ML20149H929

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Insp Rept 50-263/97-08 on 970528-0707.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Operations,Engineering,Maint & Plant Support
ML20149H929
Person / Time
Site: Monticello Xcel Energy icon.png
Issue date: 07/17/1997
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20149H920 List:
References
50-263-97-08, 50-263-97-8, NUDOCS 9707250254
Download: ML20149H929 (17)
v • d • e


See also: IR 05000263/1997008

Text

. . . . . - .- . .. .. -. . .~ . . . . . .

.

, .

-

!

!

!-

(. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

l

REGION lli

-

i

.

Docket No. 50-263

l. License No.' DPR-22

!

!

Report No: 50-263/97008(DRP)

l

Licensee: Northern States Power Company

Facility: Monticello Nuclear Generating Station l

Location: 414 Nicollet Mall l

Minneapolis, MN 55401 l

!

J

i

Dates: May 26 - July 7,1997 l

l

Inspectors: A. M. Stone, Senior Resident inspector

J. Lara, Resident inspector

Approved by: J. W. McCormick-Barger, Chief,

Reactor Projects Branch 7:

I

l

r

r

9707250254 970717 *

PDR ADOCK 05000263

Q PDR

. _ . _ . _ . . ~ _ . ._ ..._ -. ___.--__.._..__.m. --m.~- _

.

-

'

.

i

i

I

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

l

l

l Monticello Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 '

NRC Inspection Report 50-263/97008(DRP)

This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and

plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection.

Ooerations

l

L

-

Operator performance during routine and surveillance activities was excellent.

(Section 01.1),

'

-

The planning and execution of the torus draindown were conducted in a controlled -

manner. Operations personnel demonstrated a questioning attitude through the

identification of several procedural problems. (Section 01.2) ,

-

Operators properly hung and removed equipment isolation tags. However, it

appears that on two occasions, plant personnel did not obtain proper authorization

prior to removing equipment or manipulating a valve. This resulted in a violation of

NRC requirements. (Section O2.2)

Maintenance

.

The observed maintenance activities were performed in a professional manner and

in accordance with applicable technical specification and updated safety analysis

report requirements. (Section M1.1)

.

- The inspectors concluded that shutdown risk concepts were conservatively -

addressed by the licensee. The scheduling and implementation of the outage plan

was conducted in a controlled manner. (Section M1.2)

. .

,

-

The licensee adequately implemented and controlled the #11 emergency diesel

generator maintenance activities with appropriate oversight by system engineers

and quality control inspectors. (Section M2.1)

i

Enaineerina

-!

-

The inspectors identified discrepancies on several Class 1 and 2 drawings. The

incorrect drawings indicated a weakness in drawing controls and is considered ,

another example of a violation. (Section E8.1) '

i

!.

~

2

.

,1 , , + ,. .- - * - - ,.

. -- -- . - . . . . . . . . . . - - -- - .

. .

1

4

Bant Suocort

-

Radiation protection coverage during the outage was good. Involvement with the

,

^

torus draindown was excellent and resulted in low contaminations and personnel

exposures, improvements were noted in radiological postings; however, some

challenges still existed. (Section R2.1)

. -

The observed security officer training was realistic and was considered an excellent

tool. (Section S1,1)

'

-

The fire brigade and control room personnel responded promptly and appropriately

during two fire drills. The inspectors noted good communication between tne site

and Monticello Fire Department personnel. However, communication between the

fire brigade leader and security personnel was weak,in that, two directives were

,

not completed as requested. The inspectors noted good discussions during the

critique. (Section F5.1)

3

- - -. - - - - . - . _ - - - - - . . - - . - -

. .

4

Reoort Details

,

Summarv of Plant Status

]

The unit remained in cold shutdown during the entire period for torus suction strainer

replacements. Other work accomplished during this period included preventive

maintenance and modifications for the #11 emergency diesel generator (EDG) and

replacement of scram solenoid pilot valves (SSPV).

1. Operations

01 Conduct of Operations

01.1 General Comments (71707)

Using inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of

ongoing plant operations. These reviews included observations of control room

evolutions, shift turnovers, operability decisions, and togkeeping. Updated Safety

Analysis Report (USAR) section 13, " Plant Operations," was reviewed as part of

the inspection.

The inspectors observed several shift turnovers and noted good communication

between the crews. The status of plant equipment, on-going testing, and

maintenance was discusstd as appropriate.

Operator performance during routine and surveillance activities was excellent.

Procedures were reviewed and followed. Discrepancies were promptly identified,

communicated to operations management, and resolved satisfactorily.

01.2 Torus Draindown Evolution

a. Jnsoection Scone (71707)

The inspectors reviewed the planning for and execution of the torus draindown to

facilitate torus suction strainer replacements. The following documents were

reviewed:

  • Procedure 8010, " Procedure for Securing and Draining the Torus for

Maintenance," Revision 8

  • Operations Manual C.3, " Shutdown Procedures"
  • Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (P&lD) M 108, " Condensate &

Demineralized Water Storage System"

4

. _

.

P&lD M-120, " Residual Heat Removal System," Sheet 1

  • P&lD M-135, " Fuel Pool Cooling & Clean-Up System"

I

  • P&lD M-136, " Fuel Pool Filter /Demin System" j

1

  • P&lD M-139, " Clean Radwaste System'

l

b. Observations and Findinos

l

The licensee conducted several planning meetings to coordinate the torus

draindown activities. The actual draindown was to be accomplished during the day

shift over a 3 to 4-day period. A senior reactor operator was assigned as the

draindown manager (DM) to oversee the activities.

During previous draindown evolutions, torus draindown occurred with the reactor

head off and the cavity flooded. This provided a large inventory of water for the

reactor. Under current conditions, thi inventory would not be available since the

licensee did not plan to remove th6 mctor head. The inspectors reviewed the

draindown procedure to verify appropriate controls were in place to prevent a loss

of inventory and ensure makeup sources were available. The procedure was

flexible and allowed some equipment isolations to be performed simultaneously.

For example, an operator could close both trains of core spray (CS) torus suction

valves prior to opening the condensate storage tank (CST) suction valves.

However, the DM provided additional guidance to ensure a suction path for a CS

pump was maintained. The DM also performed a detailed review of the draindown

procedure and identified some coaflicting valve positions as specified in the

draindown and shutdown cooling, alignment procedures. Operators also identified

that the ability to let-down might be constrained since the reactor water cleanup

and the torus draindown path were through the same pipe. These problems were

resolved through temporary changes to the procedures.

The inspectors observed several infrequent evolution briefings conducted in the

control room. The sequence of isolating torus suction paths to ensure continued

operability of at least one CS pump was clearly communicated and understood by

the operators. The inspectors also observed plant operators aligning equipment as

required by procedures. Problems were quickly communicated to the DM and

resolved. The licensee recognized that due to the required line-up, fuel pool cooling

would not be available during this evolution. Compensatory measures were

established including increased monitoring during operator rounds. The inspectors

had no concerns with this evolution.

5

.

.

\

I c. Conclusions

The planning and execution of the torus draindown were conducted in a controlled i

manner. Operations personnel demonstrated a questioning attitude through the

i identification of several procedural problems.

02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment

02.1 Enaineered Saiety Feature System Walkdowns l

The inspectors used Inspection Procedure 71707 to walk down selected pcrtions of

the residual heat removal (RHR) Service Water system, #12 EDG, reactor building

closed cooling water (RBCCW) system, CS, and torus. Minor housekeeping and

personnel safety issues identified during the system walkdowns were promptly

corrected by the licensee. No operability concerns were identified.

02.2 he of Hold und Secure Taas for Controllina Status of Plant Eauioment

a. Insoection Scone

During routine plant inspections, the inspectors verified valve and circuit breaker

positions with safety (hold and secure) tag isolation requirements. The purpose

was to evaluate the implementation of administrative controls for placing equipment

out-of-service,

b. Observations and Findinas

A concern with hanging isolation tags was identified in a previous inspection period.

During routine inspections and system walkdowns, the inspectors independently

reviewed safety tags on equipment. Hold and secure tags were clearly labeled and

equipment was observed to be in the proper position. The inspectors also observed

plant operators perform equipment isolations and restorations. No problems were

identified with the operators' performance.

However, on May 29,1997, the inspectors observed maintenance on the #12

RBCCW pump and noted that the high point vent line and RBCCW 2-2 valve had

been physically removed from the pump; however, tag 7 of isolation 96-1148 was

still placed on the RBCCW 2-2 valve. Operations personnel immediately reviewed

the required isolation and temporarily removed the card.

Also, on June 6,1997, the inspectors identified that the refueling bridge air

compressor blowdown valve was in the CLOSED position. However, a hold tag on

'the valve (96-80806-2) indicated that the valve was to be in the OPEN position.

This condition was brought to the attention of auxiliary plant operators for their

review. Subsequently, the licensee initiated Condition Report (CR) 97001675 to

document the incorrect valve position. The inspectors reviewed the isolation and

restoration sheet for this valve and noted that the valve had been positioned in the

open position on February 26,1997, to support maintenance activities. This

6

-. - -- - -.

. .-

i

!

isolation contained the required verification signature. Sometime after February 26,

the valve had been repositioned to the closed position, contrary to the hold tag

isolation.

i

Administrative Work Instruction (AWI) 04.04.01, " Equipment Isolation," step 4.2.1

stated that safety-tagged equipment shall not be operated until the safety tag has

been properly released. Failure to follow this procedure on two occasions is

considered an example of a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V,

" Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," which required that activities affecting

i quality be prescribed by and accomplished in accordance with documented

instructions, procedures, or drawings (VIO 50-263/97008-01a and -01b).

c. . Conclusions

Operators properly hung and removed isolation tags. However, it appears that on

two occasions, plant personnel did not obtain proper authorization prior to removing

equipment or manipulating a valve.

08 Miscellaneous Operations issues

08.1 (Closed) Unresolved item (URI) 50-263/97003-02: Missed Notification of Change

in Medical Status for Operator.

On October 29,1996, a licensed operator notified the shift manager of a medical

condition. The shift manager contacted operations management and monitored the

licensed operator's performance in accordance with the licensee's fitness-for-duty

manual. On February 14,1997, the licensed operator was removed from duty due

to a different medical condition. During follow-up from this event, the

superintendent of operations-training identified that the first change in rnedical

status required notification of the NRC and review of licensed duties. On

March 12,1997, the licensee informed the inspectors of this missed notification. A

formal notification was later made to tb 'egional Office. Corrective actions

included revising the fitness-for-duty manual to include the requirements of 10 CFR

55.25, training, and documenting the event in CR 97000781. Failure to notify the

NRC of a change in medical status for a licensed individual is contrary to 10 CFR

55.25. However, this event was of minor significance and is being treated as a

Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy

(NCV 50-263/97008-02).

l

7

- _ - - . . - - - - -. - - . .. .- -

. .

! 11. Maintenance

! M1 Conduct of Maintenance

1

M 1.1 General Comments

a. Insoection Scoce (62703 and 61726)

The inspectors observed all or pcrtions of selected maintenance and surveillance

activities, included in the inspection was a review of the surveillance procedures or

work orders (WOs) listed as well as the appropriate USAR sections regarding the

activities.

b. Observations and Findinas l

In general, the inspectors found the work performed under these activities to be

professional and thorough. All work observed was performed with the work

package present and in active use. Technicians were experienced and

knowledgeable of their assigned tasks. The inspectors frequently observed

supervisors and system engineers monitoring job progress, and quality control

personnel were present whenever required by procedure. When applicable,  ;

appropriate radiation control measures were in place. l

The following work was observed. Specific concerns or observations are provided

where appropriate.

  • Procedure 40100CD, " Hydraulic Control Unit Water Accumulator

Removal / Installation"

Cooler Chemical Cleaning and Pressure Test"

Assemblies. This WO involved the replacement of SSPV pilot head

assemblies in response to a concern identified at another nuclear facility and

was determined applicable to Monticello. The concern dealt with Buna-N

elastomer material found in SSPV core discs where Viton material was

required. The licensee documented this issue in CR 97001375. The

inspectors observed the replacement of various pilot head assemblies and

noted good adherence to work instructions and random quality control (OC)

inspection of replacements.

Pump

Strainers

8

. _ .

.

c. Conclusions

The observed maintenance activities were performed in a professional manner and

in accordance with applicable TS and USAR requirements.

M1.2 Shutdown Risk Considered Durina Outaae Plannina and imolementation

a. Insoection Scone (62703 and 61726)  ;

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's proposed forced outage schedule and

equipment maintenance windows to verify that outage risk was appropriately

,

considered. The following documents were reviewed:

  • Operations Manual C.3., " Shutdown Procedures"
  • System Window schedule dated May 21,1997 (and daily thereafter)

b. Observations and Findinas

The unit was shut down on May 9 due to concerns with available not positive

suction head for some ECCS pumps. The licensee anticipated that the forced

outage wculd last about three munths and required a torus draindown.

The inspectors made the following observations:

  • Since this outage was not planned, the licensee management authorized that

only routine work be performed until an outage schedule was developed and

reviewed for outage risk. This demonstrated a conservative operations

approach.

  • The inspectors concluded that the equipment operability and availability

requirements listed in Operations Manual C.3 were more limiting than the

TSs under shutdown conditions. This was considered a strength. The

inspectors verified that the requirements of Operations Manual C.3 were

str;ctly followed and that deviations from guidelines were appropriately

dispositioned.

  • The licensee performed a shutdown probabilistic risk assessrnent and

identified periods of increased risk. Activities were rescheduled to minimize

risk. The inspectors noted that as expected the period with most risk

occurred with the torus drained. Licensee compensatory actions included

defining a minimal CST level for CS and RHR alternate suction paths.

  • Controls were placed on changes in the schedule due to emergent work or

other problems encountered during work execution. The risk assessment

war, re-evaluated assuming longer equipment outage windows or additional

unavailability times later in the outage.

9

. .

1

c. GLnclusions

,

The inspectors concluded that shutdown risk concepts were conservatively I

addressed by the licensee. The scheduling and implementation of the outage plan l

was conducted in a controlled manner.

M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment

M2.1 Emeraency Diegl Generator Maintenance

a. Inspection Scone (62703 and_37551)

The inspectore nbserved the licensee's maintenance and modificatian activities

associated with the #11 EDG.

b. Observations and Findinns

During this inspection period, the licensee performed the 8-cycle maintenance

inspection of the #11 EDG. The scope of this work also included maintenance on

the air start system and cther EDG support systems. Additionally, modification ,

930415 was implemented to install a new speed sensing device. The inspectors l

performeo , arious inspections of the in-progress work including diesel engine i

inspection, duplex fuel oil filter replacement, governor replacement, gasket

replacements, relay and wiring installation, and air start motor installation.

Inspection attributes also included work control aspects such as housekeeping,

foreign material exclusion, and OC hold points. The inspectors reviewed portions of

the work activities listed below:

  • 0187-1, #11 Standby Diesel Generator Start and Load Test
  • 1052-3, #11 Diesel Generator Auxiliary Systems Test

l

  • 4100-01PM, #11 EDG 1 Air Start System Maintenance  ;
  • 4109-01PM, EDG 8 Cycle Maintenance l
  • 97-04588, install Timing Relays and Speed Sensing Panels for EDG #11
  • 97-04738, Test # 11 EDG Following Synchronizing Motor Winding

Protection (SMWP)

  • 97-04733, Wire SMWP Relay in Circuit #11 EDG
  • 97-04776, Perform Fast Start Test of #11 EDG
  • 97-04807, #11 EDG Governor Speed Slow Test

l

The inspectors also witnessed various EDG starts including slow and fast speed

starts and independently verified acceptable test parameters. During the various

EDG starts, the licensee identified problems associated with a leaking fuel oil filter,

inoperative air start motor, and the air compressor start setpoint. Additional WOs

were written to resolve thece deficiencies. The EDG was returned to operable

status following the TS required operability surveillance test.

10

?

- .- -- - . --- - .- .- . - - . . - .. . .

.

k

The inspectors also performed independent verifications of the as built wiring

associated with the SMWP modification. This inspection effort was performou

after the OC review of the wiring terminations. No deficiencies were identified by

the inspectors.

c. Conclusions

The licensee adequately implemented and controlled the maintenance activities with

appropriate oversight by system engineers and OC inspectors. -

i

111. Enaineerino

E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92700)

'

'

E8.1 (Closed) Insoection Follow-uo item (IFI) 50-263/970QQ-QQ: As-Built Discrepancies

in Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Motor Control Center (MCC).

l This item pertained to as built discrepancies found in the RCIC 250-Volts-direct

current (Vde) MCC. The discrepancies involved an installed fuse different from that

required and undervoltage relay isolation fuses not shown on schematic drawings.

Additional MCC circuits were reviewed by the inspectors to determine if the

incorrect fuse installation and drawing omissions were isolated problems.

During this inspection period, the inspectors performed field inspection of

components located in MCCs D312 (cubicles 5 and 6) and D313 (cubicle 7). A

fuse discrepancy was identified in MCC D312 (cubicle 5, high pressure coolant

injection (HPCI)/MO-2036). Through a review of Class 1,2, and 3 drawings, the

inspectors also identified discrepancies related to fuse sizes and motor horsepower

(hp) ratings All of the identified discrepancies, including those initially documented

l as part of the Inspection Follow-up ltem, are listed below. (This list of NRC

identified discrepancies was provided to licensee engineering personnel for

evaluation during this inspection).

4

System

. .Ligm Comcongnt _

Descriotion

,

'

1 RCIC/MO-3502 6%-Ampere (A) fuse installed instead of 6-A fuse (Class 1

'

drawing NE-36404 24/H).

i C1 drawing NE-36404-24/H shows 2.9-hp motor, while C1

, drawing NE-36640 5/N shows 2.39-hp motor.

2 RCIC/various Undervoltage relay isolation fuses not shown on C1

elementary drawing NX-7822-22-1/H.

3 HPCl/MO-2036 30-A fuse installed instead of 20-A fuse shown on C1 drawing

NE-36640-5/N. C2 drawing NX-9297-1-2/E shows 30-A fuse.

11

)

~

4 HPCl/MO-2035 C1 drawing NE-36640-5/N shows 2.9-hp motor, C2 drawing  !

NX-9297-1-2/E shows a 2.8-hp, C3 drawing NX-9297-1-7/D

shows 1.8-hp motor.

!

Same C1 drawing shows 30-A power fuse while C2 drawing

shows 15-A power fuse.

5 HPCl/MO-2067 C1 drawing NE-36640-5/N shows 100-A power fuse while C2

drawing NX-9297-1-2/E shows 175-A fuse. l

6 HPCl/MO-2068 C 1 drawing NE-36640-5/N shows 100-A power fuse while C2

drawing NX-9297-1-2/E shows 175-A fuse.

7 HPCl/MO-2071 C1 drawing NE-36640-5/N shows 100-A power fuse while C2

drawing NX-9297-1-2/E shows 175-A fuse.

8 HPCl/MO-2072 C1 drawing NF-46101/E showed connection wiring for valve

MO-2072 in MCC 132 cubicle F01. However, valve MO-2072

l is not an active valve. C3 drawing NX-9297-1-7/D also shows l

this valve as a load at cubicle F01.

,

9 RCIC/MO-2076 C1 drawing NE-36640-5/N shows 1-hp motor while C3

drawing NX-9297-1-7/D shows 0.36-hp motor.  !

10 RCIC/MO-2078 C1 drawing NE-36640-5/N shows 1.08-hp motor while C3

drawing NX-9297-1-7/D shows 1.0-hp motor.

11 RHR/MO-2030 C1 drawing NE-36640-5/N shows 7.4-hp motor while C3

i

drawing NX-9297-1-10/A shows 14.5-hp motor.

Procedure 4 awl-02.04.01, Drawing Control, Revision 5, section 4.3.2, stated that

Class 1 drawings shallinclude those drawings which are essential to safe plant

operation and shall be revised to represent current plant status. Class 2 drawings

include those drawings not considered essential to safe plant operation and shall be

revised to indicato current plant status with respect to modifications. Class 3

drawings include those drawings not considered essential to safe plant operation

, and may be revised as deemed necessary by the engineer. Class 3 drawings are

not required to be as-built; but the engineer shall as-built the affected area of any

Class 3 drawing prior to use.

Examples 1 through 8 are considered examples of failure to maintain plant

configuration in accordance with plant drawings and appropriately revise Class 1

and 2 drawings. This is considered another example of a violation of 10 CFR 50,

Appendix B, Criterion 8, " Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," which required

that activities affecting quality be prescribed by and accomplished in accordance

with documented instructions, procedures, and drawings (VIO

50-263/97008-01 c(DRP)).

12

l .

i I

i l

' l

l

IV. Plant Suonort

,

R2 Status of Radiological Protection and Chemistry Facilities and Equipment l

l 1

i

l

R 2.1 Postinas of Radioloaical Controlled Areas l

l

a. Insoection Scoce f71750)

!

The inspectors performed tours of various plant areas to evaluate the adequacy of

radiation protection (RP) controls and radiological controlled area postings,

b. Observations _and Findinas

The inspectors observed good radiological controls and posting.s during the current '

forced outage. RP technicians were observed to be present during various stages

of work activities in the torus and hydraulic control unit creas. Careful planning and

execution of the interior torus cleaning resulted in few personnel contaminations

and a significantly reduced radiological exposure as compared to previous cleanings.

This effort also created a low contaminated environment for the torus suction l

strainer replacements. The technicians also performed a survey of the exterior i

torus area after the torus draindown. The inspectors performed an independent '

survey a few days afterwards and noted some differences in results. Discussions

with the technicians indicated that a survey was not conducted after the ECCS ring

header (located outside the torus) was drained. The radiological conditions did not

change significantly; however, the inspectors were concerned that a follow-up

survey was not conducted.

The inspectors also noted that contaminated areas were properly set-up with signs,

barriers, and step-off pads and that corrective actions for a previous CR on posting

of areas controlled as high radiation areas had been implemented.

The inspectors did note an inconsistency in identification of Special Status Areas in

the torus room which was posted as a high radiation area. Areas identified as

Special Status were areas where dose rates were higher than general area dose

rates and personnel were warned to not loiter. The inspectors independently

measured radiation levels at bay 3 to be about the same as near bays 9 and 16.

However, while bays 9 and * S were identified as Special Status Areas, bay 3 was

not. Bay 3 was in the vicinity of the HPCI and RCIC injection lines, while bays 9

and 16 were in the vicinity of RHR-Low Pressure Coolant Injection A and B injection

lines. The inspectors questioned RP personnel as to this inconsistency. Af ter

subsequent RP review, bay 3 was posted as Special Status Area. The inspectors

reviewed procedures 4 AWi-08,04.01, Radiation Protection Plan, and R.07.02,

Area Posting, Special Status Signs and Hot Spot Stickers, and determined that no

procedural violation occurred because of latitude on Special Status Areas in the

procedures. Other NRC comments with regard to radiation survey maps were

l

properly resolved.

l

l

l 13

- - -. . - . .- - - . - - . -. .. ~ .-. - - -

,

!

,

1

l

c. Conclusions

Radiation protection coverage during the cutage was good, involvement with the

( torus draindown was excellent and resulted in low contaminations and personnel  ;

exposures. Improvements were noted in radiological postings; however, some

challenges still existed.

P1 Conduct of Emergency Preparedness Activities

During normal resident inspection activities, routine observations were conducted in

the area of emergency preparedness. No discrepancies were noted,

i

E1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities i

S 1.1 DAservations of Security Force Trainina (71750)

In addition to routine observations of security and safeguards activities, the

inspectors observed a security officer training session during this period. The

licensee integrated the threat of outside intruders with probabilistic risk assessment

data and developed training scenarios to aid officers. A mockup model of the plant

was used to simulate intruder and security force movement within the plant

boundarios. Information on door conditions, force advancements, and other

available information was given to the officer as it would be available duri_ng a real

event. The officer made quick decisions which were then carried out using the

mockup. This training was realistic and was considered an excellent tool.

F5 Fire Protection Staff Training and Qualification

F5.1 Observations of Fire Briaade Durina Routine Trainina and Annual Drill

a. Insoection Scone (717@

The inspectors observed a routine fire drill and the annual Monticello Fire

Department (MFD) participation drill,

b. Observations and Findinas

The routine fire drill consisted of a simulated fire in a MCC in the reactor building.

The fire brigade immediately responded to the ready room and donned the required

clothing, including self-contained breathing apparatus. Communication was

established between the control room and the fire brigade leader (FBL). At the

simulated fire site, the crew discussed fire fighting tactics including the need to

protect surrounding equipment. The inspectors had no concerns with the brigade's

pcrformance.

j The MFD drill consisted of a simulated fire in two barrels located outside the

l security diesel generator with inoperable plant fire pumps. Fire brigade personnel

! immediately responded to the fire alarm, with the shift supervisor assuming the role

i

( 14

. _

. .

of the FBL. Because of the inoperable fire pumps, the FBL immediately requested

help from the MFD, who responded to the site within 10 minutes. Coordination

and communication between the MFD and the fire brigade were gcod. The

simulated fire was extinguished within 20 minutes.

The inspectors noted that a security guard did not complete two actions as directed

by the FBL. The guard did not ensure the appropriate gates were opened as i

requested. This presented a problem since the gates that had been open led the

fire trucks through a potentially explosive area. The FBL immediately recognized

the danger and directed the trucks be moved a safe distance from the hazard.

AdditionaUy, the FBL directed the guard to keep bystanders out of the immediate

area. The inspectors noted that later in the scenario, the guard moved to the other  ;

side of the reactor building. The guard's view of the area was obstructed; I

therefore, the guard did not notice (or respond) to an individual taking a smoking

, break within the area. The guard did not ensure positive control of the area. The

inspectors discussed those observations with the FBL and security supervisor. The

cause of the communication problem was being reviewed.

The inspectors noted good discussion during the critique. The drillleaders asked

probing questions to ensure that the potential hazr,.ds and subsequent actions were

understood. Fire brigade members, security force persornel, and MFD personnel

noted some positive corrective actions implemented since the previous drill and also

recommended actions to improve coordination and response times.

c. Conclusions

The fiie brigade and controi room personnel responded promptly and appropriately

during the fire drill. The inspectors noted good communication between the site

and MFD personnel. However, communication between the F8L and security

personnel was weak,in that, two directives were not completed as requested.

V. Management Meg. tings

X1 Exit Meeting Summary

On July 8,1997, the inspectors presented the inspection results to the plant manager and

.

others. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection

should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

15

_ .s. _ _ . __ _ _ - . _ - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ . . _ . . _ . _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . ,

.,. -

2

i

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

a

,

Licensen

,

M.'Wadley, Vice President, Nuclear Generation

W. Hill, Plant Manager

l B. Day, Training Manager l

'

M. Harnmer, General Superintendent, Maintenance

K. Jepson, Superintendent, Chemistry & Environmental Protection l

L. Nolan, General Superintendent, Safoty. Assessment

l

M.'Onnen, General Superintendent, Operations

l E. Reilly, Superintendent, Plant Scheduling {'

C. Schibonski, General Superintendent, Engineering

. A. Ward, Manager, Qualit) Services-

L. Wilkerson, Superintendent Security

a J. Windschill, General Superintendent, Radiation Protection

.

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

1

IP 37551: Onsite Engineering

IP 61726: Surveillance Observations

IP 62703: Maintenance Observations

'

IP 71707: Plant Operations

j IP 71750: Plant Support

IP 92700: Onsite Follow-up of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor

'

Facilities

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Doened

'

50 2S3/97C08-01 VIO Three Examples of Failure to Follow Procedures

50-263/97008-02 NCV Failure to Notify the NRC of a Change in Medical Status

C101Rd

1

,

50 263/97003-02 URI Missed Notification of Change in Medical Status for Operator

50-263/97006-06 IFl As-Built Discrepancies in RCIC Motor Control Center ,

.

50-263/97008-02 NCV Failure to Notify the NRC of a Change in Medical Status

i

^

.

. 16

4

1

. - . _ . .. .. ._ _ _ . _ _-_-__.. _. . ~ . _ _ . _ _ _ . __ . ... _ _ _ . . _ _ .

. -

i

i

,

1

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

,

A Ampere

AWI Administrative Work instruction  :

CFR Code of Federal Regulations  ;

CR Condition Report '

CS Core Spray.

l CST Condensate Storage Tank

'

"

DM Draindown Manager

DRP Division of Reactor Projects

ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System 4

EDG Emergency Diesel Generator

FBL Fire Brigade Leader

hp horsepower

'

HPCI High Pressure Coolant injection

Inspection Follow-up item

'

IFl I

'

MCC Motor Control Center l

'

! MFD Monticello Fire Department

.

NCV Non-Cited Violation i

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NSP Northern States Power

P&lD - Piping and Instrumentation Diagram

QC Ouality Control

RBCCW Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water

RCIC Reactor Core Isolation Cooling

RHR Residual Heat Removal

RP Radiation Protection

SMWP Synchronizing Motor Winding Protection

SSPV Scram Solenoid Pilot Valve

TS Technical Specification

URI Unresolved item

USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report

VIO Violation

Vdc Volts-direct current

WO Work Order 17

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML20149H929&oldid=3045418"