IR 05000456/1988021
| ML20151U585 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 08/11/1988 |
| From: | Patterson J, Ploski T, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151U582 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-3.A.1.1, TASK-3.A.1.2, TASK-3.A.2.1, TASK-3.A.2.2, TASK-TM 50-456-88-21, 50-457-88-21, NUDOCS 8808190182 | |
| Download: ML20151U585 (22) | |
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. t U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0fHISSION i
REGION III
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Reports No. 50-456/88021(ORSSi;.60-457/88021(0RSS) .
Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457 Licenses No. NPF-72; NPF-77 i
- Licensee
- Commonwealth Edison Company
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Post Office Box 767 i Chicago, IL 60690 .
Facility Name: Braidwood Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2
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Inspection At: Braidwooc Station, Braceville, Illinois ,
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Inspection Conducted: August 1-3, 1988
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Inspectors: Thomas Plo A.3. 1), l# tt l Date y '
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James Patterson 4%W, bM . I/j l487 Data] 1
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l Approved By: William Sne 40.. II,/lig
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l Emergency Preparedness Section Oh".e7 ;
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l Inspection Summary Inspection on August 1-3, 1988 (Reports No. 50-456/88021(ORSS); ~ i
- No. 50-457/88021(0RSS))
Areas Inspected: Routine announced inspection of the Braidwood Station's .
emergency preparedness exercise (IP 82301), involving observations by three i NRC representatives of some key functions and locations activated for this '
exercise, which did not involve state or country participatio Section 6 of (
, this report provides an updated summary of the TMI Safety Issues Management '
Systems (SIMS) items related to Emergency Preparednes !
Results: No violations, deficiencies, or deviations wwe identified during '
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this inspecticn. One Open Item was identified regarding the inadequate
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demonstration of onsite accountability, and the subsequent untimely decision l
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e to simulate the evacuation of non-essential onsite personne I
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O ADOCK 05000456 PNU !
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DETAILS l
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4 Persons Contacted NRC Observes and Areas Observed, T. Ploski, Control Room (CR), Technical Support Center (TSC)
R. Hogan, Operational Support Center (OSC) and Inplant Teams :
J. Patterson, Eeergency Operations Facility-(EOF) Commonwealth Edison Personnel R. Querio, Station Manager, NRC Site Team Role Player r D. Butterfield Nuclear Licensing Manager, NRC Site Team Role Player L
- K. Kofron, Production Superintendent t
- L. Davis, Assistant Superintendent - Technical Services
- T. Gilman, Emergency Planning Supervisor, Lead E0F Controller ,
- L. Literski, GSEP Coordinator -
- 3. Vanaerheyden, Operations Training Supervisor, CR Controller !
'S. Ramsey, Shift Foreman, CR Controller :
- 0. Combs, Security Force Manager :
- Roth, Assistant Security Administrator !
- Harper, Quality Assurance Inspector i a * Gorski, Nuclear Safety Department i T. Lechton, Lead CR Controller <
C. Brown, Lead TSC Controller i A. Nykiel, TSC Controller K. Klotz, Lead OSC Controller P. Skiermont, OSC Evaluator R. Carson, OSC Controller '
R. Holman, OSC Controller
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- Indicates those who attended the August 3, 1988 exit intervie I General (IP 82301) '
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An exercise of tne licensee's Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP)
and the Braidwood Annex to the GSEP was conducted at the Braidwood
! Station on August 2, 1988. The exercise tested the integrated response of the licensee's emergency organization to a hypothetical accident
- scenario. The daytime exercise did not involve the participation of State and County emergency response o m.nizations. Hrsever, telephone communications with the NRC's emergen / response organization were practiced through the ute of a response cell of controllers simulating the NRC Headquarters Operations Center and Region III Base Tea The l licensee also effectively utilized roleplayers in the TSC and EOF to
! simulate NRC Site Team personnel. The attachments to this report consist l of the exercise scope and objectives and the scenario narrative summary, i
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) General Observations (IP 82301) Procedures !
This exercise was conducted in accordance with 19 CFR 50, Appendix E requirements using the GSEP, Braidwood Annex, and the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) used by the Station and Emergency Operating Facility (EOF) staff Coordination [
t The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly and timely. If the events had been real, actions taken by the licensee would have been i sufficient to permit the State and local authorities to take appropriate actions to protect public health and safet Observers
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Licensee observers monitored and critiqued this exercise along with three NRC observers, Critiques The licensee' controllers held a critique following the exercis The NRC critique was held on August 3, 198 ' Specific Observations (IP 82301)
i Control Room (CR)
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An inspector observed CR participants during the first three hours of the exercise. CR personnel demonstrated good knowledge of relevant Technical Specifications (Tech Specs) and surveillance ;
procedures. For example, they quickly recognized that a proposed vibration test on the 18 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump, while the 1A RHR pump's impeller key was still being replaced, constituted a i voluntary brief entry into Tech Spec 3.0.3. The vibration test involved valve movements that would render the IB RHR incapable of j performing its designed function. The Duty Operations Enginner was called to inform him of this Tech Spec's applicabilit The conservative decision was then made to delay the simulated vibration -
test on the 1B pump until simulateo repairs on the 1A RHR pump were :
ceplete Controllers overruled this decision in order to keep the scenario play moving along the desired route, which was the i failure of the vibration test and the declaration of an Alert due to
- both RHR trains being simultaneously out of servic ;
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Howe'ver, as summarized in Section 5, an actual feedwater pump problem
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with Unit 1 then occurred which essentially resulted in a suspension of exercise play until onshift personnel resolved the actual
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problem. When play resumed, a message was issued that defective i l
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impeller keys had been installed in.both RHR pumps. The Shift :
Engineer (SE) promptly reviewed the Station's Emergency Action Levels '
< (EALs), and correctly declared an Alert for both trains of the RHR system being inoperabl The SE also correctly instructed the team that was to perform the vibration test on the IB RHR pump to instead conduct tests on the 1A RHR pump which had now presumably been -
repaire ! .-
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!- Exercise participants demonstrated good teamwor The SE oversaw
- . the activities of his staff to 9hom he had delegated various
- responsibilities'and kept them well informed of his decision The ;
Shift Control Room Engineer (SCRE) closely monitored plant status and provided concise briefings to other participants, who provided .
inputs as necessary. _A Shift Foreman (SF) and a communicator were '
used to prepare and transmit initial notification messages to NRC !
and State officials following the Alert declaratio The licensee i has proceduralized the NRC's Event Notification Worksheet in l
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addition to the standard form utilized for State agency notifications. The SE approved both message forms, and both initial ,
, notifications were accurately completed within the rraulatory time ,
limits, i Several Public Address (PA) announcements were made after the Alert ,
declaration to instruct Technical Support Center (TSC) and !
Operational Support Center (OSC) personnel to report to these locations. Several CR communicators soon established communications with counterparts in both facilities over dedicated telephone
.] lines. The SE was kept informed of the activation' status of both ,
facilities,
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Based on the above f.indings, this po sion of the licensee's program
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- Technical Support Center (TSC, The TSC was fully staffed, with the Station Director (50) in charge j i of onsite emergency response, within about 35 minutes of the Alert
declaration. The SD assumed the lead role after he had been ,
adequately briefed during several telephone conversations with the SE and had assured himself that his aides were ready to assume their j responsibilitie CR and OSC personnel were promptly informed of this transfer of lead responsibilit The OSC Director was also ordered to dispatch t.o offsite survey (environs) teams a
- accordance with the Emergency Pla A number of major deteriorations in Unit 1 status and associated ,
decisions occurred between about 10:19 a.m. and 10:40 The TSC's {
technical staff quicely and correctly analyzed the events as a large !
steam generator tube rupture, with a minor radioactive release i
through a stuck-open Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) 'or the 1C
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steam generato Safety injection had begun but was apparently ,
insufficient to compensate for the primary to secondary leak. The -
SD ordered his staff to confirm this point and to make a "worse case" offsite dose assessment assuming that some fuel damage would
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eventually begin. While his staff addressed these concerns, the SD briefed the Corporate' Nuclear Duty Officer. They quickly decided to activate the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). After receiving confirmation that the leak rate exceeded makeup capability, the SD accepted his staff's recommendation and correctly declared a Site ,
Area En rgency at 10:37 i
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TSC staff correctly interpreted real-time actual wind direction variations and identified four affected downwind sectors (A through ,
0). As reasonable offsite dose assessment resi:its were not yet available, the SD prudently selected the Emergency Plan's most ccnservative offsite Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) for'a i Site Area Emergency declaration, which is to seek shelter in a two '
mile radius of the Station and also in affected downwind sectors i
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from two to ten miles. State and simulated NRC officials were adequately informed of the chais a in emergency classification, the offsite PAR, and the bases for the classification change within the '
regulatory time limit Dose assessment staff later posted updated current meteorological t
information on a flip chart fur the SD's referenc However, no one
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ever posted forecast meteorological information or the current i
offsite PAR on any TSC status board or flip char l The 50 did not order the onsite assembly siren to be sounded until [
- approximately twelve minutes after the Site Area Emergency declaration, i as he wanted to ensure that both environs teams.had left the Protected Area. He did, however, instruct the Rad Chem and Security Directors ;
to select an optimum evacuation route for non-essential personnel
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following completion of accountability. He prudently told his staff to review their manpower needs ar.d to retain any additionally needed personnel onsite prior to a site evacuation decisio :
L Theonsiteasserpdlysirenwassoundedat10:50a.m. The Security e Director and his assistant wero very active in reviewing incoming ,
accountability sinformation. The SD occasionally checked on their l l- progress. Non-essential onsite personnel were released from their assembly areas at 11:30 a.m. However, at 11:35 a.m. the Security i i Director announced the names of eleven persons who were presumed to be onsite but had not yet been adequately accounted for. TSC staff .
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then provided information regarding the whereabouts of several of I 1 these persons to the Security Director. All eleven were determined :
to have been onsite and were accounted for shortly after noo l Several had been located in the onsite emergency response )
facilitie At the exit interview, the licensee agreed with the ;
inspector' conclusion that completion of onsite accountability had i been unacceptably slow and stated that internal investigations j i indicated several likely contributing factor ]
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The 50 did not order the simulated evacuation of all non-essential onsite personnel until 12:30 p.m., although accountability had been accomplished for some time; the only identified release path had been shut since about 11:00 a.m. ; and there were no natural hazards to prevent a safe evacuation of nonessentials along a route selected over an hour earlier. The SD concurred with the EOF's strong recommendation to order the simulated evacuation at 12:30 At the exit interview, the licensee indicated that there was inconsistent wording in several implementing procedures regarding site evacuation and that the wordings would be revised to conform to the Emergency Plan and regulatory guidance to clearly state that i non-essential personnel shall be evacuated followin0 any Site Area .
or General Emergency declaration unless such an evacuation wouid I expose them to greater hazards than by remaining onsit The inadequate demonstration of the capability to account for all onsite personnel in a timely manner and the subsequent untimely I decision to order the simulated evacuation of non-essential onsite personnel is an Open Item (456/88021-01).
In general, TSC staff were kept well informed of changing plant conditions, the efforts of inplant repair teams, and decisions made by principal EOF and TSC staffs through: periodic briefings by TSC directors; the timely updating of status board information; and the distribution of chronological directors' log sheet entries prepared i by TSC clerical staf The notable exception to this good information flow was that TSC staff were not informed by the OSC that several inplant team members had supposedly been contaminated while simulating repairs to the 1A RHR pump and had later been decontaminated. No actual contamination of these workers had occurre Following a 16-hour time jump in the scenario, TSC staff adequately demonstrated the capability to prepare a short-term, onsite plan of ,
action. Several TSC staff narticipated in a conference call with I EOF counterparts to discuss this plan and the offsite consequences l of the onsite event !
In addition to the Open Item, the following items should be )
considered for improvement: 1
- Offsite PARS and forecast meteorological information should be ;
posted on a TSC status board for reference by decisionmakers j at least until command and control of the licensee's emergency response has been transferred to the EO * Initiation of onsite assembly / accountability should not be unreasonably delayed to allow a relatively small number of emergency workers to first enter or leave the Protection Are * TSC staff should be kept adequately informed of all situations which adversely affect onsite manpower availability and which may also be of interest to EOF and Joint Public Information Center staff .
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c. . Operational Support Center (OSC) and Inplant Teams The OSC Director and OSC Supervisor generally exhibited good control of OSC activities. They showed good knowledge of their responsibilities and referred to relevant procedure Requirements for assessing the habitability of onsite emergency response facilities were known and appeared to be followe Planning for inplant team tasks began immediately after requests were received. However, teams were not always dispatched in a timely manner for various reasons. Many briefings were given to individual team members, instead of conducting one briefing for all team member This practice could lead to later confusio One example of such confusion was observe One inplant team was assigned two tasks at different location This team encountered a second team at the Radiation Protection Office that had left the OSC minutes before the first team. The Radiation Protection Technicians accompanying the teams became involved in a discussion on how the teams could most efficiently complete all their assignments. The OSC was eventually contacted to clarify the situation. Meanwhile, decisionmakers had revised the priorities of tasks assigned to the teams. Other factors edversely affecting the dispatch of teams from the OSC were: congestion around the facility's doorway; congestion around a status board utilized to track inplant team assignments; and temporary shortages of radiation protection technicians to accompany team Dedicated OSC communicators provided an excellent method for ensuring the ti'aely transfer of information between the CR, OSC, and TS However, as stated in Section 4b, the TSC was not informed by OSC staff of a simulated contamination / decontamination incident involving one inplant team. Flip charts were kept up to date with pertinent information on ansite condition The OSC Director supplemented his briefings by advising OSC staff to review recent information on flip chart sheets which were hung on the OSC's wall The sheets were difficult to read from the middle of the room where seats had been provided for technicians awaiting assignment. No OSC staff were observed to approach these sheets to get a closer view of their content Radiation protection technicians exhibited adequate knowledge of their responsibilities, and proper concern for ALARA when preplanning tasks and accompanying inplant teams. A form was utilized to document the departure and return times of each team and the simulated exposures received by individually listed team member However, a limitation of this form is the assumption that all team members will remain with the same team for the duration of the team's mission, which was not always apparent to the inspecto _ . . -
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Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program ,
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was acceptable; however the following items should be considered for .
improvement: !
- All members of an inplant team should be briefed as a group to ,
reduce the potential for confusion af ter leaving the OS ;
! * OSC supervision should increase efforts to reduce congestion
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around the facility's doorway and the status t'oards used to track team assignment l j * OSC supervision should make more complete. verbal briefings
! rather than placing greater reliance on having assembled technicians periodically review posted informatio * The method utilized to track inplant teams' exposures should be reevaluated to ensure that it adequately addresses I circumstances where personnel may not remain on a given team i for the duration of its mission.
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d. Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
] The SD and Corporate Nuclear Duty Officer conservatively decided to eativate the EOF roughly fifteen minutes before a Site Area
, t.mergency declaration was warranted due to deteriorating plant :
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conditions. Incoming personnel were briefed by the Manager of Emergency Operations (MEO) and were told to prepare to assume L j responsibilities from +. heir TSC counterparts at 11:30 p m. The '
orderly transfer of command and control from the 50 to the MEO a occurred at 11:45 a.m. , or about 68 minutes after the Site Area ,
- Emergency declaration. Due to an actual EOF radio equipment !
problem, the transfer of control of the Station's two offsite ,
] surveys teams to EOF staf f was delayed until about 12:20 !
1 Affected EOF staff maintained telephone contact with their TSC
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counterparts to keep informed of the teams' whereabouts until the ,
I radio equipment problem was correcte t The EOF can receive electrical power from two source The scenario :
postulated that both were available, but that the facility was receiving power from the secondary sourc Incoming personnel were ;
- informed of that fact but did not switch to the primary power suppl ;
a Therefore, controllers soon simulated the failure of the secondary
- power supply by turning off the lights. As the circuitry does not automatically switch from the secondary to the primary power supply, i a participant successfully demonstrated the capability to manually
, perform that power transfer. TSC staff were kept adequately ,
informed of this brief power supply problem, which was resolved >
while the EOF was still in the process of being activate i
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of plant status and of notifications, previously made by TSC staff to simulated State and NRC officials, through the use of status l boards and briefings. The ME0 and his aides recognized that onsite accountability had been completed for some time, but that
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l non-essential onsite personnel had not yet been evacuated. As no ;
hazards had been idertified to prevent this evacuation, the MEO-strongly advised the TSC's SD to comply with the Emergency Plan by ordering this simulated evacuation before conditions might deteriorate. The MEO and his staff adequately monitored the ,
progress of the simulated evacuation which was ordered at about 12:30 ,
i l At about 1:15 p.m., E0F staff were informed that five of their key
! supervisces had supposedly become incapacitated shortly after eating their lunches. EOF staff successfully demonstrated their capability to arrange for medical assistance and to appoint-qualified members of the remaining EOF staff to fill the vacant
, positions on an interim basis until repla ements would arrive. At the exit interview, the licensee indicated that five qualified replacements had actually been contacted by EOF staff and had been l asked to provide their estimated arrival times. While these events were taking place, the ME0 maintained command and control of the licensee's response efforts, as he still had appropriate staff per the Emergency Plan, and ensured that the TSC was kept advised of the situation. A revised EOF organizational roster was also transmitted to the TSC.
I EOF staff adequately interfaced with three NRC Site Team roleplayers l who arrived by noontime. The question was raised regarding the continued operation of the unaffected Unit 2. The matter was discussed with TSC staff, who did not recommend a shutdown due to l assumed power demands and the lack of indications of the samE l problems with Unit 2 as had been discovered for Unit 1. However, I the issue of continued Unit 2 operation was not resolved prior to the scenario time jump.
l Following the time jump, TSC and EOF staffs adequately interfaced to discuss a short term plan of action which was then telephoned to an Assistant Vice President. Given the updated status of onsite l
corrective actions following the time jump, the ME0 and SD correctly concluded that the situation should remain classified as a Site Area i Emergency and that no change in the latest offsite PAR was warrante Based on the above findingt, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptabl . .- -
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5. Exercise Scenario and Controller Actions (IP 82301)
Exercise objectives and the scenario package were submitted in accordance with the established schedule. The licensee was responsive to minor questions on the scenario that were rtised by the staf The scenario included several creative aspects that challenged the
participants. Although the scenario did not include a major radioactive release, dose assessment and protective action decisionmaking staffs had to contend with the variability of real-time meteorological conditions rather than the typical pre-scripted, fairly constant meteorological dat Prior to the exercise, two inplant team members were instructed to ignore the assembly siren, with the expectation that a search and rescue effort
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would then be initiated. However, a roving security patrol encountered
- these individuals and directed them to the OSC before a search and rescue
team was formed. The scenario also included a message that five key EOF staff had become incapacitated due to food poisoning. Scenario developers ,
successfully tested the abilities of other EOF staff to arrange for medical assistance while maintaining the fully operational status of the facilit F The unique aspect of this exercise was the use of seven roleplayers,
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including the Braidwood Station Manager and Corporate Nuclear Licensing Manager, to function as NRC Site Team representatives in the TSC and EO The roleplayers were not cognizant of scenario details prior to the *
exercise. Scenario planners had provided some training to the four TSC and threc' EOF roleplayers. On August 1, an inspector supplemented this . training py distributing copies of descriptions for a number of Site Team positions, responding to questions, and by relating some experience as a Site Tesm member. Several licensee representatives later indicated that i the use of roleplayers was challenging to TSC and EOF staffs and that ,
several areas for improvement had been self-identifie '
Between about 8:10 a.m. and 8:40 a.m., onshift CR staff responded to an l actual oroblem with Unit l's 1A feedwater pump. Exercise participants and controllers took appropriate measures to cvoid disrupting actions taken by onshift personnel. Exercise activities were resumed once the ;
operational problem had been resolve '
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An inspector observed several problems involving OSC controller On a
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few occasions, dispatch of an inplant team was briefly delayed until a
- . controller was available. One team displayed initial uncertainty about y the extent to which they were to simulate actions to obtain a liquid l
, sample from a RHR pump room. On another occasion, a technician was to :
a report to the CR before going near a RHR pump room where he was to
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describe how he would perform some task. The technician went to the CR ,
., where he remained for some minutes without continuing to the pump room
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improperly prompting players to take actions which might not otherwise have been taken,
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Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable; however, the following item should be considered for improve.aent:
i e Controllers should consistently enforce exercise ground rules l regarding the limits of simulation allowed to the participant . TMI Safejy Issues Management System (SIMS) Items l t
On October 31, 1980, the NRC issued NllREG-0737, which incorporated into !
one document all THI-related items approved for implementation by the Commission at that time. On December U,1982, the NRC issued
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i 1 Supplement I to NUREG-0737 to provide additional clarification regarding Regulatory Guide 1.97 (Revision 2) - Application to Emergency Response
. Facilities, Emergency Response Facilities, and Meteorological Datt, as 4 well as other areas. The status of the con.pletion of these TMI SIMS t i items are internally tracked by the NRC.
The below listing provides the status as of May 26, 1988 for each of the I
- SIMS items related to emergency preparednes In some cases the status i of items tracked by SIMS is incorrect and/or should be updated based on '
recent inspection findings. The "comments" portion of the listing- ,
indicates when the ctatus is incorrect and states what should be don .
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SIMS Status On
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II Not Listed This item should be added to the tracking system with a SIMS !
status of ope This item refers
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to implementation of Chapter 8 of f Supplement I to NUREG-0737 and [
sitould be closed upon completion ,
of the as yet unscheduled ERF ;
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Appraisa ;
! III.A. Not Listed This item should be added to SIMS [
j with a status of closed. This ,
item involved short term '
) improvements to the emergency preparedness program and was closed at the conclusion of the ;
, Implementation Appraisal: Reports l No. 50-456/86021(ORSS) and i
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No. 457/86019(DRSS) dated July 22, i 198 !
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III.A.1.2.1 Open (Unit 1) The SIMS status of this item is N/A (Unit 2) incorrect. It should be listed as closed. This item involved interim upgrades to the ERF's end was closed at the conclusion of the F2ergency Preparedness Implementation Appraisal: Reports No. 50-456/86021(DRSS) and No. 50-457/86019(ORSS) dated July 22, 198 III.A.1.2.2 Not Listed This item should be added to SIMS with a status of N/A, This item involved design criteria for upgraded ERF's, but was subsequently determined to be not applicable (N/A).
III.A.1.2.3 Not Listed This item should be added to SIMS with a status of close Because this item involved ERF modifications that were incorporated into MPA-F-63, 64 and 65, this item was closed at the conclusion of the Emergency Preparedness Implementation Appraisal: Reports No. 50-456/86021(DRSS) and No. 457/86019(DRSS) dated July 22, 198 III.A. Not Listed This item should be added to SIMS with a status of closed. This item involved the submittal of upgraded emergency plans. This item was closed with the March 1986
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issuance of a Supplement to the SER (NUREG-1002) which addressed emergency preparedness in Chapter 13.3, Eh.ergency Plannin III.A. Not Listed This item should be added to SIMS with a status of closed. This
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item involved the submittal of emergency procedures. This item was closed at the conclusion of the Emergency Preparedness
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Implementation Appraisal:
Reports No. 50-456/86021(ORSS)
and No. 50-457/86019(ORSS) dated July 22, 198 .. .
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Ikl.A.2.3 Not Listed This item should be added to SIMS !
with a status of closed. This !
item involved an acceptable interim meteorological progra l This item was closed at the t
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conclusion of the Emergency 'f
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Preparedness Implementation Appraisal: -Reports .
No.'50-456/86021(ORSS) and ,
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No. 50-457/86019(DRSS) dated
. July 22, 198 i III.A.2.4 Not Listed This item should be added to SIMS .
with a status of open. This item involves an acceptable final l
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meteorological program and should !
be closed upon completion of the ;
as yet unscheduled ERF Appraisa ;
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III.A.2.5 Not Listed This item should be added to SIMS ,
with a status of ope This item involves an acceptable Class A :
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meteorological model and should be !
closed upon completion of the as
. yet unscheduled ERF Appraisa ,
! III.A.2.6 Not Listed This item should be added to SIMS l with a status of open. This item i 1 involves a licensee's review of I
theit Class A meteorological model
and should be closed upon j completion of the as yet i unscheduled ERF Appraisal.
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III.A.2.7 Not Listed This item should be added to SIMS !
with a status of not applicable !
(N/A). This item required the :
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licensee to orovide a description
- of the Class B meteorological i model to the NR Based on the !
current structure of the ERF t j Appraisal program, the NRC is not '
reviewing these submittals of the i
, Class B mode I
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III.A.2.8 Not Listed This item should be added to SIMS with a status of open. This item
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- meteorological model and should i l be closed upon completion of the '
i as yet unscheduled ERF Appraisa !
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MPA-F-63 Not Listed This item should be added to SIMS l
with a status of open. This item l involves a review of the TSC during the ERF Appraisal and should be closed upon completion of the as yet unscheduled ERF Appraisa .
MPF-F-64 Not Listed This item should be added to SIMS with a status of closed. Thia item involved a review of the i OSC, which was completed during l the March 18, 1987 exercise:
Reports No. 50-456/87006(DR$5)
I and No. 457/87005(ORSS) dated
, April 7, 198 ;
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MPA-F-65 Not Listed This item should be added to SIMS with a status of ope This item l involves a review of the EOF
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during the ERF Appraisal and ,
l should be closed upon completion l of the as yet unscheduled ERF ,
l Appraisal.
I MPA-F-66 Not Listed This item should be added to SIMS I with a status of not applicable I (N/A). This item involved the i Nuclear Data Link, which has been .'
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Response Data System (ERDS). Exit Interview On August 3, 1988, the inspectors met with those licensee representatives !
identified in Section 1 to present their preliminary inspection !
findings. The licensee shared the inspectors' concern regarding the i I inadequate onsite accountability demonstration and untimely decision to i l evacuate non-essential onsite personnel. The licensee indicated that
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corrective measures were already being discussed, and that Region III l staff would be invited to observe s 1988 onsite assembly / accountability
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drill intended to demonstrate the adaquacy of corrective measures to be taken. The licensee also agreed to consider other items discussed, and .
I indicated thit nothing discussed was proprietary in natur Attachments: Exercise Scope and Objectives Exercise Narrative j Summary l
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- E2AIDWOOD NUCIJAE POWER STATION CSEP EXERCISE August 2, 1988
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SCOPE OF PARTICLEAIl0E The August 2, 19s8 Braidwood GSEP Exercise is a daytime event to test the capability of the basic elements within the Conuconvealth Edison Company CSEP. The Exarcise vill include mobilization of CECO personnel and resources adequare to verify their capability to respond to a simulated emergenc The Exercise is a Ceco only event thus there vill be no involvement required by local and State agencie Commonwealth Edison vill participate in the Braidwood Exercise by activating the on-site emergency response organization and the Emergency Operations Tacility (E0T), as appropriate, subject to limitations that may become necessary to provide for safe, efficient operation of the Braidwood Station and other nuclear generating stations. The Corporate Conunand Center and Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) vill not be activated for this Exercis Personnel for the TSC and other on-site participants will be on-site at Braidwood by 0700, the start of the Exercise. The Exercise shift will receive the initial scenario information and respond accordingl The "Exercise" Nuclear Duty Person vill be notified of siuulated events as appropriate on a real-time basis. The "Exercise" Nuclear Duty Person and the balance of the recovr y group will be prepositioned close to
' the Mazon EOF to permit use of personr.11 from distant location Ccanonwealth Edison vill dent + strate the capability to make contact with contractors whose assistance would be required by the simulated accident situation, but will not actually incer the expense of using contractor services to simulate emergency response except as prearranged specifically for the Exercis Commonwealth Edison vill arrange to provide actual transportation and communication support in accordance with existing agreements to the extent specifically prearranged for the Exercise. Commonwealth Edison will l provide unforeseen actual assistance only to the extent that the resources
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BRAIDWOOD NUCLEAR POWER STATION
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1988 GSEP EXERCISE Auggat __ 2. 1988 QBJICTIVES PR? MARY OMECTIVE1 Demotatrat e the capability to implement the Comunonwealth Edison Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP) to protect the public in the event of a aajor accident at the Braidwood Nuclear Powe? Statio Demonstrate this capability during the hours to qualify as a daytime
" Exercise in accordance with NRC guideline SUPPORTING OBJECTIVIS1 ,
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Incident Assessment and Cla1gification the capability to assess the accident Demonstrate conditions, to determine which Emergency Action Level (EAL)
level has been reached and to classify the accident correctly in accordance with GSE (CR, TSC)
2) Notification and Communication Demonstrate the capability to notify the principal offsite organizations within fif teen (15) minutes of declaring an accident classificatio ,
- (CR, TSC) Demonstrate the capability to notify the Ntc within one (1)
hour of the initial inciden (CR)
the capability to contact pertinent Demonstrat e
' organizations that wouli normally assist in an (e.g., emergency, INP0, but are not participating in this Exercise Murrary & Trettel, General Electric, etc.) I
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the ability to provide follow-up Demonstrate
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information/ updates to the State and NRC in a timely and
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ongoing manner.
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- (TSC,10P) ; Demonstrate the ability to maintain an open-line of l J
communication with the Ntc upon reques (CR, TSC, EOF) l
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Aunust 2. 1988
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OBJECTIVEft (cont'd)
3) Radiolonical Assessmenti l Demonstrate the ability to collect plant radiological survey information, document and trend this information and make appropriate recommendations concernina protective actions for personne (OSC, TSC, E0T) Demonstrate the capability of the Operations Support Center to implement proper Health Physics practices and disimetry issuance for OSC personnel and Maintenance Teams dispatched to radiological areas in-plan ,
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- (OSC) i i Demonstrate the capability of the Operations Support Center to implement proper contamination control provision l
- (OSC) Demonstrate the capability of the Operations Support Center to track and document personnel exposures for OSC personnel and Maintenance Teams dispatched from the OS (0SC) Demonstrate the capability of Environmental Tie).d Teams to condvet field radiation survey (OSC) l Demonstrate the capability to calculate offsitc dose projection (TSC, E0T)
the ability to make Protective Action 4 Demonstrate Recommendation (CR, TSC, E0T) \ Demonstrate the ability of Maintenance Teams to provide a briefins on job status during turnover of an incomplete jo l
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11Ll_.GlIP EXEFCllI August 2. 1981
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Q1JECTIVES (cont'd)
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4) gagnmer Facilitign Demosot rat e the capability to activate the emergency organization and staf f the Emergency Response Facilities in secordance with procedures during the daytim (CR, OSC, TSC and E0F) Desonstrate the capability to record and track major plant statue information relative to changing plant axercise I everts using plant status board (CR, OSC, TSC and EOF) Demonstrate the capability to tra:k and doctment, on status boards and logs, dispatched Operations and Maintenance Team i
activities and in-plant job statune (TSC, OSC)
, Emergener Direction and Contro a, Demonstrate the ability of the CSEP organization to manage and direct a staulated emergency Yatercis (CR, TSC, OSC, EOF) Deeenstrate the ability of the Directors to manage their energency response facilities in the implementation of GSE (CR, CSC, TSC, 30F) Demonstrate the ability to coordinate and prioritise
Maistenance and Operating activities during abnormal and energency plant operatio (CR, OSC) Demonstrate / simulate the ability to requisition, acquire i and transport emergency equipment and supplies necessary to j
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mitigate or control unsafe or abnormal plant condition l
- (CR, TSC, EOF) Deesmet rat e the capability to assemble and account for
' on-ette personne (TSC) Deesestrat e the abil,ity of the OSC Director, or designee, to conduct period {c briefings of OSC staf l - (esc)
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0_BJECTIVE1 (cont'd)
4) Agcovery Demonstrate the capability of the emargency response organization to identify the requirements, criteria and implementing procedures for recover (Tsc, 20r)
- Demonstrate the capability to identify work priorities, procedures and programs which would be required to return
the plant to a normal operating status.
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f CR = Control Room
TSC = Technical Support Center ,
OSC = Operations Support Center (including Environmental Field Teama.)
EOF = Emergency 0,;arations racility
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' _1988 GSEP EXERCIS_I BAE)tATIVE SUM 1ARY INITIAL CONDITIONS:
10700 - 0900)
Unit 1 is at 100% pcwer. Leak rate calculations indicate a/.Theleak, primary to secondary leak on the 1C S/G of approximately 57.6 g when first discovered en July 7 was 3 gals. per day and has increased to its present value. The 1A RH Ptenp is Out of Service with Maintenance working on the impeller key which was determined to be an unqualified part. The last shif t performed the monthly D/G During the surveillance, the la D/G surveillance on 1A D/ inadvertentJy tripped and could not be restarted. The 1A D/G was declared inoperable and Tech Staff was troubleshooting the cause of the trip. The steam dusp system is inoperable due to a failure of the Dipulse pressure c.hannel PT 505, which required the steam dumps to be placed in manual steam pressure mode with 0% deman ,
Unit 2 is at 50% power and has been there for 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> to allow for f physics testing and power range calibration. Fuel Handlers are in j
j the process of performinf, Fire Protection Surveillance on the MPT, UAT and SAT Deluge Systent It is determined by Westinghouse that the unqualified impeller Tech Staf!
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the 1A REP Pump is the same type as in the IB RER Pum has been directed by station management. to perform an operability run. The 15 RHR Pump la started, runs for 10 seconds with high L vibration and the shaft locks. The IB RHR Pump trips on phase over current and is declared inoperabl ,
Large TF inputs are causing water inventory problems for radwasta operations. The "A" TF tank is full, on recire and is awaiting the isotopic results from Rad / Chem prior to it being peped to the Fire and 011 Sus The "B" TF tank is at 60% level. Since both release tanks are full, Rad /Chen has been asked to expedite the isotopic sampling on the "A" TF Tank. Auxiliary Building water inputs are norma l l
ArnT CONDITIONS: (0900 - 1020)
EAL #12a - Complete loss of any functions needed to maintain cold shutdowa (both RH trains)
QE EAL #14a - Equipment described in the Tech Staff is degraded beyond the LCO chich requires a shutdown hs 0025B/1/wja BRAIDWOOD GSEP 8-2-88
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ALERT CONDITIONS: (0900 - 1010L(cont'd)
Work is completed en 1A RHR Pump 20 uinutes, ef ter IB RER Pump to run. Upon starting 1A RHR Pump, the ptusp's mechanical seal fail All personnel in the 1A RHR Pump Room are sprayed with water from the face down and are contaminated. The individuals in the room alarm A personnel Friskers and Rad Chem must decon*aminate the worker The water large leak occurs which cannot be stopped by the shif from the 1A RER Ptamp flows through the floor drain system t.o the floor drain stamp. The floor drain sump pumps are inoperable so the spill flows over through an unclosable water tight door into the Sx pump room into the S. :oom sum The Sx sump pumps flow into the IB TF Tank (Turbine Building Floor Drain Tank) which auto-isolates at 851. The 5x sump pumps then deadhead and the water level rises in the Sx pump roo The Tech Staff has diagnosed the problem on the 1A D/G to be a bad solenoid in the test mode trip solenoid valve. Electrical Maintenance Department checks and verifies this to be a grounded solenoi Work reconnences on the IB RH Pump. The workera reach their exposure limits and must conduct a job turnover with a replacement crew. If the Shif t Engineer raises the limits, the two workers become ill and have to be relieve A failure in the turbine DEHC control circuitry malfunctions causing a turbine runback. Turbine megawatts drop to 875 MWe. With the steam dumps inoperable, steamline pressure climbs to 1172 psig. All S/G atmospheric reliefs (P0kVs) open. 1C PORY sticks full open when the other PORVs close. The transient causes the leaking tube in the
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1C S/G to rupture resulting in a primary to secondary leak rate at approximately 700 sp SITE EMERCINCY: (1020 - 1345)
IAL #19 - Tube rupture is beyond the capability of the charging ptasp Two Tech Staff personnci performing a visual inspection of the 1A Turbine Building floor drain tank pump discharge check valve do not hear the assembly siren and stay in position causing a search / rescue team to be deploye The reactor trips on OT-Delta-T trip followed by a low pressurizer pressure safety injection (SI). BWEP-0 is entered (reactor trip /SI procedere).
RCS is depressurized per BWEP-3 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture Procedure) and pressure equalized to minimize the primary to secondary flow. Dackfill is started per BWEP ES 31. Ten sinutes ,
after the 15 D/G autostarts on the SI signal, the 10L cylinder rocker arm fail During activaties of the EOF, the power is found to be fed from the secondary power sourc If left this way, a power loss will occu IDF Staff most switch power back to the operable non-power seeking primary feed in oeder to get power bac ,
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At 1130, an ND' Site Team reporto to the TSC to determine the natura
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of the problet. and provide assistance. A team also arrives at the
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EO During this time, Radwaste must decide what to do with the contaminated water in the TF tanks. Options include release,-
dilution via transfer to other tanks and processing / release of other tanks to make volume availabl At 1230, five members of the EOF Staf f became ill fron food poisoning. Long-term and short-term replacements and job allocation must be demonstrate RECOVERY: (1345 - 1530)
TSC and EOF personnel must access plant conditions to see if a declaration of recovery is appropriate. Upper management has requested a briefing on plant conditions for the Board ot Directors meeting this afternoo Long and Short term plans will be compile .
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