IR 05000263/1998012

Insp Rept 50-263/98-12 on 980719-0831.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Opertions,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support

ML20153D616
Person / Time
Site:	Monticello
Issue date:	09/18/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20153D608	List: IR 05000263/1998012 ML20153D604
References
50-263-98-12, NUDOCS 9809250118
Download: ML20153D616 (14)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION lil Docket No: 50-263 License No: DPR-22

Report No: 50-263/98012(DRP)

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Licensee: Northern States Power Company l I

Facility: Monticello Nuclear Generating Station

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Location: 2807 West Highway 75 Monticello, MN 55362 Dates: July 19 through August 31,1998 Inspectors: S. Ray, Acting Senior Resident inspector D. Wrona, Resident inspector C. Thomas, Resident inspector, Prairie Island Approved by: M. Kunowski, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 l

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99092501'18 990918 PDR ADOCK 05000263 -

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Monticello Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 NRC Inspection Report 50-263/98012(DRP)

This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspectio Operations

. Operators were knowledgeable of current and planned activities and acted in a professional manner. However, the inspectors observed several operators walk by the emergency core cooling systems' control panels while wearing hard hats and an operator holding a cup of coffee over the control panels, which are considered to be poor practices in a nuclear power plant control room. (Section 01.1)

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• A reactor shutdown in response to arcing on a recirculation pump motor generator set and the subsequent startup were well planned. Power reductions, a reactor shutdown, and a reactor startup were controlled in a deliberate manner with good communications and procedure adherence. (Section 01.2 and Section 01.3)

. Material condition of three systems reviewed by the inspectors was good: the combustible gas control system, the high pressure coolant injection system, and the

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residual heat removal service water system. No concems with housekeeping or radiological controls were identified. However, minor inconsistencies existed between the current configuration of plant equipment and the piping and instrumentation drawings. Ne operability concems were noted. (Section O2.1)

. Equipment was taken out-of-service and retumed-to-service effectively. The licensee identified that the equipment " isolation and restoration" form lacked a check block for the shift supervisor to indicate if independent verification was required for tag remova A condition report was initiated to prompt tracking and resolution of this discrepancy between the form and the equipment isolation procedure. (Section O2.2)

Maintenance e in general, the observed maintenance and surveillance activities were conducted in accordance with procedures and in a professional manner. The activities involved spent fuel shuffling and work on several systems, including reactor water cleanup, standby liquid control, fire protection, main steam, emergency core cooling pump room ventilation, and high pressure coolant injection systems. (Section M1.1)

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i . The work order for maintenance on the fan for an emergency core cooling pump room ventilation system was inadequate because it failed to identify all of the equipment that would be rendered inoperable by the work activity. (Section M1.1)

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. Engineering personnel provided excellent support to the maintenance staff during maintenance and surveillance activities involving spent fuel shuffling and work on the reactor water cleanup, standby liquid control, fire protection, main steam, emergency core cooling pump room ventilation, and high pressure coolant injection system (Section M1.1)

Plant Support

. The oral critique for the annual medical drill was self-critical and focused on ways to improve. The subsequent written critique accurately reflected drill observations and

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Bgport Details Summary of Plant Status The Unit operated at or near full power for most of this report period. On July 18,1998, the

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licensee reduced power to approximately 70 percent power to perform routine quarterly surveillance tests. The Unit retumed to 100 percent power on July 19,1998. On August 24,1998, the licensee reduced power to approximately 62 percent power because of arcing of the No.11 recirculation pump motor generator set field brushes. The Unit remained i

at approximately 62 percent power until August 27,1998, when the reacto ms shut down to repair the motor generator. The reactor was taken critical on August 29,1998, and the Unit was retumed to full power on August 30,1998.

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l. Operations

. 01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (Inspection Procedure (IP) 71707)

Using IP 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations, including observations of control room evolutions, shift tumovers, and operator rounds. The inspectors also reviewed control room logbooks and operability determinations. Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Section 13," Plant Operations," was reviewed as part of the inspection.

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In general, the plant was operated in a controlled and deliberate manner. Specific F events and noteworthy observations are detailed in the sections below. Operator performance during routine operations and surveillance test activities was goo Operator tumovers were conducted in accordance with procedures. The inspectors noted that the response to annunciators improved since the last inspection period.

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Operators were knowledgeable of current and planned activities and acted in a professional manner. However, the inspectors noted several operators wa! king by the emergency core cooling systems' control panels while wearing hard hats and noted an operator holding a cup of coffee over the control panels, which are considereo to be poor practices for a nuclear power plant main control roo .2 Reactor Shutdown and Subseouent Startuo Because of Recirculation Pumo Motor

! Generator Set Brush Repairs Inspection Scope (IP 71707)

The inspectors observed various portions of reactor shutdown and startup activities.

. The following procedures were reviewed:

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• Procedure C.3, " Shutdown Procedure," Revision 16; and

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. Procedure C.1, "Startup Procedure," Revision 20 b. Observations and Findinas T% ,spectors observed portions of the pre-shutdown and startup planning meeting The licensee considered the risk impact of particular maintenance items and scheduled work accordingly. The inspectors also attended infrequent evolution briefings for the planned shutdown and startup. The infrequent evolution briefings included a review of the caution statements contained in Procedures C.1 and C.3, and assignment of personnel roles and responsibilitie On August 27,1998, operators commenced a reactor shutdown to allow repair of the No.11 recirculation pump motor generator set, which had begun arcing. On August 29, 1998, following maintenance on the motor generator, and various other maintenance activities, the licensee commenced a reactor startup. The shift managers exercised

. appropriate command and control of the activities. Extra operations personnel were assigned to assist the duty crew. Operators conducted the shutdown and startup activities in a slow, deliberate manner. Three-way communications were used by the operations crew. Appropriate procedures were used and adhered to.

A shift change occurred during the reactor startup. The off going crew decided to stop at the end of a rod withdrawal sequence step and wait a few minutes for the relief process to be completed rather than proceeding with the relief while in the middle of a step. Prior to assuming control, the oncoming crew conducted a pre-evolution briefing outside of the control room so as not to disturb the off-going cre Conclusions

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A reactor shutdown in response to arcing on a recirculation pump motor generator set

, and the subsequent startup were well planned. Reactor shutdown and startup were controlled in a deliberate manner with good communications and procedure adherenc .3 Performance Durina Planned Power Reductions (IP 71707)

The inspectors observed planned reactor power reductions on July 18,1998, and August 24,1998. The licensee reduced power on July 18,1998, to perform routine

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quarteriy surveillance tests and reduced power on August 24,1998, because of arcing of the No.11 recirculation pump motor generator set field brushes. Both load reductions were well planned and conducted in a controlled manner. Pre-evolution briefings were detailed and informative. A nuclear engineer was present and provided detailed guidance on performing the load reduction. Power reductions were coordinated with the system dispatcher. The operators were knowledgeable of their assigned tasks a d communications were clear and effective. On July 19,1998, operators retumed the Unit to full power without incident. After the August 24,1998, power reduction, reactor power remained at approximately 62 percent until the Unit was shut down. The Unit shutdown is discussed in Section 01.2.

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O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment

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O2.1 Enoineered Safety Feature System Walkdowns - l Inspection Scope (IP 71707)

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The inspectors used IP 71707 to walk down selected portions of safety-related l systems. The inspectors used the licensee's risk' analysis to aid in the determination of '

which systems to walk down and selected the following systems:

e combustible gas control system (CGCS);

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high pressure coolant injection (HPCI); and e residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) Qblervations and Findinas

, Material condition of the three safety-related systems was good. No concems with housekeeping or radiological controls were identified. However, the inspectors identified minor inconsistencies between the current configuration of plant equipment ,

and the piping and instrumentation drawings. The system engineers were notified and i initiated drawing changes as appropriate. Ne operability concems were note .2 Use of Hold and Secure Taas for Controllina Status of Plant Eauipment

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- Inspection Scope flP 71707)

During routine plant inspections, the inspectors verified that valve and circuit breaker

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positions were in accordance with safety (hold and secure) tag isolation requirement _ The purpose of the inspections was to evaluate the implementation of administrative controls for placing equipment out of-service.

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The inspectors reviewed procedure 4AWi-04.04.01, " Equipment isolation," Revision 13, 1 and various isolations in effect or recently cleared. The inspectors also observed g operators installing and removing tags. Hold and secure tags were clearly labeled and 4- equipment was observed to be in the correct position. No concems were identified with operator performance. However, the inspectors noted that the " isolation and 4 restoration" form did not have a block for the shift supervisor to indicate if independent verification was required for tag removal as specified in Step 4.7.4 of procedure

, 4AWi-04.04.01. During a followup review of this issue, the inspectors leamed that Generation Quality Services (the quality assurance group) had identified this concem in Condition Report 98001886, " HOLD & SECURE Cards - Independent Verification at Removal not in Accordance with 4 awl-04.04.01 Requirements."

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- . Conclusions Equipment was taken out-of-service and retumed to service effectively. The licensee identified that the equipment " isolation and restoration" form lacked a check block for the shift supervisor to indicate if independent verification was required for tag remova A condition report was initiated to prompt tracking and resolution of this discrepancy

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between the form and the equipment isolation procedur Miscellaneous Operations issues (IP 92901)

08.1 (Closed) Violation (VIO 50-263/97015-01(DRP)): Failure to follow temporary procedure change process which invalidated an operability determinatio This violation involved operations management issuing a temporary change to the

" Winter Checklist" procedure which invalidated an operability determination and authorizing this change contrary to procedure 4AWi-02.02.05," Temporary Change

. Process " As part of the corrective actions for this issue, the licensee included a bases section in Procedure 1151, " Winter Checklist," Revision 38, to explain the justification for removing the air supply filters and committed to revise the applicable sections of the USAR. This violation was reviewed with operators during training, which covered procedure 4AWi-02.02.0 II. Maintenance M1- Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments Inspection Scope (IP 62707 and IP 61726)

The inspectors observed all or portions of selected maintenance and su veillance activities. As practical, the inspectors selected maintenance and surveillance activities associated with systems that were risk significant. Included in the inspection was a review of the surveillance procedures or work orders (WOs) listed, as well as the appropriate USAR sections pertaining to activities inspected, Observations and Findinas in general, the inspectors observed that the work associated with these activities was conducted in a professional and thorough manner. All work observed was performed with the work package present and in active use. Technicians were experienced and knowledgeable of their assigned tasks. The inspectors frequently observed supervisors and system engineers monitoring job progress, and quality control personnel were present whenever required by procedure. When applicable, appropriate radiation control measures were in-plac _ .. _ ___ ___ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _

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The following maintenance and surveillance activities were observed. Specific concerns or observations are provided where appropriat .

Surveillance Test 1459, "RWCU [ reactor water cleanup) High Flow and High Room Temperature Trip Unit Test and Calibration Procedure," Revision 0; and 4

. WO 9802459, " Replace Meter Scales on Rosemount Trip Units"

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. WO 9802426, " Replace GSA-32-3" <

i The inspectors verified that the emergency diesel generator starting air system

was adequately isolated per Isolation and Restoration 98-02426 and that quality control personnel were present when required. Proper foreign material exclusion controls were maintained at system openings. The replacement valve

matched the requirements specified on the requisition form.

. Surveillance Test 7150, "SLC [ standby liquid control] System Instrument Maintenance Procedure," Revision .

. Procedure 9009, " Procedure for Moving Fuel Within the Fuel Storage Pool,"

Revision 15; and Operations Manual D.1, " Accountability," Revision Shuffling of spent fuel bundles within the spent fuel pool was conducted in a slow and controlled manner. Operators performed multiple verifications while grappling and repositioning spent fuel bundles. The inspectors noted an operator sitting on the bridge railing, leaning out over the spent fuel pool. This

poor practice placed the operator at increased risk of falling into the pool.

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. Surveillance Test 0051, " Main Steam Line High Flow Group 1 Isolation Instrument Test and Calibration Procedure," Revision 15.

4 . WO 9801728, " Diesel Fire Pump Flow Trending Downward - Rebuild"

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A member of the security force was present, as required, when a security barrier was removed during the maintenance activity.

i . Surveillance Test 0056, "HPCI Hi Steam Flow Sensor Test and Calibration Procedure, and Group 4 Isolation Valve Closure Test," Revision 19; and WO 9002636, " Perform Calibration of Local Indicator" During performance of differential pressure Indicating instrument (DPIS) testing, the instrument and control technician identified an oil leak in DPIS-23-768 and initiated corrective actions. The engineering evaluation of this issue is discussed in Section E2.1 of this report. The switch was replaced and the surveillance test complete . WO 9802602, " Examine and Measure V-AC-5 Motor Leads & Splices" i

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Overall Planning for maintenance on the fan for the "A" residual heat removal (RHR) pump room ventilation system was thorough. The infrequent evolution briefing was characterized by good involvement by operations and maintenance personnel and effective discussions of the work activity. A contingency plan for reactor shutdown was in-place and discussed with the operators because the maintenance required entry into a 24-hour limiting condition for operation (LCO)

action per Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.A.4. Involvement by engineering personnel was eviden An attachment to WO 9802602 was written to provide isolation, examination, restoration, and testing instructions in support of the maintenance activity for the motor leads. This attachment specified that the #11 and #13 RHR pumps and

1. 11 core spray pump would be declared inoperable, requiring entry into the LCO action requirements of TS 3.5.A.4. The inspectors identified that the "A" train of CGCS should have also been declared inoperable, since cooling water to CGCS was not available from the "A" train of RHR. The licensee was

- informed and entered an addendum in the control room log to identify that the

"A" train of CGCS was inoperable. The failure of the WO attachment to both identify that the "A" train of CGCS would be inoperable and to direct entry into the LCO action requirements of TS 3.7.E.2 is characterized as an inadequate procedure and is considered to be a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V. The safety significance of this event was minimal since the time limit imposed by TS 3.5.A.4 was much less than the 30 day action requirements required by TS 3.7.E.2; however, the inspectors were concemed that the operators were not aware that a piece of safety-related equipment was inoperable. This constitutes a violation of minor significance and is not subject to formal enforcement action i

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. WO 9802530, " Monitor and/or Adjust MG (motor generator] Set Brushes as Necsssary"

. WO 9802698, "DPIS23-76B Bellows Fill Liquid Leak" This WO contained instructions for replacing DPIS23-768. The work relied heavily on skill-of-the-craft. Wire termination points for the ncw DPIS23-76B were not specified in the WO. It was left up to the instrument and control technicians to determine how to terminate the DPlS. The WO did not specify an independent verification of the DPIS wire terminations, although the technicians did independently verify the wire termination points. The inspectors did not identify any deficiencies with the work performe . WO 9802546, " Replace the Motor on V-AC-5"

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c. Conclusions In general, the observed maintenance and surveillance activities were conducted in accordance with procedures and in a professional manner. Engineering staff provided excellent support to the malatenance staff. Some procedures rely heavily on skill-of-the-craft. An example of an inadequate procedure was identifie Ill. Enaineerina E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment E Enaineerina Evaluation of Failed HPCI Pressure Switch (IP 37551)

The inspectors reviewed Alteration Package 98A039, " Replace HPCI High Steam Flow l Switch, DPIS-23-76B, with a +/- 300" range switch." A 10 CFR 50.59 applicability screening was performed and the licensee determined that a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation

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l was not required for this alteration. Surveillance Procedure 0056, "HPCI Hi Steam Flow Sensor Test and Calibration Procedure, and Group 4 Isolation Valve Closure Test,"

Revision 19, was changed to incorporate the new trip settings for DPIS23-76B as calculated in CA 95-014, Revision 1. The inspectors had no concem IV. Plant Support l

R1 Conduct of Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls (IP 71750)

During normal resident inspection activities, routine observations were conducted in the l area of radiation protection. The inspectors noted that effective radiological controls l were established and that technicians provided support during maintenance and l surveillance activities. No concems were note P1 Conduct of Emergency Preparedness Activities (IP 71750)

The inspectors observed the annual medical drill from the control room and from the scene of the simulated personnelinjury. The inspectors also attended the licensee l

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critique. The inspectors observations and concems were mirrored by the participants and controllers. The oral critique was self-critical and focused on ways to improve. The subsequent written critique accurately reflected drill observations and concem S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities (IP 71750)

During normal resident inspection activities, routine observations were conducted in the area of security and safeguards activities. No concems were noted.

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l F2 Status of Fire Protection Facilities and Equipment (IP 71750)

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During normal resident inspection activities, routine observations of fire extinguishers, hose stations, and emergency lighting were conducted. No concems were noted.

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V. Manacement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary On August 31,1998, the inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The ( inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie ~

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee

- M. Hammer, Plant Manager

' B. Day, General Superintendent Operations K. Jepson, Superintendent, Chemistry & Environmental Protection L. Nolan, General Superintendent Safety Assessment E. Reilly, General Superintendent Maintenance S. Hammer, Acting General Superintendent Engineering A. Ward, Manager Quality Services L. Wilkerson, Superintendent Security J. Windschill, General Superintendent, Radiation Protection

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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 62703: Maintenance Observations IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71750: Plant Support IP 92901: Followup - Plant Operations ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Closed 50-263/97015-01(DRP) VIO Failure to follow temporary procedure change process which invalidated an operability determination

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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED 4AWI Administrative Work Instruction CF Code of Federal Regulations CGCS Combustible Gas Control System DPIS Differential Pressure Indicating Switch DRP Division of Reactor Projects HPCI- High Pressure Coolant injection IP Inspection Procedure IR Inspection Report LCO Limiting Condition for Operation MG Motor Generator NRC' Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSP Northem States Power

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PDR Public Document Room RHR Residual Heat Removal

, RHRSW- Residual Heat Removal Service Water j

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' RWCU Reactor Water Clean-Up SLC - Standby Liquid Control l USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report - '

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