IR 05000263/1998014
| ML20239A242 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 09/04/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20239A238 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-263-98-14, NUDOCS 9809080336 | |
| Download: ML20239A242 (14) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGIONlll Docket No: 50 263 License No: DPR-22 Report No: 50-263/98014(DRS)
Licensee: Northern States Power Company Facility: Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Location: 2807 W. County Road. 75 Monticello, MN 55362 Dates: August 10 - 14,1998 Inspector: R. Glinski, Radiation Specialist Approved by: G. Shear, Chief, Plant Support Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety i
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant t NRC Inspection Report 50-263/98014
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. This inspection evaluated the licensee's liquid and gaseous effluents program, the calibration and testing of area and process radiation monitors (PRM), and the free release program. In j general, these activities were well implemented. However, problems with radiation monitor
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calibrations, a PRM alarm set point, and performance trencing for area radiation monitors (ARMS) indicated a lack of self-checking by plant personnel. The following conclusions were reached in the specified areas:
. The gaseous radwaste system functioned to maintain offsite doses from gaseous i radioactive effluents As-Low-As-is-Reasonably-Achievable (ALARA). In addition, there l were no materiel condition or operational issues with the system. The calculated offsite l doses were verified by the NRC's PC DOSE program and were well below the j'
regulatory limits. The gaseous effluent program collected and analyzed samples for all the appropriate radionuclides. The Semi-Annual Effluent Reports contained all the applicable information and listed a single abnormal liquid release which did not result in !
a discemable offsite dose. The calibrations of meteorological tower components were
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conducted properly (Section R1.1).
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. The radiation protection (RP) staff identified several scaffolding items with fixed, low-level contamination outside the Radiologically Controlled Area. The contamination did not present a health and safety hazard and there was no evidence of any release of material with detectable contamination offsite. The licensee has planned to implement corrective actions to strengthen the free release program (Section R1.2).
. The RP staff calibrated and tested the ARMS properly. The inspector verified the operability of local ARM alarms and did not identify any materiel condition issue However, the inspector identified errors in the calibration documentation and noted that the licensee was not trending Out-of-Tolerance data, which may preclude the identification of potential performance problems (Section R2.1),
. The PRM calibrations and functional checks were conducted appropriately, and no materiel condition issues were identified. The PRM operability remained high and the control functions were tested regularly. The identification of a condenser room steam leak through increased PRM readings demonstrated that these units functioned as l intended to inform the plant staff of plant problems (Section R2.2). !
. The questioning, self-checking attitude exhibited by plant staff was inconsisten Although some personnel questioned anomalous data and identified significant PRM issues, other staff continued to work without sufficiently understanding written instructions for implementing plant requirements and did not exhibit a questioning, self-checking attitude as evidenced by the fact that the alarm setpoint for a main steam line radiation monitor exceeded the correct value for several months (Section R4.1). ,
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i Report Details R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls R1.1 . Control of Liauld and Gaseous Effluents Insoection Scooe (IP 84750)
The inspector reviewed the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR), the Semi-Annual i Effluent reports for July 1996 through December 1997, representative monthly dose calculations for 1998, off gas storage tank radioactivity surveillance, meteorological tower calibrations, and a station audit. The inspector also observed the collection and analysis of gaseous effluent samples, conducted a walkdown of portions of the gaseous radwaste system, and interviewed plant personnel regarding liquid and gaseous I radioactive effluent Observations and Findinas The inspector noted that the gaseous radwaste system was consistent with the description in the USAR regarding the flowpath and holdup times for gaseous effluents 3 from the plant. During interviews, the staff indicated that there were no significant
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operational issues with the system, and the inspector did not identify any materiel J condition concerns during the walkdowns. The Semi-Annual Effluent Reports were l submitted within the required timeframe and contained all the information specified by the Technical Specifications (TS). Although the plant staff continued their practice of no f
routine liquid effluent releases, there was a single abnormal release of fluorine-18 ( E-7 curies, half-life is 1.8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />) from the turbine building normal drain sump in the second quarter of 1996 which was included as supplemental effluent information in a
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1997 report. This abnormal release did not result in a discemable offsite dos ,
t The calculated offsite doses from plant effluents for 1996 and 1997 were we nelow the regulatory limits and were As-Low-As-is-Reasonably Achievable (ALARA). Tk staff performed the required monthly offsite dose calculations and estimates, and also j determined that the off gas storage tank radioactivity and release rates were below the j values listed in the USAR and TS. The inspector verified the licensee's offsite dose calculations by using NRC's PC DOSE program. For gamma and beta dose in air the results were identical and for the 1998 critical organ dose (teen thyroid) the results were within a factor of two. A Ger,eration Quality Services audit and various observation reports verified that the radioactive effluents program met regulatory requirements.
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The inspector observed that plant personnel collected and analyzed the weekly reactor building vent noble gas and tritium samples from the wide range gas monitor (WRGM) in accordance with procedure. The samples for tritium determination were collected by a l l Milligan Cas Washer which has a high collection efficiency for tritium in gas. These l l reactor building vent radioanaYtical results were then used to determine the respective j amounts of radioactivity in the gaseous effluent through this pathway. The licensee's program involved weekly collection of reactor vent and plant stack samples, which 3 ;
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- consisted of grab samples for noble gas and tritium analyses and continuous samples for particulate and iodine analyses. These radioanalytical analyses were performed by the onsite laboratory. In addition, analyses for strontium-89/90 were conducted by a vendor laboratory on quarterly composites of the stack and vent air filters. These practices were in accordance with the guidance in NRC Regulatory Guide 4.1 The primary contribution to the offsite dose resulted from the noble gases released from i the plant stack, and the major source (approximately 70%) of these gases was gland steam from the Gland Steam Packing Exhaust. This low pressure steam functions to maintain condenser vacuum, prevent in leakage into the turbine, and prevent the escape of turbine steam into the turbine building. This steam contains nitrogen-16 (N-16) and oxygen-19 (0-19), as well as the expected noble gases and their progeny. The N-16 and 0-19 (with half-lives of 7 and 27 seconds, respectively) were minimized by ,
flow through a 42-inch delay pipe which provided a 1.75 minute holdup for radioactive decay prior to release through the 100 meter stack. The gases from the air ejector were pumped into off gas storage tanks (1250 cubic feet capacity) which held the gases for approximately 150 hours0.00174 days <br />0.0417 hours <br />2.480159e-4 weeks <br />5.7075e-5 months <br /> of decay. After this decay, the storage tanks were then channeled through charcoal and high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters prior to release from the stack. The inspector noted that the gaseous radwaste system functioned as described in the USAR and maintained the gaseous effluents Al_ AR The inspector also reviewed calibrations for the meteorological tower. The calibrations included examination of the materiel condition of various components and connection The site staff calibrated the wind speed processo s, the wind direction processors, the temperature sensors, and the precipitation processors at the 10,43, and 100 meter heights. These calibrations were consistent with NRC Safety Guide 23. Other than minor repairs, there were no component problems with the tower in 1997 and 199 . Conclusions The inspector datermined that the gaseous radwaste system functioned appropriately to maintain offsite doses from gaseous radioactive effluents ALARA. No materiel condition
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or operational issues were noted with the system. The calculated offsite doses were verified by the NRC's PC DOSE program and were well below the regulatory limits. The gaseous effluent program collected and analyzed samples for the appropriate nuclide The Semi-Annual Effluent Reports contained all the applicable information and listed a single abnormal liquid release which did not result in a discernable offsite dose. The calibrations of meteorological tower components were conducted properl R1.2 Free Release of Eauioment and Material from the Radioloolcally Controlled Area (RCA) Insoection Scone (IP 83750)
The inspector reviewed the circumstances regarding the identification of contaminated i~ scaffolding outside the RCA. Reviews of the applicable procedures and discussions with radiation protection (RP) supervision regarding this occurrence and potential corrective actions were also conducted t
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bc Observations and Findinas On April 10,1998, RP staff identified several pieces of contaminated scaffolding outside l the RCA, but within the owner controlled area. This equipment had been used during r
the recent refueling outage, and had been surveyed and released from the RC Subsequently, the RP staff located and surveyed 1946 other scafic; ding items located
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outside the RCA and found that a total of 2g pieces had detectable levels of contamination. The contamination was fixed, located in discrete areas, and ranged from the detection limit to approximately 1500 counts per minute. Therefore, this scaffolding l did not constitute a health and safety issue. This scaffolding was primarily of an older
- variety belonging to the licensee, as opposed to the newer scaffolding, some of which had been leased from a local vendo The inspector noted that the identification of this contamination was attributable to an l effective questioning attitude by the RP staff. Although the contamination was detected on only 1.5% of the items, the inspector questioned whether any scaffolding with
- detectable contamination was released offsite and whether there were adequate l controls to ensure that scaffolding with detectable contamination was not released l offsite. During discussions, RP supervision indicated that the affected scaffolding had
- also been segregated during the outage and was not routinely mixed with the leased l- scaffolding. Based on this combination of data, RP supervision believed that it was l unlikely that any contaminated scaffolding was released offsite. The inspector concluded that the licensee's methodology was appropriate.
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The RP supervision has also considered several potential corrective actions to prevent any recurrent release of contaminated materials from the RCA during future outage These actions included: (1) more stringent controls for the use of leased scaffolding within the RCA, (2) more stringent control by station RP staff for the release of equipment and material from the railroad bay, and (3) more guidance regarding the proper choice of survey instruments to conduct free release surveys.
' Conclusions The RP staff identified scaffolding items with fixed, low-level contamination outside t'
RCA. The contamination did not present a health and safety hazard and there was no evidence of any release of material with detectable contamination offsite. The licensee has planned to implement corrective actions to strengthen the free release progra R2 Status of RP&C Facilities and Equipment
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. R Calibration and Functional Tests for the Area Radiation Monitors (ARMS)
- Insoection Scone (IP 84750)
, The inspector reviewed records for ARM calibrations and functional tests, and observed an ARM functional test. The inspector also interviewed RP supervision regarding the .
overall performance and data review of the ARM i
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. Observations and Findinas The inspector noted that the ARM calibrations were performed at a six-month frequenc Although plant staff did not perform electronic calibrations, the detectors were calibrated at three radiation source strengths and potentiometer adjustments were made whenever the "As Found" readings were out-of- tolerance (OOT). Site staff also verified the downscale low and upscale high alarm set points; and the low, high, light, and horn annunciations both locally and in the control room. The ARMS did not have any safety control functions, but were strictly indicators of radiological conditions within the facilit The inspector noted minor documentation errors in the calibration checklists, and also identified that the percentage of "As Found" OOT readings had increased from 5.5% in 1997 to 10% in 1998. The OOT readings were typically either below (i.e., in the conservative direction) or slightly above the +/- 30% acceptance criteria. However, the RP staff did not trend this OOT data. The inspector also noted that the Hot Machine Shop ARM had required multiple adjustments during each of the last two calibration The inspector questioned how the staff tracked ARM data to gauge performance and l
identify operability trends. After these discussions, RP supervision initiated the trending l
of this ARM calibration data in the RP Monthly Trend Report (similar data was already l being trended for the radiation survey meters).
The inspector reviewed quarterly ARM functional tests for 1998 and noted that staff performed the tests as required. These tests checked the downscale low and upscale high alarm set points and annunciators in the control room (CR), and the radiation readings displayed by the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) computer. The RP technicians also exposed the ARMS to a radiation source to check the local meter indication, light, and horn, as well as the CR upscale high annunciation. The inspector noted that anomalous SPDS readings had occurred infrequently (plant staff were aware i of this), and also observed a radiation source check which verified that the local j indication, light, and hom were sufficient to alert site staff to a local radiological concern. l The RP staff also initiated the trending of the ARM functional test data, Conclusions The RP staff calibrated and tested the ARMS properly. The inspector verified the operation of local ARM alarms and did not identify any materiel condition issues, j However, the inspector identified errors in the calibration documentation and noted that i
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the licensee was not trending OOT data, which may preclude the identification of potential performance problem R2.2 Calibration and Functional Tests for the Process Radiation Monitors (PRMs) Insoection Scooe (IP 84750)
The inspector conducted a walkdown of the PRMs and reviewed recent PRM calibration, functional test, and system isolation test data. The inspector also interviewed RP supervision regarding recent issues with the performance and data review of the PRMs.
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b. Observations and Findinos Records for the last two rounds of PRM calibrations demonstrated that the licensee met the required TS frequency. The individual PRMs were actually composed of two separate detectors / meters which comprised the A and B channels of the PRM. The PRM calibrations involved pulse generator electronic checks of the zero, inoperable, downscale low, and upscale high control room annunciators and alarms. The PRM radiation level and the SPDS indications were also checked with a pulse generator. The PRMs were then exposed to radiation sources at three strengths and RP staff ensured that the readings were within the prescribed acceptance criteria (either +/- 20% or +/-
30%). Any OOT readings for the radiological calibrations initiated investigation and potential repair activities. Licensee staff conducted the calibrations appropriately and no problems were identifie During a walkdown of the PRMs, the inspector did not identify any materiel condition issues regarding the detectors in the field or the electronics in the control room (the C-02 and C-10 panels). Site staff indicated that the operability of the PRMs remained high and the PRM system was classified as a(2)in accordance with the 10 CFR 50.65 maintenance requirements. Preventative maintenance for the PRMs included the routine replacement of vacuum pumps and the sample flow through the WRGMs was calibrated by the Instrumentation and Control (l&C) departmen The inspector noted that the monthly source checks verified proper detector response and the quarterly function checks ensured the proper functioning of the zero indicator and the inoperable, downscale low, and upscale high annunciators and alarms. The tests to check the initiation of the safety control functions were conducted separately from these PRM tests. The automatic isolation of the stack gas valves from a stack '
effluent Hi-Hi alarm was tested annually. Although the reactor building vent WRGM does not have a direct control function, an Annunciator Response Procedure instructs the control room personnel to manually initiate the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) and isolate secondary containment when both of these PRM channels indicated a Hi-Hi alarm. The activation of safety control functions for the Main Steam Line, Spent Fuel Pool, and Reactor Building Plenum monitors were tested once per fuel cycle. The j inspector noted that these tests were conducted in accordance with procedure and the i TS frequenc During the review of the 1997 Semi-Annual Effluent Report, the inspector noted that the fourth quarter reactor building vent release of iodine isotopes was several times higher ,
than the previous quarter, but below NRC radioactive release limits. In December 1997, I RP staff suspected that the increased release of iodine isotopes was indicative of a steam leak, and they contacted operations personnel who subsequently identified a steam leak in the RO-2965 reducing orifice located in the hotside of the condenser room. Licensee staff then placed a blanket over the leak to condense the steam and thereby maintained the gaseous effluents ALARA. This steam leak was repaired during the last refueling outage. The inspector concluded that the reactor building vent WRGM functioned as intended to inform plant staff of a radiological and materiel condition concern in the facilit i
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. Conclusions The inspector determined that the PRMs calibrations and functional checks were conducted appropriately, and no PRM materiel condition issues were identified. The PRM operability remained high and the control functions of the PRMs were tested regularly. The identification of a condenser room steam leak by increased effluent WRGM readings demonstrated that the PRMs functioned as intended to inform the plant i staff of radiological concern R4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in RP&C R inconsistent Questioning Attitude Demonstrated by Staff Insoection Scooe (IP 84750)
The inspector reviewed the applicable procedures and condition reports and interviewed RP personnel regarding two separate instances in which plant personnel did not adhere to written instruction Observations and Findinos On August 8,1998, a radiochemistry supervisor noted that the main steam line radiation monitor readings had decreased from approximately 2700 milliroentgen per hour (mR/h) to 2500 mR/h. In addition, the high alarm set point had remained at 4000 mR/h, which was 1.6 times higher than the normal radiation level. This high alarm was not to exceed 1.5 times the normal full power N-16 gamma radiation level with hydrogen water chemistry on-line. Therefore, the current set point was both non-conservative and outside the appropriate limi As an immediate corrective action, licensee staff changed the high alarm set point to 3500 mR/h, which was 1.4 times greater than the 2500 mR/h level. This corrected set point was conservative and would accommodate a decrease in the radiation monitor reading without placing the licensee outside the appropriate limit. The inspector reviewed the Operations Daily Log - Part D and noted that this alarm limit was stated just below the entry lines for the main steam line monitor radiation level data, in addition, this limit and the current high alarm set point were also stated on an RP memorandum which was posted on the C-02 and C-258 panels in the control roo The identification of this issue revealed good questioning by certain site staf However, the chemistry staff indicated that the main steam line monitor readings had decreased to 2500 mR/h during the previous fuel cycle. The inspector expressed concern that this alarm set point limit was exceeded for several months, and that operations and chemistry personnel who recorded and reviewed the radiation monitor data regularly did not recognize this discrepancy. The chemistry staff was reviewing further corrective actions to ensure future compliance, as well as various causes for the l
lower radiation levels. The NRC will track the licensee's determination of the cause and l the further corrective actions as an Inspection Followup Item (IFl 50-263/98014-01).
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On August 13,1998, control room personnel reported to the I&C supervisor that the "B" channel of the control room air intake radiation monitor was oc::asionally initiating the high alarm. The l&C personnel identified that the switch to the " Operate" indication was not latching and a work order was written to correct this problem. The licensee declared the control room air intake radiation monitor inoperable and entered an unplanned Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) until this monitor was fully functional. Although l this monitor had just been calibrated two days t;efore (August 11), plant personnel ;
properly decided to re-calibrate the monitor after this switch function was restore During this re-calibration, the staff noted that the "As Found" for both channels on the
'high end' portion were OO i i
The plant personnel then questioned these results and further investigation revealed j that the August 11,1998, calibration was not performed correctly. Specifically, station staff failed to use the high side holder to properly position the radiation source for the
'high end' calibration. The chemistry technician who performed the previous calibration 1 (and had not done this calibration for about 4.5 years) indicated that he was unfamiliar j with the high side holder and its use. The inspector reviowed the procedure and note )
(1) that the high side holder was listed in the " Equipment" section and (2) that its use i was stated in bold letters in Steps 17 and 40 of the calibration procedure. In addition, l
during the calibration on August 11,1998, plant personnel needed to make significant '
potentiometer adjustments on both channels to bring the radiation readings into the acceptance band, which should have caused them to question their methodolog '
These adjustments were in the conservative direction, and therefore, the TS required set point for the initiation of the control room habitability ventilation was not exceede Although the staff did not comply with the procedural calibration requirements, this procedure was not required by the site TS and no violation occurred. However, !
chemistry supervision planned to implement the following corrective actions to prevent further problems with this calibra!!ca: (1) the chemistry technician who was unaware of I the high side holder would receive counseling regarding self-checking and adherence to procedures, (2) this occurrence would be included in chemistry technician training, (3) i
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chemistry staff would be reminded about the importance of self-checking, and (4) the procedure would be clarified -including a diagram for how to use the high side holde The inspector noted that the good questioning attitude and followup by some plant personnel determined the cause for this PRM calibration problem. However, the inspector expressed concern that the initial calibration staff did not exhibit a questioning, self-checking attitude regarding the significant electronic adjustments for both channels, and that they proceeded without understanding the need for equipment required by procedure. Considered together with the main steam line monitor set point issue, these instances revealed that some station staff did not sufficiently understand written instructions for implementing plant requirements and did not exhibit a questioning, self-checking attitude conceming anomalous data.
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The inspector concluded that a questioning, self-checking attitude was inconsistently l exhibited by plant staff. Although some personnel questioned anomalous data and '
identified significant PRM issues, other staff continued to work without sufficiently understanding wntten instructions for implementing plant requirements and did not exhibit a questioning attitud X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on August 14,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The licensee personnel did not indicate that any materials examined during the inspection were proprietar _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ -_
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED IJ.GROEnt D. Bollig, Instrumentation & Controls Supervisor M. Hammer, Plant Manager M. Holmes, Radiochem:stry Supervisor L. Kamppinen, System Engineer G. Mathiasen, Senior Health Physicist K. Thiessen, System Engineer J. Windschill, General Superintendent, Radiation Services P. Yurczyck, Radiation Protection Supervisor NBC D. Wrona, Resident inspector, Monticello INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 84750 - Radioactive Waste Treatment, and Effluent and Environmental Monitoring ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Ooened 50-263/98014-01 IFl Failure to ensure that the Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor hl alarm limit was within the specified tolerance, d
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ALAR As-Low-As-is-Reasonably-Achievable -
' ARM Area Radiation Monitor cpm counts per minute-DRS Division of Reactor Safety HEPA- High Efficiency Particulate Air l&C Instrumentation and Controls IFl inspection Followup Item IP Inspection Procedure LCO- Limiting Condition for Operation LLD Lower Limit of Detection MNGP Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant mR/h milliroentgen per hour NRC . Nuclear Regulatory Commission OOT Out-of-Tolerance PDR Public Document Room PR Process Radiation Monitor RCA Radiologically Controlled Area RP Radiation Protection RP&C Radiation Protection and Chemistry RP Radiation Protection Manager SBG Standby Gas Treatment SPDS Safety Parameter Display System TS Technical Specifications USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report WRGM Wide Range Gas Monitor
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PARTIAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Updated Safety Analysis Report, Revision 14, Section 9.3 - Gaseous Radwaste System Technical Specifications Table 3.2.9 - Instrumentation for Control Room Habitability Protection Table 4.2.1 - Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency Table 4.8.1 - Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring instrumentation Surveillance Requirements Table 4.8.2- Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring instrumentation Surveillance Requirements Table 4.8.4- Radioactive Gaseous Waste Sampling and Analysis Program Section 6.5 - Plant Operating Procedures Section 6.7 - Reporting Requirements Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Effluent and Waste Disposal Semi-Annual Reports for July - December 1996, January - June 1997, and July - December 199 Condition Reoorts:
98001994, " Unplanned LCO entry. RM-90218 (C.R. air intake rad monitor) switch failed, WO 9802680 generated to correct condition."
98001996," Control Room Air intake Rad Monitor, both channels found out of acceptance ;
criteria during high end calibration." J 98001118, " RAM CONTROL - Questions Regarding free release practices."
98001883, " Service Water Radiation Monitor low flow alarm 5-A-50 came in unexpectedly."
98001943, " Main steam line PRM hi alarm limit exceeds M92052A criteria."
Procedures:
Operations Manual B.7.2.2-01, Rev. 2. "Off gas Holdup System: Function and General Description of the System" l
" Discharge Canal Monitor Calibration",0171, Rev.1 " Discharge Canal Monitor Functional Test",0172a, Rev.1 " Discharge Canal Monitor Source",0351 !
- Reactor Building Vent Wide Range Gas Monitor Calibration",0248, Rev.1 l
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" Reactor Building Vent Wide Range Gas Monitor Functional Test",0249a, Rev. 2 " Stack Wide Range Gas Monitor Calibration",0163, Rev. 2 " Stack Wide Range Gas Monitor Functional Test",0162a, Rev.1 .
" Area Radiation Monitor Calibration",1024, Rev. 2 " Area Radiation Mo$or Functional",1025a, Rev. "StackNent Dose Limits",0342, Rev. " Stack Gas Valves Automatic Isolation",1270, Rev. " Group 2 & SCTMT isolation Simulated Automatic initiation Test",0150, Revs. 20 and 2 " Stack Wide Range Gas Monitors Process and Sample instrument Calibration Procedure,0372, Re "Off-Gas / Storage Tank Gross Activity Limit",0229, Rev. "Drywell Particulate Monitor Functional Test",0385a, Rev. " Reactor Building Vent Noble Gas Sampling", l.5.27, Rev. "StackNent Tritium Sampling",1.5.09, Rev. " Cumulative Dose from Liquid Effluents",0374, Rev. " Stack Wide Range Gas Monitor Source Check",0355, Rev. "Monticello Meteorological Station Calibration Procedure",7320, Rev. * Operations Daily Log - Part D",000-D, Rev 6 " Control Room Air intake Monitor Calibration",0461, Rev. " Unconditional Release of Equipment or Material", R.06.02, Rev Annunciator Response Procedure, Window Number 259-A-2, "RBV Effluent Hi-Hi Radiation".
Radiation Protection Monthly Trend Report Generation Quality Services (GQS) Internal Audit Report AG 1998-S- GQS Observation Reports 1998124,1998032,1998023, and 199721