ML20198G317

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Page 6 of Plant Emergency Preparedness Exercise Insp Rept 50-263/97-16.Page Inadvertently Omitted W/Rept Transmitted by
ML20198G317
Person / Time
Site: Monticello Xcel Energy icon.png
Issue date: 01/06/1998
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198G312 List:
References
50-263-97-16, NUDOCS 9801120294
Download: ML20198G317 (1)


See also: IR 05000263/1997016

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event was professional and calm. Communications were clear and teamwork was

effective. Noise levels in the TSC were generally low.

The TSC staff briefings were frequent and effective. The ED gave adequate

notifications to the staff of upcoming briefings and indicated his expectations for the

types of information to be presented. TSC staff members were well prepared for

briefings and presented their information in a very efficient manner. The ED presented

a succinct summary of the information provided at the end of each briefing. The ED

requested that phone calls be discontinued during the briefing sessions, which

contributed to their effectiveness, but also delayed some Information reaching the TSC

from other areas.

The turnover of responsibilities for offsite communications, offsite assessment, and

protective action recommendations to the Emergency Operations Facility was

conducted in an especially controlled manner and was extremely effective. The ED

gave adequate time for his staff to prepare for the turnover and directed them to insure

that no offsite notification activilles were ongoing at the time of turnover.

The ED made effective use of the TSC staff to provide information, projections, and

suggestions. He evaluated their inputs and then made rapid decisions which were then

plainly communicated. The ED was clearly in charge of the facility.

The TSC staff made good use of their resources, effectively tracked plant status, repair

teams, offsite conditions, and other relevant information. They performed their tasks

efficiently and anticipated infometion that would be needed by the ED. Personnel and

equipment resources in the TSC were adequate with the exception that there were not

enough self reading dosimeters available.

The TSC staff and ED properly prioritized mitigation tasks and made action decisions

that were well supported technically. At times, there were deficiencies in communicating

these decisions. The ED decided the single rod trip test procedure did not need to be

performed during the reactor shutdown. He asked the superintendent of nuclear

engineering to prepare a ' Volume F Memorandum" (temporary procedure change) to

delete the requirement. However, that decision was not passed on to the CRS

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operating crew and they proceeded with the rod trip testing. This had little effect on the

shutdown sequence,

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The overall performance of OSC management and staff was generally competent,

despite some examples of inconsistent c mmunication which did not impact OSC

effectiveness.

The OSC was fully staffed and operational very quickly following the Alert declaration. A

personnel status board was effectively used to track the availability of personnel to

participato in the emergency response teams. The personnel status board was an

excellent tool which enabled OSC management to accurately track personnel by

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