveillance Test," to assess this issue.
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Conclusions The HPCI system responded as expected to the Group IV isolation signal received unexpectedly during surveillance testing. Operators correctly implemented the abnormal procedure for the Group IV isolation. The licensee made a four-hour event notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 and initiated a condition report.
O1.3 Imolementation of Emeraency Operatina Procedures On a Loss of Reactor Buildina Ventilation a.
Inspection Scope (71707)
j The inspectors were observing operations in the4htrol room when difficulties arose with the reactor building ventilation system. The inspectors observed operator response, communication, procedure use, and associated actions during the event.
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Observations and Findinas On February 11, problems occurred with operation of the normal reactor building ventilation supply fans, exhaust fans, and dampers. The ventilation system was being operated in a mode that afforded proper ventilation to the fuel pool skimmer surge tank room while maintenance activities were occurring in the room. Problems were attributed to loose connections in the reactor building ventilation control panel, C-65, and were associated with this mode of operation. Equipment malfunctions resulting from j
operation in this mode included the repositioning of flow control dampers and tripping of i
supply fans.
At the onset of the control problems, operators secured all work in the reactor building that had the potential to create an airborne radioactivity problem. Engineering and maintenance were immediately contacted to investigate the problem. Subsequently, when flow control dampers closed and reactor building negative pressure was lost,
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operators implemented the emergency operating procedures. Immediate actions were taken to restore negative reactor building pressure and emergency operating procedures were exited after 10 minutes. During the event, control room demeanor was professional, and operators kept each other well informed by providing good briefings while implementing and terminating the use of the emergency operating procedures. An operator was dispatched to the reactor building to verify all work with the potential to create an airborne radioactivity problem had been secured as previously ordered.
During the event, operators confirmed that the reactor building emergency ventilation system, as well as normal ventilation isolation dampers, remained operable. Technical specifications and operating procedures were reviewed for applicability. The inspectors noted no safety concerns.
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Conclusion Operators demonstrated good communications, control room demeanor, and procedure use when emergency operating procedures were implemented on a loss of reactor building negative pressure.
01.4 Demineralized Watar close Left Installed On Service Water Process Radiation Monitor a.
Insoection Scope (71707)
The inspectors reviewed the requirements associated with a demineralized water flushing hose that was observed during routine tours connected to the service water process radiation monitor.
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Observations and Findinas On January 20, inspectore noted that a temporary hose was connected from a demineralized water line to the service water line associated with the service water i
discharge process radiation monitor. Inspectors were concerned about the j
configuration and the operability of the radiation monitor. Inspectors informed the system engineer about the line up and the licensee conducted a system walk down and procedure review. The temporary hose was immediately disconnected and the system restored to normal configuration. A revie's of procedure 1047-3, Revision 25,
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" Operations Reactor Side Checklist Weekly Procedure," indicated that the flushing hose was required to be removed when the system was restored to normal upon completion of instrument flushing. The failure to restore the system as required by procedure was a violation of Technical Specification 6.5.A.1 but was of minor significance and is not subjec'. to formal enforcement action.
Inspectors reviewed associated piping and instrument diagrams, Technical Specifications, and the USAR. Inspectors noted discrepancies between actual system configuration and that identified on a station drawing. Additiona;ly, the color coding was not consistent relative to various Technical Specification process radiation monitoring instrumentation. The licenseo confirmed the inspectors observations and entered the items into the corrective action program for resolution.
The licensee addressed past operability issues and proposed corrective actions associated with the service water radiation monitor in condition report 99000230. The engineering department's review of past operability was thorough and included discussions about seismic qualifications, configuration, valve leakage, methods for i
detection of system degradation and operability, operator actions, proceduralissues, i
and associated system instrumentation. This review effectively demonstrated that past i
operation of the radiation monitor was assured.
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Proposed corrective actions included the following: notification to shift supervision and
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operators that the flushing apparatus was required to be disconnected when not in use; labeling of valves not identified on piping and instrument diagrams; upgrade of piping and instrument diagrams to reflect plant configuration; installation of permanent piping for performance of the weekly flush of the service water radiation monitor; revision of applicable procedures to better clarify expectations; and addition of a local operator aid to remind operators to disconnect the flushing apparatus.
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Conclusion l
inspectors identified a minor problem with maintaining the service water radiation monitor i
system configuration as required by procedure when operators did not restore the system to a normalline-up upon completion of system flushing.
Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 Safety System Walkdown of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System a.
Inspection Scope (71707)
Because of the RHR system's safety significance, as described in the Monticello probabilistic risk assessment, the inspectors performed a walkdown major portions of the piping and equipment for both trains. During the walkdown, the inspectors assessed the material condition of motor-operated valves, control valves, relief valves, manual valves, gauges, temperature sensing elements, insulating materials, pumps, and motors, and assessed the housekeeping in and around the RHR system components.
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Observations and Findinas The overall condition of the RHR system was good and the RHR rooms were free of unnecessary clutter. The inspectors noted two minor material conditions discrepancies.
The supply air pressure gauge for air-operated valve (AOV) 1994 was missing its gauge glass and pointer, and the gauge face was loose; and the probe associated with the temperature detector, which measures the ambient air temperature in the vicinity of the 14 RHR pump, was bent approximately 90 degrees and cracked at the bend location.
Both of the discrepancies were discussed with the responsible system engineer, who stated that each discrepancy would be evaluated and that work orders (WOs) would be initiated as needed. The inspectors noted that these discrepancies did not impact i
system operability and were of minor safety significance.
l During the examination of the 14 RHR pump, the inspector found a partially burned
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absorbent cwipe, approximately 10 square inches in area, lodged under the pump motor heater near the lower motor air intake screen. The inspector was initially alerted to the presence of the swipe by the faint odor of burned paper. The inspector removed the swipe, verified that there was no fire, and discussed the findings with the shift manager,
the shift supervisor, and the RHR system engineer.
Condition report 9900029," Burned Paper Swipe Found Near #14 RHR Pump Motor Heater," was initiated by the system engineer. After a walkdown of the 7HR system and an evaluation of the impact of a burning swipe on the RHR pump and surrounding equipment, the system engineer concluded that air cooling flow to the 14 RHR pump motor woulu not have been impacted by the location of the swipe; the area near the charred swipe would not have ignited if the swipe would have been totally consumed by fire; oil in the guide bearing cavity of the motor would not have gotten hot enough to flash or degrade because of the small amount of combustible material and the thick metal that surrounded the nearby area; the motor heater was not impacted by the partial burning of the swipe; and that the 14 RHR pump was operable.
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Additional licensee corrective actions, which are planned or completed, to address this issue included a detailed walkdown of the ECCS pumps located in "A" and "B" RHR pump rooms to check for similar debris similar and training for operating personnel, which reviewed the requirements and expectations for the performance of tours as outlined in Operations Work Instruction 02.03, Revision 3, " Operator Rounds."
The inspectors also verified that the actual position / status of major system components i
agreed with the indicated position of those components on the control room status board and noted no discrepancies.
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Conclusions
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The material condition of the RHR system was good. The adequacy of general housekeeping for the "B" RHR pump room came into question when a partially burned swipe was found under the 14 RHR pump motor heater. The cognizant system engineer promptly addressed the operability issue concerning the 14 RHR pump and the other RHR equipment discrepancies that were identified. Operations took adequate actions to
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address the plant housekeeping issues.
l 11. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments on Maintenance Activities a.
inspection Scope (62707)
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The inspectors observed performance of all or portions of the activities contained in following WOs:
WO 9802093, "PM 4847 "MCC-132 Maintenance 8 Cycle," and Procedure
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4847PM, Revision 8, "GE 7700 Line Motor Control Center Maintenance Procedure," performed on January 29,1999.
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WJ 9803413, "RV Did Not Relieve When Expected," performed on February 3,
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WO 9904063, " Replace SW Radiation Monitor to Service Water Line Flush Hose
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and Fittings," performed on February 4,1999.
WO 9904069, " investigate CRD-113 Seat Leakage in Bank 1 HCU's," performed
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on February 4,1999.
i WO 9904136, " Repair D13 24 Volt Charger for #15 Battery," performed on
February 9,1999, i
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Observations and Findinas j
The inspectors found the work performed in these activities to be professional and
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thorough. All work was performed in accordance with procedures and the workers were knowledgeable on their assigned tasks. When applicable, appropriate radiological work
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permits were followed. The inspec' ors observed supervisory and engineering involvement in the activities and adequate foreign material exclusion controls. On one occasion, inspectors noted that maintenance technicians demonstrated good attention-to-detail when they performed system line-up verifications that were not required by the WO.
M1.2 General Comments on Surveillance Test Activities a.
Inspection Scope (61726)
The inspectors observed or reviewed the performance of all or portions of the activities contained in the following surveillance test procedures:
Procedure 0143, Revision 25, "Drywell - Torus Monthly Vacuum Breaker Check,
and instrument Air System Valve Exercise," on January 13,1999.
Procedure 0081, Revision 29, " Control Rod Drive Scram insertion Time Test," on
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Procedure 1040-1, Revision 31, " Turbine - Generator Tests," on January 17.
- Procedure 0008, Revision 11, " Main Steam isolation Valve (MSIV) Closure
i SCRAM Test," on January 17.
Procedure 0160, Revision 9, *MSIV Exercise Test," on January 17.
- Procedure 0255-07-1 A-1, Revision 12, Main Steam Valve Exercise Test," on
L January 17, Procedure 0141, Revision 13, Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum Breaker
l Operability Test," on January 20.
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Procedure 0255-1810, Revision 6,"Tip Explosive Valve Testing and Monitoring,"
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on February 18,1999.
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Procedure 7263, Revision 4, " CAM and PAS System Heat Tracing Maintenance
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In general, the inspectors found that the activities specified in the surveillance test
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procedures were performed in a professional and thorough manner and completed in
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accordance with the applicable procedures. Personnel were knowledgeable and l
generally demonstrated effective three-way communications, self-checking, and peer-l checking. When conducted, pre-job briefs were comprehensive. The inspectors t
frequently observed supervisors and system engineers monitoring job progress. Quality ce~rol personnel were present whenever specified in procedure. Three-way cor. nunication techniques were observed. When applicable, appropriate radiation
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control measures were in-place.
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w M1.3 Control Rod Scram Timino Test a.
Inspection Scope (62707. 61726)
On January 14, the inspectors observed the licensee conduct activities described in surveillance procedure 0081, Revision 29, " Control Rod Drive [CRD] Scram Insertion Time Test," and WO 9903983, " Install New Diaphragms into SSPVs."
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Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed operators perform surveillance test procedure 0081 activities from the control room and electricians perform WO 9903983 activities from the hydraulic control unit station. Operators appropriately used three-way communications. The shift supervisor and nuclear engineers were present during testing, and quality control personnel and an electrical maintenance supervisor were present during replacement of the diaphragm for SV-118, the scram solenoid pilot valve, for control rod 42-15.
The licensee issued WO 9903983 and replaced the diaphragm in SV-118 for control rod 42-15 because the rod exhibited scram times slower than expected during performance of testing in accordance with surveillance test procedure 0081. The inspectors observed the maintenance, isolation restoration, and post-maintenance testing associated with this work and identified no deficiencies. The electrical maintenance supervisor displayed an appropriate questioning attitude by identifying a material acquisition problem in the shop prior to work commencing per WO 9903983. Condition report 99000144, " Wrong Material issued From Warehouse for CRD Solenoid Repair," was written to document this problem. Also, during the surveillance testing, blue scram lights on the full core display for five rods did not illuminate. The licensee had issued WO 9903982, " Blue Scram Lights Not Functioning Properly," to correct this issue.
The inspectors verified the licensee's calculations and verified the data met the requirements of Technical Specification 3.3.C. During the surveillance testing, the inspectors observed a minor inconsistency between the order in which steps were l
performed and what was procedurally expected. No safety significant issues were identified.
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Conclusions The inspectors observed the maintenance, isolation restoration, and post-maintenance testing associated with work order 9903983, " Install New Diaphragms into SSPVs," and identified no deficiencies. The irspectors observed a minor inconsistency between the
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order in which steps were performed and what was procedurally expected during performance activities contained in surveillance test procedure 0081," Control Rod Drive
[CRD] Scram insertion Time Test." There was no safety significance associated with this
issue.
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)
M8.1 (Closed) Unresolved item (URI) 50-263/97003-07(DRP): Discrepancy between TS and bases on surveillance test frequencies.
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In a letter from Elinor G. Adensam to Roger O. Anderson, dated January 12,1999, the i
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) provided written notification to the licensee that the Monticello TSs did not allow a " fixed date" surveillance test program, regardless of the fact that the NRC staff had previously endorsed a " fixed date" surveillance test
program in a previous NRC safety evaluation. As discussed in Inspection Report 50-263/98004(DRP), the licensee had previously revised the surveillance testing program
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to disallow the "-25" percent band on surveillance test intervals.
The inspectors performed a check of surveillance test time intervals for approximately l
250 surveillance test procedures. The inspectors reviewed data for the time period approximately one year prior to the disallowed "-25" percent band. Inspectors noted that the licensee infrequently used the "-25" and "+25" percent extensions for a scheduled surveillance test time interval, and did not identify any interval that exceeded TS
requirements. The inspectors also checked the time intervals for surveillance test j
procedures after the licensee disallowed the "-25" percent band, and did not identify any interval that exceeded the time interval required by TS.
Ill. Enaineerina E8 Miscellaneoum Engineering lasues (92700,92903)
E8.1 Review of Revision 16 to the Updated Safety Analysis Reoort (TAC No. MA3106)
[nspection Scope a.
n An in-office review of Revision 16 to the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) for Monticello, dated October 23,1998, was conducted by the NRR project manager.
Exhibit A of Revision 16 is the periodic report of changes, tests, and experiments required by 10 CFR 50.59(b)(2). Revision 16 updates the information in the USAR up to August 1,1998. The review was done to assess whether or not Exhibit A described each change in sufficient detail to determine if the licensee's conclusion that the changes did not involve an unreviewed safety question was reasonable, b.
Observations and Findinas Revis'on 16 reflects the initial effort of the Monticello USAR review project to expand and verify the list of references for each section and make editorial corrections. Also, since j
some sidebar information was lost in previous revisions due to 3-hole punching, the i
margins for all sections were moved. Because of pagination changes that resulted, most USAR sections were reprinted.
Exhibit A,"Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Report of Changes, Tests, and Experiments," included summaries of 79 safety evaluations conducted under 10 CFR 50.59. These included piping and equipment modifications to support power rerate. Changes to the USAR text and tables resulting from rerate modifications that pertain to system design capabilities were included in Revision 16. Changes that pertain to operating parameters were being withheld until the next USAR revision, which is due upon completion of the power ascension testing associated with NRC approval of the rerate. The 79 summaries were reviewed to determine that each change was adequately described. Fifteen of the summaries were compared with the USAR or other licensee submittals for accuracy. In general, the summaries provided sufficient detail'o determine
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Conclusion in general, the summaries in the Monticello periodic " Report of Changes, Tests, and Experiments," provided sufficient detail to determine that the licensee's conclusion that the changes did not involve unreviewed safety questions was reasonable.
E8.2 (Closed) VIO 50-263/96009-12: Incorrect area used in test. The completion of corrective actions for this violation is being tracked by the licensee's corrective action system (condition report 97000993).
E8.3 (Closed) Inspection Followuo item (IFI) 50-263/96009-15: Portions of RHR downgraded to non-safety related. This item had been referred to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (WRR) for review. NRR determined that there were no present concerns, as the licensee had not, in actuality, downgraded the pip:ng.
IV. Plant Support l
R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 General Comments (71750)
During routine tours of the plant and observations of plant activities, the inspectors found that access doors to locked high radiation areas were properly secured, areas were properly posted, and personnel demonstrated proper radiological work practices. The inspectors reviewed various survey data and radiation work permit (RWP) use and found that personnel were logged onto the correct RWP for the work bein0 performed.
i Personnel logged into RWPs were wearing proper protective clothing and kept radiation protection personnelinformed of activities as required by the RWP. Additionally, the inspectors found surveys to be timely and accurate.
R1.2 Radiation Protection Activities To Decontaminate Fuel Pool Ventilation Ducts a.
Inspection Scope (71750)
Inspectors reviewed radiation protection activities associated svith the decontamination of fuel pool ventilation duct-work, included was a review of ALARA practices, radiation work permits, work orders, and pre-job briefings.
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Observations and Findinas On February 9, th'e licensee pumped water from the dryer separator pit into the ventilation line associated with the fuel pool. The event occurred when a maintenance technician assigned to decontaminate the dryer separator pit by pumping contaminated water to the skimmer surge tanks for filtering and processing accidently placed the pump discharge hose into the fuel pool ventilation opening versus the skimmer surge tank overflow weir. The skimmer surge tank over flow weir and the ventilation openings were both rectangular holes located in the wall of the fuel pool. The skimmer weir was located so that water overflowed the bottom of the opening and entered the fuel pool skimmer
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surge tanks. The ventilation duct was similar in size and was located next to the overflow weir at a slightly higher elevation so that water did not normally flow into the opening.
The skimmer surge tank and the ventilation lines were not safety-related and no safety systems were impacted by the error.
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The event was recognized when the control room received an area high radiation alarm for the skimmer surge tank room. Normal control room readings on the area radiation
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monitor were 10 to 15 millirem / hour (mrem /hr) and the alarm setpoint was 60 mrem /hr.
The highest reading observed on the radiation monitor was approximately 160 mrem /hr.
The control room immediately secured decontamination activities and evacuated the area. Radiation protection personnel were dispatched to investigate.
Radiation protection technicians promptly surveyed the ventilation moisture collection drain tank where the water accumulated and measured 2000 mrem /hr on contact with the tank and 1000 mrem /hr at 30 centimeters from its surface. It was determined that the drain line from the tank was clogged, probably with debris from the dryer separator pit, and that the tank had filled with contaminated water. The room was reclassified as a locked high radiation area and a radiation protection technician was posted at the door until the room was locked and surveys updated.
On February 11, inspectors observed the pre-job briefing for repair of the clogged ventilation moisture tank and for cleaning the ventilation line from the fuel pool to the moisture collection drain tank. The briefing was thorough and information in the radiation work permit contained good insights about the effects of the job on local radiation levels.
The technicians ensured that personnel were aware that performance of maintenance activities had the potential to vary radiation levels. Specifically, discussions noted that changing water levels, or movement of the contamination from the clogged drain line, would affect the shielding or cause a transient radiation source. Additionally, technicians ensured that personnel performing the work were aware of the radiation levels in the room and areas of low dose rates where personnel could await to assist in the work..
Discussions at the briefing revealed that there could be a better correlation between the
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dosimeter alarm setpoint (set at 300 mrem /hr) and the back-out limit (500 mrem /hr)
identified in the RWP. The dosimeter and RWP were modified to be consistent and the alarm setpoint of the dosimeter was changed to 500 mrem /hr. Present at the briefing were engineering personnel, maintenance personnel performing the work, and the radiation protection technicians assigned to monitor the job.
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Conclusion Radiation protection activities associated with the inadvertent contamination and subsequent decontamination of the fuel pool ventilation duct work were thorough.
Technicians demonstrated good dose minimization practices during event initial response and radiation work permit planning. Effective communications were observed during the pre-job briefing associated with decontamination activities.
S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities l
l S1.1 General Comments (71750)
The inspectors observed the licensee implement proper physical security measures associated with the integrity of protected area barriers, personnel and package access,
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personnel searches, and response to a lost badge. Additionally, on January 17, the l
inspectors accompanied security personnel on outside rounds and perimeter tours.
Lighting was adequate in all areas. The security guard was knowledgeable of requirements and performed the required inspections. The NRC inspectors noted no l
deficiencies with the performance of routine outside rounds.
F2 Status of Fire Protection Facilities and Equipment i
F2.1 General Comments (71750)
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During normal resident inspection activities, routine observations were conducted in the area of fire protection. Fire extinguishers and fire hoses were properly stored and inspected by licensee personnel. No notable degradation of equipment was noted.
V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary
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The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the l
. conclusion of the inspection on February 22,1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
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l Licensee B. Day, General Superintendent Operations M. Hammer, Plant Manager
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' K. Jepson, Superintendent, Chemistry & Environreantal Protection L. Nolan, General Superintendent Sa'ety Assessment i
E. Reilly, General Superintendent Maintenance i
C. Schibonski, General Superintendent Engineering
' A. Ward, Manager Quality Services L. Wilkerson, Superintendent Security
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J.' Windschill, General Superintendent, Radiation Protection l
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED i
lP 37551:
Onsite Engineering IP 61726:
Surveillance Observations IP 62707:
Maintenance Observations IP 71707:
Plant Operations i
IP 71750:.
Plant Support Activities IP 92700:
Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities
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lP 92902:
Followup - Maintenance IP 92903:
Followup - Engineering
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ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Ooened i
None.
Closed 50-263/96009-12 VIO Incorrect area used in test 50-263/96009-15 IFl Portions of RHR downgraded to non-safety related 50-263/97003-07(DRP)
URI Discrepancy between TS and bases on surveillance test frequencies 50-263/99001-01(DRP)
VIO Fai'ure to restore service water radiation monitor as required by procedure l
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ALARA As Low As is Reasonably Achievable AOV Air-Operated Valve CFR Code of Federal Regulations CRD Control Rod Drive DRP Division of Reactor Projects HCU Hydraulic Control Unit HPCI High Pressure Coolant injection IFl Inspection Followup ltem j
MCC Motor Control Center mrem /hr millirem per hour MSIV Main Steam isolation Valve NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission i
NRR Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation NSP Northern States Power PDR Public Document Room
'RHR Residual Heat Removal RWP Radiation Work Permit SSPV Scram Solenoid Pilot Valve SW Service Water TS '
. Technical Specification URI Unresolved item USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report VIO Violation
WO Work Order i
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