ML20126H019

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Summary of 841019 Meeting W/Util Re Seismic Design Capability.Related Info Encl
ML20126H019
Person / Time
Site: San Onofre Southern California Edison icon.png
Issue date: 10/22/1984
From: Joseph Austin
NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
To:
NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
Shared Package
ML20126G811 List:
References
FOIA-84-885 NUDOCS 8506180215
Download: ML20126H019 (15)


Text

' # UNITED STATES l

  1. o g '

8 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

> $ CASHIN^; TON.C.C. 20666 f

-  %,,,,,/ October 22, 1984 CFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER MEMORANDUM FOR: Files FROFj: ohn Austin, Technical Assistant Patricia Davis, Legal Assistant Office of Comissioner Asselstine

SUBJECT:

MEETING ABOUT SAN ONOFRE 1 On October 19, 1984, Pat Davis and John Austin of Comissioner Asselstine's office met with Ken Baskin, Don Craven and Dave Piggott representing Southern California Edison Company (SCE) to discuss the seismic design capability of San Onofre 1. SCE indicated that in the May-June 1982 timeframe questions were raised by NRC staff about the capability of San Onofre 1 to withstand the original seismic design basis (0.5g) for the unit. The staff concerns arose from the preliminary results of a reanalysis of the plant using an assumed 0.67g acceleration. The staff evidently felt that the calculated stresses from the 0.67g value were so high that the ability of the plant to withstand a 0.59 acceleration was drawn into question.

SCE attempted a " generic" approach to resolving staff's concerns.

The approach consisted of looking at similar industrial facilities, designed in the same timeframe, which have experienced the effects of significant earthquakes. SCE and its consultants found that such facilities could withstand substantial accelerations even though earthquakes were not explicitly considered in the design.

SCE also performed an analysis on San Onofre 1 as-built, and as modified since 1982. SCE and its consultants analyzed, with a 0.5g input, about 1/3 of the large piping runs, all of the small piping runs, and most (about 90 percent) of the safety equipment. The large pipes analyzed were selected to be those 10 pipe runs which had been previously (i.e.1982) detemined to be the highest stressed pipes, and 3 other large pipe runs. The methods used were the same techniques that the NRC staff had approved in February 1984 for use in the 0.67g reanalysis, and are more sophisticated than those used in 1982. SCE found that all calculated stresses were within allowable limits.

The SCE position is that the ECCS and other necessary safety systems can withstand the effects of a 0.5g acceleration. The salt water in-take structure is qualified for at least that value also. SCE is not aware of any residual NRC staff concern about the capability of San Onofre 1 to withstand the effects of a 0.5g acceleration. SCE believes that the NRC staff will document its conclusions about the status of the seismic resistance of San Onofre 1 sometime during the week of October 22. ,

8506100215 B50326 PDR FOIA BELL 84-885 PDR i

V SAN ONOFRE UNIT 1 i[ '

STATUS 10/29/84 INFORMATION DUE REFERENCE

1. COMPLETION OF RETURN TO SERVICE PLAN LTR. CRUTCHFIELD A. CERTIFICATION PLAN COMPLETE TO BASKIN 10/19/84 B. DETERMINATION FAILURES IN NON-UPGRADED SYSTEMS WILL NOT PREVENT HOT STANDBY C. CONFIRMATION OF MASONRY WALL AS-BUILT CONFIGURATION (RECEIVED 10/29/84)

D. CONFIRMATION OF ANALYSIS QA/0C FOR 0.67G UPGRADES E. DETERMINISTIC BASIS FOR RESTART -

(IN J0/17/84 SCE LTR.)

2. REPORT DESCRIPTION OF 0.5G EVALUATION TELECONS GRIMES k TO BASKIN 10/24 AND 10/25/84
3. TDI - EVALUATION OF CRANKSHAFT CRACKING LTR. CRUTCHFIELD (REPORT RECEIVED 10/29/84 - COMPLETENESS TO BASKIN 9/18/84 NOT YET VERIFIED) AND MTG 10/22/84
4. REACTOR TRIP BREAKER TEST RESULTS GENERIC LTR 83-28 EVALUATION TO REGION V
5. ENVIRONMENTAL QUA'LIFICATION AUDIT REVIEW 10/02 JC0 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THRU 10/04/84 AND MTG. 10/26/84 c/t

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INFORMATION DUE REFERENCE 6.* MASONRY WALLS - SUPPORTING INFORMATION MTG. 09/05/84 7;* RESUBMIT "0VERPRESSURE MITIGATION SYSTEM" TELECON MCKENHA PROPOSED TECH SPECS TO PAINSBERRY 07/17/84

- 8,* REVISION TO LIMITING OVERTIME TECH SPEC LTR. PAULSON TO

~ ~

BASKIN'09/05/84 9.* SEP INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT - MTG. 07/10/84 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND UPDATE 10.* APPENDIX J TECH SPEC REVIEW TELECON MCKENNA TO SUPPORTING INFORMATION RAINSBERRY 06/29/84 11.* ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION REVIEW - LTR. CRUTCHFIELD TO SUPPORTING INFORMATION BASKIN 05/09/84

, 12.* ORGANIZATION TECH SPEC - LTR, PAULSON TO SUPPORTING INFORMATION BASKIN 09/07/84

  • NOT REQUIRED FOR RESTART EVALUATION A FEW REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ARE CURRENTLY BEING PREPARED IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER ONGOING REVIEWS WHICH SHOULD NOT AFFECT RESTART.
  • N

SAN ONOFRE UNIT 1 i STATUS 11/6/84 INFORMATION REQUESTED SUBMITTAL

1. COMPLETION OF RETURN TO SERVICE PLAN A. CERTIFICATION PLAN COMPLETE LETTER DATED 11/3/84 B. DETERMINATION FAILURES IN NON- LETTER DATED 11/3/84 UPGRADED SYSTEMS WILL NOT PREVENT HOT STANDBY C. CONFIRMATION OF MASONRY WALL LETTER DATED 10/27/84 AS-BUILT CONFIGURATION D. CONFIRMATION OF ANALYSIS QA/0C LETTER DATED 11/3/84 FOR 0.679 UPGRADES E. DETERMINISTIC BASIS FOR RESTART LETTER DATED 10/17/84
2. REPORT DESCRIPTION OF 0.59 EVALUATION LETTER DATED 11/3/84
3. TDI-$vALUATIONOFCRANKSHAFTCRACKING LETTER DATED 10/26/84
4. REACTOR IRIP BREAKER IEST fiESULTS RTB TESTS AND INSPEC-TO REGION V TIONS-ARE CC'MPLETE)

RESIDENT INSPECTOR REVIEW IS COMPLETE

5. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION - JC0'S LETTER DATED 11/3/84 i

I

SAN ON0FRE UNIT 1

'( ITEMS REQUIRING COMPLETION OF LICENSEE ACTIONS PRIOR TO MODE 2 ENTRY REGION V ISSUES

1) ,

0PERATOR TRAINING ON DESIGN CHANGES

2) CALIBRATION OF STACK MONITORS
3) OPERATIONAL RADIATIONAL MONITORING SYSTEM (ORMS)

SATURATION /DOWNSCALE FAILURES - PROCEDURES

4) CALCULATIONAL TECHNIQUES FOR CORRECTING MAIN STEAM LINE MONITOR READING FOR SHIELDING
5) INCORPORATION OF PLANT VENT MONITOR CONVERSION FACTOR CHANGES WITH VENT FAN CHANGES

I AUDIT REVIEW 0F RETURN TO SERVICE PROGRAM

~

(

FOR HOT STANDBY SYSTEMS 7/26-8/1/84

  • CRITERIA (NRC LETTER DATED 9/20/82 AND 2/8/84) . .[-

- EVALUATION OF RETURN TO SERVICE CRITERIA  ? 4. -

- SEP GUIDELINES FOR SEISMIC EVALUATION CRITERIA .

- PEAK SHIFTING 0F INPUT FLOOR RESPONSE SPECTRA - AS ,

RECOP. MENDED BY PVRC .

- DAPPING RECOMMENDED BY PVRC

- STRESS LIMITS FOR PIPING FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY

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2.0SY FOR CARBON STEEL [~

2,2SY FOR STAINLESS STEEL 4 7, ,,

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- SHORT TERM ANCHOR BOLT ALLOWABLES AS REQUIRED BY IEB 79-02 .  :>. .

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WEDGE TYPE 0,5 ULTIMATE AS SPECIFIED BY MANLFACTURER - -

SHELL TYPE a;f

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  • SYSTEMS REVIEWED

- FIVE PIPING SYSTEMS AUDITED AND INSPECTED (AF-02, CV-11, MS-01, ..

RC-102/CV-100/CV-101, AND RC-115)

- ASSOCIATED SUPPORTS AUDITED AND INSPECTED (136 TOTAL)

- THREE MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ITEMS INSPECTED (AXU. FEEDWATER TURBINE DRIVEN PUMP G-]O, SEAL WATER Hx E-34, CHANGING PUMP G-8A8B)

  • CCNCLUSION

- CRITERIA USED PET RE0VIREMENTS

- SUPPORTS OF PIPING AND EQUIPMENT PROPERLY INSTALLED

- SE!SMIC FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY REASONABLY DEMONSTRATED m v

. SAN ONOFRE 1

\

SEISMIC DESIGN BASIS s

CP 3/64 (SER 11/1/63)

PROBABLE LARGEST GROUND ACCELERATION - 0.17G MAXIMUM GROUND ACCELERATION .0.40G 0.25G + WORKING STRESS

. CODE-0.5G + COMBINED STRESS - FUNCTION t

OL 3/67 (SER 10/12/66) i~

DISTINGUISH CATEGORY A AND B CATEGORY A - REFERS TO CP BASIS L

CATEGORY B - 0,2G STATIC i

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AUDIT REVIEW 0F ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEMS

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PERFORMED ON 11/14-15/84

  • CRITERIA

- SAME AS FOR HOT STANDBY SYSTEMS

- FSAR DESIGN BASIS GROUND' MOTION, I.E. , 0.5G HOUSNER SPECTRUF

- AWWA CRITERIA FOR CAST IRON PIPING

  • SYSTEMS

- FOUR PIPING SYSTEMS AUDITED (AC-05, MW-05, AC-23, AND SW-06)

- SUPPORTS AUDITED (69 TOTAL)'

  • COMPONENTS

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- COMP 0NE'NT COOLING WATER PUMP G-15A, B, C \

- RECIRCULATION HEAT EXCHANGER E-1 ( N .

- REFUELING WATER ST0' RAGE TANK l

  • CONCLUSIONS l

- CRITERIA USED MET REQUIREMENTS

- SEISMIC FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY REASONABLY DEMONSTRATED

- RWST AND CAST-IRON PIPE HAVE NO APPRECIABLE MARGIN AT 0.5G

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'( SAN ON0FRE UNIT 1 SEISMIC DESIGN 1967 DPR 0.25g CODE AND 0.5g FUNCTION 1976 MAJOR UPGRADES TO 0.679 1978 START SEP 11/79 TO 7/81 2.206 PETITIONS - 1560 CALIFORNIANS AND NADER 11/16/81 DIRECTOR'S DENI AL AND SER

( 2/27/82 SCHEDULED SHUTDOWN COMMENCES 5/20/82 SCE/NRC MTG, - DEMONSTRATE MEET 0.5g DESIGN BASIS 8/11/82 CONFIRMATORY ORDER - COMPLETE ALL 6/15/82

& 6/24/82 COMMITMENTS BEFORE RESTART 12/23/83 SCE PROPOSAL FOR HOT STANDBY SCOPE FOR RESTART 2/3/84 RESTART SER 8/30/84 SCE REQUEST FOR AUTHORIZATION To RESTART

-> SONGS SEISMIC DESIGN STATUS l

l UPGRADES TO 0.679 COMPLETE BY RESTART l e ALL SAFETY-RELATED STRUCTURES e REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM TO ISOLATION VALVES, INCLUDING MAIN STEAM AND FEEDWATER LINES e CONTROL ROD DRIVES e AFWS AND CVCS e ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION & INSTRUMENT AIR NOT COMP.LETE e RHR AND PORTIONS OF SERVICE / COOLING WATER e SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM AND RECIRCULATION e CONTAINMENT SPRAY e SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING l

l

E l STATUS AND SCHEDULE i

e HOT STANDBY CAPABILITY COMPLETE BEFORE RESTART e FINAL RESOLUTION OF SEISMIC IN SEP e HOT FUNCTIONAL TEST IN OCTOBER - FOLLOWING INTAKE STRUCTURE REPAIRS AND TDI INSPECTIONS e PLANT CRITICALITY SCHEDULED FOR NOVEMBER a

1 I

l

CHRONOLOGY - SONGS 1 SEISMIC DESIGN

\

3/27/67 DPR-13: FSAR 9.4, 0.25g Code and 0.5g Function 1973 SCE initiates 0.679 re-evaluation '

l 1976 Major upgrades to 0.679 - containment shield building, new i . diesels and various NSSS l 1978 Initiate SEP - scope includes shutdown systems, mitigation systems and B0P 12/20/79 44 FR 75535 Notice l'1/79 to 7/81 2.206 Petitions - 1560 Californians and Nader 4/28/80 SCE's JC0 - seismic capability i

, 8/4/80 & NRC 50.54f - seismic capability 4/24/81 9/80-1.0/81 SCE submittals - seismic scope and criteria 11/16/81 2.206 Director's denial and.SER: turbine building and FW heater mods complete by 1/1/83

( 12/81 ' Preliminary analysis results and SCE comitment to notify NRC when structural integrity cannot be demonstrated 2/27/82 Scheduled shutdown - ste'am generator inspection and seismic mods 5/6/82 Russell memo - analyses predict structurai (systems) failures 5/20/82 SCE/NRC meeting " licensees need(ed) to provide information that demonstrates that the facility meets its licensed design basis [0.5g] before . . . restart" 6/15/82 & SCE program to upgrade essentially all safety-related systems 6/24/82 and structures to 0.679 8/11/82 Confirmatory Order " maintain. . . shutdown condition until modifications . . . are completed and NRC approval is obtained for restart."

., 7/13/83 Clarification to 01 - the issue involves a " judgment rather than complete reanalysis" 11/21/83 SCE response to 12/29/82 Russell memo

-12/23/83 SCE proposal for restart scope and criteria

, 2/8/84 & SER 'for restart scope - hot standby scope and criteria 3/7/84 acceptable with exceptions 8/30/84' SCE request for authorization to restart

ENCLOSURE (1) TO APRfL 24,1981 50.54f LETTER i '-

SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS, STRUCTURES AND COMP 0NENTS SAN ON0FRE 1 PLANT "The scope of review for the seismic re-evaluation program should include the systems, structures, and components (including emergency power supply and distribution, instrumentation, and actuation systems, with the following i

functions:

i

1. The reactor coolant pressure boundary as well as the core and vessel
internals. This should also include those portions of the steam and feedwater system extending from and including the secondary side of the steam generator up to and including the outermost containment isolation

. valve and connected piping of 2-1/2 inch or larger nominal pipe size, up to and including the first valve that is either normally closed or is capable of automatic closure during all modes of normal reactor operation.

2. Systems or portions of systems that are required for safe shutdown as identified in the SEP safe shutdown review (SEP Topic VII-3). The system boundary includes those portions of the system required to perform the safety function and connected piping up to and including the first valve that is either normally closed or capable of automatic closure when the safety function is required.
3. Systems or portions of systems that are required to mitigate design basis events, i.e., accidents and trans *ents (SEP Topics XV-1 to XV-24). The i functions to be provided include emergency core cooling, post-accident N

containment heat removal, post-accident containment atmosphere cleanup, as well as support systems, such as cooling water, needed for proper

functioning of these systems.
4. Systems and structures required for fuel storage (SEP Topic IX-1).

Integrity of the spent fuel pool structure including the racks is needed.

Failure of the liner plate due to the safe shutdown earthquake must not result in significant radiological releases, or in loss of ability to keep the fuel covered. Failure of cooling water systems or other systems connected to the pool should not permit draining of the fuel pool. Means to supply makeup to the pool as needed must be provided.

5. Structures that house the above equipment.

For the San Onofre 1 plant, the staff considers the following systems. and.

associated structures, and components should be addressed:"

4 A

-.. . . ~ . , - . . . _ . ._.m-. z..-,.-. . . . , , -- - , _ . , . - - . _ _ . . , . _ _ . -

. Systems and Compon;nts System Status of Modifications Spectra a) Reactor Coolant System Complete =/

( b) Portions of Main Steam System a Complete 0.679 Housner 0.679 Housner (restart) c) Portions of Main Feedwater. < Complete 0.679 Housner (restart)

System d) Portions of Systems directly Complete 0.679 Housner (restart) connected to the RCS up to and including isolation valve

, e)_ Control Rod Drive Complete 0.67g Housner f) Auxiliary Feedwater System

h) Portions of Chemical and e Complete 0.679 Housner(restart)

Volume Control System

1) Portions of Component Cooling -------- --------

Water System j) Portions of Salt Water -------- --------

Cooling System k) Portions of Service /Miscel- -------- --------

laneous Water System

1) Portions of Instrunent Air Nitrogen bottles 0.67g Housner(restart)

System provided for required components m) Safety Injection System -------- --------

n)' Containment Spray System -------- - --------

o) ECCS Recirculation System ------- - --------

p) Spent fuel pool cooling -------- --------

f q) Electrical Distribution < Complete 0.67g Housner g System ,

\

b itid intpcd :CO Structures Structure Status of Modifications Spectra Conta'inment Complete / 0.67g Housner t

Reactor Auxiliary Building Completei 0.67g Housner Control / Administration Complete / 0.67g Housner Building Fuel Storage Building Complete 3 0.679 Housner

.. (including pool)

Ventilation Equipment Complete 0.67g Housner Cuilding Turbine Building Complete / 0.679 Housner Intake Structure Modifications underway to resolve rebar corrosion 0.67g riousner Sphere Enclosure Building --------

g

., 0.679 SONGS 2/3 L ,

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Diesel Generator Building --------

0.679 SONGS 2/3 CM v x._U p_c.i_. s y

_ _ __