IR 05000263/1997012
| ML20198L776 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 09/18/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198L772 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-263-97-12, NUDOCS 9710270144 | |
| Download: ML20198L776 (17) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION lli Docket No.:
50-263 License No.:
DPR-22 Report No; 50-263/97012(DRP)
Licensee:
Northern States Power Company Facility:
Monticello Nuclear Generating Station Location:
414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401 Dates:
July 8 - August 29,1997 Lnspectors:
A, M. Stone, Senior Resident inspector J. Lara, Resident inspector V
Approved by:
J. W. McCormick-Barger, Chief Reactor Projects Branch ~7 9710270144 970918 PDR ADOCK 05000263 PDR G-t
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j EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Monticello Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 NRC Inspection Report No. 50 263/97012(DRP)
This inspection included aspects of liwnsee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant cupport. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection.
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Qperations Operations personnel performed well during the observed outage and startup-related
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activities. Informative pre-job briefings for the torus flood up, the emergency core cooling systems pump testing sequence, and the reactor startup resulted in well-executed evolutions. The shift manager's identification of an improper alternate nitrogen system lineup demonstrated a good questioning attitude and attention to
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detail. The cause of the improper lineup will be determined through the licensee's condition reporting system. (Section 01.2)
The licensee conducted thorough inspections cf the drywell and torus prior to the
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plant startup. The inspectors verified that the drywell and torus, including drywell to torus vent header and downcomer piping, were free of foreign objects and debris and were in an acceptable condition for a plant restart. (Section O2.1)
M, intenance a
The observed maintenance and surveillance activities were conducted in a
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professional manner and in accordance with applicable procedures. (Section M1.1)
An electrician installed an incorrect nonsafety-related relay which resulted in cn
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inadvertent control rod withdrawal. Fatigue and inappropriate independent review of the electrician's actions were contributing causes. Operators responded appropriately to the event. (Section M3.1)
Enaineerina Engineering personnel support to operations and maintenance activities was appropriate during this inspection period. The inspectors reviewed two modifications and special tests and had no concerns. The licensee's decision to replace the inappropriate carbon steel strainer parts was conservative and demonstrated as low as reasonably achievable awareness (ALARA). (Section E1.1)
Plant Sucoort The fire brigade promptly and appropriately responded to the medical emergency
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drill. The radiation protection technician recognized the potential to spread contamination and took appropriate acticos. (Section P4.1)
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Report Details Summary of Plant Status At the beginning of the inspection period, the unit was in cold shutdown to facilitate replacement o'the emergency care cooling system (ECCS) torus suction strainers. On July 30,1997, the unit was made critical and wa3 synchronized to the grid on August 1,1997.
Operation continued at 100 percent power until August 8,1997 when power was reduced to 25 percent to facilitate replacement of a generator condition monitor fuse holder and repair a packing leak on a pressure indicator root valve. The unit was retumed to full power on August 9,1997 and continued at that power level for the remainder of the period.
l. Operations
Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)
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l Using inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. These reviews included observations of control room evolutions, shift tumovers, logkeeping and review of operability decisions. Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Section 13, " Plant Operations," was reviewed as part
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l in general, the conduct of operations was acceptable; specific events and noteworthy observations are detailed in the sections be'ow. Operator performance during routine operations and surveillance activities was good. Procedures were reviewed and followed, and discrepancies were promptly identified, communicated to operations management, and resolved satisfactorily. Operators also responded appropriately to the inadvertent control rod withdrawal event discussed in Section M3.1.
01.2 Observation of Outaoe and Startuo-related Activities a.
jnspection Scope (71707 and 61726)
The inspectors ceaerved portions of the outage and startup activities. Included in the inspection was a review of surveillance procedures, Technical Specification (TS),
and appropriate USAR sections, and observations of operator actions.
b.
Observations and Findinos in general, the inspectors observed that the work associated with these activities was conducted in a professional and thorough manner. Communication between operators and other department personnel was acceptable for the specific situations.
Pre-job briefings were informa'ive with tesponsibilities clearly discussed. The following outage and startup-related work activities were observed:
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Torus reflood:_ The inspectors noted that the infrequent evolution briefing was
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thorough. The shift manager established acceptable bands for condensate storage tank level, rate of torus floodup, and condensate /demin temperatures.
Contingency actions for unexpected conditions such as loss of communication or leaks were discussed. Procedure 8078," Torus Filling Procedure," was reviewed in detail at the briefing. Operations personnel identifieo a ceflict between this procedure and the torus drain procedure which could have created an undesirable path from the condensate storage tank to torus.
Appropriate administrative control tags were placed on the affected valves.
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ECCS operajility testina and suction strainer cost-modification test: The
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inspectors noted good communication and decision making at the special planning meeting for this evolution. The sequence of testing was executed as planned. The inspectors attended the infrequent evilution briefirrg for the post modification test and noted good communication of expectations and individual responsibilities. During the test, operators monitored pump indications for possible signs of cavitation. Reactor water temperature was also monitored when shutdown cooling was secured in accordance with the procedure. The operators were knowledgeable of the contingency actions to take if the reactor water temperature increased dramatically. The inspectors had no concems.
ept roaches to criticality: Pre-job briefings were conducted with two
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operations crews prior to the approach to criticality on July 30,1997. The shift managers reviewed caution statements and expectations for procedure adherence and assigned roles and responsibilities to individuals. The initial approach to criticality was conducted in a slow, controlled manner. An operator noted that increased drive pressure was needed for some control rods and was concerned with potential double notching near the estimated critical notch. After discussion with operations management, a decision was made to insert the control rods and perform a coupling surveillance to vent the drives. The licensee determined that the post maintenance test for tiie individual control rod blue scram light problems (discussed in Section M1.1)
caused air to accumulate in the drives. The inspectors noted that the second and final approach to criticality was also conducted in a slow, controlled manner.
System restoration The inspectors independently verified valve positions for
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the high pressure coolant injection, emergency diesel generators (EDG) and EDG-emergency service water systems. No discrepancies were noted.
However, during a review of outstanding equipment isolations, the shift manager identified that the attemate nitrogen system had not been retumed to service. The system wt.s not required to be operable at the time of discovery. It appeared that the nitrogen bottles were isolated after the system prestart checklist was completed to conserve nitrogen. A step to verify system readiness was deleted from the startup procedure since the step was completed in a different procedure. The licensee initiated condition report (CR) 97002164 and realigned the system appropriately. The licensee also
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identified some minor problems during the restoration of the steam jet air ejectors.
Synchronizino the turbine oenerator to the orida The inspectors noted good
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command and control during this evolution. The shift manager assigned an extra senior reactor operator to perform an independent walkdown of the control room panels. Distractions to operators were also reduced.
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Conclusions Operations personnel performed well during the observed outage and startup-related activities. Informative pre-job briefings for the torus flood up, the ECCS pump testing sequence, and the reactor startup resulted in well-executed evolutions. The shift manager's identification of an improper alternate nitrogen system lineup demonstrated a good questioning attitude and attention to detail. The cause of the improper lineup will be determined through the licensee's condition reporting system.
O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment L
O2.1 Drvwell and Torus insoections
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jn,gpection._ cope (71'l,QIl l
The inspectors performed walkdown inspections of the drywell and torus prior to the plant resuming power operations. The purposa of the inspections was to assess the overall cleanhness of the areas with an emphasis on material which could potentially block the ECCS suction strainers.
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Observations and Findinos
The inspectors performed an extensive tour of all of the elevations in the drywell
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including the vent pipe, vent header, and the downcomer piping. With minor exceptions, the drywell was found to be clean and in good material condition. No i
loose material or debris was identified in the drywell vent or downcomer piping.
l Valve leaks had been properly identified for work. The inspectors identified some ivasely secured or missing pipe insulation. These items were resolved prior to startup.
The inspectors also observed the licensee perform the final inspections of the torus prior to and immediately following torus flood up. The inspecW verified that the foreign material exclusion barriers placed on the ECCS test return lines, T-quenchers, and downcomer piping had been removed and that supports detached during strainer installation were reattached. The licensee identified and promptly repaired a missing metal clamp on a small instrument line. No other problems were identified.
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Conclusions
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The licensee conducted thorough inspections of the drywell and torus pric,r to the
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Miscellaneous Operations issues 08.1 (Closed) Unresolved item (50-263/97002-02): Failure to submit a licensee event report (LER) within 30 days.
(Closed) Licensee Event Report (50 263/96-013). Revision 0: Failure to Comply with Tech Spec Requirement to Verify that the Control Room Ventilation System Maintains a Positive Pressure with respect to Adjacent Areas.
This event was discussed in Inspection Report (IR) 50-293/97002. The issue was identified in August 1996; however, the licensee did not recognize the event was reportable until December 1E96. The licensee's corrective actions included submitting the report and discussing the reportability error with enginwring department personnel. The failure to submit a licensee event report within 30 (ays constituted a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section Vil of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-263/97012-01).
II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments a.
Insoection Scoce (62703 and 61726)
The inspecurs observed all or putions of selecW maintenance and surveillance activities. included in the inspection was a review of the surveillance procedures or work orders (WOs) listed as well as the appropricte USAR sections pertaining to these activities, b.
Observations and Findinas in general, the inspectors observed that the work associated with thece activities was conduced in a professional and thorough manner. All work observed was performed with the wcrk package present and in active use. Technicians were experienced and knowledgeable of their assigned tasks. The inspectors frequently observed supervisors and system engineers monitoring job progress, and quality control personnel were present whenever required by procedure. When applicable, appropriate radiation control measures were in place.
The following work was observed. Specific concerns or observations are provided where appropriate.
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Test 0255-08-1A-1, "RCIC [ reactor core isolation cooling) System Tests with
Reactor Pressure at Rated Conditions" WO 9704402, " Install new ECCS suction strainers er modification a3Q170."
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The inspectors observed effective foreign rnaterial exclusion controls, radiological protection practices, and fire watches. Quality control inspectors and engineering personnel were present at the job site as necessary.
Maintenance workels were aware of fire, radiological, and personnel hazards.
ECCS suction strainer test. The inspectors reviewed the procedure to verify
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that the test did not compromise pump operability. The inspectors also witnessed the strainer performance while inside of the torus. No vortexing and little vibration at the sirainer ramshead were observed.
WO 9704843, "Recahbrate PS 10-122A/B as described in modification package" WO 9704891, " Testing #12 CS [ core spray) pump motor without water
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cooling" WO 9705000, " Replace Solenoid Valves for RV-2-718 and RV-2-71F"
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WO 9705039 "Changeout of Control Power Fuses in 250 Vdc MCC [ motor
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control center) D311" WO 9705040, "Changeout of Control Power Fuses in 250 Vdc MCC D312" WO 9705045, "Y-71 transferred to altemate source during test 0600." The licensee experienced a similar problem during the last surveilla.1ce test in April 1997 as discussed in inspection Report 50-263/97003. At that time, the licensee replaced a varistor and a bad holding coil; however, the cause of the transfer was not determined. This work order was initiated when Y-71 transferred again. The licensee determined that electronic noisa interfe ed with the pickup coil and ir, stalled a diode in the circuitry The problem did not recur during numerous post-maintenance tests.
WO 9705051," Modify vacuum breaker AO-2382A" Vacuum breaker AO-2382A did not seat properly during post-maintenance testing. Tne licensee modified the bolting configuration as discussed in Section E1.1.
WO 9705113, " Bank 2 blue SCRAM light,'use blew second time." The
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electricians inspected the field electrical wiring for the affected control rod drives and performed a detailed review of logic diagrams. The cause was determined to be a bumt out light socket in tne control room panel. The inspectors noted that although the work delayed the reactor startup, the job proceeded at an appropriate pace.
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Conclusions
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The observed maintenance atd surveillance activities were conducted in a professional manner and in accordance with applicable procedures.
M3 Maintenance Procedures and Documentation M3.1 incorrect Relav Reolacement Caused Unexoected Control Rod Movement a.
].rtsoection Scope (62703)
On August 1,1997, about 30 minutes after control rod manipulations, the control room operators received several alarms indicating a problem with the reactor manual control system (RMCS). A fuse which powered the rod block relays had blown.
Further investigation showed that relay 3A K8 associated with the RMCS logic had failed. An electrician obtained a replacement relay from the warehouse and installed the relay. When power was restored to the logic, a control rod withdrawal signal was generated. Operators observed the previously selected control rod move from position 20 to 22 and immediately shut off power to the system.
The inspectors reviewed the immediate operator response and licensee followup to this event. The following documents were also reviewed:
CR 97002114, "RMCS Failure During Reactor Startup, Failure of 3A-K8, Rod
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Insert Permissive Relay" CR 97002274, " Repair Activities of RMCS Relay Failure Results in
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inadvertent Control Rod Withdrawal" WO 9705138, " Restore RMCS control rod drive function"
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Schematic Drawings NX 7866-74-10 and -12
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Security Bad;;e Access Transaction Report (July 23 through August 1 for the individuals involved in the event)
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Observations and Findinas The inspectors were not onsite at the time of this event. Through interviews and review of annunciator alarm printouts, the inspectors verified that the operators responded appropriately to the inadvertent rod movement. Actions were taken in accorcance with Abnormal Operating Procedure B.5.5-05.G.3 " Recovery from inadvertent Control Rod Withdrawal." Reactor g.ver was ma;ntained steady and the controi rod configuration was confirmed to be acceptable by the nuclear engineer.
The inspectors also reviewed electrical prints, applicable USAR sections, and the operations manual and confirmed that all expected responses occurred.
The licensee determined that the electrician obtained a 24002AB series relay instead of the required 42002AB series. The contact configuration on the wrong relay was such that the select withdrawal logic was complete. The relay was then replaced with a correct series relay. The inspectors observed the post-maintenance testing and had no concerns.
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l The licensee initiated a special review as documented in CR 97002274. Initial investigation indicated that fatigue contributed to the electrician's errors. This event occurred during the early moming hours. The electrician had left the site prior to midnight and was called in to resolve the blown fuse problem about three hours later. The inspectors confirmed that the individual did not exceed any Technical Specification overtime requirements. Also, tne inspectors noted that several individuals were involved with the troubleshooting efforts; yet, no one was assigned to independently observe the electrician's actions. The replacement relay was not verified to be correct prior to installation. The licensee planned to review the employee call-out and work order processes.
Although the 3A-K8 relay was classified as non safety related, the incorrect replacement affected safety-related equipment, specifically a control rod. The 'NO 9705138 did not contain adequate li struction to ersure the correct relay was replaced. Failure to provide adequate instructions constituted a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V," Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," and is being treated as a Non Cited Violation, consistent with Section Vil of the NRC Enforcement Potiev (50-263/97012-02).
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Conclusions An electrician installed an incorrect relay which resulted in an inadvertent control rod withdrawal. Fatigue and inappropriate independent review of the electrician's actions were contributing causes. Operators responded appropriately to the event.
M8 Miscellaner,us Maintenance issues M8.1 (Closed) LER 50-263/97-009. Revision 0: Partial Primary Containment Isolation Due to Voltage Transient During Severe Weather. A fault on one of the 345KV transmission lines into the substation resulted in a voltage drop in the plant's electrical system which caused a momentary dropout of the Division A reactor protection system logic. A half scram, ventilation system changes, and a partial containment isolation resulted. Operators reset the half scram and returned the equipment to the appropriate conditions. The inspectors had no concerns.
Ill. Enaineerina E1 Conduct of Engineering E1.1 General Enaineerina Olsservations a.
Inspection Scope (37551)
The inspectors reviewed engineering-related activities and observed engineering personnel involvement in resolving problems identified during mair.tenance, surveillance and operations activities. Included in the inspection wac a review of appropriate TS and USAR sections.
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Observations and Pndinn in general, tha inspectors determined that engineering support to maintenance, surveillance and operations activities was appropriate duiing this inspection period.
System engineers were cognizant of ongoing work orders and surveillance tests required prior to the reactor startup. The engineers and members of the operation committee reviewed outstanding cond;ticn reports, modifications, and work orders to iden, fy items which needed resolution prior to the reactor startup.
The inspectors also reviewed the (cllowing engineering activities:
Modification 97Q125, " Vacuum Breaker AO 2382A Modification." During a
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post-maintenance test, torus to drywell vacuum breaker AO-2382A did not seat properly. This modification involved the installation of a spacer between the disc arm and disc nut washer. The inspectors reviewed the modification package and the justification for not performing a 50.59 evaluation, and attended the operations committee meeting. The it'spectors had no concerns.
Safety Review Item 94-003, Revision 0, Addendum 1, " CSP [ core spray
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pump) Motor Test Without Water Cooling." As discussed in previous inspection Reports (IR 50-263/96005 and IR 50 263/96009), the service water line to the motor cooler was prone to clogging and silting problems. This evaluation provided justification to perform a special test to remove all cooling to the No.12 core spray pump. The results from the test will be used to justify isolating the cooling water to the motor. The inspectors reviewed the 10 CFR Part 50.59 safety evaluation for the test and had no concerns. The licensee adequately documented the basis for determining the test was not an unreviewed safety question. The system engineer specified vibration and metal / oil temperature limits to ensure that the test would not affect pump operability. The inspectors verified that the conditions and limitations established in the evaluation were contained in the special test.
96Q170 ECCS Strainer modifications: The inspectors noted extensive
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engineering involvement during the installation and testing phase of this project. During the installation of one strainer, the holding strap broke, causing the strainer assembly to fall a few feet onto some scaffolding. A small dent on the outer subassembly resulted. The inspectors observed the dent and concurred with the licensee's assessment that the damage was negligible.
During a final walkdown of the torus prior to refilling, a system engineer identified rust on a portion of a 4-inch band around a 40" diameter subassembly. The licensee found two additional subassemblies (26" diameter) with rust. The licensee determined that the three subassernbly bands were fabricated from A-36 carbon steel, not stainless steel as designed. The material receipt documentation showed that all of the perforated sheets used in this project had the same heat number. The
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licensee and strainer manufacturer did not know how the incorrect sheets (carbon steel) became mixed in with those made of stainless steel. The vendor had not completed an evaluation for 10 CFR Part 21 applicability by the end of this inspection period. The completion of this evaluation is considered an inspection Followup item (50-263/97012-03).
The licensee decided to replace the affected strainer pieces during this forced outage. This demonstrated sound ALARA awareness since radiological exposure would be greater in subsequent outages, and conservative decision-making by eliminating the need to drain the torus during the next refueling outage.
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. Conclusions Engineering personnel support to operations and maintenance activities was appropriate during this inspection period. The inspectors reviewed two modifications and special tests and had no concerns. The licensee decision to replace the inappropriate carbon steel strainer parts with the required stainless steel parts was conservative and demonstrated Al. ARA awareness.
E2 Engineering Support of Fac,lities and Equipment E2.1 USAR Discrepancy involvinn EDG Circuit Breaker Trios a.
insoection Scope (37551)
The inspectors reviewed CR 97001672,"As-found setpoint of a voltage sensing relay (40V) on the #12 EDG out of specification during a surveillance test." No deficiencies were identified with respect to the evaluation and corrective actior,s.
However, during this review, the inspectors identified a discrepancy between the USAR Chapter 8 description, actual plant configuration and plant design with respect to EDG protective relay trips.
The following documents were reviewed:
USAR Section 8.4.1.2 and 8.4.1.3 Operations Manual B.9.8-01, Emergency Diesel Generators Schematic drawings NE-36403-2/S and NX-9216-5-3/E
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Observations and Findinas The inspactors reviewed USAR Section 8, the operations manual, schematic drawings, and as-built conditions, and identified a discrepancy with the EDG protective relay trips.
The inspectors noted that USAR Section 8.4.1.2 stated, " Protective relays initiate tripping of the generator circuit breakers and the engine for differential current, phase fault or reverse power. An automatic overspeed trip is the only mechanical device
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which will trip the diesel engine." Section 8.4.1.3 stated that," Protective relaying of the diesel-generators is provided only for electrical faults which, if not cleared, would most likely immediately render the unit unavailable as a power source and possibly result in major damage requiring extensive repairs."
The schematic drawings and as-built conditions indicated that eight protective relays were provided to trip the generator circuit breakers during EDG emergency start demands. As described in the operations manual, these trips included:
bus fault anti-motoring
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differential current phase overcurrent
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loss of generator field
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engine stop relay overspeed trip relay
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no field relay (concurrent with a fast start demand)
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The inspectors discussed the additional trips with the licensee since it appeared that the plant design did not nCch the USAR description.
The licensee initiated CR 97001919 "USAR Section 8.4 discrepancy identified involving EDGs," to address the concern. Additionally, the report documented that contrary to the USAR description, the three protective relays only trip the generator circuit breakers but do r at trip the engine. The licensee believed that the USAR description was not meant to be all inclusive and that the trips were part of the original design considerations. The licensee de' ermined that the additional trips were acceptable and that the EDGs were operable. Tiie licensee planned to clarify the USAR description.
The inspectors requested additional assistancs from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) to review this issue. The USAR discrepancy is an Inspection Followup ltem (50 233/97012-04) pending NRR review of the issue and licensee revisions to the USAR c.
Conclusions The current plant design and as-built condition provided additional EDG trips other than those described in the licensee's USAR. This issue remains open pending further NRC review.
E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues E8.1 Completion of NRC Commitments Prior to Startuo in a ;etter dated July 25,1997, to Mr. Roger Anderson, Director Nuclear EnerCY Engineering from Tae Kim, NRC Senior Project Manager, the NRC issued Amendment No. 98 to facility operating license DPR 22. The amendment evaluated the apparent unreviewed safety questions associated with the updated analysis of the design basis accident containment temperatures and pressure response and the
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l rdiance on containment overpressure to compensate for the potential deficiency in not positive suction head (NPSH) for ECCS pumps. The letter addressed two li;ensee commitments which were to be compbted prior to the startup of the unit.
These included:
Revise the emergency operating procedures to require manual isolation of
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torus and drywell sprays prior to the point where primary conteinment pressure would not provide adequate NPSH, change the caution statement regarding NPSH in the Primary Containment Pressure emergency operating procedure to include the core spray pumps, and add a caution statement regarding NPSH considerations for pressure contro! while venting to control primary containment pressure.
Finalize the additional containment analysis and associated NPSH evaluation
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which extends the existing long-term case evaluation to the time when the required containment overpressure returns to atmospheric conditions.
The inspectors verified that the procedures were revised as discussed above and attended operator training on tae revised procedures. The training consisted of classroom review of the changes and a demonstration on the simulator. The inspectors verified that alllicensed individuals received the training prior to assuming shift duties. The inspectors also verified that the containment analysis evaluation for the long-term case was finalized and reviewed by licensee personnel.
E8.2 (Closed) Unresolved item (50-263/97002-04): Adequacy of Control Room and Envelope Pressore Testing. This issue was discussed in detail in inspection Report 50-263/97002, Section E1.1. Briefly, the licensee identified that control room ventilation testing was not conducted in accordance with TS and USAR requirements. The licensee's corrective actions included continuing their effort to verify that acceptance criteria stated in test procedures were appropriate and revising the ventilation test procedure to include untested areas. All previously untested areas were found operable during this subsequent test. The failure to ensure that all testing requirements specified by TS 4.17.B.2.b.(3) and described in USAR Section 12.3.1.6 were considered a licensee-identified violation of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion XI, " Test Control," and is a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section Vil of the NRC Enforcernent Poliev (50-263/97012-05).
E8.3 (Closed) Violation 50-263/97006-03: Inadequate Operator Instructions for Operating Combustible Gas Control System Post-Accident. This NRC identified violation involved a failure to provide adequate system operating instructions for initiation of the combustible gas control system and failure to provide adequate surveillance test instructions tc demonstrate system logic functionality.
The inspectors reviewed the comple.!ed Condition Report 96001598 which documented this issue and did not identify any deficiencies. The procedures were
revised to include testing of the logic circuit bypasses. As documented in Inspection
- Report 50-263/96008 (Section M1.1), the inspectors reviewed these procedures and
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had no concerns. Additionally, the licensee's corrective actions included review of post-accident equipment configuration procedures to identify any similar procedure inadequacies.
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IV. Plant Support R1 Conduct of Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls During normal resident inspection activities, routine observations were conducted in the area of radiation protection. The inspectors noted that effective radiological controls were established at the torus and drywell entrances and that technicians provided support during maintenance and surveillance activities.
P1 Conduct of Emergency Preparedness Activities P4.1 Qbservations of Medical Emeroency Preparedness Drill a.
Inspection Scope (71750)
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The inspectors observed the licensee's annual medical emergency preparedness drill, b.
Observations and Findinos The scenario involved a " victim" falling from a stairway while carrying a bag of
" contaminated" rags. As a result of the fall, the bag broke resulting in
" contamination" to the " victim's" left leg.
The fire brigade team responded immediately to the scene and assessed the situation. Communication with control room personnel was established and appropriate notifications to outside agencies were made The fire brigade leader decided to place the " victim" in a more comicriable position while waiting for the
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ambulance to arrive onsite. The radiction protection technician did not put on gloves prior to lifting the " victim" and could have potentially increased the spread of contamination. The technician recognized the error and put on gloves. Security personnel setup a boundary to prevent unnecessary personnel from interfering with the emergency equipment. Two individuals wandered into the area and were promptly removed by tiie officers,
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Some confusion occurred due to the scenario. The fire brigade leader notified the ambulance attendants that the " victim" would be placed on a backboard and ready for direct transfer to the ambulance. However, the drill controller requested that this action not be performed. When the ambulance arrived onsite, the " victim" was not in the condition anticipated by the ambulance attendants. -This caused some confusion as the attendants were then required to don protective clothing and did not
' meet with the fire brigade leader for a face-to-face tumover. This, however, did not hinder the prompt transport of the " victim" to the hospital.
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The inspectors reviewed the licensee's critique of the drill. Although the objectives of the drill were met, some improvement items were identified. The inspectors agreed with the licensee's assessment; however, the inspectors identified some inconsistencies in the detail of the exercise report. These included the description of the fire brigade leader to ambulance attendant tumover, contamination control, and medical response of the fire brigade team. These inconsistencies did not affect the drill objectives.
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Conclusions.
The fire brigade promptly and appropriately responded to the medical emergency drill. The radiation protection technician recognized the potential to spread contamination and took appropriate corrective actions.
V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary On September 2,1997, the inspectors presented the inspection results to the plant manager and quality services manager. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The licensee classified the support engineering evaluation for the special core spray pump test as proprietary information. The inspectors verified that the inspection report did not cor;ain this specific information.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee M. Wadley, Vice President Nuclear Gent stion W. Hill, Plant Manager B. Day, Training Manager M. Hammer, General Superintendent Maintenancs K. Jepson, Superintendent, Chemistry & Environmental Protect;on L. Nolan, General Superintendent Safety Assessment M. Onnen, General Superintendent Operations E. Reilly, Superintendent Plaat Scheduling C. Schibonski, General Superintendent Engineering A. Ward, Manager Quality Services L. Wilkerson, Superintendent Security J. Windschill, General Superintendent, Radiation Protection INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551:
_ Onsite Engineering IP 61726; Surveillance Observations IP 62703:
Maintenance Observations IP 71707:
Plant Operations IP 71750; Plant Support IP 92700:
Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities IP 93702:
Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 50-263/97012-01 NCV Failure to submit a licensee event report within 30 days 50-263/97012-02-NCV Personnel error caused unexpected rod movement 50-263/97012-03 IFl Part 21 upplicability determination for non-stainless steel strainer components 50-263/97012-04 IFl USAR discrepancy conceming diesel generator trips 50-263/97012-05 NCV Failure to ensure adequate testing of the control room ventilation system in accordance with TS and USAR Closed -
50-263/97002-02 URI - Failure to submit a licensee event report (LER) within 30 days 50-263/96-013 LER Failure to Comply with Tech Spec Requirement to Verify that the Control Room Ventilation System Maintains a Positive Pressure with respect to Adjacent Areas
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50 263/97-009 LER Partial Primary Containment isolation Due to Voltage Transient During Severe Weather 50-263/97002-04 URI Adequacy of Control Room and Envelope Pressure Testing
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50 263/97006-03 VIO Inadequate Operator Instructions for Operating Combustible Gas Control System Post Accident LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable CFR Code of Federal Regulations CR Condition Report CS Core Spray ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System EDG Emergency Diesel Generators IFl inspection Followup Item IR inspection Report LER Licer'see Event Report NCV Non-Cited Violation NPSH Net Positive Suction Head NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission RMCS Reactor Manual Control System TS Technical Specification URI Unresolved item USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report VIO Violation WO Work Order
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