ML20134G161

Insp Rept 50-263/96-11 on 961017-1127.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support

ML20134G161
Person / Time
Site:	Monticello
Issue date:	01/29/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20134G148	List: ML20134G146 ML20134G161
References
50-263-96-11, NUDOCS 9702100301
Download: ML20134G161 (18)

See also: IR 05000263/1996011

Text

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION III

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Docket No. 50-263

License No. OPR-22

Report No: 50-263/96011(DRP)

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Licensee: Northern States Power Company'~

Facility: Monticello Nuclear Generating Station

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Location: 414 Nicollet Mall

Minneapolis, MN 55401

Dates: October 17 through November 27. 1996

Inspectors: A. M. Stone. Senior Resident Inspector

J. Lara. Resident Inspector

S. Ray. Senior Resident Inspector

Prairie Island

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Approved by: J. Jacobson. Chief. Projects Branch 4

Division of Reactor Projects '

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9702100301 970129

PDR ADOCK 05000263

O PDR

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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Monticello Nuclear Generating Station. Unit 1

l NRC Inspection Report 50-263/96011(DRP) - -

This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering.

i maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident

inspection.

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Doerations

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Operations personnel responses were appropriate to the increasing "D"

safety relief valve tailpipe temperature and to the high radiation

levels in the discharge canal. (Sections 02.1 and 04.1)

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A lack of self-checking resulted in a licensed o]erator and system

engineer placing a jumper in the wrong relay. T11s action resulted in a

trip of both recirculation pumps. Control room operators responded

appropriately to the event. (Section 04.2)

Maintenance

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Work observed was conducted in a professional and thorough manner. The

inspectors identifled a concern with timeliness of documenting Quality

Control inspections. A licensee Quality Control inspector identified

inadequate wear rings which were to be installed in the #11 residual

heat removal service water pump. This demonstrated a good questioning

attitude. (Section M1.2)

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Material condition of plant equipment was acceptable. The licensee

identified a degraded fire barrier. (Sections M2.1 and M2.2)

Engineerina

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The licensee's actions to resolve the residual heat removal service

water air vent valve failure to seat were mixed. After several

failures. a surge check valve was installed which appeared to eliminate

the air vent valve failures. However. a root cause was not determined.

(Section El.1)

Plant Support

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The inspectors noted that all observed contaminated areas except one

were clearly marked and posted. (Section R1.2)

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The licensee's performance during a planned emergency preparedness

exercise was acceptable. Appropriate operator and plant personnel

response to the drill scenarios were evident. (Section P4.1)

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Report Details

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Summary of Plant Status

The unit operated at power levels up to 100 percent thermal power for most of

the period. However, on November 12. a licensed operator and system engineer

inadvertently caused both recirculation pumps to trip during the performance

of a surveillance. Control room operators manually tripped the reactor in

accordance with procedures. This event is discussed in Section 04.1. On

November 13. the operators synchronized the generator to the grid; however,

about 20 minutes later a turbine trip occurred. The turbine bypass valve

opened and the reactor remained critical. No annunciators or failure flags

were received. On Novembe~r'14. the operators synchronized the generator to

the grid and maintained 30wer at about 43 MWe for further troubleshooting.

This additional troubleslooting did not identify the cause of the previous

turbine trip. About an hour later, the operators manually unloaded the

generator because of increasing turbine vibrations. The unit was re-

synchronized to the grid later on November 14 without incident.

On November 15. operations personnel noted that the "D" safety relief valve

tailpipe temperature was higher than expected. This trend is discussed in

Section 02.1.

I. Operations

01 Conduct of Operations

01.1 General Comments (71707)

Using Inspection Procedure 71707. the inspectors conducted frequent

reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of

operations was acceptable: specific events and noteworthy observations

are detailed in the sections below.

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02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment

02.1 Response to Increasing "D" Safety Relief Valve Tailpine Temperature

a. Inspection Scope (71701)

On November 15, 1996, operations personnel noted the tailpipe

temperature for the "D" safety relief valve (SRV) was higher than

expected and was trending upward. The inspectors evaluated the l

licensee's response to this equipment problem. The following documents l

were reviewed:

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Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.E. 3.7. A.2 and 4.7. A.1.b;

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Abnormal procedure C.4-B.3.3.B. " Relief Valve Leaking;" and l

. Operations Manual B.3.3 " Reactor Pressure Relief."

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b. Observations and Findinos

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Theinspectorsreviewedthe"D"SRVtail)ipetemperaturedatahistory

and confirmed that the temperature was a)out 145 F and increasing about

1"F per hour. The. shift manager directed operators to increase cooling

to the drywell in an attempt to slow the rate down. The inspectors

observed that operations personnel were knowledgeable of a procedure

requirement to initiate a controlled shutdown if the tailpipe

temperature approached 200 F. The temperature decreased to about 140 F

and appeared to be constant. The inspectors also verified that the

o)erators were monitoring torus temperature. No notable temperature

clanges were observed.

A meeting with appropriate personnel was held to discuss the trend and

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potential for a manual reactor shutdown. The inspectors observed good

communication and conservative decision making during this meeting. The

licensee reviewed outstanding outage-related work orders and developed

an outage schedule in the event a shutdown was necessary. The system

engineer recommended temporarily increasing the pressure to the valve

bellows. This action was performed, however, the tailpipe temperature

remained high. The engineer surmised a problem existed with the second

stage disc. Operations and engineering personnel continued to monitor

the tailpipe temperature and decided to re-evaluate the situation if the

temperature increased above 150 F.

The inspectors confirmed that the tailpipe temperature varied between

135 to 145"F during the remainder of the inspection period. Further

licensee actions to address this issue will be discussed in Inspection

Report 50-263/96012.

c. Conclusions

Operations personnel response was appropriate to the increasing "D" SRV

temperature. The licensee's actions in anticipation of an cutage were

proactive.

04 Operator Knowledge and Performance

04.1 Onerator Response to High Discharge Canal Radiation Alarm

a. Insoection Scope (71707 and 93702)

The inspectors independently assessed operators response to numerous

high discharge canal radiation alarms on October 17, 1996. As discussed

in Inspection Report 50-263/96010. hard rains washed the emissions from

the Monticello plant and nearby coal plant exhausts into the discharge

canal.

The inspectors reviewed applicable emergency operating procedures (EOP)

and TS.

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f b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors reviewed the Channel A and B discharge canal radiation

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monitor data and noted that the radiation levels gradual increased to

about 25.4 cpm. Discussions with the operators and review of -

annunciator alarms confirmed that the operators appropriately entered

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the E0Ps. The operators isolated the discharge of the #11 offgas

storage tank through the stack as a precautionary measure.

Notifications to licensee management and state and federal agencies were

made in a timely manner. The operators exited the E0Ps once the

radiation levels decreased and trended toward expected values.

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c. Conclusion

The operators responded appropriately to the high radiation levels in

the discharge canal.

04.2 Licensee Response to Dual Recirculation Pumo Trios

a. Inspection Scone (71707 and 93702)

On November 12. 1996. during a special surveillance test. both

recirculation pumps inadvertently tripped. The inspectors reviewed the

cause of the pumps trip and subsequent licensee actions.

The inspectors reviewed the following documents:

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Surveillance test 1448. Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Containment

Spray / Cooling Logic Test;

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. TS 3.5.F:

. Emergency Operating Procedures:

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Operating Procedure B.1.4.05.02. " Shutdown of One Pump with

Reactor at Power;"

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Operating Procedure B.1.4-05.02. A.3. " Restart of a Shutdown Pump

While in a Hot Shutdown Condition:"

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Operating Procedure B.1.4-05.03.6. " Isolation of Cooling Water to

a Control Rod Drive to Determine Bottom Head Temperature:" l

. Logic diagram NX 7905-46-5: and

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Quality Services Observation Report 1996416. " Plant Startup

Activities in the Control Room."

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors interviewed the operator and system engineer involved in

the special surveillance test 1448. Step 8 of the test instructed the

operator to momentarily place a jumper across studs 1 and 2 of relay

10A-K 74A. From the front of the panel, the operator observed that the

desired relay was the fourth relay from the edge of the cabinet. The

operator proceeded to the back of the panel and observed that the relay ,

studs were obstructed by a vertical support and believed it would be '

easier to access the studs from the adjacent panel. The system engineer

concurred. The operator then applied the jumper across the two studs of

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the first relay in the second panel. However, the operator and engineer

did not realize that the first relay in this panel was 10A-K 73A. not

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10A-K 74A as desired.

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The momentary jumper across 10A-K 73A caused both recirculation pumps to

trip through the break detection portion of the low pressure coolant

injection recirculation loop select logic circuitry. The inspectors

independently verified that all automatic actions associated with this

circuitry occurred as expected.

The operators in the control room responded appropriately to the

recirculation pump trips. The shift manager directed the operators to

manually trip the reactor in accordance with operating procedures. (At .

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the time of the event. 1S 3.5.F prohibite'd operation with natural

recirculation.) The inspectors confirmed through discussions with the  !

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operators and review of annunciator alarms that the operators

4 appropriately entered and exited the emergency operating procedures.

• Following the reactor trip, the operators restarted the #11

recirculation pump without incident

The inspectors-observed the restart of the #12 recirculation pump. The

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inspectors noted that operators used either the bottom head drain

temperature indicator or the vessel metal temperature. This action was

in accordance with procedures. The inspectors observed good conflict

resolution and conservative operation when operators noted a significant

difference between the two temperature indications. The shift manager

suspended the restart of the pump until the temperature discrepancy was

resolved. The inspectors had no concerns.

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c. Conclusions

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A lack of effective self-checking and verification resulted in a

licensed operator and system engineer incorrectly placing a jumper in a

relay. This action resulted in a trip of both recirculation pumps.

Control room operators responded appropriately to the event. This event

will be further reviewed upon issue of the LER.

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04.3 Goerators Performance Durinq Surveillances

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a. Insoection Scoce (71707 and 61726)

The inspectors observed operators perform several daily and routine

equipment surveillances. The inspectors assessed operator knowledge.

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communication with other departments, and procedure adherence.

, b. Observations and Findings

In general, the inspectors determined that the surveillances were

performed in a professional and thorough manner. The operators

performed the surveillances with the procedure at hand and acceptance

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criteria were veri fied by shif t management. Technical specification

limiting conditions for operations were appropriately entered and

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adhered to.

However, the inspectors noted that the plant operators performed a step

out of order during a #12 emergency diesel generator service water pump

surveillance (0187-2). The surveillance required the plant operators

to: (1) open the bypass valve to the strainer; (2) close and open a

strainer outlet valve; (3) manually cycle a crosstie valve: and

(4) reclose the bypass valve. The inspectors identified that the plant

operators opened and immediately closed the bypass valve prior to

manipulating the strainer outlet valve. This action caused the pump to

be inoperable while the strainer outlet valve was momentarily closed.

The plant operators immediately acknowledged the problem and reported

the procedure adnerence issue to the shift manager. Failure to follow

procedure is a violation of 10 CFR 50. Appendix B. Criterion V.

However. this violation is of minor significance since the pump was

inoperable for less than 15 seconds. The plant operator was in

attendance in the event that the emergency diesel generator started.

This is considered a tion-Cited Violation consistent with Section IV of

the t1RC Enforcement Policy (50-263/96011-01). ~

II. Maintenance

M1 Conduct of Maintenance

M1.1 General Comments

a. Inspection Scope (62703)

The inspectors observed all or portions of the following work orders

(WO) and surveillance activities:

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WO 9602046 De-terminate /Re-terminate #11 RHR pump motor l

. WO 9602495 Changeout procedure for ASCO solenoid valve SV-2379 l

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WO 9602649 lighten oil leak on #12 fuel oil fitting '

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WO 9602719 Investigate / repair #12 RHR service water (SW) pump

seal leakage

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WO 9602728 Replace #11 emergency diesel generator emergency

service water pump

. WO 9602848 Perform test of surge check valve with AV-3147

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WO 9602849 Perform test of air vent valve AV-3147

. 0056 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Hi Steam Flow

Sensor Test

. 0060 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Hi Steam Flow

Sensor Test

. 0067 Spent Fuel Pool Monitor Functional Test and

Calibration

. 0133 Daily Jet Pump Operability Check

. 0187-2 #12 Emergency Diesel Generator Testing

. 0439 Reactor Building Exhaust Plenum Monitor Functional

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Test and Calibration

. 1025 Area Radiation Monitor Functional Testing

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• 1448 RHR Containment Spray / Cooling Logic Test

In addition, see the specific discussions of maintenance observed under

M1.2 and M1.3 below.

b. Observations and Findinas

in general the inspectors found the work performed under these

activities to be 3rofessional and thorough. Work observed was performed

with the work paccage present and in active use. Technicians were

experienced and knowledgeable of their assigned tasks. The supervisors

and sy~s tem engineers monitored job progress, and cuality control

personnel were present whenever required by procecure. When applicable,

appropriate radiation control measures were in place. The inspectors

also verified that redundant equipment remained operable during the

maintenance activities and that operations personnel documented entries

into applicable TS limiting condition for operations (LCO).

M1.2 Observations of Quality Control Activities

a. Insnection Scone (62703)

The inspectors observed maintenance and quality control personnel

performing WO 9602046. "De-terminate /Re-terminate #11 RHR Pump Motor."

The inspectors also reviewed documentation to ensure that the work

performed was reflected in the work order.

b. Ob ervations and Findings

The inspectors verified that maintenance personnel documented the work

performed accurately in the work order. However, the inspectors noted

that three items in the Quality Control (OC) Inspection Record were not

signed. These items were signed off as complete in the WO package. The

inspectors discussed this discrepancy with the lead reactor operator who

verified with the OC inspector that the OC hold points had been adhered

to with satisfactory results. The OC ins 3ector had performed the

required inspections but had not signed t1e inspection record following

completion of the inspection activity (motor terminations). The NRC

inspectors later observed the OC inspector sign the inspection record.

Discussions with the QC supervisor indicated that QC observations should

have been documented concurrent with the work performed.

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The inspectors noted that a OC inspector identified that the newly

machined wear rings tolerances for the #11 RHR pump were out of

! tolerance. The OC inspector found that the micrometer used during the

l machining of the wear rings was offset by 0.025 inches. This offset

i resulted in the out-of-tolerance dimensions. The licensee machined new

rings to the correct dimensions.

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c. Conclusions

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The inspectors concluded the QC inspections were completed as required.

but were not documented in a timely manner. The QC inspector's

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identification of inadequate wear rings demonstrated a good questioning

attitude.

M1.3 HPCI/RCIC Hi Steam Flow Sensor Tests

a. Inspection Scope (61726)

The inspectors reviewed the following materials: .

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Surveillance test 0056. "HPCI Hi Steam Flow Sensor Test;" ,

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Surveillance test 0060. "RCIC Hi Steam Flow Sensor Test;" l

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Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Chapters 6.2.4.2.4 I

and 7.6.3.4.2: 1

. Schematic drawings NX-8292-12-1. and -2: i

. Operations Manual B.3.2: and

. Operations Manual B.2.3. '

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The inspectors also reviewed the following condition reports (CR) i

~.iated with out-of-tolerance flow switches:

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CR 95000183 Flowswitch FS-23-78 HPCI Flow Switch out of Tolerance

CR 96001917 Flowswitch FS-23-78 HPCI Flow Switch out of Tolerance

for switches 1 and 2 i

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b. Observations and Findings

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The inspectors witnessed instrument and controls personnel perform  !

surveillance tests 0056 and 0060 and noted that the trip setpoints of

the HPCI and RCIC system pressure switches (e.g. PS-7414. PS-7415. and

dPIS 13-83) were tested and recorded after these switches were

previously tripped. The inspectors were concerned that the true as-

found setpoint may be masked (i.e., the devices could be pre-conditioned

prior to testing). The inspectors reviewed the applicable UFSAR

Chapters. schematic drawings, and Operations manuals, and discussed this

issue with the system engineer. Based on this review. the inspectors

determined that the pressure switches were in series with other relays

and switches, thereby requiring the actuation of these pressure switches

to test the other devices. Additionally. the performance of pressure

switches was generally repeatable and exercising does not affect the as-

found condition. Therefore, the surveillance procedure was acceptable.

The inspectors reviewed the operability determination for the two out-

of-tolerance HPCI flow switches and had no concerns with the licensee's

conclusions or corrective actions as documented in the condition

reports.

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c. Conclusions

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The inspectors concluded that the testing method was appropriate for the

HPCI and RCIC pressure switches.

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M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment

M2.1 Degraded Fire Barrier in Control Room

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a. Inspection Scope (37550 and 93702)

- On October 16, engineering personnel identified that a fire barrier

installed between redundant division panels in the control room was

dislocated from the 03ening between the two adjacent panels. The

inspectors reviewed t1e licensee's immediate actions.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors confirmed that the fiberboard which provided divisional

separation between two adjacent panels was out of position. These l

panels contained the redundant division components associated with the

RHR and Core Spray systems. The fiberboard provided a barrier between

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the floor and the bottom of the common panel side (3-inch opening). Due l

to its close proximity to the floor and relatively small size, the

dislodged fire barrier was difficult to identify. The licensee's

initial corrective actions included inspection of other control room

panels for similar conditions and reinstallation of the barrier. No

other deficiencies were identified. The inspectors independently

verified the fire barriers were intact in the other control room panels.

The licensee notified the resident inspectors of this condition and also

notified the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72. The licensee determined the

plant was outside design basis as described in General Electric l

Specification 22A2501. " Separation Requirements for Reactor Safety and '

Engineered Safeguards Systems." which required floor to panel fire

barriers between adjacent panels having closed ends.

c. Conclusions

The licensee's immediate corrective actions were acceptable. The

licensee's long-term actions will be evaluated concurrent with review of

the licensee event report.

M2.2 Current Material Condition and Imoact on Operations Personnel

a. Insoection Scope (71707)

The inspectors conducted control room and plant inspections and

interviewed operations personnel to assess the material condition of

plant equipment.

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b. Observations and Findinas

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During inspections in the plant and control room. the inspectors noted

that the following degraded conditions were outstanding:

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1. 11 reactor water cleanuo oumo seal leak As discussed in

Inspection Report 50-263/96008. the inspectors identified

increasing leakage. Maintenance performed during this period was

unsuccessful in reducing the leakage. The licensee was pursuing a

new seal package. The pump remained inoperable. l

. Increasino tailoioe temoerature on the "D" Safety Relief Valve

This condition is discussed in Section 02.1.

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The inspectors also noted that the licensee resolved some previously '

discussed material condition concerns during the November forced outage.

Maintenance personnel replaced the limit switch on a turbine stop valve

which had previously caused a half scram signal during routine

surveillances,

c. Conclusions

The inspectors verified that the above conditions did not violate TS.

The operators interviewed were knowledgeable of the conditions. The

inspectors verified that work orders were initiated to repair the

degraded equipment.

III. Enaineerina

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El Conduct of Engineering

E1.1 Residual Heat Removal Service Water #11 Pump Declared Incoerable Due to l

an Inoperable Air Vent Valve

a. Insoettion Scone

The inspectors continued a review of the licensee's troubleshooting.

maintenance, and engineering activities pertaining to the inoperable #11

RHRSW pump. The problems associated with the inoperable pump were of

concern due to the recurring failure of the air vent valve. The

licensee documented these failures in CRs 96002076 and 96002578.

b. Observations and Findinas

As discussed in NRC Ins)ection Reports 50-263/96006 and 50-263/96006.

the licensee declared t1e #11 RHRSW pump inoperable on several occasions

due to the failure of air vent valve. AV-3147, to close when the #11

RHRSW pump was started. The air vent valve was designed to close after

air was ejected from the pump column and system piping.

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The pump was declared inoperable on October ll.1996. when the air vent  !

valve failed to seat. The licensee discussed the results of previous

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troubleshooting and system performance with the valve manufacturer and a 1

discernible root cause was not @termined. The licensee installed an I

orifice plate in the inlet to the air vent- valve. -The purpose of the

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orifice was to allow the entrapped air in the system to escape but would

throttle the flow and allow the valve to seat. The inspectors

previously reviewed the licensee's modification package 960150 and

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l safety evaluation. UFSAR. and installation of the modification (orifice i

l plate) as documented in Inspection Report 50-263/96008.

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The licensee performed post-modification testing which included daily

pump starts for 7 days and followed by an additional start one week

later. Theinspectorsobservedthetestsandindependent19verifiedthe  :

test results reflected acceptable air vent valve performance. On

November 1. the inspectors attended an operations committee (OC) meeting

where the system engineer presented the modification and test results.

The OC members approved the modification and concluded that the #11

RHRSW pump and air vent valve were operable. Operations personnel

declared the pump operable and exited the 30-day TS 3.5 LCO.

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However, to gain additional reliability data, the OC members recommended

performing the #11 RHRSW pump test on a weekly basis. On November 6.

the inspectors witnessed the first pump start since declaring the air

vent valve operable. When operators started the pump. the air vent

valve failed to seat and the pump was secured after about 7 seconds.

again

Operators attempted

af*.er 15 seconds when the a second start;

air vent valve however,

failed to seat. secured

The the pump #11

pump was declared inoperable. On November 8, the licensee temporarily

installed a surge check valve upstream of the air vent valve to

determine if the check valve provided improved performance of the air

vent valve. The inspectors witnessed the installation and testing of

the surge check. The licensee determined that the surge check valve '

improved the air vent valve performance and proceeded to implement a

permanent modification. No additional failures had occurred by the end

of the inspection period.

c. Conclusions

The licensee's actions in evaluating the RHRSW air vent valve were

determined to be mixed. Although the air vent valve modification was

acceptably tested demonstrating proper system Jerformance, reliability

concerns remained. The implemented surge checc valve modification

allowed for system operation by compensating for the poor air vent valve

performance. A root cause for the air vent valve failures has not been

established.

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E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment

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E2.1 Cable Travs Not labelled in Accordance With UFSAR Description

a. Inspection Scope (37550 and 71707) .

While performing the inspections discussed in this report, the

i inspectors reviewed the applicable portions of the UFSAR that related to

l the areas inspected.

b. Observations and Findings

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The inspectors verified that the UFSAR wording was generally consistent t

with"the observed plant practices, procedures, and parameters. One

discrepancy was identified with cable tray labeling. The inspectors

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identified numerous cable trays were not marked or labeled as discussed

in UFSAR Section 8.8. This section stated that all conduit cable

trays, boxes and cables were assigned unique identification numbers.

Markers were applied to cable trays not to exceed 20 feet, at points

where trays change direction, and at points adjacent to all tray

junctions. The inspectors discussed this observation with engineering

, personnel. The licensee planned to add the labels in conjunction with

other walkdowns and painting efforts. This issue is considered an

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Inspection Followup Item (50-263/96011-02) pending completion of the

licensee labeling program. The licensee initiated CR 96002444 to

address this issue.

IV. Plant Support

R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls (RP&C)

R1.1 Ladder leading to Contaminated Area Not Posted

a. Insoection Scope (71750)

The inspectors reviewed radiation and contaminated area postings during

routine inspections. The inspectors also reviewed radiation protection

procedure. R.07.02. Revision 8. " Area Posting. Special Status Signs and

Hot Spot Stickers.'

b. Observations and Findings

Concerns with radiation area postings were discussed in Inspection

Report 50-263/96010. In general, contaminated areas were clearly marked

and posted. However, the inspectors identified a ladder leading down to

the "A" train of residual heat removal and core spray pump floor was not

posted as contaminated. The inspectors reviewed the area survey map and

verified that the floor elevation was correctly posted as contaminated.

Radiation procedure R.07.02. Revision 8 ste) 5.d. required attaching a

required posting sign at each access point Jarricade. Failure to post

the ladder, an access point to the contaminated floor below. is a

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violation of TS 6.5.B.1. However, this violation is of minor

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significance and is considered a Non-Cited Violation consistent with '

Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-263/96011-03).

. c. Conclusions .

The inspectors noted that all observed contaminated areas except one

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were clearly marked and posted.

P1 Conduct of Emergency Preparedness Activities  !

Pl.1 Emergency Preparedness Exercise

, a. Inspection Scone (71750) ^

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On October 30. the licensee performed an emergency preparedness  ;

exercise. The inspectors reviewed the exercise and observed activities

in the TSC and control room simulator.

b. Observations and Findinas

The planned exercise consisted of two primary events: an oil spill near

the intake structure and a reactor coolant system leakage in the

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dryweil. The inspectors witnessed the developing exercise from the

simulator and TSC.

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Simulator Control Room Activities witnessed included shift turnover,

i operator response to the primary events, classification of the unusual

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event and ALERT in response to the events, and activation of

communicators in the simulator. Operator response to the exercise

scenario was acceptable as evidenced by 3 roper annunciator response,

monitoring of plant parameters. use of tle TS and E0Ps. emergency

classification of events, and entries into LCOs.

Technical Support Center The inspectors observed the site communicators

in the technical support center (TSC). The site communicators notified

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' appropriate state and federal agencies promptly when the shift manager

declared an unusual event for the simulated oil spill. The site

communicators provided additional information as the scenario progressed

to an ALERT declaration. Minimum staffing as defined in the licensee's

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emergency plan required only one communicator; however, the ins]ectors

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noted that three communicators participated in the exercise. T1e

licensee indicated that although only one was needed. the exercise

permitted an excellent training opportunity for those who were assigned

this function.

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The inspectors noted that the TSC was promptly staffed. The emergency

director quickly established command and control. Briefings were held

periodically and were informative. Priorities were established and

communicated to the simulated control room and operations support

center. The inspectors observed that staff members were aware of

equipment status and changes in priorities. Some problems occurred

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.

resulting from the simulation of the event. For example. when the Bus

15 lock-out condition cleared, an emergency diesel generator

.

automatically started. This occurred because operators simulated

isolating the bus when maintenance and engineering personnel initiated

, work. The automatic start of the diesel did not impact the scenario - -

objectives.

Critiaues The inspectors also attended several post-exercise critiques.

Participants and controllers provided constructive comments. The

ins)ectors concluded that while the exercise scenarios were not

tecinically challenging (e.g., no offsite dose assessment and

~ calculations required plant radiation levels were normal etc.), the

exercise did provide an opportunity for training of personnel and

provided a test for effective communications between the various

licensee organizations.

c. Conclusions

The licensee's performance during the exercise was acceptable.

Appropriate operator and plant personnel response to the scenarios were

evident.

P8 Miscellaneous Emergency Preparedness Issues

P8.1 (Closed) Inspection Followuo Item (50/263-95007-01): Exercise Weakness

- Failure to Notify NRC Immediately After Notifying State and Local

Agencies. As discussed in Section Pl.1. the inspectors observed the

site emergency communicators during the 1996 emergency drill. All

notifications were made in a timely manner. The inspectors also noted

that the licensee appropriately notified the NRC during two actual

events as discussed in Sections 04.1 and M2.1. These notifications were

accurate and timely.

V. Management Meetinas

X1 Exit Meeting Summary

On December 2. 1996. the inspectors presented the inspection results to the

plant manager and the manager of quality services. The licensee acknowledged

the findings presented.

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials 9xamined during the

inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was

identified.

15

.. _- _

0

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

-

Licensee

. E. Watzl. Vice President Nuclear

W. Hill. Plant Manager

M. Hammer. General Superintendent Maintenance

K. Jepson. Superintendent. Chemistry & Environmental Protection

L. Nolan. General Superintendent Safety Assessment

,

'

i

M. Onnen. General Superintendent 0)erations

E. Reilly. Superintendent Plant Scleduling  !

C. Schibonski, General Superintendent Engineering -

'

W.-Shamla. Manager Quality Services

J. Hindschill. General Superintendent. Radiatibh Protection

L. Wilkerson. Superintendent Security

B. Day. Training Manager i

4

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 37550: Engineering

IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying. Resolving. and

Preventing Problems

IP 61726: Surveillance Observations

IP 62703: Maintenance Observations

IP 71707: Plant Operations

IP 71750: Plant Support

IP 93702: Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors

ITEMS OPENED CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

1

50-263/96011-01 NCV Plant operator failure to follow surveillance  !

procedure

l

50-263/96011-02 IFI UFSAR discrepancy with cable tray labellng '

50-263/96011-03 NCV Ladder leading to contaminated area not posted

Closed

,

50/263-95007-01 IFI Exercise Weakness - Failure to notify NRC immediately

4

after notifying state and local agencies

50-263/96011-01 NCV Plant operator failure to follow procedure

50-263/96011-03 NCV Ladder leading to contaminated area not posted

i

16

,

__. - ~ . . _ __ _ _ __ . _ _ _ . _ - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _

.

.

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

cpm Counts per minute - -

CR Condition Report

E0P Emergency Operating Procedures ,

l

HPCI High Pressure Coolant Injection

IFI Inspection Followup Item

IR Inspection Report '

LCO Limiting Condition for Operation

NCV Non-Cited Violation

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

DC Operations Committee

Ouality Control

l

OC

RCIC Reactor Core Isolation Cooling

RHR Residual Heat Removal ,

RHRSW Residual Heat Removal Service Water '

RP&C Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls

SRV Safety Relief Valve

TS Technical Specification '

.

TSC Technical Support Center

UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report  ;

WO Work Order

-.

!

!

I

l

17

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