ML20140G974
| ML20140G974 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 03/21/1997 |
| From: | WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20140G761 | List:
|
| References | |
| ORT-10A, NUDOCS 9705120273 | |
| Download: ML20140G974 (200) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:._. - __ . NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT ORT 10A OPERATIONS REFUELING TESTS MAJOR Revision 0
. RECOVERY FROM INTEGRATED LEAK RATE TEST March 21,1997 WITH CORE OFF-LOADED UNIT 2 RECORD PROCEDURE VERIFIED CURRENT AND CilLCKLD FOR TEMPORARY CIIANGrS IF FIELD COPIES REQolRLD, USL PDF-0026i 1AW NP 12.4 AND DO M COMPl.ETE THIS DLOCK.
BY: DATE: 1.0 PURPOSE To return the containment and systems affected by the integrated leak rate test to a normal refueling shutdown alignment with the core off-loaded.
2.0 REFERENCES
2.1 CL lE, Containment Closure Checklist 2.2 IR 96-006, NRC Inspector Report, NRC Commitment for Operations procedures ] PMT/QC reviews. j 2.3 ICP 10.13, Routine Maintenance Procedure; Containment Leak Rate Test Preparation 2A PBF-9033b, Unit 2 Electrical Penetrations 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 3.1 The PRT and RCDT have been exposed to containment atmosphere and must rema'in isolated from the vent header until properly purged and backfilled with nitrogen. 3.2 Recovery of components / systems involving radioactive or toxic liquids shall be in accordance with approved Health Physics practices and procedures. INITIALS I 4.0 INITI AL CONDITIONS 4.1 The RCS is depressurized and drained to 3/4" pipe. l 4.2 All containment isolation valves are shut, except 21A-3047,2IA-3048, j 2RM-3200A, B, & C, and purge supply and exhaust valves as required. 4.3 Containment pressure is at atmospheric pressure with the purge supply and l exhaust system in operation. 4.4 Permission to Recover from ILRT The conditions required by this procedure are consistent with required plant conditions, including equipment operability. Permission is granted to recover from ILRT. DSS Time Date 9705120273 970505 Page 1 of 10 REFERFNCE USE PDR ADOCK 05000301-P PDR ,,
NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT ORT 10A . OPERATIONS REFUELING TESTS MAJOR Revision 0 . l March 21,1997
- RECOVERY FROM INTEGRATED LEAK RATE TEST i WITIf CORE OFF-LOADED l UNIT 2 INITIALS 5.0 PROCEDURE NOTE
- Sequentialperfortnance ofSteps 5.1 through 5.11 in this procedure section is not required. Substeps within the underlined steps MUST befollowedin sequence.
5.1 Recover the Service Air System To Containment: l 5.1.1 VERIFY 2SA-15 shut AND service air line between 2SA-15 and containment depressurized. 5.1.2 SilUT 2SA-28. l 5.1.3 REMOVE the ILRT depressurization valve, spoolpiece and hose from the test connection located between 2SA-15 and 17, and the PAB exhaust duct per a Maintenance WO. ! 5.1.4 INSTALL the blind flange on the service air test connection and cap PAB exhaust duct test connection per a Maintenance WO. 5.1.5 INSTALL blank flange at 2SA-28 per a Maintenance WO. PMT 5.1.6 ALIGN service air to containment AND LEAK CIIECK the service air header test connection flange. ; 5.1.7 REMOVE AND STORE duplex air filter from containment per a Maintenance WO. 5.1.8 REMOVE electrical service to rented air dryer connected at 2PR-01 (supplied by 28-11) per a Maintenance WO. 5.1.9 DISCONNECT rented ILRT service air compressors AND
; PREPARE for shipping per a Maintenance WO.
l l 5.1.10 DISCONNECT ILRT verification panel at penetrations P31a, l I P31b, and P31c. Page 2 of 10 REFERENCE USE
NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT ORT 10A OPERATIONS REFUELING TESTS MAJOR Revision 0 March 21,1997 RECOVERY FROM INTEGRATED LEAK RATE TEST WITil CORE OFF-LOADED UNIT 2 INITIALS 5.1.11 SIIUT AND CAP the ILRT connections:
- a. 21'2 V-6 and 2H2 V b. 21I 2V-11.
- c. Cap only at P31a test connection.
5.2 Containment Cylinders: 5.2.1 RETURN fire extinguishers to containment as necessary. 5.2.2 RETURN N 2and helium cylinders to containment AND RECONNECT:
- a. N 2cylinder for 2RC-430 PORV.
- b. N cylinder 2 for 2RC-431C PORV.
- c. N cylinder 2
for 2RC-431 A&B spray valves.
- d. Helium cylinder for flux mapping system.
5.2.3 VERIFY no leakage at bottle connections by momentarily cutting in the bottle and snoop fittings:
- a. N 2cylinder for 2RC-430 PORV.
- b. N cylinder 2 for 2RC-431C PORV.
- c. N 2cylinder for 2RC-431 A&B spray valves.
- d. Helium cylinder for flux mapping system.
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Page 3 of10 REFERENCE USE j l
NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UhlT ORT 10A - OPERATIONS REFUELING TESTS MAJOR Revision 0 - I RECOVERY FROM INTEGRATED LEAK RATE TEST March 21,1997 WITII CORE OFF-LOADED UNIT 2 ' INITIALS 5.3 REMOVE Test Gauces. 5.3.1 SIIUT IA-1316 Unit 2 containment instrument air header depressurization AND REMOVE gauge. 5.3.2 INSTALL pipe cap at IA-1316. 5.3.3 SilUT 2VNPSE-1, Unit 2 containment purge supply test connection AND REMOVE gauge. 5.3.4 INSTALL swaglok plug at 2VNPSE-1. 5.3.5 SIIUT 2VNPSE-2, Unit 2 containment purge exhaust test connection.AND REMOVE gauge. l 5.3.6 INSTALL swaglok plug at 2VNPSE-2. 5.3.7 SIIUT 2SI-D-24, P-14 A containment spray pump 2SI-862A discharge check drain AND REMOVE gauge. 5.3.8 INSTALL swaglok plug at 2SI-D-24. 5.3.9 SIIUT 2SI-D-25, P-14B containment spray pump 2SI-862B , discharge check drain AND REMOVE gauge. 1 5.3.10 INSTALL swaglok plug at 2SI-D-25. ! 1 Page 4 of 10 REFERENCE USE
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NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT ORT 10A ' OPERATIONS REFUELING TESTS MAJOR Revision 0 RECOVERY FROM INTEGRATED LEAK RATE TEST March 21,1997 WITH CORE OFF-LOADED UNIT 2 INITIALS 5.4 PERFORM the Followine Outside Containment: l
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5.4.1 RECHARGE electrical penetrations with nitrogen per Maintenance call-up and PDF-9033B. ! 5.4.2 INSTALL vent plugs for mechanical penetrations per , Attachment A. , 5.4.3 OPEN SW-252, HX-30A/B cavity cooling coil inlet. 5.4.4 REMOVE danger tags issueo per ORT 9A for the following components AND ALIGN per the direction of the DSS:
- CAUTION
- DO NOT CLEAR THE DANGER TAGS ASSOCIATED WITH VALVES 2RC-538
& 539,2WG-1786,1787,1788, & 1789 ISSUED FOR OP 4D.
l
- a. 2P-1 A&B, RCPs.
l I
- b. 2P-74A&B, RCP oil lift pumps. _
- c. 2W-4A&B, Cavity cooling fans.
- d. 2W-43A&B, Containment cleanup fans.
- e. 2W-3A&B, CRDM shroud fans.
- f. 2W-1 A2, B2, C2, & D2, Containment recire fans.
- g. 2P-18 & 2P-66, RCDT pumps. 1
- h. 2B52-113ML and 2B52-113MR at 2B-11.
- i. 2PR-02 through 2PR-06 power receptacles.
5.4.5 INSTALL filter bowl on vacuum pump for upper personnel hatch inner door seal test system. 5.4.6 REMOVE personnel safety placards from upper and lower personnel hatch doors and store. Page 5 of 10 REFERENCE USE
NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT ORT 10A - OPERATIONS REFUEI ING TESTS MAJOR Revision 0 - RECOVERY FROM INTEGRATED LEAK RATE TEST March 21,1997 i WITH CORE OFF-LOADED UNIT 2 i INITIALS I 5.5 2T-34A&R Si Accumulators: 5.5.1 ALIGN SI accumulator valves: 2SI-886A, 2T-34A vent Shut ! , 2SI-886B, 2T-34B vent Shut 2SI-886C, 2T-34A makeup LT 1/6 Turn ! 2SI-886D, 2T-34B makeup LT 1/6 Turn 2SI-892A, 2T-34A drain Open ) 2SI-892B, 2T-34B drain Open 1 l 5.5.2 Blank flange installed per Maintenance WO for vent valves: ! 2SI-886A 2SI-886B t l 5.6 COMPLETE restoration sections ofICP 10.13," Routine Maintenance i Procedure; Containment Leak Rate Test Preparation". ! 5.7 Blank flange installed at PRT local vent per Maintenance WO. 5.8 Hich And Low Pressure Nitronen Sunnly 5.8.1 SHUT unnumbered vent valve on low pressure nitrogen header between 2RC-595 and 2RC-441.
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5.8.2 SIIUT 2SI-686, SI accumulator nitrogen header vent valve. 5.8.3 REMOVE danger tag on 2NG-1662, PRT N2 Inlet, TIIEN OPEN 2NG-1662. l 5.8.4 REMOVE danger tags on 2SI-838A and 2SI-838B, SI Accumulator N2 Inlets. 5.9 REOPEN containment isolation valves as required. I i Page 6 of 10 REFERENCE USE
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NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT ORT 10A OPERATIONS REFUELING TESTS MAJOR ) Revision 0 RECOVERY FROM INTEGRATED LEAK RATE TEST March 21,1997 WITH CORE OFF-LOADED UNIT 2 INITIALS l 5.4 P ERFORM the Followinu Outside Containment: 5.4.1 RECHARGE electrical penetrations with nitrogen per Maintenance wall-up and PDF-9033B. 5.4.2 INSTALL vent plugs for mechanical penetrations per Attachment A. i 5.4.3 OPEN SW-252, IlX-30A/B cavity cooling coil inlet. 5.4.4 REMOVE danger tags issued per ORT 9A for the following components AND ALIGN per the direction of the DSS:
- CAUTION
- DO NOT CLEAR TIIE DANGER TAGS ASSOCIATED WITil VALVES 2RC-538
& 539,2WG-1786,1787,1788, & 1789 ISSUED FOR OP 4D.
- a. 2P-1 A&B, RCPs.
- b. 2P-74A&B, RCP oil lift pumps.
l c. 2W-4A&B, Cavity cooling fans.
- d. 2W-43A&B, Containment cleanup fans.
- e. 2W-3A&B, CRDM shroud fans.
- f. 2W-1 A2, B2, C2, & D2, Containment recire fans.
i
- g. 2P-18 & 2P-66, RCDT pumps.
h, 2B52-113ML and 2B52-113MR at 28-11. l
- i. 2PR-02 through 2PR-06 power receptacles.
5.4.5 INSTALL filter bowl on vacuum pump for upper personnel l hatch inner door seal test system. 5.4.6 REMOVE personnel safety placards from upper and lower personnel hatch doors and store. Page 5 of 10 REFERENCE USE
NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT ORT 10A - OPERATIONS REFUELING TESTS MAJOR , Revision 0 - RECOVERY FROM INTEGRATED LEAK RATE TEST March 21,1997 WITH CORE OFF-LOADED UNIT 2 INITIALS 5.5 2T-34A&B SI Accumulators: 5.5.1 ALIGN SI accumulator valves: 2SI-886A, 2T-34A vent Shut 2SI-886B, 2T-34B vent Shut 2SI-886C, 2T-34A makeup LT 1/6 Turn
?SI-886D, 2T-34B makeup LT 1/6 Turn 2SI-892A, 2T-34A drain Open .
2SI-892B, 2T-34B drain Open 5.5.2 Blank flange installed per Maintenance WO for vent valves: 2SI-886A 2SI-886B s 5.6 COMPLETE restoration sections ofICP 10.13," Routine Maintenance Procedure; Containment Leak Rate Test Preparation". 5.7 Blank flange installed at PRT local vent per Maintenance WO. 5.8 Hiuh And Low Pressure Nitrocen Sunnly i 5,8.1 SIIUT unnumbered vent valve on low pressure nitrogen header between 2RC-595 and 2RC-441. 5.8.2 SIIUT 2SI-686, SI accumulator nitrogen header vent valve. 5.8.3 REMOVE danger tag on 2NG-16'62, PRT N2 Inlet, TilEN OPEN 2NG-1662. 5.8.4 REMOVE danger tags on 2SI-838A and 2SI-838B, SI AccumulatorN2 Inlets. i 5.9 REOPEN containment isolation valves as required. Page 6 of 10 REFERENCE USE
ORT 10A NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT MAJOR OPERATIONS REFUELING TESTS Revision 0 March 21,1997 RECOVERY FROM INTEGRATED LEAK RATE TEST WITH CO tE OFF-LOADFD UNIT 2 INITIALS 5.10 Primary System Valves and Pumps 5.10.1 DSS to determine desired post-ILRT valve position if different than ILRT position, TIIEN have valve (s) realigned. l ILRT Desired Position Position 2RC-545C, 2HX-1 A cold leg vent Open 2RC-546C, 2HX-1B hot leg vent Open 2RC-547C, 2HX-1 A hot leg vent Open 2RC-548C, 2HX-1B cold leg vent Open 2WG-1609, RCDT local vent Open 2SI-868A, Containment spray A header isolation Shut 2SI-868B, Containment spray B header isolation Shut 2RH-704A, 2P-10A R HR pump suction Shut 2RH-704B, 2P-10B RHR pump suction Shut 2RH-701, 2P-10A/B RHR pump suction Shut MOV from RCS _ 2RH-720, RHR return to RCS MOV Shut 2SI-878B, 2P-15A SI pu up loop B injection Shut 2SI-878D, 2P-15A SI pump loop A injection Shut 2SI-878E, 2P-15B SI pump loop A . injection Shut 2SI-878F, 2P-15B SI pump loop B injection Shut Page 7 of 10 REFERENCE USE
NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT ORT 10A , OPERATIONS REFUELING TESTS MAJOR Revision 0 . 3' RECOVERY FROM INTEGRATED LEAK RATE TEST March 21,1997 WITil CORE OFF-LOADED UNIT 2 , INITIALS 5.10.2 DSS to determine desired post-ILRT pump breaker position if different than ILRT position, T_IIEN have breaker (s) realigned. REMOVE danger tags. ILRT Desired Position Position f 2852-38A, 2P-14A breaker Rack Out i 2B52-27A, 2P-14B breaker Rack Out ' 2B52-36A, 2P-10A normal bra ser Rack Out 2B52-29A, 2P-10B normal breaker Rack Out 2B52-58B, 2P-10A/B alternate breaker Rack Out 2A52-74, 2P-15A breaker Rack Out 2A52-88, 2P-15B breaker Rack Out 5.10.3 Operate U2C portion of CC system as desired by DSS. 5.10.4 Operate RIIR system as desired by DSS. 5.11 REMOVE reactor vessel FME cover per Maintenance WO. 6 i I i 1-Page 8 of 10 REFERENCE USE
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NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT - ORT 10A
. OPERATIONS REFUELING TESTS MAJOR Revision 0 RECOVERY FROM INTEGRATED LEAK RATE TEST March 21,1997 WITH CORE OFF-LOADED UNIT 2 ATFACIIMENT A 1.0 INSTALL vent plugs for . mechanical penetrations.
Mechanical Penetrations: Lower Pipeway #3: Lower Pipeway #4: Initials Initials i P46 P30 P45 P34 P31 P26 P38 P37 P28 1 P42 I P44 P13 : P36 P33 P29 l P40 P32 P48 P27 P12 I P21 l P25 P24 P23 1 P14
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P8 P22 P15 l Pl7 P18 P16 P7 P9 P19 P20 P10 P11 l Page 9 of 10 REFERENCE USE l l
NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT ORT 10A a OPERATIONS REFUELING TESTS MAJOR + Revision 0 - , l RECOVERY FROM INTEGRATED LEAK RATE TEST March 21,1997 l WITH CORE OFF-LOADED - - UNIT 2 Attachment A i Mechanical Penetrations: i Upper Pipeway #3: Upper Pipeway #4: Initials Initials P35 P52 ~ P5 P53 P59 P50 l 4 P41 P51 l
, P54 i 61' EL i P43 !
P6 P4 l P60 i P4 48' EL l P55 P3 P65 P64 West of flatch P61 i P39 P56 . P47 1 26' EL P66 P67 P52 ! P68 P53 ! P62 P63 11' EL 88' EL P70 P1 3' EL P57 P2 P69 P58
-17EL (Tendon Gallery)
P71 i 1 { Page 10 of 10 REFERENCE USE
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j - { POINT BEACH UNIT 2 RESTART COMMITMENT i INDEPENDENT REVIEW RESULTS t j Commitment ID Number 8 Commitment Description 1 l Review 20% of the Operational Technical Specification, Inservice Test, and Operations Refueling Specification related surveillance procedures, with concentration on those involving major equipment. Upgrade as necessary to
- include appropriate initial conditions, return to service lineups, properly specified independent verification, reviewing i
acceptance criteria, and Technical Specification implementation. J The population considered for this commitment will be the Unit 2 and common Operations Technical Specification, Inservice Test, and Operations Refueling Test related surveillance procedures. The scope of this review will be examining the identified documents for accuracy and compliance with requirements, per the criteria in the above paragraph. Should this review identify either generic issues or significant discrepancies j' which could negatively impact reactor safety, the scope of the review will be expanded. Where discrepancies are i identified, appropriate corrective and preventive actions will be taken commensurate with their safety significance 1 3 Review Methodology 1 1 i Review Enforcement Conference Commitment item #17, for background. 3 s
- " The Technical Speci5 cation, Inservice, and Operations Refueling Test Indexes currently contain the following total numbers of surveillance procedures: Technical Specifications Tests - 14, inservice Tests - 142, Operations Refueling i
Tests - 108. The list of surveillance procedures reviewed by WE was reviewed (10 TSs,29 ITs, and 24 ORTS), and 1/4 of these were reviewed (3 TSs, 6 ITs, 8 ORTS). In addition, an identical munber of surveillance procedures that ] were not reviewed by WE were reviewed, concentrating on those involving major equipment. ; The same review criteria (initial conditions, return to service lineups, properly speciSed independent verification,
- acceptance criteria, and Technical Specification implementation) were used for this review. Procedures reviewed j were
. TSs ITs ORTS { WE Samole Other WE Samnie Other WE Samole Other 8 ! TS-10A, U2 TS-72 IT-03 Ul IT-07 ORT-3 ORT-12 i TS-3 A, UI TS-81 IT-06 U2 IT-10 ORT-6 ORT 15 TS-84 TS-34 U2 IT-09A U2 IT-il ORT-11 ORT-66A IT-13 U2 IT-65 U2 ORT-33 ORT-80 , IT-40 Ul IT-90 Ul ORT-68 Appendn G IT-215 U2 IT-335 U2 ORT-73 Appendix W IT-536 U2 IT-755 U2 IT-765 U2 IT-295A U2 j The review of the above procedures did not verify the correctness of Technical Specifications as stated in individual procedures. This element of the Independent Review was performed as part of the review for Restart Commitment
; #7.
Page 1 of 7 4 i
I POINT BEACH UNIT 2 RESTART COMMITMENT INDEPENDENT REVIEW RESULTS r Commitment ID Number 8 1 i The results of the independent review were compared with the WE review results. f Review Results I } The following is a listing of the procedures reviewed along with observations of the independent review J Technical Specifications Tests l
- 1. TS-3A Ul Turbine Trip Test (Monthly)
Steps 4.8,5.7,6.7, and 7.6 reference return of pressure to normal. Recommend specifying reference basis to determine " normal" in these cases (i.e., pressure range). ] 2. TS-10A U2 Contamment Airlock Door Seal Testing No observations. j 3. TS-34 U2 SurveillanceTesting: Contamment Accident Recirculation Fan-Cooler Units (Monthly)
.I No observations.
/
a
- 4. TS-72 Annual Fire Pump Capacity Test 1
] Step 3.1 describes reporting deSciencies to DSS or Duty Supervisor for appropriate action in accordance with Technical Specification 15.3.14. Such instructions are more appropriate for Section 2.0 PRECAUTIONS AND 2 UMITATIONS, instead of Section 3.0 DISCUSSION. i
- 5. TS-81 Emergency Diesel Generator G-01 (Monthly) I 4
Recommend description of 10*/1.7 min. to specify point at which breaker should be closed should use clearer terms (e.g.,5 minutes before 12 o' clock). i TS-84 Step 2.1.1 contains air pollution limitations. Do these apply to TS-81 too? 4 Step 2.9 describes diesel rating at 2850 kW. TS-84, however, lists the hours applicable to the rating in a similar step. 1 l Step 3.12 has a comma which should be a period. Step 4.54: For ca'ch run of diesel only one bank of starting air valves will be verified. Step 4.54 should be clarified to ensure the proper valves receive IST testing credit. K Page 2 of 7 + .: - , . - , .
POINT BEACH UNIT 2 RESTART COMMITMENT INDEPENDENT REVIEW RESULTS Commitment ID Number 8
- 6. TS-84 Emergency Diesel Generator G-04 (Monthly)
No observations
)
Inservice Tests
- 1. IT-03 UI Low Head Safety Injection Pumps and Valves (Quarterly)
IT-10 has " Time Date " blanks in procedure steps for entry into LCOs. Recommended good practice for the IT-03 procedure and other procedures as well. Checking for pump operability appears to be performed in two places: Steps 4.1.31/4.2.29 and Section 6.0. In discussions with IST personnel, this is normal practice with Operations performing the test. Actual pump operability determmation occurs in Steps 4.1.31/4.2.29. Policy and training on this aspect of procedure structure were reviewed to be sufficient.
- 2. IT-06 U2 Contamment Spray Pumps and Valves (Quarterly)
, No observations.
t
- 3. IT-07 Service Water Pumps and Valves (Quarterly)
No observations.
- 4. IT-09A U2 Cold Start Testing of Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump and Valve Test (Quarterly)
Precaution (Step 2.2) needs clarification. Also, use of DTP is required in this procedure (IT-09A), but DTP is only recommended in similar procedure for testing electrically-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps (IT-10). Also, Step 2.2 ofIT-09A references REI 1.0 and REI 17.0. Step 2.2 ofIT-10 references REI 1.0 only. Parallel initial conditions should be considered for IT-09A and IT-10,'where appropriate. For example, IT-09A has step 3.7, " Steam Generators available to receive water." IT-10 has no such statement. - IT-09A step 3.8 discusses ensuring bearing temperatures have stabilized prior to pump test. IT-10 has no such requirement. This statement is possibly unique to turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps due to their environment (higher temperatures). l IT-09A has initial Condition 3.1 of " Reactor power reduced a minimum of 2% to a power level directed by l DSS."IT-10 Initial Condition 3.8 states " Reactor power reduced a minimum of 2% or to a power level directed by DSS." These s'atements t should be consistent. Also, in IT-09A, as currently written (Rev.15, January 6, 1997), reactor power must be reduced a minimum of 2% This conflicts with restoration step 4.50, which states "If reactor power was reduced to perform this test, power may be increase [ sic) as directed by DSS."
\' IT-10 has no power level restoration step as IT-09A has.
Page 3 of 7 l
POINT BEACH UNIT 2 RESTART COMMITMENT INDEPENDENT REVIEW RESULTS Commitment ID Number 8 l Step 4.10 appears to be a control room trip of 2MS-2082, the 2P-29 overspeed trip valve. Step 4.10.1 appears to be a local manual trip of pump 2P-29. The two steps should be distinguished from each other (i.e., expand Step 4.10 to state where 2MS-2082 is tripped from). Step 4.24: checking of packing for excessive leakage. Pump or turbine packing?
- 5. IT-10 Test of Electrically-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pumps and Valves (Quarterly)
See obsenations for IT-09A. i
- 6. IT-11 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps (Quanerly)
)
l Procedure references " Pump and Valve IST Program Acceptance Criteria Book" for comparing valve and pump data in order to determine operability. Most procedures reviewed call the same document the "lST Binder." Recommend using "IST Binder" for consistency.
- 7. IT-13 U2 Component Cooling Water Pumps and Valves (Quarterly)
Same comment as for IT-11 with regards to use of term "lST Binder" for consistency. I 8. IT-40 Ul Safety lujection Valves (Quanerly) No observations
- 9. IT-65 U2 Containment Isolation Valves (Quanerly)
No obsenstions.
- 10. IT-90 Ul Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves (Quarterly) i l
No observations. I1. IT-215 U2 Safety Injection Valves (Quanerly) - i No observations.
- 12. IT-295A U2 Auxiliary Feedwater System Flow Paths and Indicators Step 2.3 states that " Flow tests may cause increased cooldown rates or raise reactor power level."
However, step 1.0 implies that this test must be performed " prior to entering power operations. Step 4.22, clarify if this is steam or pump packing leakage. l' age 4 of 7
. . t POINT BEACH UNIT 2 RESTART COMMITMENT INDEPENDENT REVIEW RESULTS ,
i Commitment ID Number 8
- 13. IT-335 U2 Containment Isolation Valves (Cold Shutdown)
No observations.
- 14. IT-536 U2 Containment Sump B Suction Line Leak Test (Refueling Shutdown)
Instrument identification numbers should be specified in Steps 4.5 (graduated cylinder),4.7 (pressure gauge), and 4.8 (stopwatch). t
- 15. IT-755 U2 Flow Test of Low Head Safety Injection Check Valves (Refueling)
Step 4.3 refers to the Operations standing order for comparing check valve data against in order to detennine valve operability. Per discussions with Operations personnel, this reference should instead be made to the IST binder.
- 16. IT-765 U2 Flow Test of High Head Safety Injection Check Valves (Refueling)
Steps 4.2.12 and 4.3.20 refer to the' Operations standing order for comparing check valve data against in order to determine valve operability. Per discussions with Operations personnel, this reference should instead be made to the IST binder. Ooerations Refuelimr Tests j 1
- 1. ORT-6 Contamment Spray Sequence Test Unit 2 )
l Independent veri 5 cation ofitems which assure preventing injection of contamment spray into the contamment building should be added, e.g., I.V. shutting Spray Isolation Valves and racking pump breakers to " Test" (Steps 2.2 and 2.5). Such independent verification of shutting these spray valves is performed in ORT-3. '
- 2. Appendix G Nitrogen to SI Accumulators No observations. -
- 3. Appendix W Spray System, B Train, Containment isolation Valves No observations.
- 4. ORT-il CVCS and CC Systems Check Valve Stroke Test No observations.
1
- 5. ORT-12 Fuel Transfer Tube Flange Seal No observations.
Page 5 of 7
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i- ! ' POINT BEACH UNIT 2 RESTART COMMITMENT INDEPENDENT REVIEW RESULTS Commitment ID Number 8 l
- 6. ORT-15 Fuel Manipulator and Fuel Transfer System Che:kout No observations.
- 7. ORT-33 Post-Accident Containment Ventilation System i No observations.
- 8. ORT-66A Containment Pressure (P31A)
No observations.
- 9. ORT-68 Component Cooling Water to and from 2P-1 A - Refueling Shutdown No observations.
i
- 10. ORT-73 Electrical Penetration Leak Test No observations.
I1. ORT-78 Mechanical Penetration Leak Test j No observations. ! i
- 12. ORT-80 Mechanical Penetration Leak Test (P29,13,27) l No observations.
The results of the WE review of 20 percent of TS, IT, and ORT surveillance procedures were in turn reviewed as
. part of the Independent Review. These results were similar to the above comments.
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e , ,. 1 POINT BEACH UNIT 2 RESTART COMMITMENT INDEPENDENT REVIEW RESULTS Commitment ID Number 8 Recommendatiom Make revisions as appropriate to address the above observations. Incorporation should be tracked to schedule the necessary procedure revisions to be accomplished prior to next scheduled performance of the procedure. Some mmor i
~ items may, however, be deferred until the next scheduled procedure review commensurate with their safety !
signi6cance. Some of the observations discussed above may be common to other procedures which were not ) reviewed as part of this independent review. Guidance to procedure reviewers should be provided to maintain ! consistency in eventual procedure reviews. From reviews of NPBU Procedures NP 1.1.5,1.2.2,1.2,6. and l Operations Procedures OM 2.15 and OM 2.16, as well as discussions with' plant personnel, the current revieu pokey i for Technical Specifications, Inservice, Ond Operations Refueling Tests is on an as-need basis (i.e., if procedure , changes are made). While this may be su.Ticient to address the quality ofindividual procedures, the consistency of ! procedures within a system may be reducci over the long term, RE: Comments on procedural differences between l IT-09A and IT-10. It is recommended that system review of procedures be adopted to remedy this situation. Such procedure review is currently in progress r.s part of the Procedure Upgrade Program being performed as part of the
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resolution to NRC Enforcement Confererce Commitment #17. [ The results of the Independent Review contained herein were discussed with the WE responsible engineer. These comments will be incorporated into the Procedure Upgrade Program. Overall, the procedures reviewed appeared to be ofgood quality. The procedures reviewed included numerous notes ( - and cautions which demonstrate appropriate written instructional guidance of unique plant equipment and operational aspects of performing the procedures. Based on the Independent Review, there are no items involved with Commitment #8 which would impede Unit 2 startup. ' l
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Reviewer: ' s, Page 7 of 7
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1
- Responsible Person: 05/03/97 1 1
- Trkid: U2R22 RESTART
- Urgency: DONE l
- Action Number: 13
- Work Priority: 99 I
Activity Pending is: DONE ASSOCIATED WITH A COMMITMENT l
TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Unit 2 Refueling 22 Startup Commitments Prior to leaving cold shutdown, review operating procedures that contain l maintenance activities and revise as necessary to ensure PMT and QC are ; properly addressed by those procedures.
DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
Sourge Record: 01/10/97 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: 02 11 97 Action Create: 01 13 97 Orig Eval Due: Orig CA Due: 02 11 97 Action Closed: 05 03 97 Eval Done: Corr Act Done:02 07 97
PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
Responsible for Overall Action: OPS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(01/29/97 Group Operations
) Update provided to NRC on 1/24/97 Lysle Il Mtg: All procedures were reviewed for ma,intenance activities.
Defined what was llagged (flange, test can removal if there is no isolation valve, packing adjustments on AbVs,, lubrication, fill with oil, 1 greasings, filter removal or replacement, resin replacement set oint j adjustments,, installing and removing Jumpers, grounds, leads " repair" and others as appropriate or questionable). or lifting landing ! Tot 1 popula, tion of.pr,ocedures reviewed (781), total number of procedures requiring revision based on above criteria (70)... 67 of which re PMT 15 of which required QC. eg., ORT 12 transfer tube flange.. quired .no PMT/QC on the flange bolts but O leak checks per Appx J. Another example, tS37/3SerationsdoesconductSpray Hdr Nozzle Flow Test...the . flexitallics are 150# vs. the required 300#. As of 1 of these 70 ! procedures had been submitted for approval. Temp chan/24/97 53ges were implemented i on the remaining 13 as a means of controlling use until permanent changes ' be made. The Temp Change states "This procedure must be reviewed tor can/QC PMT adequacy prior to use". Operability determinations were initiated on 1/23/97 for the 70 procedures identified to be inadequate in PMT/QC scope. (01 An " exception table" or list of procedures that I wil 29/97NOT have) been As of 1/29: permanently revised by 1/31/97 was created. All of l these procedures donave the previously stated temporary change to them as
~
a control measure onusage. These procedures are ORT 3, 3A 3B 3C ORT 9 and associated appxs. 17 and RP 7 and 8 and associa,ted, subsets. All of these procedure, ORT 10,be permanently changed prior to use. s will l All of the original 70 identified as requiring changes are ready for ap' proval. 22 of these require staff approval which is planned for l/30/97. Issuance of all 70 procedures is anticinated on 1/31/97. There are no outstanding operability issues associateB with the review of the original 70 procedures identified as requiring PMT/QC changes. Outstanding issues associated with this commitment as identified by this review:
- 1. Training and qualification of operators on torque wrench usage. OPS training has taken the lead on developing training to be delivered in cycle 97-2 (Feb/ Mar).
- 2. An action item needs to be created to address procedurally capturing the requirement to scope new procedures for PMT and QC. May involve a change to NP 1.1.3 " Procedure creation revision, review and approval" for all groups' use, and for Ops ,
group procedure development...poss/or iblespe,cial requirements creation of a new OM addressing standards and expectations for procedure development. (01/29/97 ) Passed to for acceptance of work.
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 2 05/03/97 t (OS/07/97
- Passed to for Verification.
This item is also reflected in Enforcement Conference commitment #57. t ,
- The intent of the commitment has been completed through procedure This was .
revisions and temporary gommunicated atthe /97 update in Lisle. changes placedRecommend 1/24 as control measures. closing this action item and doing the following:
- 1. Verify that OPS Training,has, created a TWR (training work request) to address the torque training issue.
- 2. Assign a NTRK item to have the necessary procedures changed to formally require PMT/QC adequacy reviews during new procedure development. ]
This iten may be closed due to upgraded procedures being issued and i request evaluating the two issues recommended above. CLOSED. 4 (03/31/97 assigned to NTITRK item OPA 97-001 has been initiated and is now of Ooerations for ensuring the procedural expectagions for PMT and QC hold points are included in the NP. This action is scheduled to be completed prior to U2 Start-up. (04/29 ) On 4 NP 1.1.3 Procedure Creation, Revision, Review and, App roval,
/97 revis/25/97, ion 3 was issued,. Step 3.3.5 under Cognizant Group Review, states " Quality Control (<QC) Review - a s,tep-by-step analysis of th9 procedure or changg ? hereto to ensure that QC hold or inspection points exist for, activities outlined in NP 8.4 1 Use of Quality Control Hold and Inspection Points." Steo 3,3.6 states I' Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) Review a step-by-step analysis of the procedure or changes thereto ;
to ensure ade uate post-maintenance testing is documented, as outlined in i NP 8.1.3, Pos -Maintenance Testing." This was the agtion assigned per No further action required. OPA 97-001. ULOSED. OPA 97-001 is now complete. I (05/01/97 Passed to for Final Close Out, Recommendations from the Duke Engineering Independent Review have been < 1 included as UER22 Restart Actions 95, 96, and 97. This item is ready for I clos ecut. ; (05/03/97 PLA Closure of Item. i l
----------REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------------
OPA 97-001 OM 2.6 OM 3.20 OP-4A OP-4D ORT 82 OP-9C TS-36 i OI-32 TS-38 OP-4F OP-5A
- OP-5B ORT 59 ORT 71 OI-38 4
TS-38 TS-39 IT-385 IT-520B PC-73 RF-195 RF-495 RP-1A ! RP-1B RP-1D ORT 83 U2R22 RESTART :495 U2R22 RESTART #96 U2R22 RESTART 197 Originating Agency:----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------S hstem: XX
- NRC Open Item Number
- NRC Status:
' Related Outages: U2R22 Engineering Work Type: None,Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate =
Current Estimate = Actual Hours =
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POINT BEACH UNIT 2 COMMITMENT INDEPENDENT REVIEW RESULTS Commitment ID Number 13 Commitment Description Review other operating procedures that contain maintenance activities and revise as necessary to ensure PMT and QC are properly addressed by those procedures. This will be done for Unit 2 operating procedures. This commitment is also Enforcement Conference Commitment Item # 51. Review Methodology Determine criteria for the maintenance activities permitted to be performed by operating procedures. Detennine criteria which established proper PMT and QC for maintenance performed by operating procedures. Determine population of operating procedures that contain maintenance activities. Determine the appropriate sample size and verify that the PMT and QC criteria are appropriately l addressed within the operating procedures selected. Review Results The search for criteria that would defme the types of maintenance activities permitted to be performed by operators was conducted by reviewing the Operations Manual and discussing the subject with the responsible person for this commitment. While OM 2.6 " Auxiliary Operator" did not contain any maintenance related aspects in his job description, from the discussions, it is clearly part of the Point Beach operation's culture to expect operators to perform such tasks as I packing adjustments, minor tubing and pipe fitting assembly and disassembly, alarm set point adjustments, some flange removals and restorations (Maintenance has pnmary accountability for i this type of activity), and possibly others not discussed. Since most of this type of maintenance activity is not formally described, the criteria which
- establishes the proper PMT or QC in general is also not formally described. In most cases
! however, the types of PMT's suggested in the revised procedures are within the skill of the operator (snoop testing for leaks), and no formal criteria is needed In OM 3.20,"MOV/AOV Operation and Maintenance" some guidance for PMT's is provided when adjusting packing on an , MOV. This guidance recognizes the challenge to operability for an MOV when packing is
- tightened, but does not prohibit this activity. To address operability following a packing adjustment on an MOV, OM 3.20 indicates the valve should be cycled if plant conditions permit.
It does not appear to provide guidance on what to do following packing adjustments on MOV's l which cannot be cycled. For safety related MOV's, this could lead to an operability issue. Page 1 of 10 1
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!- POINT BEACH UNIT 2 COMMITMENT l INDEPENDENT REVIEW RESULTS
- l Commitment ID Number 13 Additionally, OM 3.20 addresses operator action to manually seat an MOV. In section 3.3.4, the guidance,like the guidance for the packing adjustment, appears to be deficient in that it does not prevent an operator from manually closing the MOV with excessive torque and causing the MOV to be inoperable.
The population of procedures that potentially contain maintenance activities performed by
. operators is essentially the entire Operations Group series procedures. While the total number of.
I procedures was not independently tallied up, the 781 procedures reviewed by the Point Beach Staff appears to be a reasonable count of the affected population of procedures. Of these 781 , procedures reviewed by the Point Beach Staff,70 were determined to require revision to address either PMT, QC verification, or both. The Staff developed a list of maintenance activities which, if
- i. found in the procedures, would be flagged for potential revision.
The independent review of the Staffs work centered on reviewing about 20% of die revised procedures to verify that their work satisfied the commitment. Additionally, of the procedures that i were deemed not to require revision, about 2.5% were reviewed. Each of the eight es: cories of procedures within the Operations Group series, was included in the independent review, t l l .' As a. result of this review the following observations were made:
- 1. OP-4A " Filling and Ventina the Reactor Coolant Svstem" l.a Steps 3.2.4 and 3.2.5 install a spool piece and blank flange and the completion sign off (
is for maintenance. His is only noted for the purpose ofidentifying that operators ' don't do maintenance on all flanges and spool pieces. I l l
- 2. OP-4D Part 1 Rev. 46 dated 1/31/97 " Draining the Reactor Coolant System to a >
CVCS Hut Without Enterina Reduced Inventerv" i 2.a Verified that step 5.11.4 was identified as a PMT to stroke RC-430 closed after reraoving the valve block that had been installed in step 5.9. It is not clear why step 5.9 did not test the block installation to verify the function of the block. 2.b There are various steps in the procedure ( examples would be 5.18.13,5.18.14, and 5.34) which set alarm set points and would appear to need follow-on PMT's as identified by the criteria developed by the Point Beach staff. i I I l Page 2 of 10 l
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- POINT BEACH UNIT 2 COMMITMENT INDEPENDENT REVIEW RESULTS Commitment ID Number 13
- 3. OP-4D Part 5. Rev 1. dated 1/31/97 "Drainine the Reactor Coolant Svstem Without Enterine Reduced Inventory" 3.a Verified that step 5.11.4 was identified as a PMT to stroke RC-430 closed after removing the valve block that had been installed in step 5.9.1. It is not clear why step 5.9 did not test the block installation to verify the function of the block.
3.b This procedure also changes alarm set points without an identified PMT (eg 5.18.13, 5..I8.14, 5.31).
- 4. OP-9C Rev 38 dated 1/31/96 " Containment Ventina and Purcina" 4.a Step 4.20.2 installs a pneumaticjumper per OI-64A Sec 3.0. Step 4.20.3 identifies the need for a PMT, but specifies the performance of two complete and self contained (in terms ofits PMT's) other procedur.-s (IT-380/385 and TS-35/36). Based on the content of the majority of the PMT's included for this commitment, it is probably an error to call out step 4.20.3 as the PMT step. In most other procedures, this PMT would have been a snoop test for leaks. A possible enhancement to procedures IT-380/385 would be the labeling of the figures with the component ID's.
i L_T3-36 Rev 1I dated 9/20/96 " Local Leak Test of Containment Purce Valves" 5.a P6= procedure does not incorporate PMT's, but has steps that would appear to require t'iem (eg step 5.1.4 connection of test rig). ; 5.b This procedure refers to the use of 01-58, " Leak Testing of Contamment Isolation . Valves- Unit I and 2, General Instructions and Information" 01-58 performs PMT's by ! calling out leak checks, but they are not identified as PMT's as was done in other procedures. !
- 6. OP-4D Part 2 Rev 2 dated 6/12/95 "Drainina Reactor Coolant System to CVCS Hut into Reduced Inventerv" i
6.a This procedure installs and removes the block on RC-430. In this case, there are no PMT's identified for either evolution (steps 4.9.1, 4.11.3). 6.b Alarm setpoints are changed without PMT's (steps 4.18.13,4.18. 4. 4.26.1, and 4.27.1). Page 3 of 10
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.. j POINT BEACH UNIT 2 COMMITMENT INDEPENDENT REVIEW RESULTS l i Commitment ID Number 13 -
- 7. OP-4d Part 3 Rev 4 dated 8/30/96 "Drainine the Cavity and Reactor Coolant System !
with Fuel in the Vessel'_' ! i 7.a Steps 3.7 and 4.12.1 change RCA level alarm serpoints without identifying a PMT.
- 8. OP-4F Rev 121/22/96 " Reactor Coolant System Reduced Inventorv Reouirements" 8.a No PMT's required in this procedure based on the criteria developed by the Point i Beach staff. :
C. OP.5A Rev 29 8/30/96 " Reactor Coolant Svstem Volume Control" 9.a Steps 4.1.1,4.2.1,4.3.1, and 4.4.1 change Reactor Coolant System level alarm i setpoints without an identified PMT. 1 l 10 ' OP-5B Rev 1212/9/96 " Blender Ooeration/ Dilution / Briton" 10.a No PMT's required in this procedure based on the criteria developed by the Point Beach staff. I1. ORT- 59 Rev 17 1/31/97 " Train A Soray Svstem CIV Leaksee Test Unit 1" 11.a Step 8.4 identifies a PMT to leak check the plug installations. I1.b Step 7.2, which attaches a test rig, would appear to need a leak check PMT consistent with other PMT's placed in other procedures. i
- 12. ORT- 71 Rev 71 1/31/97 " Electrical Penetration Leak Test" i
12.a Step 5.7 identifies a PMT (snoop test) for all disturbed fittings. ! l l Page 4 of 10
ls. .. l i 1 l - POINT BEACH UNIT 2 COMMITMENT l INDEPENDENT REVIEW RESULTS Commitment ID Number 13
- 13. ORT- 82 Rev 4. ORT-82 Rev 7. and ORT-84 Rev 7 all dated 2/13/95 " Mechanical Penetrations Leak Test" 13.a All three of these procedures install the pressure test rig without a PMT to check for leaks consistent with other PMT's placed in other procedures.
- 14. 01-32 Rev 17 1/25/97 "Hvdrogen Svstem Ooeration" 14 a Steps 7.3.12 and 9.3.9 have been identified with PMT's to check for leaks when connecting the 12-pack carbon dioxide to the system.
I5 OI-38 Rev 10 3/10/1995 " Circulation Water Svstem Operation"
- l. 15.a Section 4 closes the water box manways without identifying the need for a PMT that checks for leaks.
I 16. TS-38 Rev 6 1/31/97 " Containment Sorav Nozzles Check Unit 2" l 16.a Step 5.13 has been modified with a QC verification of the proper installation and torquing procedure for a flange replacement. While it is recognized that there is a plan to train opemtors in the procedure for proper compression of a flexitalic gasket during installation of a flange, this trauung has not yet been accomplished. From discussions with the responsible person, the intent of having a QC person present is to make sure the job was done correctly. It does not seem appropriate for a QC witness to take the place of trained and qualified operators and/or technicians doing the work. ; 1
- 17. TS 39 Rev 5 12/4/95 " Main Steam Isolation Valves Operability Trio Test" 17.a Step 39 directs the operator to torque closed a leaking Main Steam Isolation Valve using a 0-600 ft-lb torque wrench. There is no PMT or QC identified for this step. It would seem that some additional direction is needed for how much torque is permitted.
I8 IT-385 Rev 7 1/31/97 "Purne Valve Air Svstem Check Valve Unit 2" 18.a Step 5.2.13 replaces a cap on IA-373. The following step (5.2.14) has been identified as a PMT to snoop test for leaks. It is noted that because these caps are down stream of an isolation valve, this PMT is not required by the established criteria. This is
]
also true for steps 5.4.13,5.4.14,5.5.13, and 5.5.14. , i Page 5 of 10
- 5. .-
POINT BEACH UNIT 2 COMMITMENT INDEPENDENT REVIEW RESULTS Commitment ID Number 13
- 19. IT-520B Rev 7 9/8/95 " Leakage Reduction and Preventative Maintenance Procram Test of ISI-896A&B. SI Pumo Suction Valves.
- 19.a This procedure does not require any PMT or QC additions.
- 20. PC-77 Part i Rev 9 and PC-77 Part 2 1/25/97 "Refuelinn Interval Automatic Fire Protection System Valve Trio-Test and Alarm Verification Test Unit 1" 20.a Step 6.16 is identified as a PMT however it does not appear to meet the established criteria. This step appears to be documenting the pressure observed as a result of the operation that is taking place.
- 21. PC-73 Part 5 Rev i 12/19/97 " Biennial Service Testina of No ice Buildine Fire Hose and Fire Hose Station" 21.a This procedure does not require any PMT or QC additions.
- 22. RF-195 Rev 3 1/25/97 " Condenser Hotwell Insocction" 22.a Step 5.7.7 contains the PMT to check for leakage in accordance with PC-93. )
I' 22.b Step 5.7.6 closes the manways and torques the bolts to 50 ft lbs without the QC verification used in other procedures as an apparent substitute for trained and qualified ] operators. This is merely a consistency of approach issue, not agreement by the reviewer ; that this approach is appropriate.
- 23. RF-495 Rev 0 4/5/91 "2P-29 Aux Feed Pumo Exhaust Stack Drain Line Check.
Unit 2" 23.a This procedure does not require any PMT or QC additions.
- 24. RP-I A Rev 43 1/3/97 "Precarations for Refuelina" 24.a Step 4.6.1 identifies the need for QC veri 5 cation of the installation of the refueling cavity drain line cleanout flange. The issue ofindependence of the QC person applies here.
i I I Page 6 of 10 i i
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POINT BEACH UNIT 2 COMMITMENT INDEPENDENT REVIEW RESULTS I l Commitment ID Number 13 25 RP- IB Rev 33 1/31/97 "Recovew from Refueline" 25.a Step 5.28 identifies the need for QC verification of the installation of the Fuel Transfer Flange Replacement. The issue ofindependence of the QC person applies here. 25.b Step 5.28.5. identifies the PMT by ORT-12 for the leak test of the flange seal.
- 26. RP-1D Rev 0 10/4/96 "Filline and Drainine the Unit 2 Refueline Cavity and Unit 2 Cavity Purification" 26.a This procedure did not require PMT or QC additions.
Recommendations
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As a result of this independent review, errors ( ie: PC-77 Part 1), omissions (ie: ORT- 82/83/84), and sometimes inconsistent application of PBNP criteria (ie: OP-4D Part 1) have been discovered. It is this reviewer's judgment that most of the procedure changes made to resolve this conunitment describe actions within the skill of the operator. These actions can be performed without the need for specific procedure steps and without adversely affecting Nuclear Safety or the safe operation of the plant. 1 Based on this independent review, the following actions should be completed prior to the restan of j Unit 2: Rt. Improve the operator guidance on MOV/AOV packing adjustments and msnual closure to stop seat leakage. The improved guidance should provide sufficient limitations to avoid manipulation of the valve to the extent that it makes it inoperable. R2. Resolve the use of a QC witness as an apparent replacement for qualified indisiduals to perform flange and torquing work requirements. This can be accomplished by using qualified people to perform the initial work item and use QC as a second verification only where necessary. Other actions, relative to Commitment # 13, that are recommended and which are considered long term enhancement issues that should not impede restart are the following: i Page 7 of 10 u
POINT BEACH UNIT 2 COMMITMENT INDEPENDENT REVIEW RESULTS Commitment ID Number 13 R3. Improve the Auxiliary Operatorjob functions description in OM-2.6, to more completely describe the expectations for maintenance activities and the need for and relative safety significance of any required Post Maintenance Testing. R4. Train the Auxiliary Operators on these expectations and their relative safety significance. RS. Address the expectations in the irrplementing procedures in a manner that clearly improves the safe performance of the procedure. This effort should balance the need for specific procedure wording with the skills of the operator and the relative safety significance of the evolution. On 2/12/97, an additional 25 " operating" p rocedures were reviewed from the population of procedures reviewed but not revised by the original review done by the PBNP staff. The sample was not random,(attempted to focus on do:uments with a higher probability of problems) but included samples from all eight categories of procedures within the Operations Group series. The following procedures were reviewed 'vith the results identified:
- 27. ORT 13 " Equipment Hatch Flange Ecal", Rev. 8, dated 9/20/96, no PMT/QC issues identified
- 28. ORT 24 "SI Test Line CIV's Leaka ge Test", Rev. 2, dated 3/10/95, no PMT/QC issues identified
- 29. OP-8A "SFP Cooling Operation", lev.14, dated 12/4/95, no PMT/QC issues identified
- 30. OP-11 A " Emergency Diesel Generitor G01 (G02), Rev. 27, dated 10/13/95, no PMT/QC issues identified
- 31. 01-14 "S/G Blowdown Operatio i", Rev.10, dated 10/2/96, 31.a Attachment A installs and remoies a filter skid using flanges with flexitalic gaskets with no PMT/QC identified.
- 32. 01-52 "SFP Skimmer Saction Strainer Changeout", Rev. 5, dated 9/28/95, 32a. Section 4 installs a strainer cover with no PMT/QC identified.
- 33. TS-79 " Monthly Surveillance of Fire Hose Stations", Rev. 7, dated 10/7/94, no PMT/QC issues Page 8 of 10 l
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j I I l . POINT BEACH UNIT 2 COMMITMENT l INDEPENDENT REVIEW RESULTS l l l l
- l. Commitment ID Number 13 ,
l l
- 34. TS-31 U-2 "Hi;;h Head / Low Head SI Check Valve Leakage", Rev.15, dated 11/27/95 34a. In scaions 5.1.5,5.1.6,5.1.7, and 5.1.8, liquid leak tests are not identified as a PMT.
)
35* IT-09A U-2 " Cold Start Testing Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and Valve
- Test", Rev.15, dated 1/6/97, no PMT/QC issues identified i l
- 35. IT-100 " Scat Leak Test of Diesel Generator Air Compressor Discharge Check Valves",
l Rev. 4, dated 10/12/95, , 35.a Section 4.8 (example) provides an air jumper installation without a PMT.
- 36. PC-75 Part 6 " Semi-Annual G-01 Diesel Generator Fire Damper and Vent Surveillance Test" Rev.1, dated 1/30/97, no PMT/QC issues identified
]
- 37. PC-11 Part 5 " Semi-Annual Crossover Steam Dump Pilot Valve Periodic Check, Unit 2",
Rev. 4, dated 10/23/95, no PMT/QC issues identified ,
- 38. RF-155 " Main Lube Oil System Inspection", Rev. 5, dated 1/25/95, no PMT/QC issues identified. ;
- 39. RF-225.3 " Water Treatment Anion Resin Sampling Post Brine Cleaning, Unit 2, Rev. 2, dated 3/23/94, no PMT/QC issues identified !
- 40. RP-6B "S/G Crevice Flushing", Rev. 2, dated 1/20/94, no PMT/QC issues identified.
- 41. RP-ID, Unit 2 " Fill / Drain Unit 2 Refueling Cavity (RV Flange Level and Below) and Unit 2 Cavity Purification", Rev. O, dated 10/4/96, no PMT/QC issues identified
- 42. OI-2A " Unit 2 S/G Leak Test", Rev. I1, dated 10/17/96, no PMT/QC issues identified.
- 43. 01-22 " Changing Prunary Coolant Micron Filter", Rev. 20, dated 4/10/95, no PMT/QC issues identified.
- 44. OI-38A "SF-6 Condenser Tube Leak Test", Rev. 9, dated 7/17/95 l 44.a SF-6 injection point not leaked checked post installation. l j 45. 01-114 " Returning CCW to the CCW System", Rev. O, dated 11/4/96 45a. No leak check identified to prevent loss of CCW as PMT.
- 46. OP-9D " Discharge of B CVCS Hut" Rev. 5, dated 7/19/93, no PMT/QC issues identified i
- 47. OP-13A " Secondary System Startup" Rev. 45, dated 9/7/93, no PMT/QC issues identified l
4
- 48. OP 13B " Secondary System Shutdown" Rev. 5, dated 8/21/95, no PMT/QC issues identified Page 9 of 10
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- ' POINT BEACH UNIT 2 COMMITMENT INDEPENDENT REVIEW RESULTS i
Commitment ID Number 13 i
- 49. ORT-53 "RCDT to Gas Analyzer Sample Line" Rev. 8, dated 3/28/95 49a. A bonnet vent plug is re-installed in step 4.5, without a PMT. 1
- 50. ORT-46 " Auxiliary Charging Line, Unit 2", Rev.12, dated 9/22/95, no PMT/QC issues identified ,
Recommendations: The independent review of this restart commitment is considered complete with comments noted above. It is recommended that the PBNP staff review and document their response to these comments prior to restart of Unit 2. Based on the 2/17/97 meeting with the PBNP staff, Duke Engineering and Services will review the WEPCo responses to the items listed above. WEPCo. provided there written response to each of the detailed comments provided by the Independent Review. The Independent Reviewer has no additional issues with the WEPCo. responses. r The recommendations identified as R1 thru R5 have been identified in the NUTRK System as . I U2R22 RESTART Actions Nos. 95,96, and 97 The Independent Review considers recommendations R1 and R2 as the only ones that need to be resolved prior to Unit 2 Restart. Given the commitment and tracking to resolution of recommendations R1 and R2, this Independent Review is complete with no other issues relative to Restart Commitment No.13 which would impede Unit 2 Restart. I i 4 l l Reviewed by:, _ __ wh h'T Page 10 of 10
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1
******************************* Responsible Person:
05/03/97
- Trkid: U2R22 RESTART
- Urgency: DONE
- Action Number: 23
- Work Priority: 99 Activity Pending is: DONE ASSOCIATED WITH A COMMITMENT
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Unit 2 Refueling 22 Startup Commitments Prior to leaving cold shutdown, review 20% of the condition reports closed since January 1 1995 that are associated with PSA safety significant systems for Begr,aded equipment operability issues to ensure that we have adequately identified and dispositioned operability issues.
----------DATES- -------------------------------------------------------------
Source Record: 01 /10/97 ******* Evaluatier ********* ****** Correction ** *** Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: 03 01 97 Action Create: 01 13 97 Orig Eval Due: Orig CA Due: 02 11 97 Action Closed: 05 03 97 Eval Done: Corr Act Done:02 27 97
----------PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
Responsible for Overall Action: SEN Responsible for Current Pending Activity: Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(01/13/97 Set Work Priority to 65. f02/06 is )( I reviewed bein/97g attached to this NUTRK20% item.of CR's. The result is documented and As a result of the review, we will be performing a 100% review of the CR list. I will also be farming out individual operability questions generated from , the review to- the appropriate system engineer, through the supervisor. .. (02 Changed the Due Date from: to 03 The/14/97 scope or this item has been increased to02/11/97 1005 thus the/01/97 need to change the due date. This due date still supports the current scheduled Unit 2 startup schedule. (02/14 ) Changed Responsible Person: From to I am reassig/97ning this to you since you have the lead. (02 ) Passed to for Verification. ; The/27/97 review is complete - see vem r/-0200. The list of CR's that need to be r9 opened has been turned in to Reg Services. Tracking this list is outside the scope of this NUTRK item. (05 i Passed to .__.. . . . . _ _ . for Final Close Out. Rev/02/97 iewed documentation. This item is ready for closecut. (05/03 /97.imately Approx PLA Closure of Item. 29 condition reports were reopened for further resolution or adequate closecut documentation.
----------REFERENCES---------------------------------------------------------- l CR 96-850 CR 97-0415 '
CR 97-1210 CR 95-079 CR 95-496 CR 96-1410 CR 96-0725 CR 96-0974 CR 96-0134 CR 96-1772 CR 96-0080 CR 96-0099 CR 96-1312 CR 96-0285 CR 95-036 CR 96-1301 CR 96-0809 CR 96-0740 CR 97-0060 CR 96-0070 CR 96-1387 CR 95-331 CR 96-0761 CR 95-421 CR 96-0282 CR 96-0131 CR 96-0134 CR 95-357
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT 2 PAGE 05/03/97
-MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
Originating Agency: S stem: XX
- NRC Open Item Nuder: N C Status:
Related Outages: U2R22 Engineering Work Type: None Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual-Hours = 1 i F 1 i n j i l l l 1
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i INTERNAL W CORRESPONDENCE 4 ,l I PBM 97-0200 To: ; ) From: Date: February 26,1997 subject: RESTART COMMITMENT ITEM 23, REVIEW OF CLOSED CONDITION REPORTS ; Copy To: _ l i 1 I have completed my review of Condition Reports (CRs) per Restart Commitment Number 23. The original review was of 20 percent of the CRs for seven PSA safety significant systems closed : since 1995 looking for potential operability questions. This review was expanded to 100 percent , afler finding a significant number of open issues during the first review. ! Attached are the detailed results of my reviews. Two evaluations are included. The first is the original 20 percent review and the second is the subsequent 100 percent review. Notes describing my evaluation process are included in the first page of each evaluation. A total of 235 closed condition reports were reviewed and a total of 43 are intended to be reopened. Regulatory Sersices has both lists for reopening. Attachment
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I 20% Condition Report Review Equipment Operability Review l General discussion - j i reviewed the below condition reports closed since 1995 looking for operability l questions. I took a very conservative approach, and identified where "1" might have l questions. I assumed that ifI was not reasonably sure of the operability status, an outside auditor might be uncertain as well. I used the NRC inspection manual (Part 9900: Technical guidance) Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions as a guideline for my review. The definition of ] OPERABLE in the document is virtually identical to the definition in our Tech Specs. A ) very critical point referenced in the guideline is the following statement:
"In addition to providing the specified safety function, a system is expected to perform as designed, tested and maintained. When system capability is degraded to a point where it cannot perfbrm with reasonable assurance oc reliability, the system should be judged inoperable, even if at this instantaneous point in time, the system could provide the specified safety function."
Additionally, the definintion of Operable says that a device is operable when it is
" capable" of performing it's safety function.
The above statements leave a lot of room for interpretation. I went conservative in order to identify potential operability concerns for resolution. A substantial portion of the l CR's that dealt with equipment problems closed out the CR when the component was fixed. This leaves in doubt the reasonable assurance quoted above. Without finding a root cause or potential generic implications of a failure, there seems to be room for reasonable doubt about the reasonable assurance of operability of a piece of equipment or j system Some of the issues that are in doubt may have been addressed, but there is no documentation in the CR that supports the full closcout. This would be needed to satisfactorily close out the concern. Please also note that a large numba of the CR's reviewed were administrative in nature, , and therefbre the operability question did not apply.
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A. Component Cooling Water 1 There were 17 CR's closed - four were reviewed j 1 l Two of the four CR's were administrative in nature and therefore did not involve operability questions. The two remaining CR's both involve ' closed system { outside containment' questions. Although CCW was not a system mandated to be included in the ' closed system' program by the NRC, we have traditionally applied the rationale anyway and the FSAR does classify CCW as a Closed System Outside Containment. One criteria for a closed system outside containment is that it does not communicate with the outside atmosphere. CR (95-098) questions leakage through CCW pump seals. Occasionally when we , start a pump, the leakage can be somewhat high (gallons per hour) until the seal seats. Leakage through the seals is not specifically addressed in any NPBU document. The CR was closed stating that the system is closed and does not have any maximum leakage criteria and introduction of fission products into the CCW . system is not expected post accident. There was no otherjustification. CR (96-131) questions opening the CCW surge tank vent for testing and whether the tank or system are operable with the vent open. With the vent valve open, the
'not in communication with the outside atmosphere' criteria is violated, although for a short period of time. OM 3.26 stated that temporarily opening this valve i "has been shown to have no significant impact on the PBNP fission product release probability" SER 95-010 says that a dedicated operator is not required for this kind of testing. Ahhough both references discuss the safety of the issue, they do not talk about operability.
I
- 13. 4160 distribution systems There were 36 CR's closed - 7 were reviewed.
Five of the CR's were administrative in nature or involved simple mechanical fixes. CR 96-231 discusses a safety related protective relay 273/A01 was found with an out of spec setpoint. The relay was replaced and a WO was issued to correct the relay before returning it to stock. The WO to troubleshoot and correct the bad i relay could not be tracked in CilAMPS. There is a potential that this relay has been returned to stock or reinstalled elsewhere without corrective actions. CR 96-470 states that high resistance contacts were found in an ABB breaker. The CR documents that the breaker contacts were cleaned and checked and that the " issue will be forwarded to Engineering for evaluation". There were no i l l
followup actions listed in the CR and no other action items generated. Since there was no root cause evaluation for this event, it is possible the problem could recur or that it could be affecting other ABB breakers. i 1 C. Auxiliary Feedwater System l l There were 36 CR's closed - 8 were reviewed. l l Three of the CR's were administrative in nature. One other CR documents the ) acceptability of a mechanical defect. CR 95-155 describes a single failure situation that could prevent starting of the j Turbine Driven auxiliary feed pump. Loss of DC control power to A01 or A02 )
"could prevent actuation of the turbine driven AFW pump on undervoltage on A01 or A02" The documentation in the CR describes an analysis done by q
' 1 Westinghouse that shows that PCT does not reach the limits in th FSAR and that there are therefore no operability concerns. Nonetheless TS table 15.3.5-3 states that the minimum channels to trip in 1/each bus.10CFR50 appendix A " General l Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants" states that there needs to be enough redundance in the safety system to allow function assuming a single failure. A single failure of control power to A01 or A02 could lead to the pump not starting
- and therefore is an operability question.
CR 96-1387 describes a test that showed that P38A was very close to it's l minimum design pressure. The documentation describes recalibrating the l pressure guage to show more margin, but the pump is running extremely close to l it's minimum design pressure referenced in CALC 96-0244. Actual pressure was ! measured at 1188 and the minimun allowed is 1186. Although this is not an immediate operability concern, there is NO room for any degredation in this l pump. Any drop in bus frequency could also put this pump below it's minimum l pressure. These questions bring up the ' reasonable assurance' question referenced earlier. CR 96-1435 discusses hairline fractures in the seat of MS-2020 (steam supply to TDAFWP). The CR says this may be an operability issue since pieces of the seat may break off and render the turbine / pump inoperable. The CR closes the issue by saying that the valve is going to be worked prior to U-2 restart, but does not reference a WO nor does it say what outage. I also cannot find this listed in the restart commitment list. Fortunately the valve is being worked. Since there was no root cause determined, this could call into question the operability of the equivalent valve on Unit 1. CR 96-1839 describes the use of dedicated operators on the pressure control valve on the discharge of the motor driven aux feed pumps. When the valve is in manual, we have a dedicated operator due to it not being operable as defined in
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j Tech Specs. Ilowever, when the valve is in auto and in any but the normal setting for standby situations,it also seems to not meet the Tech Spec definition of operabit. , D. Service Water System 4 i There were 64 CR's closed - 12 were reviewed Eight CR's were administrative in nature or were otherwise resolved. , l - CR 95-331 discusses the Accident Fan Coolers not passing a surveillance test for 4 flow. Two action items got rolled into CR 96-026, two items were completed and the fifth itemsays the FSAR will be updated to remove flow rate as a design criteria and replace it with a BTU / Hour heat removal rate. The CR does not l answer the original question about the capability of the accident fan coolers to l remove heat at the required rate. I checked with Brian McLean and he pointed out
, two TS tests that actually test the heat removal rate. This should eliminate any operability concerns arising from this CR. Note that CR 96-026, to which the 3
- first two action items got assigned is still an open issue. This CR refers to fan !
! cooler response when potential boiling can occur. The latter CR is still an operability concern. i CR 95-452 refers te a litiltre of SW-LW-061 to operate when demanded to close for a test. After realigning another SW valve the test was tried again and the valve performed satisfactorily. The failure could not be reproduced. This valve is designed to close on safeguards actuation. Because the root cause of the failure was not determined or corrected, this ! caves the operability of the valve in ; question. 1 CR 96-642 refers to a failure of the SW outlet from tiie GO2 diesel cooler to open upon engine start. The valve was checked and cleaned, but a firm root cause was not found. The valve has a history of not opening upon demand. A design change is in place to open and leave this valve permanently open, but it is waiting for completion by maintenance. This is an outstanding operability question. CR 96-761 is about the U-l SW radiation monitor routinely plugging. The CR is ! closed out based upon the " Unit 2 monitor has been replaced with an upgraded I version and the Unit I monitor has been completed and is awaiting release of the work order paperwork from Operations. Therefore the monitor have been repaired under the 1993 work order, and are awaiting final release from Operations." Per Brian Mel.ean and Don llartjes, the monitors were not replaced, but wye strainers were placed in the line. Unit 1 is still waiting for this i installation. This should not be an operability question because low flow would be alarmed in the control room and the monitor could be flushed. j
A4,.e..,. _a..- - A% ru+. e _ L, # -.u.a.m,,. 4w ._ _ _ ._A.g ,., s _ g., E. G05 Seven CR's were closed and two were selected. One CR was due to a miscalibrated temperature trip device. The unit was repaired. CR 95-421 refers to the G05 output breaker not closing on demand. The problem related to the failure of a mechanical linkage causing the breaker to not fully open when G05 was previously shutdown. Because the breaker did not fully open,it would not close when called upon. The linkage was repaired and the cause was corrected for this breaker. Although this breaker was repaired, it is not clear whether there are similar situations in other breakers used in the plant and whether they might be susceptible the the same event. The CR did not address the generic implications of the failure so I questioned Kelly Holt about this aspect. He said there were no other breakers used in the plant with this type of mechanical linkage. F. Emergency Diesel Generators There were 55 CR's and 11 were reviewed. Eight were administrative issues or were satisfactorily closed. CR 95-493 discusses G02 failing to excercise start. The CR closed the issue referring to possible pinion abutment and the fact that the diesel was OOS anyway and the diesel started when checked a second and third time. This may be an operability issue due to the recurring nature of this problem. This ha : happened several times in the last couple years and a good root cause has not b:en found. Although the ; tarting sequence is not the same for an exceneise start es for a fast start, not knowing root cause of the failure leads to questions about futere start attempts. CR 95-597 refers to G02 Held Dashed early. The closecut stated that the fieM closing contacts were dirty. The contacts were cleaned, but no root cause was detennined for the dirty contacts and generic implications were not addressed This could be an issue for G01. CR 96-285 Failure of G01 governor. The : .vernor would shed load but not pick up load. The govemor was repaired. The f oot cause of the failure and possible generic implications to G02 were not determined. Again, because of the repetitive i nature of these types of failures, the ' reasonable assurance' question comes up, leaving some doubt about operability. i G. Instrument Air r
l There were 20 CR's,4 were reviewed.
. All CR's were administrative or were simple mechanical repairs. ;
In summary, there are a significant number of outstanding questions. It is possible that l the issues have been addressed, but there is no indication of that in the closcout ! documentation for the C.R. t
- I recommend farming the quesstions to the system engineers for resolution. We should I be careful to focus on OPERABILITY and not acceptability, safety etc. In the closeout L documentation of several of the CR's I reviewed, this point seems to have been missed.
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i l t , i l l I 100% Condition Report Review Equipment Operability Review General discussion - After reviewing 20 percent of the CR's closed since 1995 looking for operability questions, we opened the scope to 100 percent. Once again, I took a very conservative approach, and identified where "I" might have questions. I assumed that ifI was not reasonably sure of the operability status, an outside auditor might be uncertain as well. Please note my comments from the original 20 percent review for some of the assumptions and philosophy I used in these reviews. A point of note - during the second review, the number of CR.'s with open questions totalled 29. The original review totalled 14. Logicalh, the re-review should be five times the original number, but this turned out not to be the case. I questioned whether I applied the criteria equally and I feel that I did. Some CR's I did not reopen since they were redundant with CR's opened in the original review, but this was a small number. A. Component Cooling Water There were 17 CR's closed - 13 additional reviews were performed Five of the thirteen CR's were administrative in nature and therefore did not involve operability questions. Three CR's were acceptably closed, CR (95-023) questions leakage through CCW pump seals. The CR notes that an ; operability deterrnination was not necessary per the ' system engineering manager' (the date is 01/17/96). There was no other reasoning. CR (96-054) This CR notes escessive seal leakage but is redundant to CR 95-098 and 96-023. i CR (96-076) This CR notes that there is a piece broken off the casing of one of the CCW pump casing. The CR noter some fixes, but there is no documentation about permanent resolution. Ex: the holes were redrilled and tapped for the holes, but no procedure changes to note the difference in this bolt hole vs others.
i . CR (96-134) This CR identifies two issues one is the QA aspect of a part acquired from KNPP and the other is ' closed system outside containment' The QA aspect is addressed but the closed system is still outstanding. Since the latter question is redundant to several other CR's, this CR should only note where the
' closed system' issue is closed.
CR (96-1772) This CR describes a lack of weld penetration on a heat exchanger relief valve. There is a WO tag number documented in the CR, but there is no way to track a closed WO via the tag number. It is not clear from the l documentation what the status of this repair might be. j B. 4160 distribution systems There were 36 CR's closed - 29 additional CR's were reviewed. Twenty seven of the CR's were administrative in nature, involved simple mechanical fixes or were otherwise acceptably resolved. 1 CR (96-1322) identifies the internal wiring of a safety related breaker being incorrect. Although the documentation notes that the wiring was corrected, it i does not address the possible applicability to other breakers. ) l CR 96-265 notes a problem with the performance of the breaker for a main feed l pump. No root cause was determined although one was speculated. This leads to ! questions about the operability of other similar breakers. There were no noted corrective actions to help prevent recurrence of this type of problem with other l breakers. ! l C. Auxiliary Feedwater System l l l There were 36 CR's closed - 28 additional CR's were reviewed. l 24 of the CR's were administrative in nature or otherwise appeared to be closed ; acceptably.
- . CR 95-205 describes a condition in which manual action would have to be taken j to maintain functionality of the AFW system while the system is in manual ,
I control. The CR documents that as long as operator action occurs within 5 I minutes, no deleterious effects will occur. It also notes that our procedures would
, direct operator action. The CR does not really address the true ' operability' l question however. My understanding from the system engineer is that the operator is not placed in manual as noted in the CR and that it would perform acceptably. The correct resolution needs to be addressed in the CR.
3 I
l CR 96-080 notes governor oscillations in the U-l TDAFWP. This has been a recurrent problem and is also noted in CR's 96-1312 and 96-099 and 96-1411. This CR does not resolve any operability questions, either by addrasing another CR or in any other way. CR 96-099 identifies the same governor oscillation problem as the above CR but for Unit 2. This CR identifies CR 96-1411 for resolution of the problem but does not resolve operability. It notes that the MSS will address operability but does not specify what the resolution was. CR 96-1312 is another CR referring to governor oscillation. This CR questions whether the failure was a MPFF. The CR notes that there is no operability question since the pump passed it's previous two IT tests. The closcout refers to CR 96-1411. l i l D. Service Water System 1 There were 64 CR's closed - 52 additional CR's were reviewed 45 CR's were administrative in nature or were otherwise resolved. CR 95-149 addresses a failure of an IST of SW 2838 (SW discharge from the i GO2 diesel). The closecut notes that the valve was restroked and the times were acceptable and therefore there was no issue. One year later, however, the valve failed to open upon demand and the diesel was declared inoperable. This is a recurring problem. Although this CR is more administrative in nature, it points out a hardware failure that could make the diesel inoperable, therefore it should be reopened. CR 95-036 notes a failure of a service water pump motor preventative maintenance checks. The failure was of the insulation in meeting it's required resistance to ground. Although the question is resolved for this motor, it does not identify a root cause for the problem or applicability to other SW pump motors. CR 96-1301 notes an oil level drop during SW pump testing. The same type of problem was noted in CR 96-1489. Apparently while the pump (s) are running, oil level in the sight glass drops, sometimes out of sight, but returns when the pump is secured. No root cause was determined and there does not appear to be a good explanation (at least daumented). The CR was closed out by stating that the oil did not really go away, but there may be some question about whether the bearings are really getting lubricated with the apparent drop in level. CR 96-809 notes degradation of the packing nuts of the p-32c SW pump. Although it notes that the packing nuts were replaced on this pump it does not
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l I address the possible failure of these nuts on other pumps or the operability l question this might cause.
- 1 CR 96-827 identifies a section of SW piping that is not the correct pipe. The l l
closecut notes that the engineer has determined that SW integrity is not an issue, it i does not explain why or what rationale was used in this conclusion. There may be j some transient conditions where the incorrect pipe in conjunction with general corrosion might lead to a failure. CR 96-829 notes general corrosion causing failure of pipes in the SW system supplying the service air compressors. As closcout. it notes MODS 93-005 and i 92-045 to replace the piping. The CR also notes that a failure of this piping could , lead to " serious impact on plant operation". It does not raise an operability question for the SW system. Neither MOD is complete. CR 96-964 identifies thinning of the elbow in the SW system that supplies water 3 the the Decon area off the West SW header. It notes that a MOD is in place to replace the elbow and that the Design Engineer requested additional analysis of ; this section of piping to look for further degradation. It is not clear what the results of any further inspections were and whether the mechanism for the thinning might be applicable to other portions of the SW system. l li. G05 Seven CR's were closed and live additional were reviewed. l All five CR's were administrative in nature or appeared to be acceptably closed. ; 1 l l F. Emergency Diesel Generators There were 55 CR's and 44 were reviewed. Most CR's were administrative in nature were satisfactorily closed. CR 95-408 noted that the small fan for GO3 had tripped on overload. No root cause was performed and no evaluation of applicability of this failure to other j l equipment was done. I believe that this issue has since been resolved, there is no ) , documentation with this CR that supports acceptab;e closecut. l ! CR 95-409 identifies spiking of GO3 KW, KVAR and amps when the governor control valve was placed in increase. No root cause was done and no evaluation about operability was done. I I i
I - 1 i CR 95-444 identifies GO2 exceeded expected voltage when load was dropped. The evaluation and closecut was extensive for G02, but did not address GOl. The tests were done on G01, but there is no documentation fo this in the CR l closcout. There was apparently no CR written to document the potential problem on GOl. CR 95-489 documents failures of thermal overloads related to GO3/GO4 support systems. This is also noted in CR 95-408 (above). The CR basically states that the recurring failures are not safety significant. Since that time we have readjusted all the applicable therma! overloads due to the recurring failures. Although the issue is probably closed, the CR's should be updated to reflect current information or a new CR should be created to reflect final resolution. CR 95-526 identifies a failure of a relay in the field flash circuit of GO4. An evaluation by engineering stated that the contacts were dirty and were cleaned. There was also a statement that there should be no implications for GO3 since it had recently passed a test. Without really knowing the root cause of the dirty contacts or other cause of the failure, it would seem to be difficult to determine the implications, especially long term, about GO3. CR 96-1689 notes a failure of the redundant start systems for GOl. The
' documentation describes the failure sequence but only speculates about the cause.
The corrective action was to blow down the air start line (to clear out debris that could cause the solenoid to stick), but does not identify where the potential debris might be coming from. This leaves open the question about potential problems with GO2. The failure that occurred would not have prevented a diesel start, but without identifying the root cause. it is not clear that similar debris might not have prevented a start. CR 96-182 discusses a pinion abutment that prevented an excercise start of GOI. The list of relays and other checks that were done was extensive, but no root cause was found. This leaves open the question of operability for G01 and GO2. CR 96-207 documents chattering brushes on the field coil slip rings of GO3. Although the cause of the problem is well documented and an appropriate fix is in the works, there is no statement about the acceptability of the problem or operability of the diesel. G. Instrument Air There were 20 CR's,16 additional were reviewed. 12CR's were administrative or were simple mechanical repairs. 1 1
O CR 95-158 describes a failed fitting supplying air to the iJ-l PORV's. The closcout states that the engineer does not feel that the problem is generic and wouldn't affect U-2, but does not state why. There is therfore an open question about the status of U-2 PORV air supply lines. CR 96-070 identifies degradation to an IA line to the CCW IIX temperature control valve. The sectbn of pipe was repaired, but no root cause was determined for the failure. Because of this, the potential for degradation to other sections of
. pipe are left in question.
CR 97-0060 identifies a kink in a section ofIA tubing. The closecut notes
, initiating a WO, but the WO number is not identified. The implications for the valve the air supplies is not mentioned nor is the possible effect of a failure of the line. Although the tubing is only 3/8 inch, a failure could have a significant affect on the I A system.
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? CONDITION REPORT CR 95-083 l
STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 0 SYSTEM: INITIATED: 02/11/95 CLOSED: MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR INITIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER: ... NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS:- _ _ _ _ _1 _ NUMEER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 1 Instrument Air Flow Indicators Not Calibrated (Restart Issue) DESCRIPTION: Unit 1 and Unit 2 Containment Instrument Air supply line flow indicators (1FI-3087 and 2FJ-3087) are not calibrated. These flow indicaQors are utilized during inservice testing of the instrument air containment isolation checR valves in IT-110 and IT-115 jaffects-IA-1182, IA-1192 IA-1324 and IA-1314). IT-110 and IT-115 require the documentation of the air flow rates as part of the inservice test. Significance: Flow indicators may not be indicating accurate flow rates and may have an adverse affect on results of the inservice test. (NOTE: I+C indicates that these two flow indicators along withhave 1FI-3085 and 2FI-3Q85} cannot be properequipment for these indicators. calibrated by)I+C because the{y do not the STATUS UPDATE: 02/15 i(ndica/95 Discussions with Ops has revealled that these flow tors were initially installed to provide Operations with a means to verify that IA flow was or was not occurring through these IA supply lines and to assis? them in the event of any type of trouble shooting or damage control activity. Discussions with ISI indicates that sometime after these flow indicators IT-110 for these flow indicators and were installed, began utilizing them fo/115 took creditr verification of the operability of the IA Containment Isolation Check Val es. Accurate flow rates are required for successful completion of IT-110 115 (note: ISI has determined that the IA check valves IA-1182, IA-119 , IA-1324 and IA-1314 operability is not in question. There is not reason to believe that the inaication of 1/2FI-3087 is inaccurate or that the flow indicators have failed {per discussion with .) (06 plan /01/95into) This place issue has been evaluated to adequately resolve thisand a corrective concern. No further action put actions necessary under this issue. Closed. (03 valv/12/97es CR reocened functionality to address Yollowing IA containment review for isolation check NRC restart commitment #22.
- Issue manager.
SCREENED BY : DATE: 02/14/95 REGULATORY REPORTABLE.....( 1 N TS VIOLATION.......... . . N 10 CFR 21................. ?:: N TS LCO............ .. .... : N OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. (; J: N JCO REQUIRED. . . .... . . N MSS REVIEW................ ): N SCAQ......... ... ...... . N . -OPERABILITY DETERMINATION.( L J: COMITMENT. , ........ . . . N SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: This event isnotaviolationofanyPBNPTechnicalSkecificationand . currently is not being deemed a reportable event. Fur her evaluation concerning the affects of potentiallv inaccurate flow indicators on IST program and testing of the Instrument Air containment isolation check valves is still being evaluated. No further action necessary at this 4 time.
REFERENCES:
IT-110 IT-115 WO TAG # 78062 WO TAG # 78063 TRENDING INFORMATION: WHEN : NON-OUTAGE 1980 - 1989 WHO : WHY : PROBLEM WAS NOT ANTICIPATED WHEN DESIGNED WHAT--~ : MODIFICATION RELATED MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT RELATED
- SYSTEM
- INSTRUMENT AIR 1 8413 - Original design was to provide Operations with a positive indication
,_that there was or was not air Ilow through these IA supply lines. Originally
i i 1 r 4 l 'not designed to be utilized for IT testirg of containment isol . valves. , ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE l 1 -100 DONE 06/01/95 2 EVALUATION NEEDED ___________-100 ____________________ ._____ _____________________________________ l l l l l I 4 l l I I L a f F 6 1 I I a l l t-l h 1 e d
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. ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1
~******************************* Responsible Person: 04/28/97
** Trk4d: CR 95-083 Action Number: 1 Urgency: DONE Work Priority: -100 Activity Pending is: DONE
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------ I l
Instrument Air Flow Indicators Not Calibrated CR 95-083 identifies two instrument air flow indicators (1FI-3087 and 2FI-3087) that are not calibrated but are necessary for determination of tible operation of IA check v,alves IA -1182, IA-1192, IA 1324 and acce$14duringtheperformanceofIT-110andIT-115. IA-1 I+C cannot calibrate these flow indicators with their equipment (I+C also indicated that 1/2FI-3085 fall into this category as well). Determine / implement the necessary corrective actions to allow for periodic calibration of these IA flow indicators to ensure adqquate performance of Inservice Inspection testing of Instrument Air Containment Isolation Valves. ( , is the ISI point of contact, is the I+C point of contact)
----------DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
Source Record: 02/11/95 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: 06 01 95 Action Create: 02 16 95 Orig Eval Due: Orig CA Due: 06 01 95 Action Closed: 06 01 95 Eval Done: Corr Act Done:06 01 95
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Responsible for Overall Action: MPE Responsible for Current Pending Activity: Issue Manager: - Initiator: Punchlist Adm,inistrator:
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(02/18/95 ') Received Action into Group: MPE Responsible Person: TER: ~~~ Due Date: 06/01/95 (05/31/95 > Flow indicators 1FI-03087 and 2FI-03087 were installed as part of instrument air. mod MR 85-243. These devices were initially installed as air flow indicators, and not as flow measurement devices. Sometime following installation these devices were incorporated into IT , 110 and 115 as flow measuring instruments to evaulate containment check valves IA-1182,1192 1314 and 1324 ASME Section XI re 1+2FI-03087 be calibrated, devices with an accuracy of + - 2% full scale. The original installation did not require calibrated dev/ quires that ices. These devices are manufactured by ERDCO and are in-line paddle type indicators. Simone Engineering TAppleton) is the local representative for ERDCO. Although no calibration r9 cords could be loacted in the mod. pagkage, th9 manufacturer did calibrate these indicators at the, factory ! prior to shipmenQ. The manufacturer also stated that these devices l usually hcld their calibration, and therefore the calibration frequency. Their accuracy is also +/y - do not specify scale. a i 2% full Although no evidence of loss of calibration is evident, these indicators inspected and recalibrated (if necessary will be removed,libration certificateof ca w,ill then issued and placed in-fi)le Aat the plant with I+C. - 1 Removal coordinatingof thetheflow workindicators can be done with Operations. durink This wor normal can be operation by tracked through i work order tags 78062 (unit 1 and 78063 (unit 2). Following this work a . calibration frequency will be) determined for these instruments. l j Discussed problem and plan with Operations I+C, ISI, and the system l engineer. All were in agreement. No immediate corrective actions are l required since their is no evidence that the flow indicators are out of i caIibration. Future actions can be tracked through the work orders. l (05/31/95 TER) Passed to for acceptance of work.
-(06/01/95 KRR) Passed to for Verification.
l
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 2 04/28/97 )06 ) PLA Closure of Item. The/01/95 evaluation of the calibration status of these flow indicators has been r completed and a adequate course of action for verification of the calibration of these flow indicators has been implemented. No additional actions necessary. Closed.
REFERENCES----------------------------------
IT-110 IT-115 WO TAG # 78062 WO TAG # 78063
MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
Originating Agency: S stem: NRC Open Item Nuder: N C Status: Related Outages: Engineering Work M e: None,Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours = I, 1 l h
. ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 I
******************************* Responsible Person: . _ _ _ _ _
04/28/97 CR 95-0
- Urgency: NO DUE DATE ASSIGNED
't*******************************
Trkid:* Action Number:83 2
- Work Priority: -100 j Activity Pending is: EVALUATION NEEDED ,
I
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Instrument Air Flow Indicators Not Calibrated Followin a r9 view of closed CRs in suoport of NRC restart commitment #22 I it was d termined that this CR should be reopened to address a potential operabil Ly concern: Unit 1 and Unit 2 Containment Instrument Air supply line flow indicators '. (1FI-3087 and 2FT-3087} are noQ calibrated. These flow indicators are utilized during inservice testing of the instrument air containment I l isolation checx valves in IT-110 and IT-115 faffects IA-1182, JA-1192 IA-1324 and IA-1314). IT-110 and IT-115 require the documentation of the l air flow rates as part of the inservice test. Operability of the Instrument Air containment isolation check valves is questionable. Justify / document the functionality of these valves.
----------DATES------------------------ --------------------------------------
Sourge Record: 02/11/95 ******* Evaluat ion ********* ****** Correction ****** I Commitment: Eval Due: Orig Eval Due: Corr Act Due: Orig CA Due: I l Act4cn Create: Action Closed: 03/12/97 Eval Done: Corr Act Done: l
----------PEOPLE-------------------------------------------------------------- 1 1
l Responsible for Overall Action: BMS i l Responsible for Current Pending Activity: BMS ~- l Issue Manager: - l l InitiaQor: Punchlist Administrator: re
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
l (03/17/97 ) Received Action into Group: BMS , l Responsible Person: DAB: ! I l l ________--REFERENCES---------------------------------------------------------- 1
--------MISCELLANEOUS-------------------------------------------------------
! - iginating ! Or Agency: System: NRC Open Item Nuder: MC Status: Related Outages: Engineering Work Type: None Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours = l I l i t a
CONDITION REPORT CR 95-G58 i STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 1 SYSTEM: INITIATED: 02/16/04 CLOSED: MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: I INITIATOR: . ISSUE MANAGER: NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 0 l
- Mechanical Seal Leakage on Component Cooling Water Pumps
. DESCRIPTION On 2/16 95 the mechanical a9al on the Unit 1 "A" Pump (1.-11A) started spraying component cooling component Cooling Water water following a flow j adjustment. Approximately 3 gallons of component cooling water was spilled before the IP-11A pump was secured. When IP-11A was secured the i 1P-11B pump auto started and the outboard mechanical seal began to leak as well and 1P-11B was secured.
(NOTE- Th(approximately 2 gallons of CCW spilled)e CCW pumps are designed to allow sl4ght leakage wj starting the pumps - less than 40 drops per minute.) Significance: Loss of CCW (entrance into AOP9B) , Hazardous material spill (CCW is chromated water) and potential degradation of a closed j system coratainment boundary. Immediate Corrective Actions: AOP-9B was entered for loss of CCW AOP-12A was entered for the hazardous material spill and an engin;eering 1 I evaluation was performed for IP-11A for operability determination. STATUS UPDATE: (02/22/95 ) This CR is being closed out to the Work Order submi d 4 to repair the,1P-11A mechanic 1 seal. No further action necessary. SCREENED BY : DATE: 02/22/95 l REGULATORY REPORTABLE..... ): N TS VIOLATION..... ........ ?: N I 10 CFR 21................. OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. p: N p: N TS LCO....................(4 JCO REQUIRED.............. g J: N J: N l MSS REVIEW................ OPERABILITY DETERMINATION. p: N SCAO...................... L C O M I T M E N T . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . ( J: N J: J: N SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS; This event is not a violation of any PBNP Technical Specifications and is not a reportable event. The CCW spill (chromated water) was recovered via AOP-12A and the CCW system was restored following determination (following dicussion with the DCS DTA and D+C Maint. Supervisor) that IP-11B was operabl9 (determined tbat initial leakage was due to the mecharlical seal being "cgcked',') . Mechanical Plant Engineering ( .
) performed an engineering evaluation for operability of 1P-11A anc cetermined that the pump 10618)perable, was o but required seal repairs ('WO submitted to correct WO #9 The engineering evaluation also concluded that the IP-11A seal leakage was not a containment integrity issue. CCW leakage is not a factor in the overall containment leakage rate acceotance criteria (La) and that the CCW system does not have any maximum leakage griteria. CCW is a closed system and it is not expected for any fission introduced into the CCW system following an accident. products CCW system to be functional operability was never in question. This item is closed to the WO submitted to repair the IP-11A seals.
REFERENCES:
AOP-9B AOP-12A WO #9410618 TS 15.3.6 CR 96-GT4 CR 95-128 CR 96-013 OSTI ITEM #23 TRENDING INFORMATION: WHEN--: NON-OUTAGE FIRST QUARTER OF 1995 WHO : WHY : UNEXPECTED EQUIPMENT FAILURE WHA F : MECHANICAL PUMP RELATED SYSTEM: COMPONENT COOLING WATER 9230 - Mechanical seal on IP-11A failed ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE 1 32 EVALUATICN NEEDED 05/01/97
i l , ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1
******************************* Responsible Person:
04/28/97 1 Trkid: CR 95-098 1
- Action Number:
Urgency: DUE IN 1-15 DAYS Work Priority: 32 l ' Activity Pending is: EVALUATION NEEDED
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------- ----------------------------
Mechanical Seal Leakage on Component Cooling Water Pumps , THIS CR IS BEING REOPENED AS A PART OF THE NRC OSTI COMMITMENTS (#23) On 2/16/95 the mechanical seal on the Unit 1 "A" Component Cooling Water Pump (1P-11A) starQed spraying component cooling water following a flow adjustment. Approximately 3 gallons of com0onent cooling water was spilled betore the IP-11A pump was secured. When 1.-11A was secured, the IP-11B p(ump auto started approximately and the 2 gallons ofoutboard mechanical CCW spilled) seal was and 1P-11B began secured.to leak as well A review of closed CRs since 1995 identified this CR as a potential concern. It has been deemed that insufficient justificaqion was provided for closure of this item. Review this item and provide Justification for acceptance of the leakage through the CC pump seals that is routinely experienced. ________--DATES---------------------------------------------------- ---------- Source Record: 02/16/95 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correct ion ****** Commitment: Eval Due: 05/01/97 Corr Act Due: Action Create: 02/07/97 Orig Eval Due: 03/31/97 Eval Done: Orig CA Due: Corr Act Done: Action Closed:
----------PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
Responsible for Overall Action: NMS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: NMS Issue Manager: InitiaQor: Punchlist Administrator:
-______-UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(0z/08/97 Received Action into Group: NMS Responsible Person:
"---" ~--~~
Due Date: 03/31/97 (02/08/97 :) Set Work Priority to 32. Resolution of this question is a regulatory commitmen' . (03/13/97 Requested Due Date: 05/01/97 Changed the Due Date from: 03 (03 is related to This/15/97 closed system outside of co/31/97 to 05/01/97 ntainment issue and allowable leakage.of that type of system. This requires additional research that may be best accomplished by contract engineering resources. Due date changed in order for a contract person to investigate possible answers to the problem.
------REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------------
OSTI ITEM #23
----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
Originating Agency: S stem: NRC Open Item Nu der: N C Status: Related Outages: Engineering Work Type: None,Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = l Actual Hours
=
CONDITION REPORT CR 95-149 d STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 0 -SYSTEM: INITIATED: 03/09/95 ' CLOSED: MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: :
~XNITIATOR: .- .. ISSUE MANAGER: __...
NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 0 - SW-3838 Failed Its Stroke Test During IT-72 l
- DESCRIPTION:
During the performance of IT-72 on 03/08/85 SW-2838 stroke times in both the open and shut directions exceeded e,stablished acceptance limits. position The (open valve withwas declared motive power inoperabl)e removed as and placed in the fail-safe a result. Significance: SW-2838 supplies service water to the G-02 diesel. NOTE: An en ineerin evaluation was performed on 03/09/95 and it was determinedt$atSW-2$38 is operable as allowed under the ASME Code. STATUS UPDATE: ! (03/13/95 ) Close CR. U e for tracking and trending. ; SCREEMED BY : DATE: 03/13/95 REGULATORY REPORTABLE.....( ?: N TS VIOLATION........ ..... ?: N ! 10 CFR 21................. ( J: N TS LCO............... .... J: N OPERABILITY' IMPACT PER TS. ( J: N JCO REQUIRED............ . J: N MSS REVIEW................ OPERABILITY DETERMINATION.ys c: N J: Y SCAO...................... COM I TMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J:N
): N SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS:
This condition is not a TS violation, and it did not affect plant operability. ; On 03/09/95, SW-2838 was stroke time t9st9d again with the IST j3 cycled Engineer observingits performed) All resu from this testing were within establishea acceptance limits, and fully indicative of normal historical performance. The AOV was observed to move in a smooth and fluid fashion, with no evidence of binding or other abnormality. Air operator pressures were consistent, and indicative of normal performance : for the component. l It has been goncluded that the data gathered on 3/8 is spurious and does not indicate any component degradation. As a result SW-2038 may be considered fully operable at this time as is allowed un, der ASME Code. This CR will be closed with no further action.
REFERENCES:
IT-72 DCS 3.1.17 WO 78677 PBM 97-0200 TREifDING INFORMATION: WHEN-- : NON-OUTAGE FIRST QUARTER OF 1995 WHO : WHY : ROOT CAUSE UNKNOWN WHAT : MECHANICAL AOV VALVE OPERATOR RELATED REGULATORY DOCUMENT - ASME XI RELATED SYSTEM: SERVICE WATER ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE 1 _--.__.___-100 ACTION NEEDED 04/30/97 l r I f +
l ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1
******************************* Responsible Person:
04/28/97
- Trk:.d : CR 95-149
- Urgency: DUE IN 1-15 DAYS
- Act.on Number: 1
- Work Priority: -100 Activity Pending is: ACTION NEEDED
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
SW-2838 Failed Its Stroke Test During IT-72 A review of previously closed CRs for notential operability issuea flagged this CR T iBentifigation of any permanent resolution.his CR wasare These closedrestart withoutissues for Unit 2, 2/27/97. This CR addresses a failure of an IST of SW 2838 (SW discharge from the G-02 diesel). The closeout notes that the valve was restroked and the times were acceptable and therefore there was no issue. One year later however the valye failed to open upon demand and the diesel was declared inoperable. This is a recurr4ng problem. Although this CR is more admin $strat4ve in nature it ooints out a hardware failure that could make the diesel inoperable thereYore it should be reopened to identify the possible hardware problem.
-----DATES- -------------------------------------------------------------
Sour e Record: 03 /09/95 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** Comm tment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: 04/30/97 ActLon Create: 02/27/97 Orig Eval Due: Orig CA Due: 04/01/97 ActLon Closed: Eval Done: Corr Act Done:
----------PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
Responsnble for Overall Action: NMS Respons:.ble for Current Pending Activity: NMS Ispue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPD, ATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(03/12/97 ) Received Action into Group: NMS Due Date: 04/01/97 Responsible Person: (03 28/97 I agree that there is a hardware problem with SW-2838 and SW- 839. The) problem is the accumulation of scale on the valve disc along wig the valve trim design. The valve trim does n9t accomodate scale build up very well and the result is sticky operation. Two fixes are available. To ensure operability of Qhe valve until the valve can be replaced a call-up to clean the valve internals every 9 months will be created for these two valves. The long term fix will be to, replace these valves with a valve trim that can accomodate scale build-up. (03/28/97 ) Passed to for acceptance of work. (04/03/97 ) Returned to for additional work. (04/03/97 ) , Action cgmpleted Qo this point is good., I, agree that best corrective action at this point is to increase the periodicity of cleaning of SW-2838 and SW-2839. This item is returned to document initiation of the required callups. (04/03 Additig/97 Changed the Due Date from: nal time provided to complete new work 04/01/97 to 04 g callups for of initiatin/30/97 valve inspections. creation ) CR (04/03/97 or tne 97-0718c,all-ups. required Action 1 has been closed to this action for l I
----------REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------------
IT-72 DCS 3.1.17 WO 78677
----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
Originating Agency: S stem: NRC Open Item Nueer: N C Status: Related Outages:
, ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 2 i 04/28/97 Engineering Work Type: Evaluation -Parson Hours: Original Estimate =
Current Estimate = Actual Hours = l 1 e
. - -_- . _ _ - - . - . . _ - . . -- .- . - - ~ - . -. -
CONDITION REPORT CR 95-158 i r l STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 1 SYSTEM: INITIATED: 03/11/95 CLOSED: i MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: ! INITIATOR: ' ISSUE MANAGER: ! NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 0 i Degraded Instrument Air Lines to Unit 1 PORVs DESCRIPTION: On 3/11/95 during while conducting the Hot Loop Inspection on Unit 1 it I was noted by operations personnel that the copper tubing supplying Instrument Air to the PORV's was leaking air. Upon further inspection it was noted that the lines were in very (to the point where the operator was afraid to touch them) poor . condition Since Unit 1 was alreadv , shutdown and still above 360F iQ was decided to repair the air line ' before LTOP was required. Technical Specification 15,3.1. A.5.a (3) was enter d and Work Order 9503177 was completed to repair and return the air 1 ne to service. Signif4cance Degraded instrument air line could have affected PORV ; operatirn. STATUS UPD TE: (03 ) The' portion of degraded copper tubing was in the region wher/15 e he 95 IA lings are connected and disconnected to the PORVs for maintenance / testing activities. , (03/17 enginee/95
) The instrument air line was inspected by the comoonent and it was determined that the tubing had worked '
r its way loose trom Lne fitting at the connecting to the PORVs and was not degraded via corrosion or wastage. Engineering felt that this was not a generic type of problem and that there was no reason to believe that a similar problem exists on Unit 2. , PORV operation was not degraded, the PBNP PORVs have a backup nitrogen supply line for an event where instrument air is lost to the valves. (03/17/9 - ) This issue is clos 9d based upon the above evaluation. The operabil ty of the PORVc was not in question due to the nitrogen bagkup supply 1 ne and it was determined that this problem was not a generic issue. No further actions necessary at this time. Closed. > (02 ) This CR has been reopened following a review of all l gd out Cwa for op.erabil4ty concerns in order to comply with a NRC clos /24/97 ' commitment. Issue manager. SCREEWED BY : DATE: 03/15/95 REGULATORY REPORTABLE.....( : N TS VIOLATION.............. ?: N 10 CFR 21................. ( : N TS LCO............ ....... J: Y OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. ( : N JCO REQUIRED.............. J: N MSS REVIEW................ : N SCAO...................... J: N OPERABILITY DETERMINATION.sL : COM ITMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J: N SUPPOR ING DETERMINATIONS Th s event is not a Violation of any PBNP Technical Specification and is 2 Technical S imolemen repairstothePORV'sinsbecificationgntrywasrehuiredto notarekortab4eevent. rument air line. The PBN PORV's are not safety related and both are allowed to be inoperable at power for 1 hour oth 9 rwise the unit must be placed in hot shutdown. This action was not required since the Unit 1 was already in hot shutdown.
REFERENCES:
TS 15.3.1.A.5 WO # 9503177 TRENDING INFORMATION: WHEN--: OUTAGE FIRST QUARTER OF 1995 WHO : . WHY - : UNEXPECTED EQUIPMENT FAILURE WHAT~~ : MECHANICAL PIPING RELATED SYSTEM: INSTRUMENT AIR 8300 - IA line was not degraded, tubing had worked its way out of the fitting. 09II9EE ___E81_____D9II98.EIDI9E___.__ __ EEEE9EEIELE_SE3E99 ______99E.9 DIE. 1 6 REVIEW EVALUATION 04/30/97 , l i
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1
- Responsible Person:
04/28/97 1 Trkid: CR 95-158 1
- Urgency: NOT DUE / IN CLOSEOUT
- Action Number:
- Work Priority: 6 eee****************************
Activity Pending is: REVIEW EVALUATION
TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Degraded Instrument Air Lines to Unit 1 PORVs This CR has been reopened following a review of all closed CRs for operability concerns. On 3/11/95 during while conducting the Hot Loop Inspection on Unit 1 it wasd by operations personnel that the copper tubing supplying Instrument Air t PORV's was leaking air. Upon further inspection it was noted that the linee in ver afraid to $ouem)y . poor Sincecondition Unit 1 was(toalready the point where and shutdown the operatorstill above was360F it was decided pair the air line before LTOP was required. Technical was entered and Work Order 9503177 was completed Specification 15.3.1 tr to repair and return (3)line to service. This CR was closed without consideration for a potential similar problem onthe Unit 2 PORV air supply lines. Provide sufticient justification for Unit 2 to allow for closure of this item. _____-----DATES------------------------------------------ ---------- Source Record: 03/11/95 ******* Evaluation ** ***** ****** Correct --------- ion ****** Commitment: " Eval Due: 04 97 Corr Act Due: Action Create: 02/24/97 Orig Eval Due: 04 Eval Done: 04 97 97 Orig CA Due: Corr Act Done: Action Closed:
PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
Responsible for Overall Action: PRE Responsible for Current Pending Activity: SEN Issue Manager: . Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(03/03/97 closed) Issued to Group: NMS this the first time. Suggest either referring back to . or as the problem is between the local air isolation and the PORV, this item could be for the RC system engineer. (03/12/97 Issued to Group: PRE Responsibility for RCS issues transferred to system engineer in PRE. (03/14/97 ) Received Action into 'Group: PRE Responsible Person: Due Date: 04/30/97 (03/14/97 Set Work Priority to 6. (04/14/97 Passed to for acceptance of work. (04/ 97 ) Passed to for Verification. On 4 97, a walkdown of the Unit 2 InstrumenQ Air and Nitrogren backup to the V's was conducted by the RC system Engineer and the Instrument Air system engineer. During this walkdown the physical condition of the tubing was visually inspected and mecha,nical connections were snooped to inspect for leakage. Yo degradation (as subject of this acgion item) was notei Tuck tape residue was found on a portion of the tubing for the Nitrogen backup system. A separate Condition Report was written to document and track this condition. This action item can be closed.
REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------------
MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
Originating Agency: S stem: NRC Open Item Nuder: N C Status: Related Outages: - U2R22 Engineering Work Type: Evaluation Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours =
CONDITION REPORT CR 95-205 STATUS: OPEN UNIT: O SYSTEM: INITIATED: 03/23/95 CLOSED: MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: INITIATOR: _ _ . . . . . . . ISSUE MANAGER: NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS:_ _ _ _ _ _ .1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 1 Potentially InadequateFeed Flow to Steam Generators Without Operator Action DESCRIPTION-When using the .1opor driven AFW pumpsthe d..scharge (P38 A to fill the steam generaters, s pressure controller are placed in manual/B) and adjusted to achieve the desired flowrate. Should there be an automatic start signal of these AFW pumps (during a postulated accident senario), this automatic start signal would be blocked. The result could be inadequate taken to adj(usteed flow. flow to the steam generators unless operator action is Significance: AFW flow could pgssibly not meet the required flow assumed in the design basis accident analysis. STATUS UPDATE: (07/16/96 inerefore, No furth 9 r actions are necessary based on the evaluation this CR is considered closed. results. SCREENED BY : DATE: 03/29/95 REGULATORY REPORTABLE.....i ) : N TS VIOLATION.............. : N 10 CFR 21................. ) : N TS LCO.................... JCO
- N OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS.
MSS REVIEW................ OPERABILITY DETERMINATION.L (( 1 0:N J:N J: REQUIRED.............. SCAO...................... COMMITMENT................
- N
- N
- N SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS:
At this point the accident analysis values for feed flow are assumed to be adequate, however further analysis is recommended to determine actual required accident flow and the time required for its initiation. Also, it should bg determined if operator action can be taken credit for within the analysis. Therefore no reporting is believed required at this time', but further evaluatio,n needs to be pursued.
REFERENCES:
PBNP FSAR SECTION 14 TRENDING INFORMATION: WHEN--: NON-OUTAGE FIRST QUARTER OF 1995 WHO : WHY : NOT AN ADVERSE CONDITION WHA F : REGULATORY DOCUMENT - FSAR RELATED MECHANICAL VALVE OPERATOR RELATED SYSTEM: AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE 2 59 EVALUATION OVERDUE 04 97
- l. ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 04/23/97
******************************* Responsible Person: - .* Trk:.d: CR 95-205
- Urgency: DONE
- Act:.on Number: 1
- Work Priority: -100 l Activity Pending is: DONE
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Potentially InadequateFeed Flow to Steam Generators Without operator Action Evaluape to be the required Also,AFW accident determine if flow creditandcan theberequired taken in timeframe for it the accident analys+nitiated.is for operator action to adjust the AFW pump discharge pressure controller. DATES--------------------------------------------------------------- Sour e Record; 03/23/95 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ** *** Comm tment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: 02 28 96 Action Create: 03 30 95 Orig Eval Due: Orig CA Due: 02 28 96 Action Closed: 07 16 96 Eval Done: Corr Act Done:06 28 96
----------PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
Responsible for Overall Action: NSA . Responsible for Current Pending Activity: Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(03/30/95 ) Received Action into Group: NSA Responsible Person: (08/15/95 ) Requested Due Date: 02/28/96 (08/15/95 Changed the Due Date from: << BLANK >> to 02/28/96 , 1 (05/23/96 Passed to ~" for acceptance of work. j (05/23/96 ) Like many systems at Point Beach the auxiliary feedwater I system serves more than one function. It is use8 during shutdown and startup for steam generator level control. It is also a standby emergency system,while the, units are operating for refilling the steam generators following an accident. The Point Beach accident analysis is done assuming the plants are operatingat 100% power. it assumes that In theand auxiliary fe9d water will start accident respondanalysis,ically automat for those scenarios which cause a plant condition that requires AFW actuation. The condition report describes a plant condition other that that assumed in the accident, analysis (100% power),in which the auxiliary feedwater system may require some operator actions to respond to an emergency actuation. This condition does not violate the PBNP accident analysis, and does not place the plant outside its design basis. Previous evaluations of the need for operator action to control auxiliary feedwater operation were performed in response to Generic Letter 81-14, AFR #A-P-90-12-073 (See calculation N-91 -037) , and AFR #A-P-90-12-075 (documented in LER 91-001-00, WE to NRC letter VPNPD-91-149 These evaluations concluded that as long as operator actions would). occur within 5 minutes no deleterious impacts would result. The condition report describes a plant condition when the auxiliary feedwater system is under manual control by the operator. If an actual AFW actuation would occur while the system is being controlled and moniyored by the operator it is expected that the operator could respond within the 5 minute time frame evaluated earlier, and that this would be rapid enough to allow for an adequate accident respone. No further actions are needed to close out this condition report. (06 Passed to for Verification. Like/28/96 many systems at Point Beach, the auxiliary feedwater system serves more than one function. It is used during plant shutdown aa startup for steam generator level control. It is also a standby emergency system whiletne units are operating for refilling the steam generators following an accident.
, ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 2 04/28/97 -The Point Beach accident analysis is done assuming the plants are operatingat 100% power. In the accident analysis, 1Q assumes that t
auxiliary feed- water will start and respond automatically for those scenarios which cause a plant condition that requires AFW actuation. Thisconditionreportdescribesaplantconditionotherthanthat assumed n the accident analysis 100% power) L system would rgquire some(operator action to respond to an emergency $n which the auxiliary feedwater ! actuation. This condition Boes not violate Qhe PBNP accident analysis, and does not place the plant outside its design basis. Pravious evaluations of the need for operator action to control auxiliary feedwater operation were performed in response to Generic Letter 81-14,
'AFR #A-P-90-12-073 (See calculation N-91-007), and AFR #A-90-12-075 (documented in LER 91-001-00, WE to NRC letter VPNPD-91-149). These evaluations concluded that as long as operator actions would occur within
! 5 minutes no deleterious impacts would result. This. condition report describes a plant condition when the auxiliar. feedwater system is under manual control by the operator. If an actual AFWactuation would occur while the system is being controlled and it is expected that m9nitored within thebythe operator, 5 minute time frame evaluated earlier,the and operator that could respond this woula be rapid enough to allow for an adequate emergency response.
'No further actions are needed to close out this condition report.
(07/16 i PLA Closure of Item. Based o/96n the ini assuming that ti.Qial is is conditions not somethingof the CR,is govered inis which thecorrect in accident analysis. I agree with the analysis that 5 minutes will be adequate for operaenr acedon and is taken credit for in the accident analysis. Based on this time. s evaluation,CR Therefore, this may be closed out.no further actions need to be performed at
----------REFERENCES---------------------------------------------------------- 'PBNP FSAR'SECTION 14 i ----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
Originating Agency: S stem: NRC Open Item Number: N C Status: Related Outages: Engineering Work Type: None Specified Person Hours: Original Es(imate = J Current Estimate = Actual Hours = l i l
. . ~ . - _ _ - - -- . -. - - - . . . - - - - . - . . .- .
l
, ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 ! ******************************* Responsible Person: . . . .
04/28/97 1
- Trk$d:
- Acti CR 95-205 2 *
- Work Priority:
Urgency: PAST DUE 1-30 DAYS 59 eeeee,on Number: Activity Pending is: -EVALUATION OVERDUE.
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------ ~Potentially InadequateFeed Flow to Steam Generators Without Operator Action This CR has been reopened following a review of closed CRs for operability concerns in order to-comply with a NRC commitment.
to fi:.1 the steam When using the motor driven AFW pumpsgeneratore rs discharge are o pressure .n manualcontrolle(P38 and A/B) laced 1 a4 justed to achiee desired flowrate. Should Qhere be an automatic start signal of these AFWs senarig), this automatic start signal (during a postulated accidentThe result could be inadequate feed wouldlocked. J flow to the steam generators u operator action-is taken to adjust flow.
-]
This'CR documents that ag long as ooerator action occurs within 5 minutes, l no deleterious effects will occur It also states that proceudr9s would -) direct operator action. Review this determination to ensure it is valid 1 and sufficient.
------.---DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
Sourge Record: 03/23/95 ******* ********* ****** Correction ****** Commitment: Evaluation Eval Due: 04 /15/97 Corr Act Due: 1 Act4on Create: Action Closed: 02/24/97 Orig Eval Due: 04/15/97 Eval Done: Orig CA Due: Corr Act Done: l l
----------PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
Responsible for Overall Actign: NMS ' Responsible for Current Pending Activity: NMS Issu9 Mana Initiator:ger- 1 l Punchlist Administrator:, )
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(03/13/97 , Received Action into Group: BMS Due Date: 04/15/97
- ~ ~ ~ - ~
Responsible Person: (03/13/ 71 Set Work Priority to 59. Priority based on congern for AFW ooerabi ity under postulated conditions. If this is not a valid concern, then pr ority is much lower. Priority also based on potential for this being a startup issue. (03 Per OI-62A 4.4.8 ed in manual are: 1)whe(n flow) plac/28/97 tothe only times a faulted S/G the c9ntrol switch is is intentionally
. blocked; 2)during startup and shutdown; 3) approved special testing; 4)when necessary to defeat the-automatic shut signal to the other unit's MOV (in the same train); and 5 n to both
'Hunits inorder to feed o)during ne U1 S/G concurrent frQm oneauto pump AFWS and one initiatio/G U2 S from the other motor drivenpump. This, Condition Recort is applicable to items 2 and During these evolutions the heightened awareness by the operator
'3 above.ing
- controll the Aux Feed system would improve the response to an actuation as far as control of S/G level is concerned. The previous evaluation of this Condition Report was adequate and correct. This item should be closed.
-(03/28/97 ) Changed Responsible Person: From ( ') to ( ).
(03 Changed Res From ( ) to (, ) ged Responsible Chan/31/97 Group:ponsible From (BMS) Person: To (NMS).. (04/08/97 Passed to for acceptance of work.
----------REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------------
----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
! Originating Agency: System: NRC Open Item Nuder: NRC Status: Related Outages: U2R22
. Engineering Work Type: Evaluation . Person. Hours: Original Estimate =
1 _, ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT- -PAGE 2 Current Estimate = 04/28/97
, Actual Hours =
l i i l, I i e e i 4 i l I
CONDITION REPORT CR 95-333 e STATUS: OPEN UNIT: O SYSTEM: DG INITIATED: 06/13/95 CLOSED: MSS #2 ADMINISTRATOR: INITIATOR: i ISSUE MANAGER: .. NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 1 Turbocharger Low Oil Pressure Alarm Following Engine Run DESCRIPTION: a turbocharger low oil pressure Following the alarm,was, performance received. of TS-83,il Turbocharger o pressure was 7 psig and the alarm setpoint is 8 psig. Significance: Turbocharger lubrication is required 15 minutes to 3 hours after shutdown to prevent thrust bearing damage from repeated fast hot starts. STATUS UPDATE: (11 ) The required actions are being tracked by WO # 9506767. This/22/95is not a SCAQ therefore no futher action is required. SCREENED BY : DATE: 06/14/95 REGULATORY REPORTABLE.....( : N TS VIOLATION......... .... : N O ERA I i * $P i'P$A'iS. !N O REQ $$bl.lll'.l...*.~ . . N MSS REVIEW................ 9 : N SCAO...................... : N OPERABILITY DETERMINATION.c : COM I TMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : N SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: This is not a Technical Specifica4 ion violation nor is it a reportable event. The diesel generator remains operable per JAW as long as the oil pressure is greater than or equal to 6 psig. In this case pressure never got below 7 psig.
REFERENCES:
WO TAG # 77545 ARB C101 2-5 WO 950676,7 TRENDING INFORMATION: WHEN-- : NON-OUTAGE SECOND QUARTER OF 1995 WHO : WHY : SITUATION WAS NOT COVERED BY PROCEDURE WHAT--: OPERATIONS PROCEDURE ELECTRICAL INSTRUMENTATION OR CONTROL DEVICES STATUS CONTROL - SETPOINT RELATED SYSTEM: DIESEL GENERATOR The procedure did not address the situation of a low oil pressure alarm following the, diesel run. The low pressure alarm is not a problem as long as the pressure is greater than or equal to 6 psig. ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE 2 ACTION NEEDED ___________-100 ___________________________ _____________________________________
1 . ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 I
- Responsible Person: 04/28/97 '
t Trkid: CR 95-333
- Urgency: DONE l
- Action Number: 1
- Work Priority: 11 i
- e*****************************
Activity Pending is: DONE
TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Turbocharger Low Oil Pressure Alarm Following Engine Run Evaluate cause of turbocharger oil low pressure alarm and recommend corrective action to prgvent recurrence. Provide written guidance to operations in the interim.
-----DATES---------------------------------------------------- ----------
Sour e Record: 06/13/95 ******* Evaluation *** ***** ****** Correct ion ****** Comm tment: Eval Due: 11 30 95 Oriq Eval Due: 11 30 95 Corr Act Due: Orig CA Due: Action Create: 06 14 95 Action Closed: 11 22 95 EvaI Done: 11 14 95 Corr Act Done: ..__.-----PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------- Responsible for Overall Action: MPE Responsible for Current Pending Activity: Issug Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(06/26/95 ') Received Action into Group: MPE Responsible Person: (06/26/95 Set Work Priority to 11. (06/26/95 Changed the Due Date from: << BLANK >> to 11/30/95 (Q6/27/95 Written guidance provided to G/27/95 for distribution to operations regarding this issue. In briefthe low lube oil pressure is not The alarm and switch are nuasance alarms. an theopera ability current concern,tch prgssure swi is incapable of cerforming in the application and therefore will be replaced. (11/10/95 ) This work item is covered under WO 9506767, assigned to MTN. The responsible engineer is Accetpable replacements have been found and replacement will be pursueo at the earliest convenience. (11/10/95 Passed to for acceptance of work. (11 ) Passed to for Verification. Clos e/14 / 95 CR to WO 9506767. Switcnes to be replaced. this No(11/22 PLA Closure of Item. fur /95ther action required.
----------REFERENCES---------------------------------------------------------- <
WO TAG # 77545 ARB C101 2-5 WO 9506767
--...-----MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
Originating Agency: S stem: DG ! NRC Open Item Number: N C Status- ! Related Outages: i Engineering Work Type: None Specified i Person Hours: Original Estimate = l Current Estimate = l Actual Hours = l
, ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 l ******************************* Responsible Person:
04/28/97 I l t Trkid: CR 95-333
- Urgency: NO DUE DATE ASSIGNED l
- Action Number: 2
- Work Priority: -100 l Activity Pending is: ACTION NEEDED
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Turbocharger Low Oil Pressure Alarm Following Engine Run . There is a concern that the operability of this component was not clearly defined. There 4s not much supporting information to document operability of the diesels with this situation still in place. This is part of ceview of previously completed action items. _____ DATES--- ---------------------------------------------------------- - Sour e Record: 06/13/95 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** Eval Due: Corr Act Due: Comm tment: Action Create: 03/18/97 Action Closed: Orig Eval Due: Eval Done: Orig CA Due: Corr Act Done:
----------PEOPLE-------------------------------------------------------------- ,
Responsible for Overall Action: BMS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: BMS Isgue Manager: InitiaQor: Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(04/01/97 RFH) Received Action into Group: BMS Responsible Person:
----------REFRENCES----------------------------------------------------------
WO TAG # 7754:5 ARB C101 2-5 WO 9506767 __.-------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- -------------------------------- Originating Agency: S stem: DG NRC Open Item Number: N C Status: Related Qutages: Engineering Work Type: One,Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours = l I l l 4 I I i i
CONDITION REPORT
. CR 95-408
! STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 1 SYSTEM: DG INITIATED: 08/10/95 CLOSED: MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: INITIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER: NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 0 l G03 Small Capacity Exhaust Fan Out of Service i DESCRIPTION:/95 On 08/10 at 1645 the Turbine Hall watch discovered that the G03 Small Capacity Exhau,st Fan (W183B) had no indicating lights. Further investigation revealed that the fan was tripping on thermal overload and was subsequently declared out of service. Significance: W183B is a safety related component for G03 operability. With the fan OOS, and if outside air gemperature is > 84F G03 would be declared OOS. This would result in Unit 1 being in a 7 day LCO. Corrective Actions: The Control Room verified that outside air L tempgrature had not exceeded 84F during the day shift. The 19n was repaired by Maintenance and returned to service at 2348 on E./10/95. STATUS PDATE: (08 30/95 ) This CR $s being closed out based upgn the corrective The act ons completed by Maintenancefailed part wascomponent turned over to the(replacement of failed fuse block). enginee but nothing was discovered that would cause concern for similar breakers, at PBNP. No additional actions are warranted under this CR. Closed. (02 This CR has been reopened following'a review of all clo/24/97 sed out CRs for operabili y concerns.
- issue manag .
SCREENED BY : DATE: 08/11/95 REGULATORY REPUKTAube..... : N TS VIOLATION.............. : N 10 CFR 21................. : N TS LCO.................... : Y OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. : N JCO REQUIRED.............. : N MSS REVIEW................ : N SCAQ...................... : N OPERABILITY DETERMINATION. : N COMMITMENT................ : N SUPPORTING This event DETERMINATIONS: was not a violation of any PBNP Technical Specification and is ngt a reportable event. The Small Capacity Exhaust Fan (W183B) for G03 1s a satety related and QA related component that affects the operability of G03. TS 15.3.7 requires that this fan be operable for G03 to be considered operable when outside air temperature is greater than 84F (see DCS 3,1,17 for TS interpretation). The operations crew verified that outside air temperature had not exceeded 84F on 8/10/95, therefore TS 15.3.7 LCO was not required to be entered into. Investigation into the problem by Maintenance revealed that the thermal overload heater block had failed. This failed component of the circuit breaker was replaced by scavenging a cart off of spare breaker on 1B-40 cubicle 1B52-407. The failed heater block,has been forwarded to engineering for additional investigation into the cause of the failure. The reason that no spare carts were available thru CHAMPS is due to the fact that the document upBates for the new EDG project have not yet been completed.
REFERENCES:
TS 15.3.7 DCS 3.1.17 TRENDING INFORMATION: WHEN--: NON-OUTAGE THIRD QUARTER OF 1995 WHO : , WHi : UNEXPECTED EQUIPMENT FAILURE l WHAT--~ : ELECTRICAL BREAKER RELATED t REGULATORY DOCUMENT - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION RELATED l SYSTEM: DIESEL GENERATOR l t ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE 1 -100 EVALUATION NEEDED
l
. ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 ******************************* Responsiole Person: 04/28/97
- Trk:.d : CR 95-408
- Urgency: NO DUE DATE ASSIGNED
- Act: on Number: 1
- Work Priority: -100 eeeeee*************************
Activity Pending is: EVALUATION NEEDED
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
G03 Small Capacity Exhaust Fan Out of Service ! This CR has been reopened following a review of closed CRs for operability concerns in order to comply with a NRC commitment. On Cty08/10/95 ExhaustatFan1645 the Turbine Hall watch discovered that the G03 Small (W1b3B),had no indicating lights. Further investigation revethat the fan was tripping on thermal overload and was subsequently declaredof service. No rgot gause of thig problem was identified and the potential appl icability for this. failure,to affect the other EDGs was not, addressed. Provide the necessary information to support the closecut of this CR.
----------DATES----
Source Record: 08/10 Commitment:
/95----------------------------------------------------------
******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ******
Eval Due: Corr Act Due: Action Create: 02/24/97 Orig Eval Due: Eval Done: Orig CA Due: Corr Act Done: Action Closed:
----------PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
Responsible for Overall Action: BMS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: BMS Isrue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE *-------------------------------------------------------------
(02/24/97 -) Received Action into Group: BMS Responsible Person: (02/24/97 ) Changed Responsible Person: From ( ) to ( ). (03 . Changed Res ged Responsible Group:ponsible Person: From ( to ( Chan/18/97 From (BMS) To (DB). Changed Responsible section: From (SEN) To (NES).. _________-REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------------
----------MISCELLANEOUS-------------------------------------------------------
Originating Agency: System: DG NRC Open Item Number: NRC Status: Related Outages: U2R22 Engineering Work Type: Evaluation Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours = l t l
___ _ _ _ .._ _ .~ l l
' CONDITION REPORT l CR 95-409 1
! STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 0 SYSTEM: DG INITIATED: 08/09/95 CLOSED: I l MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: l INITIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER: .- ! NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 0 During Performance of TS-83, G03 Indications Spiked During Switch Transfer DESCRIPTION: Durimg the performance of TS-83 " Emergency Diesel Generator G-03 Montily Test' the indicated KW ioad KVAR and amps spiked down and back up waen the governor control switch,was _op,erated to increase KW loading on the EDG, G-03 was operating at 1800 KW at the time. Si nif Unanticipated equipment response. G-03 was de ined to be operable since the event could n(NOTE:ot be repeated after erm$cance: in tial occurrence.) STATUS UPDATE: (08/11/95 This CR was submitted for documentation and tracking gurgosesonly,Theev9ntcouldnotberecreatedandtheoperabilityof
-0 was not in question. Issue closed l
(02 This CR has been reopened following a review of all clos /24/97 9d out CRs for ooerability concerns in order Eo comply with a NRC commitment. - 1ssue manager. , SCREENED BY : DATE: 08/11/95 ' REGULATORY REPORTABLE.....( : N TS VIOLATION............ .
. N 10 CFR 21................. : N TS LCO............. . ...
N OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. : N JCO REQUIRED..... .. .... : N MSS REVIEW................ : N SCAQ............... .. . . N OPERABILITY DETERMINATION. : COMMITMENT................ : N SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: This event was not a violation of any PBNP Technical Specification and is not a reportable event. While this surveillance test is a technical i specification required callup, TS-83 was completed successfullv. The ! on-shift crew attem but could not successfully do so.pted to recreate the soiking event,The CR was submitted for documentation and tracki purposes. A copy of this event has been forwarded to the System Engineer responsible for the EDGs for evaluation /information purposes. No further actions warranted.
REFERENCES:
TS-83 t TREMDING INFORMATION: ) WHEN--: NON-OUTAGE THIRD QUARTER OF 1995 j WHO : j WHY : ROOT CAUSE UNKNOWN WHAT--: REGULATORY DOCUMENT - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION RELATED OPERATIONS PROCEDURE ELECTRICAL INSTRUMENTATION OR CONTROL DEVICES SYSTEM: DIESEL GENERATOR ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE
~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~i-~~~~~iU6~~~~~EyhLU TEbb bbbbbb..................--..........--......
j l t : l 1 i i i
a ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 4****************************** Responsible Person: 04/28/97
- Trk:.d : CR 95-409
- Urgency: NO DUE DATE ASSIGNED
- Act:.on Number: 1 Work Priority: -100 Activity Pending is: EVALUATION NEEDED
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
During Performance of TS-83, G03 Indications Spiked During Switch Transfer This CR has been reopgned following a review of all closed CRs for operability concerns in order to comply with a NRC commitment. During the performance Tthe indicated of TS-83,d KW load amps KVAR, an spiked down and back up when the" Emergency Diesel Generator G govecontrol switch was, operated to increase KW loading on the EDG. G-03 was opeg at 1800 KW at tne time. Review this CR and provide justification for operability.
----------DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
Source Record: 08/09/95 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: Act4on Create: 02/24/97 Orig Eval Due: Orig CA Due: Action Closed: Eval Done: Corr Act Done:
----------PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
Responsible for Overall Action: bMS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: BMS Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(03/03/97 ) Received Action into Group: BMS Responsible Person:
----------REFERENCES---------------------------------------------------------- ----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
Originating Agency: S stem: DG NRC Open Item Number: N,C Status: Related Outages: U2R22 Engineering Work Type: Evaluation Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours =
i CONDITION REPORT CR 95-444 l s , STATUS: OPEN UNIT: O SYSTEM: DG INITIATED: 09/07/95 CLOSED: MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: INITIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER: . NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 2 ! G-02 Steady State Voltage Exceeded Expectations Following Load Rejection l Testing DESCRIPTION , During the performance of IWP 91-116*Y2, steps 4.5.22.and 4.9.2 of "EDG i G-02. Retrain to Train A Pre-Tie-in Preoperational Test", the steady state G-02 voltage following a full load reiection from a nominal 2850 KW and 2140 KVAR loading exceeded the procedural limit of 4784V. Voltages obtained were 5200V (step 4.5.22) and 5425V (step 4.9.2). Significance: Obtained voltages exceeded acceptance criteria of IWP test procedure. STATUS UPDATE: (10/12 ) This issue ic being closed out based upon the evaluation l and cor/95 .rective measures taken under action item #1. Closed. I (02 clo/24/97 sed outThis URs CR for has been reopened following a review of all operability concerns in order to comply with a NRC l commitment, e manager. l l l SCREENED BY : DATE: 09/08/95 REGULATORY REPORTABLE. 10 CFR 21.............
...(
... (
?: N
?.N TS VIOLATION..............
TS LCO....................
- N
. N l
OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. ( J: N JCO REQUIRED.............. : N ; c: N MSS REVIEW................ SCAO................... .. : N OPERABILITY DETERMINATION.(t J: COM I TMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N ] !' SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS; l This event is not a violation of any PBNP Technical Specification and is L not a reportable event. Normally G-02 4s.a safety related component but l it is currently considered out of service while undergoing retrainin,g to i l the A train as part of the new emergency diesel generator project. The load rejecti9 n test was being conducted as part of the preoperational testing requirements _for G-02 following the retraining activity. The voltage results of ghis test will need to be evaluated for acceptibility and potential. additional testing requirements. j
REFERENCES:
IWP 91-116*Y2 WO 9511090 TRENDING INFORMATION: WHEN"-- : NON-OUTAGE THIRD QUARTER OF 1995 WHO : CIVIL / SEISMIC ENGINEERING WHY : LIMITS GIVEN IN PROCEDURE WERE LESS THAN ADEQUATE WHAT--. MODIFICATION RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT RELATED SYSTEM: DIESEL GENERATOR 1205 - Limit chosen was 110% of 4160V, should have been no-load voltage CSE - Responsible for EDG project l ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE 2 56 DONE 10 31 95 3 100 EVALUATION NEEDED
1 ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1
******************************* Responsible Person:
04/28/97 : 1
- Trkid: CR 95-444
- Urgency: DONE
- Action Number: 1
- Work Priority: 56 eeeee**************************
Activity Pending is: DONE
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
G-02 Steady State Voltage Exceeded Expectations Following Load Rejection Testing With G-02 at loaded at the 2000 hour rating ,(2850 KW, 2140KVAR) a load rejection test was performed with a IWP required acceptance criteria for steady state voltage limit of 4784V, the actual voltages obtained following the test were 5200V and 5425V. Evaluate the acceptability of these voltages on G-02 following a full load rejection. (Point of contact is Dick Hornak). Source Record:DATES-09 /07/95 ******* Evaluation *** ***** ****** Correction ****** . Commitment: Eval Due: 10 31 95 Corr Act Due: Act$on Create: 09 08 95 Orig Eval Due: 10 31 95 Orig CA Due: Action Closed: 09 13 95 Eval Done: 09 13 95 Corr Act Done: __.-------PEOPLE------------------------------------------------------------- Respons$ble for Overall Act1 9n: EEG _ _ _ _ . Responsible for Current Pending Activity: Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator: ________.-UPDATE '------------------------------------------------------------- (09/11/95 ) Issued to Group: EEG (09/13/95 Received Action into Group: EEG Responsible Person: Due Date: 10/31/95 09/13/95 Set Work Priority to 56. i(tem are based) upon a need to a8 dress the effect of the overvoltage The priority assignments for this condition which did occur on the operability of G02 prior to placing it service toward the end of the Fall Unit 2 outage. When this concern has been addressed it may be appropriate to revise the priority for further actions. (09 ) Passed to . for Verification The/13/95 scope 9f the effort required by this action item _s identical to that of action item #2 for this same condition report. Th: s item will therefore be closed (09/13/95 3) PLA Closure of Item. Since This actionisitem this item has been issued twicethis act:_on redundant ing closed is be(see out CR 95-444 #2 to Action Action #2) . under this condition report. Closed w: th no action taken. (10/12 i U2R21 outage activity 8261 will inspect the potential transfo/95rmers for evidence of damage due to overvoltage. Activity 7730 will monitor GO2 voltage during the GO2 Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) tesQing agtivity 7720. The completion of 7720 establishes GO2 Availability to 2A05 bus... operability is established later upon successful completion of ORT-3 SI + Loss AC testing. The work order associated with the inspection of the PT's and monitoring ofGO2 output voltage is 9511090.
----------REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------------
IWP 91-116*Y2 __________ MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- -------------------------------- Originating Agency: S stem: DG NRC Open Item Number: N C Status: Related Outages: U2R21 Engineering Work Type: None,Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate = 40 Current Estimate =40 Actual Hours = 0
l
. ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 .******************************* Responsible Person:
04/28/97 ;
# Trknd: CR 95-444
- Urgency: DONE
- Actnon Nuder: 2
- Work Priority: 56 :
Activity.Pending is: DONE : I - - - - - - - - - - T I TLE AND . TAS K D ES CR I PT I ON - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ; l G-02 Steady State Voltage. Exceeded Expectations Following Load Rejection LTesting. During the cerformance of a full load rejection test of G-02 from 2850KW arQ of the preoperatighal testin of G 02, a steady i and state2140 voltage m as $owing fol the load rejection of 5425h was obtained. This , value was in excess of the acceptance test limit of 4784V (115% of 4160V). ; L Evaluate the accentability of a G-02 open circuit voltage of 5425V. There ! I is concern that this high of voltage notential may have an adverse effect nn nther EDG,co,mponents powered oft of the EDG. Point of contact: : i !
' NOTE: A simila'r test is anticipated to be completed next week for G-01. !
t
---- -----DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
' Sour e Record: 09/07/95 ******* Evaluation *** ***** ****** Correction ****** Eval Due: 10 31 95 Copr Act Due: l Comm tment: , Action Create: 09/08/95 Orig Eval Due: 10 31 95 Orig CA Due: ; Action Closed: 10'12' / /95 Eval Done: 10 10 95 Corr Act Done: l
._____.----PEOPLE---------------------------------------------------- -- ------
I r
- Responsible'for Overall Action
- EEG }
Responsible for Current Pending Activity- ' Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator: !
----------UPDA,TE---------------------------------------------------------~~--- )
(09/13/95 .) Received Action inen Group: EEG Responsible Person: Due Date: 10/31/95 Set ~ Work Priority to 56. The priority assignment for this
'j09/13/95 item are based) ungn a need to aadress the effect of the overvoltage condition which aid occur on the operability of G02 orior to placing it in service toward Qhe end of the Fall Unit 2 outage. When this concern has been addressed it may be appropriate to revise the priority for further ,
actions. [ (09/13/95 I have had several discussions with a representative of MKW concerning the accentability of the voltage levels which we experienced. He indicated that their recommendation was that the no-load output voltage be limited to'no more than 20% of the. rated output. He gave me no specific reason for this level other than it was standard throughout their industry. He also suggested that we adjust the drogp in the diesel generator control such that their is not as singnificant a difference between the full load and no load voltage. Th4s information was forwarded to Dick Hornak- of the di 9 sel team and will be incomorated into the test procedure for the G01 delsel test as mentioned in the description.
.(09/25/95
- Changed Responsible Person: From ( to (.
(10/09/95 Passed to i for acceptance of work. (10/10/95 complete Evaluation Passed t 10/o/_95. for Verification. i 9 Recommendations are contained on the l attachment. I (10/12ha/95s completed EEG PLA Closure of Item. a thorough evaluation of the potential adverse effects . that the overvoltage condition may have had on G-02 and its associated electrical components. This engineering evaluation has concluded that ! there were no adverse affects to the G-02 generator by the 30% overvoltage l primarily because the event occurred under a no-load condition and for a . ven brief duration (less than one. minute) . - Auxilian components connected I to G-02 were also* evaluated and it was concluded that this overvoltage , condition was not detrimental-to-any components operability. The evaluation concluded that it would be prudent to perform aaditional y testing and inspection of the following items: 1-I
- ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 2 04/28/97 ;
1 Visual ins ) i (cam) age due ovgrheating. to pection of G-02 potent $al transformers (2) Verification for evidence of the operation of of the i elapsed time, indicator and fuel transfer motors #1 and #2. (3) Inspection and calibration of reverse power relay 67RP and overpowe relays G7P1 and 67P2. , i These additional measurgs are currently being implemented under WO #. 9511090 during U2R21 prior to returning G-02 to service. This issue is being closed out based upon the evaluations findings and the corrective measures being taken under this work order. i
----------REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------------
WO 9511090 J IWP 91-116*Y2
----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
Originating Agency: S stem: DG NRC Open Item Nuder: N C Status: Related Outages: Engineering Work Type: None,Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours = l l l i e l I i i l i
l
. ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 ******************************* Responsible Person: 04/28/97
- Trknd: CR 95-444
- Urgency: NO DUE DATE ASSIGNED l
- Actnon Number: 3
- Work Priority: -100 <
******************************* l Activity Pending is: EVALUATION NEEDED ----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION--------------------- --------------------
i - G-02, Steady State Voltage Exceeded Expectations Following Load Rejection Testing <
\
This CR has been reopened following a review of closed CRs for operability I concerns in order to comply with a NRC committment. l DuringtheherformanceofIWP91-116*Y2, st ms i 5.22 and 4.9.2 of "EDG G-Orain tg rain A Pre-Tie-in Preoperational Test" the steady state G-02 voltollowing a full load reiecQ1on from a ncaminal $850 KW and 2140 KVAR loadinceded the procedural limit of 4784V. Voltages obtained were 5200V (step 4.5.nd 5425V (step 4.9.2).
*his CR adqquately documentation addressed the
/ Justification forG02G01concern,ified.however, was ident Provide ng sufficient justification to support the closecut of this CR.
---- -----DATES----------------------------------------------------
Sour e Record: 09/07/95 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correct ion ******---------- Comm tment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: Action Create: Action Closed: 02/24/97 Orig Eval Due: Eval Done: Orig CA Due: Corr Act Done:
----------PEOPLE----------------------- --------------------------------------
Respons BMS Respons$ble ible for forOverall Action:Pending Act371ty: BMS Current Issu9 Manager: Initiator: ~ Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE------------ -------------------------------------------------
(03/03/97 Received Action into Group: BMS Responsible Person:
----------REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------------
----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
Originating Agency: System: DG NRC Open Item Nuder: NRC Status: Related Outages: U2R22 , Engineering Work Type: Evaluation Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours = 1 e
CONDITION REPORT CR 95-489 STATUS: CLOSED UNIT: 0 SYSTEM: DG INITIATED: 10/04/95 CLOSED: 04/09/97 MSS #: 95-2n ADMINISTRATOR: INITIATOR: i _ - . _ _ . , ISSUE MANAGER: . . . NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 0 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 4 Repetitive Failures Of Thermal Overload Relays l DESCRIPTION: Since the new emergency diesel generators were placed in servige, there have been three failures of thermal overload r9 1ays installed in the Motor Control Centers 1(2)B-40 The failure is such that one of the 1 phases of a relay will open while the load is running. When Qhe phase l onens, the load will stop. The overload relav, requires resetQing before the load can be restarted. When the relays first started falling the failure is random and will only occur once out of several times the load l is run. These failures occur with no actual overload condition present. - The significance: The f ailure of one of the overloads on MCC 1(2)b-4 0 can cause a safety-related piece of equipment fed by the MCC to not run. This could result in the associated emergency diesel generator G-03 (04) failing to operate when required. Corrective actions: Westinghouse has been contacted to evaluate the style of overload relays to determine if they find a generic problem with,the relays. A message will be sent to the EMD Owners Group to find NPRDS and Nuclear Network out if others searches were are findingand performed similar failures.ilar revealed no sim problems at other planQs A question was put out on Nuclear Network to query other plants of similar occurrences and possible corrective actions. STATUS UPDATE: . The responsible engineer has agreed to writting a Operability Determination. TI 95-007 Trend Investigation which requested engineering to analyze rep,etitive breaker therm,al overload relay . failures for a generic failure mode is being closed out to this CR. TI l 95-007 was initiated 8/31/95. ! Part 2F three possible causes are considered: Heater element undersize, ! excessive motor load, or inadequage powere quality. The first two l causes have been pretty muc dismissed and the focus falls on the l third. At this time, 11/20 95 there ha,s been nn resolution from l Westinghouse as to a possib e explanation. notified the
- resoonsible engineering staff that the 90 day clock is running on the l part 21 issue. A copy of said E-Mail is attached to the CR package. ,
(08/31 e collected . The root cause has been initiated and is on going. The ( evidenc/96 thus far does not indicate a generic problem with I this over load device. Other similar devices in the plant have two heaters on the two outer contacts. These relays have three heaters. The middle heater coupled with the two outer heaters may be causing the center contact to overheat and trip. ; Operability determinations have been completed for this condition. (04/09/97 ' By raising the setpoint to 115% has eliminate the
)
repetitive. alarms and trips. This is to prevent recurrence per the System Engineer. 1 SCREENED BY : . . DATE: 10/05/95 .
! REGULATORY REPORTABLE.....[ >: N TS VIOLATION.............. : N 1 l 10 CFR 21................. ; ):Y TS LCO....................
JCO REQUIRED.............. N N OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. s J:N : N MSS REVIEW................ J:N SCAQ...................... ' l OPERABILITY DETERMINATION.(c J: N COM I TNENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : N '- SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: Three failures over a short t4me frameindicate the possibility 9 of(operati n of the new diesel generators) a generic problem Until turther investigation determines the root cause an Operability 2 - Determination will be written. This will provide engineering evaluation as to why or why not this safety-related is operable. This is not considered reportable at this time. If a o9neric problem is discovered and this event is considered a significant safety hazard, it should be reported per 10 CFR 21.
REFERENCES:
1
. . . . = - . - _ . _ ~ . _ .. -_
TI 95-007 CR 94-566 CR 94-585 CR 95-408 PBM-0931 CR 96-714 l PBM-97-0200 TRENDING INFORMATION: WHEN--: THIRD NON-OUTAGE QUARTER OF 1995 WHO : VENDOR
.WHY : -DESIGN EQUIPMENT ENVIRONMENT WAS NOT CONSIDERED WHEN DESIGNED
' WHAT-: ELECTRICAL REWORK RELATED INSTRUMENTATION OR CONTROL DEVICES l ' jSYSTEM: DIESEL GENERATOR . Rework because of the. repetitive failures of thermal overload relays. It is ! suspected that three neaters rather than two on the relays for overcurrent , detection is the problem. ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE 2 -100 DONE 06 96 3 -100 DONE 11 95 4 -100 DONE J3 97
+
6
?
i t l l i I
._. .]
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 04/28/97
******************************* Responsible Person: -
- Trk$d: CR 95-489
- Action Nuder: 1 Urgency: DONE Work Priority: -100 Activity Pending is: DONE
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Repetitive Failures Of Thermal Overload Relays Continue to evaluate to determine if the three failures reflect a generic common failure mode or are three isolated incidents.
----------DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
Sourge Record: 10/04/95 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ** *** , Commitment: Eval Due: Corr'Act Due: 12 20 95 Action Create: 10 05 95 Orig Eval Due: Orig CA Due: 12 20 95 Action Closed: 01 02 96 Eval Done: Corr Act Done:12 19 95
----------PEOPLE----------------------------------------------------------- --
Responsible for Overall Action: EPE Responsible for Current Pending Activity: Issue Mana Initiator:ger: Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(10/09/95 ) Received Action into Group: EPE Responsible Person: (11/17/95 Requested Due Date: 12/20/95 (11 Changed the Due Date from: << BLANK >> to 12/20/95 The/20/95 evaluation should be completed by the requested date. (12/19/95 Passed to for acceptance of work. (12 Passed to for Verification. The/19/95 thermal overload relays replaced were considered failed due to a condition associated with the reset feature of the relays. themselves actuated at ap The relavs depending on the size of the heaters used.propriateHowever levels of current,if a relay actuates th handle may have to be depressed more than,once to reset the relay.e reset Action item #3 to this condition recort addresses the actions taken to { determine whether a generic common failure mode problem exists with the < thermal overload relays. The conclusion of the actions taken is that there is no generic problem with the thermal overload relays causing them to fail. The reason why the thermal overload relays actuated is still unknown. The center phases of each relay replaced show definite signs of heating. Powerquality monitoring has been performed on the loads whose thermal overload relays tripped. The monitoring revealed nothing unusual with any of the loads or the power source. To ensure the relay was not the problem, testing has been performed on one of the thermal overload relays that were replaced. The testing showed that the thermal overload relay would not trip unless sufficient current existed. The thermal overload relays on 1+2B-40 have heater elements on all three chases. The other Motor Control Centers (MCCs) around the plant use heaters on the two outer phases only. Since the center heater is between the two other heaters, the heat may be concentrating in the center and causing the relay to actuate. The heater elements used in the thermal overload relays on 1+2B-40 are sized larger than for similar sized loads on other MCCs to account for the extra heating obtained from using the center heater. However, the larger revent ! heatermaynotbeenoughtokuturethermaloverloadrelayactuations,the have occurred. To minimize occasional relay actuations that the center heater will be removed from the relays on 1+2B-40 and the heater to the other MCCs in the plant and in ! elements accordancewill bemanufacturer's with resized similarrecommendations. The difficulty in resetting the relays is not considered significant. If the relays do not inappropriately actuate, resetting is not an issue. But in case a relay does actuate, an entry has been made in the Operations
- ~
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE .2 04 l Notebook stating that the reset button may have to be depressed more than/28/97 once, and gives operators indications that the relay has been reset. !( 1/02 >) PLA Closure of Item. ! T e ev/96idence collegt thus far does not indicate a generic problem with
- t is over load devices. Other similar devices in the plant have two heaters on the two outer contacts. These relays have three heaters. The middle heater coupled with to two outer heaters may be causing the center contact to overheat and trip.
----------REFERENCES-------------
CR 9 d'555'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~----------- I [R [~kk CR 95-408 PBM-0931
----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --- ----------------------------
Originating Agency: S stem: DG NRC Open Item Nuder: N C Status: , Pelated Outages: Engineering Work Type: None,Specified Person Hours: Original EsQ1 mate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours = i
)
i f l t
. ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGs 1 ******************************* Responsible Person: 04/28/97 Trkid CR 95-489
- Urgency: DONE Action Number: 2
- Work Priority: -100 I
l Activity Pending is: DONE
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Repetitive Failures Of Thermal Overload Relays Revise / update NP 5.3.6 10 CFR 21 Reviews and Reporting, to reflect recent changes to.the Federal Code with particular attention to commercial grade dedication. l.---------DATES--------------------------------------------------------------- l Sourge Record: 10/04/95 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ** *** l Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: 06 28 96 l Action Create: 10/09/95 Orig Eval Due: Orig CA Due: 02 02 96 i Action Closed: 08/31/96 Eval Done: Corr Act Done:07 29 96 l ----------PEOPLE--------------------------------------------- ---------------- Responsible for Overall Action: TROPS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: Issue Manager: InitiaQor: Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(12/01/95 ...) Received Action into Group: OER Due Date: 02/02/96
~~
Responsible Person: : i (02/02 /96-Change due dateChanged to allowthe meDueto also Date from: incorporate 02/02/96 to 03 nce to the some guida/01/96 procedure re posting requirements and to devise a system to enable us to l Reep the postings 2n to date as specified in 0 CFR 21. While delivering an intragroup lec'. "e to the OE group on 1/25 96 I realized that the two postings at PBNP d the one in the PSB in M lwa,ukee, were not posted properly. Workin, interim measures.g with MBK of the Regulatory Group to take the proper (03/01/96 ---) Changed the Due Date from: 03/01/96 to 04/01/96 (03/01/96 Changed Responsible Person: From ( - to ( . (03/29/96 ' ) Requested Due Date: 04/19/96 , (03 ) Changed the Due Date from: 04/01 procedure change request has been completed The/29/96 a/96 to 04/19/96 nd another change to the same procedure is being incorporated into this revision. The additional time will allow for the merging of the two revisions and a techinical review of the final product by QA. (04 forw/11/96arded ) The procedure changes were reviewed by QA and were to the induividuals responsible for ' Dedication' for a very close look to ensure adequac The procedure change is still expected to becompletedbythepresentguedate . l l (04/18/96 ) Requested Due Date: 05/31/96 i procedure has passed technical review04/19/96 to 05/31/96 (04 Changed the Due,Date from: The/19/96 and has begn submitted to typing. The new due date will allow for typing and issue of the procedure. (06/03/96 Requested Due Date: 06/28/96 (06 .. Changed the Due Date from: 05/31/96 to 06/28/96 The/06/96 thislast grou issue. p of'NPs were issued on may 31st and NP and 5.3.6 not partmeof wasinformed I contacted the front office personnel they that the next issue will be on 6/28/96. The conversion contributing to the delay. The new due date will allow to WORD may be front office i l lpersonneltocompletechangesandissueprocedure. i (06 Changed Res From ( to I ged Responsible Chan/07/96 Group:ponsible From (OER) Person:To (TROPS).. (07/01/96 Requested Due Date: 07/31/96 l
- ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 2 04/28/97 (07/29/96 ) Passed to for acceptance of work.
(07 ) Passed to for Verification. The/29/96 procedure has been issued and no further action is required. Recommend , closure. (08 PLA Closure of Item. The/31/96 procedure) change has been completed.
----------REFERENCES--------------------- ------------------------------------
TI 95-007 CR 94-566 CR 94-585 CR 95-408 PBM-0931
----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
Originating Agency: S stem: DG NRC Open Item Nuder: N C Status: Related Outages: Engineering Work Type: None Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours = i a 3 5 L h (
. . . .. -- . . . ~ . -. . . . - . _ . _ - - - - .
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1
******************************* Responsible Person: 04/28/97
- Trkid: CR 95-489
- Urgency: DONE
- Action Number: 3
- Work Priority: -100
***ee**************************
Activity Pending is: DONE
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Repetitive Failures Of Thermal Overload Relays This event has possible 10 CFR 21 reporting implications. Track this event in accordance with NP 5.3.6 to ensure that the proper groups are kept informed and reporting requirements are met. 1
----------DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
Sourge Record: 10/04/95 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ** *** Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: 11 30 95 Action Create: 10/09/95 Orig Eval Due: Orig CA Due: 11 30 95 1 Action Closed: 12/08/95 Eval Done: Corr Act Done:12 01 95 _.--------PEOPLE-------------------------------------------------------------- l Responsible for Overall Action: OER Responsible for Current Pending Activity: Issu9 Manager: Initlayor: Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(10/17/95 ) Received Action into Group: OER Responsible Person: Due Date: 11/30/95 of (10/18/95 aQ the..10/17795
) I presented themeeting issue to the 95-18 MSS).along with the I outlined EPE,ifics spec of the issueregularin terms of the(MSS historical development of the trend the CR which identified the trend (CR 95-489 dtd 10/04/95), the operability dated 10/10 and the soecific steps or Part w'riteup by21 responsibilities as outlined by the/95, regulation and in NP 5.3.6.
dure is 10/04/95; The starting thus, of the 60-day the completion date must evaluation be no laterclock than per proce/95. 12/03 I explained that a finding of part 21 applicability must involve a " basic component" defect which imposes a " substantial safety hazard." and I stated that it was our belief that the issue would probab3y not be a part 21 issue based on the investigation conducted thus far by However I recommended to the chairman that we keep the issue ana tne evaluation,open until the equipment root cause was definitiveknown. discussed the equipment issue in detail. There are two problems associated with the breakers which are being looked at separately:
- 1) Thermal overload acQuations and once actuated. Regarding issue; 1
- 2) Difficulty in resetting the relays, One of the following is a oossible cause of relay actuation: the heater elements may be und 9rsized, there may be excessive Investigation motor load,dorno reveale the power quality may be inadequate.
problem with the heater sizina calculation. Current measurements were taken at the MCCs for the loaas which have tripped showing normal levels. However, the current measurements were ngt take,n when the MCC voltage was the highest it couldmay, Distortion be and some indicate a l distortion was noted in the current traces problem with power cuality, and the company power qualiev specialist has l been contacted for discussion. Following the outage intends to take voltage trages on the MCCs during high voltage condi6 ions following U2R21 at nig transformers.ht with both units on line with lightly loaded X04 issue may lead to evaluating one of Finding a1)oower the following options: lowering quality the 4kV bus voltages; 2)X06 replacement; t 3'*706 tap changes. l The thermal overload reset problem is believed to be a design deficiency , ir that the full length of travel of the reset handle cannot be attainea ! when the extension handle is attached to the reset handle. However ! engagement can be made if the reset is done " smartly". EPE has initiated an OPS Notebook Entry advising of this condition. Westinghouse was contacted on 0/16in this regard, but we bave not received a response from them as of 10 17. I told the MSS that I would bring this issue back to them when we are further down the line toward understanding the root cause. (12/01/95 -) and I discussed this issue in the MSS I l
. ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 2 '
04 Subcommiytee meeting dtd 11/29/95 (MSS 95-20). had completed furthe/28/97 r testing in re to the power quality aspect. The results have been mixed. Initial results after the equipment- was first set up showed quality i
' problems, but after adjustment by ., the company power quality l specialist there does not appear to be power quality roblems. There has notbeena,failuresincetheequipmenthasbeeninstalSed.
and I recommended to the MSS that the issue be closed out from the perspective of a part 21 concern. This is based not on our finding a but based on what has been excluded by definitive the-investigation. caupe tor the failures, Because heater elements appear to be sized properly, the re lays themselves bench test and because the situa okay, and tion the is not being seen anywhere else in industry, it was strongly felt that the '
issue did not triager part 21 notification. I also reviewed the two things which must be found in order to have a part al finding - a defect in a basic component, and that defect bein reasonably associated with a substantial safety hazard. I reviewed t e criteria for a qubstantial safety hazard with the MSS, and they agree we did not meet this threshold (see NP 5.3.6). the staff concluded that Therefore,d CFR 21, an the chairman accepted that conclusion.the issue was not reportable iaw 10 further investigation into the the failure mode continues, as tracked by other action items associated with the parent condition report. (13/01/95 ) Passed to . ~ for Verification. (12/08 Withou/95t PLA Closure of Item. being) able to definitively identifying a manufacturing defect it was determined not to be a Part-21 issue. Bench testing did not identify any degraded or less than functional components or piece parts.
----------REFERENCES---------------------------------------------------------- .
TI 95-007 CR 94-566 CR 94-585 ' CR 95-408 PBM-0931
- - - - - - - - - - M I S CELLANEOUS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --------------------------------
t Originating Agency: S stem: DG NRC ODen Item Number: N C Status: Relatbd Outahork Engineering es: Type: None,Specified ! Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours = l l l l l t 5 i . 1
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 '5****************************** Responsible Person: 04/28/97
- Trkid: CR 95-489
- Urgency: DONE
- Work Priority: -100
- Action Number: 4 Activity Pending is: DONE
TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Repetitive Failures Of Thermal Overload Relays A review of previously closed CRs for potential operability issues flagged this CR. This CR was closed without identification of ny permanent resolution. These are restart issues for Unit 2, 2/27 97. CR 96-714 identi.fies a corrective action to this concern and should be referenced. The CR basically states that the recurring failures are not safety significant. Since that time we have readjusted all the applicable thermal overloads due to the recurring failures. Although the issue is probably th9 or a newclosed,ld CR shoube created to reflectCR's should final be updated to reflect current information resolution.
DATES----------------------------------------------------
Source Record: 10/04/95 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correct ion **---------- *** Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: 03 97 Action Create: 02 27 97 Orig Eval Due: Orig CA Due: 03 97 Action Closed: 04 09 97 Eval Done: Corr Act Done:04 97
PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
Responsible for Overall Action: EIS Responsible for Current PeIding Activity: Issue Manager: InitiaQor: Punchlist Administrator:
UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(02/28/97 ) Received Action into Group: EIS Responsible Person: Due Date: 03/30/97 (03/27/97 Passed to -" for acceptance of work. (04/03/97 Passed to for Verification. All of the enermal overload relays associated with loads on 1+2B-40 have been adjusted to 115% of the rated heater values to prevent nuissance tripping. This was done in accordance wit. quidance contained in the component Instruction Manual for the overload relays. Since the adjustments have been made, no trips have occurred. The adjustments have stopped the nuissance tripping. No further action is required. (04/09/97 PLA Closure of Item. All of Qhe thermal overload relays associated with loads on 1+2B-40 have been ad]usted to 115% of the rated heater values to prevent nuissance tripping. This was done in accordance with guidance contained in the Component Instruction Manual for the overload relays. Since the adiustments have been made, no Qrips have occurred. The adjustments have stopped the nuissance tripping. No further action is required. System Engineer's response.
----------REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------------
TI 95-007 CR 94-566 , CR 94-585 CR 95-408 I PBM-0931 rR 96-714 1
--- ------MISCELLANEOUS----- ------------- --------------------------------
l Originating Agency: S stem: DG J NRC Open Item Nuder: N C Status: i' Related Outages: Engineering hork Type: None,Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours =
CONDITION REPORT CR 95-496 STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 0 SYSTEM: 4.16KV INITIATED: 10/08/95 CLOSED: MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: INITIATOR: . ISSUE MANAGER: NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 0 50/51 Over Current Device Of Unit 1 Station Service Transformer X13 Hi-Side Breaker 1A52-58 Was Damaged DESCRIPTION: During routine 4,16 KV breaker racking operations associated with Section XI surveillance testing on Unit 2 high head safety injection, the "A" phase 50/51 ovgr current device of Unit 1 station service transformer X13 high side breaker 1A52-58 was damaged. The breaker handling tool contacted the glass of the 50/51 device, causing it to shatter. The significance: Potential loss of 1B03 if relay had actuated. Corrective actions: Engineering / maintenance were contacted to verify operability of the breaker. E-mail sent to those who operate breakers, discussing the recent changes to OI-35. Entry was made to the Operations Notebook. STATUS UPDATE: (10/10 Noteboo/95 The E-Mail messages and the entry into Operations DCP)k were considered sufficient to keep operators and maintenance personnel informed fo the changes to OI-35. SCREENED BY . - DATE: 10/10/95 REGULATORY REPORTABLE.....( : N TS VIOLATION.............. : N 10 CFR 21................. L : N TS LCO............. ...... : N OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. L : N JCO REQUIRED.............. : N MSS REVIEW................ : N SCAQ...................... : N OPERABILITY DETERMINATION. : N COMMITMENT................ : N SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: This incident can be considered a near miss. The actual incident did not degrade or affect the operation of safety related equipment. The glass in front of the over current relay flag was shattereB, but the relay' remained intact with no loss of function. This occurrence did violate our Technical Specifications. It is not considered a reportable incident.The concern in this CR was a change in the OI-35, the change came out on 10/6/96 and was not properly communicated,to the different groups. The operations note was to advise ! people of this change.
REFERENCES:
OI-35 REVISION 22 ATTACHED E-MAILS l TRENDING INFORMATION: l WHEN -
- FOURTH QUARTER OF 1995 NON-OUTAGE l WH !N EQU E COMMUNICATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS (SPAC) l
-WHAT--: ELECTRICAL RESTART ISSUE BREAKER RELATED !
SYSTEM: 4.16 KVAC ELECTRICAL i Per discussion with the Operations Trainer who issued the referred to E-Mails, He believed that root cause to be the timing of issuing a revision to an existing procedure. makes it
- to communicate To revise changes OI-35 to all just the priorpeople to theinvolved.
outage \\For an example l difficultan operator getting off mids on Thursday morning is not required to return to ! work until the following Monday. If the procedure comes out on Thursday I afternoon and the operator is called in on overtime due to the outage on I Saturday, how does he get 14) to speed on an informational use only procedure? ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE ! 1 -100 RECEIVE ASSIGNMENT I
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1
*oooooo*ooooooooooooooooooooooo Responsible Person: 04/30/97 o Trkid: CR 95-496 o Urgency: NO DUE DATE ASSIGNED 0 Action Number: 1
- Work Priority: -100 oooooo******** ****************
Activity Pending is: RECEIVE ASSIGNMENT
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
50/51 Over Current Device Of Unit 1 Station Service Transformer X13 Hi-Side Breaker 1A52-58 Was Damaged This condition report is identified by Duke engineering as needing to be reviewed to ensure that the operability and screening are complete. The review is part of our restart commitment #23. When I screened this CR the focus was the issuance timing of 01-35. Please review and verify is, you agree.
----------DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
Source Record: 10/08/95 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: Action Create: 04/30/97 Orig Eval Due: Eval Done: Orig CA Due: Corr Act Done: Action Closed:
----------PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
Responsible for Overall Action: EIS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: EIS Issue Manager: Initiator: . Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE-------------------------------------------------------------- ----------REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------------
OI-35 REVISION 22 ATTACHED E-MAILS
----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
Originating Agency: System: 4.16KV NRC Open Item Number: NRC Status: Related Outages: Engineering Work Type: None,Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours = m.
CONDITION REPORT CR 95-526 STATUS: OPEN UNIT: O SYSTEM: DG INITIATED: 10/18/95 CLOSED: MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: INITIATOR: . . . . _ _ _ . . ISSUE MANAGER: NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACT10N6: A G-04 Declared Out-of-Service.Due to Failed Relay DESCRIPTION: On 10/18/95 at 1705, the field of G-04 failed to flash during the performance of Emergency Diesel Generator G-04 Montly Test (TS-84). G-04 was declared out-of-service. Significance: Entrance into a seven day LCO for Unit 1. STATUS UPD TE: (10/23 95 i This issue has been closed based upon the immediate correc ive actions taken under the LCO and the WO to repair the failed relay. Site Engineering recommended no further actions necessary. Closed. (10/30/95 thi}s event. Additional issues have been raised by other groups concerning Issues at hand are:
- 1. Was the failure indicative of inherent problems with this type of relay? (No other occurrences documented) . 2. Is it necessary to establish callups to prevent future failures? (Component Engineer believes not necessary). 3. Should we inspect G-03? (G-03 recently passed a similar test with noQ identifiable problems). 4. Do we need to stock spare relays and since exact replacements are not available should we have the SPEED completed? (Replacement being pursued}. 5. Should a modification with a surge protection be installed to minimize future failures?
As it stands now this issue will remain closed based upon the recomm9ndations o,f Site Engineering. The component engineer will discuss the failure of this LR relay with the EMD owners group to determine if ) similar failures or problems have occurred elsewhere. It has also been i determined that G-03 will be taken out of service for inspection during the spring of 1996 and ththis inspection will include looking at the LR j relay. . l (11/20 still p/96 i Issue closed. It was discovered that Engine Systems, Inc. question) rovides technical support and partfor the twe of emergency diesel (generators PBNP has. thatincluding No the actions required. Closed. (02 i This CR has been reopened following a review gf all clos /24/97 ed out Uwn for ooerability concerns in order to comply with a NRC commitment. - s ue manager. SCREENED BY : . DATE: 10/23/95 REGULATORY REPORTABLE.....i ): N TS VIOLATION.............. ?.N J: Y 10 CFR 21................. s J: N TS LCO.................... OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. J: N JCO REQUIRED.............. J: N MSS REVIEW................ (( ): N SCAO...................... J: N OPERABILITY DETERMINATION.h ): COM I TMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . /: N SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: This event was not a violation of any PBNP Technical Specification and is not a reportable event. The failure of G-04 to start as required 1 2 was shutdown i dictated entry into and defueled at the LCOtime TS 15.3.7.B.1.f for Unitand testing of this event) (Unit of G-03 and G-01 to verify operability of these EDGs. Site Engineering (S. Bacalzo) evaluated the failure of the "LR" relay in the field flash circuitry of G-04 and determined that the relav had dirty or slightly corroded contacts and that this problem did not pose an oberability concern for G-03 (which was tested satisfactorily prior to the G-04 event). G-01 and G-02 were not an issue concerning this relav since this type of "LR" relay is not used on these machines. The relay has been repaired under WO 9511318 and returned to service following testing.
REFERENCES:
TS 15.3.7.B.1.F TS-84 WO 9511318 MKW 6090F02501 SH. 3 ESI FAX ATTACHED TRENDING INFORMATION: WHE L ,: NON-OUTAGE l l l
FOURTH QUARTER OF 1995 WHO : WH'r : UNEXPECTED EQUIPMENT FAILURE f4 HAT-: REGULATORY DOCUMENT - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT RELATED SYSTEM: DIESEL GENERATOR ACTIONS ~ PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE t 2 EVALUATION NEEDED __________-100 f
)
1 1
! . ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 ooooooooooooooooooo*ooooooooooo 04/28/97 Responsible Person: t Trk:.d : CR 95-526 o Urgency: DONE o Act:.on Number: 1
- Work Priority: 19 oooooo************************* j Activity Pending is: DONE
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------ l G-04 Declared Out-of-Service Due to Failed Relay This event describes a situation where G-04 was declared out-of-service due to a failed "LR" relay. Based upon the recommendations from various
! portions of NPBU engineering staff it has been determined that it would be f prudent to orocure a replacement spare relay for stock in th9 event of ruture problems with the G-03 "LR" relay in question. Singe this l relay is no lon er available a/G-04 suitable replacement should be identified, i PEED prepared documenting its acceptance for use (S. l procured and aBacalzo will prepare the SPEED) . < Sourge Record:____------DATES-10 /18/95
******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction *=****
Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: 03 97 Act$on Create: 10 30 95 Orig Eval Due: Orig CA Due: 03 97 Action Closed: 11 20 96 Eval Done: Corr Act Done:11 96 PEOPLE-------------------------------------------------------------- Responsible for Overall Actign: MPE Responsible for Current Pending Activity: Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(11/14/95 . Received Action into Group: MPE '" , Responsible Person: (01/17/96 - Changed the Due Date from: << BLANK >> to 03/31/97 (01/17/96 Set Work Priority to 19.The LR Relay is no longer manufactured or supplied by MKW Power Systems. MKW sold the Nuclear businessto ESI. The subject relay is shown on Portec drawing D72 12100 710. There are two relays designated as "LR" in the G-03 i control circuits. The relay in question is the " latching /04 enE ne relav for the excitation of the generator.is no longer The ori ITE GT . # J11B20 2 POLE LATCHING, available,ginal relay,since ITE sold its relay busin,ess. PB requisition # 10006383 will source and procure like replacements for these relays. The original action requested was to find and procure a replacement for an obsolete _plece of equipment. The replacement relav is being sourced through United Controls an alternate sup lier of QA S/R sgrvices and components. Thenewreiaysmustbequallkied1EandSeismic. The vendor will update PB on the new relay and the lead time to deliver.
----------REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------------
MKW 6090F02501 SH. 3 ESI FAX ATTACHED
----------MISCELLANEOUS-------------------------------------------------------
Originating Agency: System: DG NRC Open Item Nuder: NRC Status: Related Outages: Engineering Work Type: None,Specified Person Hours: Original EsQ1 mate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours = l l
. ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 ******************************* Responsible Person: 04/28/97 I t Trkid: CR 95-526
- Urgency: NO DUE DATE ASSIGNED l ********************************
Action Number: 2
- Work Priority: -100 Activity Pending is: EVALUATION NEEDED
! ----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------ l G-04 Declared Out-of-Service Due to Failed Relay l This CR has been reopened following a review of all closed CRs for operability concerns in order to comply with a NRC commitment. On 10 I cerfo/18/95 at 1705,Diesel the field of G-04 failed to flash during the rman Emergency Generator G-04 Montly Test (TS-84I. G-04 was Beclared outervice. CR concludes that there is no implications for G03 since it had recently passed its related TS test However, without knowing the cause for the : G-04 failure, long term apblicability or susceptibilty to G-03 is not known. exists for Review G-04 thisdue CRto and determine a similar if an potential operability concern failure.y ______----DATES--------------------------------------------------------------- Source Record: 10/18/95 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: Action Create: Action Closed: 02/24/97 Orig Eval Due: Eval Done: Orig CA Due: Corr Act Done: PEOPLE-------------------------------------------------------------- Responsible for Overall Action: BMS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: BMS Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(03/03/97 ' Received Action into Group: BMS Responsible Person:
----------REFERENCES---------------------------------------------------------- - - - - - - - - - - M I S J.
i 'JL LAN EO U S - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - S
- - stem:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - DG Originating NRC Open Item ?, Nuder: v :
N C Status: Related Outages: U2R22 Engineering Work Type: Evaluation Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours = 1 4
, . _ _ _ - = _ _ _ . ,_. . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ _,
CONDITION REPORT CR 95-636 i STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 0 SYSTEM: SW INITIATED: 12/12/95 CT.OSED : MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: INITIATOR: ..l ISSU2 MANAGER: NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 0 P-32E Motor Requires Replacement DESCRIPTION: While performing preventative maintenance on service water pump motor - P-32E-M per WO 9507274 subsequent to cleaning the stator, insulation resisQance values of gr, eater than approximateIV 150 KOHM or a ' polarization index of greater than approximately 1.3 could not be obtained. The minimum acceptable resistance is 1.5 MOHM and the minimum acceptable polarization index is 2.0) Significance: P-32E is saftey related equipment and cannot be returned l to service until the motor is replaced.
' Corrective actions: A WO was written to replace the motor with the spare and repair the defective motor.
STATUS UPD TE: (12/13 95 ground d pump ) The corrective action for this CR is to re with a spare and repair the grounded motor. place A WO thehas been written to track the completion or this action. There is no additional action required, this CR is closed out to the WO. (12/28/95 # Before the spare motor could be installed it was determined that it did not meet the specifications required for installation. CR 95-655 was written to document this situation. The ! original P-32e motor was sent to Kurtz electric, cleaned and baked. The insulation resistance and polorization index reading were sat following baking. The motor was returned to PBNP and re-installed to its orignal l location. , i SCREENED BY : . _____ . DATE: 12/13/95 REGULATORY REPORTABLE..... ?: N TS VIOLATION.......... ... : N 10 CFR 21.............. .. J: N TS LCO.................. . : N OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. J: N JCO REQUIRED.............. : N l ER B L ' 5i$RNi iIUN ! O ii$$ lll~lll'.l..ll$.ll ! t SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: - The TS's require 4 pumps to be operable (2 from each train) and in this case there are five operable service water pumps (2 from one train and 3 from the other). This is not reportable nor does it require an LCO.
REFERENCES:
WO 9507274 WO 9513241 TS 15.3.3.D.1
~ TRENDING INFORMATION:
WHEN--: NON-OUTAGE FOURTH QUARTER OF 1995 WHO : WHY : UNEXPECTED EQUIPMENT FAILURE WHAT- : ELECTRICAL MOTOR RELATED ELECTRICAL WIRING INSULATION RESTART ISSUE SYSTEM: SERVICE WATER PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE . ACTIONS 4 l-4 1
1 1 ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGF 1 i 04f30/97 l ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo Responsible Person: , o Trkid: CR 95-636 o Urgency: NO DUE DATE ASSIGNED ' o Action Number: 1
- Work Priority: -100 l 00000c************************* i Activity Pending is: RECEIVE ASSIGNMENT i 1
TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
P-32E Motor Requires Replacement As part of the restart commitment #23 we are to review CR for completness f of operability and screening. This Ck was identified as needing further review. Ensure that the operability, and acreening are complete.
DATES------------------------ --------------------------------------
Source Record: 12/12/95 ******* Evaluat ion ********* ****** Correction ****** Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: Action Create: 04/30/97 Orig Eval Due: Eval Done: Orig CA Due: Corr Act Done: Action Closed: )
PEOPLE------------------------ -------------------------------------
Responsible for Overall AL' ion: EIS i Responsible for Current Penling Activity: EIS Issue Manager: , InitiaQor: Punchlist Administrator: _________. UPDATE----------- -------------------------------------------------- J l l
REFERENCES---------------------------------------------------------- l WO 9507274 WO 9513241 1 TS 15.3.3.D.1 l 1
----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- ------------------------- ------
Originating A'gency: S stem: SW NRC Open Item Number: N C Status: Related Outages: l Engineering Work Type: None,Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours = 1 1
l CONDITION REPORT CR 96-023 STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 0 SYSTEM: CC INITIATED: 01/15/96 CLOSED: I MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: ! INXTIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER: ! NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: U l Component Cooling Pumps Have a History of Seal Problems l DESCRIPTION-The co ponent cooling water cumps have had a history of seal leakage.
- On 6/7 95 2P-11A was work orBered for seal leakage and 2P-11B was work ordgre on 12 for the same. Both pu.aps have been on the increased monitoring pro /9/94 gram due to leakage and vibration on 2P-11B. History has shown a continuous problem with the seals on these pumps A mod was
, to be installed on 2P-11B during the fall f "95". The mod was ! d9 1ayed and rescheduled to the week of 2 vibration and temperatures were noQed on/9 2 96.
-11B.
On 1/12/96 incr9ased This,was attributed to the increased Ilow with the Boric Acid Evaporator being on line. 2P-11A was run on 1 for approximately 24 hours with the leak rate of 100,to 150 drops 11A operation. /8/96The pump was2Pthen per minute scheduled which to have was its unacceptable seal for contin however with the replaced prior to theand increase vibration mod installationgaused temperatures on 2P-11B,hflow by hig this may ngt be acceptable. Due to delays in repairs both Unit 2 CC pumps are in a degraded condition. Significance: Potential loss of Component Cooling water to a unit. , Repair of both pumps is planned. 2P-11A with the old type of seals, t 2P-11B with the new moditied assembly. l STATUS UPDATE: (01/17/96 ) This CR identifies a potential loss of CC water to one
- unit under normal power operation alignment
- (02/24/97 CR reopened follgwing review of closed CRs to comply with NRC commitment. - 1ssue manager.
SCREENED BY : DATE: 01/17/96 REGULATORY REPORTABLE.... : N TS VIOLATION.......... ... : N 10 CFR 21................. : N TS LCO....... ..... ...... : N OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. : N JCO REQUIRED... .......... : N MSS REVIEW................ : N SCAQ....... .............. : N OPERABILITY DETERMINATION. : COMRITMENT... ............ : N SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: The MSS has reviewed and approved the IWP 91-159 for the installation of the modified seal assembly. Both of the two Unit 2 component cooling pumps are performing their safety-related functions. They are both l operable. The problem identified in this CR is the potential exist for a loss of CC water to one unit. An operablity determination for the CC oumps was not determined necessary by the system engineering manager. As stated in the CR both pumps are fulfilling their functions. This is not reportable per our TSs. From the basis of TS The component cooling water pump together with one component cooling hea;t exchanger can accomodate the heat removal load on l one unit either following a loss-of-coolant accident or during normal l plant shutdown. If during the post-accident phase the component coolina watgr supply is lost core and containment cooling could be maintained ~ until repairs were effected.
REFERENCES:
l IWP 91-159 50.59 95-117 l FSAR SECTION 9.3.2 TS 15.3.3.C CR 95-128 CR 95-098 CR 96-023 CR 96-054 TRENDING INFORMATION: WHEN : FIRST QUARTER OF 1996 NON-OUTAGE WHO : WHY : CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS NOT YET IMPLEMENTED OR INSTALLED . WHAT : MECHANICAL PUMP RELATED L SYSTEM: COMPONENT COOLING WATER The modification on the Unit 2 "B" pump was to be completed during the last
i refueling. i PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE S.CTIONS 1 41 EVALUATION NEEDED 04/30/97 4 i -G 1 i I, 1 1 1 l 1 j l l f s
I L # ' ACTION. ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE- 1-04/28/97
***************************** Responsible Person:
l**Trkid: L *% CR 36-023 *
- Work Urgency: DUE IN 1-15 DAYS Priority: 41 j** Action Number: 1 Activity Pending is: EVALUATION NEEDED
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION-------- ---------------------------------
Component Cooling Pumps Have a History of Seal Problems Review of closed out CRs flagged this CR as having an insufficient l Operability Determination justification. The component cooling water pumps have had a history of seal leakage. On L5 2P-11A was work ordered for seal leakage and 2P-11B was work ordered on l14--for iprogram the o same Both pumps have been on the increased monitoring leakade. and vibration on 2P-11B. History has shown a l continuous probIem the seals on these pumps. t l~ Review this CR to determine if any Operability Determination documentation l is required for the CC pumps seal problems. t
- .- -------DATES---- --------------------------------------
Sourge Record:- 01/15/96
******* Evaluat ****** Correction ******-
Commitment: Action Creat*:
------------------- ion /30/97 Eval Due: 04 Orig Eval Due: 03'15'97 / /
Corr Act Due: Orig CA Due: Action Closed: 02/24/97 Corr Act Done:
~
! Eval Done: __.-------PEOPLE-------------------------------------------------------------- Responsible for Overall Action: NMS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: NMS i ! Initiator:ger: Issue Mana i Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
L (02/27/97 i Received Action into Group: NMS Due Date: 03/15/97 l' Responsible Person: (02/27/97 ) Set Work Priority to 41. Priority based on concern form operability issue,that must be resolved prior to unit-2 startup. Scope of work for this CR is operability issue only. l (03/12/97 Requested Due Date: 05/01/97 l-f (03/15/97 Changed the Due'Date from: 03/15/97 to 05/01/97 Due to the should l be allowed,proolems tied withintheidentifying what leakage closed system outside should of containment,be or whatan l' extension of the due date is requested. l This would be an, item a contractor could advise us on and possibly give us j a criteria to which may call the seals inoperable. (04/28 te revised Changed the Due Dage from: 05/01 Due da/97 based on supervisor / system eng/97 to 04/30/97ineer review of priorities and work load.
..____.---REFERENCES------------------------------ ---------------------------
-.-..------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
Originating Agency: S stem: CC NRC Open Item Nuder: N C Status: I Related Outages: U2R22 L Engineering Work Type: Evaluation Person Hours: Original Estimate = 3 Current Estimate = Actual Hours = l
-'y, , -
CONDITION REPORT CR 96-033 e STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 0 SYSTEM: SW INITIATED: 01/18/96 CLOSED:
)
MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: INITIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER: l WUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 0 l AFW Pump Room Cooler Has Tube Leak DESCRIPTION;11ary The Aux 1 Feed Pump service water strainer blowdown callup cannot be performed normally. An abnormal SW lineup for Aux. Feed area cooler l RX-66 isolates the flow path. SW to issue from the leak in theAttem HX.pting to perform the blowdown isolatedcauses HX-66 is currently l (SW-109 and 105 are closed) ! Significance: PC 43 part 3 cannot be performed for this strainer . without spraying SW from HX-66. I Corrective Actions: HX-66 is scheduled to be cleaned inspected and j repaired the week of February 19. The callup will not be performed i until April at which time the repairs will be complete. i STATUS UPDATE: (01/26/96 that this Discussion with the ISI engineer responsible for HXs ! Indicates HX will be repaired the week of 19 February. This is prior to the next performance of the callup and is adequate to prevent recurrance. No further action required. SCREENED BY : DATE: 01/25/96 REGULATORY REPORTABLE..... : N TS VIOLATION.............. : N 10 CFR 21................. : N TS LCO.................... : N OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. : N JCO REQUIRED.............., : N MSS REVIEW................ : N SCAQ......................( : N OPERABILITY DETERMINATION. : COMMITMENT................L : N SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: The heat exchanger is not safety related nor is it covered in or TSs. This situation is not reportable.
REFERENCES:
WO TAG 82725 PC 43 PART 3 M-207 SH 1A TRENDING INFORMATION: 4 l WHEN--: NON-OUTAGE THIRD QUARTER OF 1995 WHO : WHY : CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS NOT YET IMPLEMENTED OR INSTALLED WHAT--: MECHANICALOPERATIONS HEAT PROCEDURE EXCHANGER RELATED SYSTEM: SERVICE WATER AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP AREA HVAC ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE ;
-------... -- ......-------- ......-- --........--.... .....------......--- l l
. ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 ******************************* Responsible Person:
04/28/97 i o Trkid: CR 96-033
- Urgency: UUE IN 16-30 DAYS l
- Action Number: 1
- Work Priority: 31 l
Activity Pending is: ACTION NEEDED
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
AFW Pump Room Cooler Has Tube Leak l As part of . . . _ _ _ . . _. s review of previously closed action items it was noted that the implic__tigns a of operability of the AFW pumps or SW system if the Heat Exchanger falls is not aadressed in the corrective actions.
----------DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
Source Record: 01/18/96 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: 05/15/97 l Action Create: 03/18/97 Orig Eval Due: Eval Done: Orig CA Due: 05/15/97 Action Closed: Corr Act Done:
----------PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
Responsible for Overall Action: NMS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: NMS Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(04/01/97 ~) Received Action into Group: NMS Responsible Person: Due Date: 05/15/97 (04/01/97 Set Work Priority to 31. (04/09/97 Passed to for acceptance of work.
----------REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------------
WO TAG 82725 PC 43 PART 3 M-207 SH 1A
----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
Originating Agency: S stem: SW NRC Open Item Number: N C Status: Related Outages: Engineering work Type: None Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours =
. _ - _ _ . . ~ . _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _. - - - _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ . . _ . _ _ _ . . . . . _ _ _ _ _ -..
i
. CONDITION REPORT - CR 96-070 STATUS: OPEN MSS #: .
UNIT: 0 SYSTEM: IA INITIATED: 02//96~~ '-' CLOSED: ADMINISTRATOR: INITIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER: NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 0 IA System Copper Tubing Found Degraded
. DESCRIPTION:
j While crimped onand rounds,kedan crac Ao found (cracked 90 1/2 instrument degrees around air itssystem copper circumterence tubing crimped an additional 90 degrees).' Defect is located upstream of i IA-783, IA isolation to D component cooling water heat exchanger temperature control valve. Damaged area is at the tubing support clamp , closest to IA-783. j Significance: Potential rupture of 1/2 diameter IA line. l NOTE; A priority 2 WO was submitted. DSS briefed crew on actions required should the tubing fail. ! ! STATUS UPDATE: 02 Work was completed under minor maintenance. Condition no ! {ong/21/96, er exists. Close CR i SCREENED BY : DATE: 02/21/96 REGULATORY REPORTABLE..... ): N TS VIOLATION......... .... : N 10 CFR 21................. J:N TS LCO.................... : N OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. p : N JCO REQUIRED.............. : N )
- MSS REVIEW................ J:N SCAQ...................... : N '
t OPERABILITY DETERMINATION. J: N COMMITMENT................ : N SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: i This condition is not a TS violation and did not affect plant operability. The WO was submitted immediately as a Priority 2. The compensatory actions discussed included: isolate with IA-780 and , manually throttle CC HX TCV isolation valves since TSVs would fail open on a loss.of air. l l REFERENCES. WO TAG 93078 l TRENDING INFORMATION: I WHEN~~: NON-OUTAGE FIRST QUARTER OF 1996 l J WHO . WHY : EQUIPMENT RELIABILITY WAS LESS THAN ADEQUATE WHAT--: MECHANICAL RESTART ISSUE PIPING RELATED 1
-SYSTEM: INSTRUMENT AIR ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE
~~~~~~~~~ ~~ ~~ ~~~~ ~~ ~~~~~~~ ~~~~
~~~~i'~~~~.ib6~~~~~kiChiVb~EbbibbMb T~
j
)
ACTION ITEM STATI'S REPORT PAGE 1 ococooooooooooooooooooooooooooo Responsible Person: 04/30/97 o Trkid: CR 96-070 o Urgency: NO DUE DATE ASSIGNED
- Work Priority: -100 o Action Number: 1 00000**************************
Activity Pending is: RECEIVE ASSIGNMENT
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION--- --------------------------------------
IA System Copper Tubing Found Degraded As part of our Restart commitment #23 we are to review 20% of past CRs to verify complete operability and screen,ing calls. This CR was identi.fied
! as one needing a more complete ooerability/ screening. Can we document that the crimped and cracking tubing is not a generic problem. ----------DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
- Source Record
- 02/17/96 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ******
' Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due:
Action Create: 04/30/97 Orig Eval Due: Orig CA Due: Action Closed: Eval Done: Corr Act Done:
----------PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
,1 l Responsible for Overall Action: BMS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: BMS
- Issue Manager:
' InitiaQor:
i Punchlist Administrator: i .______ --UPDATE-------------------------------------------------------------- 4
----------REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------------
WO TAG 93078 ______.---MISCELLANEOUS------------------------------------------------------- Originating Agency: System: IA NRC Open Item Nuder: NRC Status: Related Outages: Engineering Work Type: None,Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours =
CONDITION REPORT CR 96-076 STATUS: OPEN , MSS #: UNIT: 0 SYSTEM: CC INITIATED: 02/21/96 CLOSED: 1 ADMINISTRATOR: INITIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER: , NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: il Component Cooling Water Pump 2P-11A Casing Broken DESCRIPTION: The lower case half of 2P-11A is broken. The break occurred in the area of the outboard bearing housing to case bolt (west side}. The casing break exposed the bolt threads making the bolt ineffective. The outboard bearing housing is now held in place by the east side bolt and the 2 locating pins. The outboard bearing (housing) provides both radial and axial support. Based on the condition of the metal at the greak point it aopears that this is not a new break and that the pump nas operated with this condition for some time. Significance: The outboard bearing housing contains the pumps thrust bearing. The fractured case will not provide support to the bearing housing at the break point therefore the axial thrust from the pump is not being countered as designed. This could lead to failure of the bearing housing of east side bolt due to axial thrust of the pump. This would lead to pump failure. Corrective actions: The pump was WO'd and engineering will evaluate the ' situation to determine Corrective action. STATUS PD TE: (03 27 96 The casing was radiographed and it was determined that it cou d e repaired by drilling and tapping the hole deeper into the casing. This was comp lleted satisfactorily. No further action required. (02/24/97 CR reopened following review of closed CR to comply with NRC commitment. - 1ssue manager. SCREEMED BY : DATE: 02/22/96 REGULATORY REPORTABLE..... 10 CFR 21.................
?:: NN TS VIOLATION..............
TS LCO.................... N N OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. : N JCO REQUIRED.............. : N MSS REVIEW................ : N SCAO...................... : N OPERABILITY DETERMINATION. : COMI TMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : N SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: The affected pump is oos. TSs only requires three CCW pumps to be operable and this is met. This is not reportable.
REFERENCES:
WO TAG # 92318 CIM 76 WO 9602242 TRENDING INFORMATION: WHEN--: NON-OUTAGE , FIRST QUARTER OF 1996 l WHO : ) i WHY : UNEXPECTED EOUIPMENT FAILURE , WHAT : MECHANICAL POMP RELATED
- SYSTEM: COMPONENT COOLING WATER I ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE 2 41 EVALUATION OVERDUE 04 97 i
l l l
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1
******************************* Responsible Person: 04/28/97
- Trkid: CR 96-076
- Urgency: UUNE
& Action Number: 1
- Work Priority: -100 Activity Pending is: DONE
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------ i Component Cooling Water Pump 2P-11A Casing Broken j Evaluate the crack in the 2P-11A CCW pump and recommend corrective actions I to return pump to service. Some possible options may be an operability de l termin tion to return the pump to service as is or leave the pump OOS and repair replace the, pump casing. Document your recommendations and provide l basis or your decision. '
Sourge Record:_ --------DATES-02 /21/96 ******* Evaluation *** ***** ****** Correction ****** Commitment: Eval Due: 03 29 96 Corr Act Due: i Action Create: 02 22 96 Orig Eval Due: 03 29 96 Orig CA Due: Action Closed: 03 27 96 Eval Done: 03 22 96 Corr Act Done:
----------PEOPLE-------------------------------------------------------------- l
)
Respons4ble for Overall Action: MPE Responsible for Current Pending Activity: Issue Manager: Initiator: 1 Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(02/29/96 Received Action into Group: MPE Responsible Person: Due Date: 03/29/96 (03/21/96 _ Passed to KURT RATHGABER for acceptance of work. (03/22/96 Passed to SCOTT ZEPPLIN for Verification. An operability analysis was conducted for the fracture case. Due to the area of the fracture and stresses involved the pump was considered operable. A. copy of the operability analysis is attached to the hard copy of this Nutrk. The fractured area has been repaired. Radiography was conducted to verify that sufficient material existed to drill and tap the case " deeper" to provide the same thread engagement as before. This was done. The area of the case missing was filled with a polymer material, Belzona. All the CCW oumps were looked at to verify that none of the other pumps hadthis same deYect. l The Belzona has since fallen out. The Belzona was only there for aesthetic reasons, it provided no material function. (03/27/96 PLA Closure of Item, Pump was repaired. No further action required. ____ -----REPERENCES---------------------------------------------------------- WO TAG # 92318 CIM 76 WO 9602242
- - - - - - - - - - M I S CE LLANEOUS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --------------------------------
Originating Agency: S stem: CC NRC Open Item Nuder: N C Status: Related Outages: Engineering Work Type: None,Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours = I t
1
- ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 04/28/97
******************************* Responsible Person: ** Trkid: CR 96-076
- Urgency: PAST DUE 1-30 DAYS Action Number: 2
- Work Priority: 41 Activity Pending is: EVALUATION OVERDUE
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Component Cooling Water Pump 2P-11A Casing Broken Review of previously closed CRs for potential operability issues flagged this CR, This CR was closed out without identification of any permanent ! resolution. The lower case half of 2P-11A is broken. The break occurred in the area ofoutboard bearing housing to case bolt (west side). The casing break i expose bolt threads making the bolt ineffective. The outboard bearing ; housing isheld in place by the east side bolt and the 2 locating The outboard ng (housing) provides both radial and axial support. pins. ,
)
Review this CR and determine if additional documentation, corrective i action or procedure revisions are warranted.
---DATES-------------------- ------------------------------------------ l Sour e Record: 02/21/96 ******* Eva luation ********* ****** Correction ****** ;
Comm tment: Eval Due: 04/15/97 Corr Act Due: 1 Action Create: 02/24/97 Orig Eval Due: 03'15/97 Eval Done:
/ Orig CA Due:
Corr Act Done: Action Closed:
----------PEOPLE ,- -----------------------------------------------------------
Responsible for Overall Action: NMS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: NMS Issue Manager: Initiator: i Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDA,TE--------------------------------------------------------------
I (02/23/97 _ . Received Action into Group: NMS Due Date: 03/15/97 Responsible Person: ] (02/25/97 Set Work Priority to 41. (03/24/97 Requested Due Date: 04/15/97 (03/24/97 more work and has lesser03/15 Changed the Due Date from: item requires prio/97 ritytothen 04/15/97 other current This,ttments. commi
----------REFERENCES------------------------------------------------
---------MISCELLANEOUS-------------- -------
Originating Agency: S stem: CC NRC Open Item Nuder: N C Status: Related Qutages: U2R22 Engineering Work Type: Evaluation Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours =
CONDITION REPORT CR 96-080
)
STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 1 SYSTEM: AF INITIATED: 02/23/96 CLOSED: MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR INITIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER: NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSEU acrivas: 0 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1P-29 Fails IT Test Due To Pressure Oscillations DESCRIPTION: During ghe performance IT terminated due to governorof IT-08A,illations.1P-29 osc wasPump removed discharge from service pressure and was the oscillating approximately 100 psig and turbine RPM was oscillating 30 RPM. Significance: IT-8A was cancelled and a 72 hour LCO entered due to 1P-29 being declared OOS. STATUS UPDATE: (11/27/96 ) This problem was initially repaired under the work order process. However, the oscillations reappeared as documented in CR 96-1312 and CR 96-1411. The governor was replaced under CR 96-1312 and there the is currently oscillations under an CR investi 96 gation 411. underway tosince determine the cause,for the immediate problem was resolved at the t}ime andTherefore, current investigations are underway for the cause under CR $6-1411, and the governor was replaced under CR 96-1312, this CR can be closed to the action that were taken and are currently underway. No further actions are needed for this CR and it is considered closed. SCREENED BY . DATE: 02/23/96 REGULATORY REPORTABLE.....( : N TS VIOLATION........... . : N 10 CFR 21................. : N TS LCO................. .. : Y OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS.sL : Y JCO REQUIRED............ . .N MSS REVIEW................ : N SCAQ................... : N OPERABILITY DETERMINATION. . COMMITMENT................ . N SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: This incident caused the entry into a 72-hour LCO per technical This is a safet specifications piece due the AFP being declared OOS.and repairs are being made to the governor. of equipment Upony related completion, an IT-Oa4 cold test is to be run to ensure pump and governor operability.
REFERENCES:
TS 15.3.4 TRENDING INFORMATION: 1 1 WHEN--: FIRST NON-OUTAGE QUARTER OF 1996 WHO : MECH AND ELEC MAINTENANCE WHY : PROCEDURE PROVIDED LESS THAN ADEQUATE TECHNICAL DETAILS SITUATION WAS NOT COVERED BY PROCEDURE INADEQUATE CORRECTIVE ACTION CAUSED RECURRENCE WHAT'~~. REWORK RELATED MECHANICAL CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE MECHANICAL CORROSION OR EROSION RELATED UNIT 1 RESTART ISSUE SYSTEM: AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE
~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~
~~~~{~~~~~~ioo"~~~~RbCbkVb kbbIUhkkhT
- . - - . . _ - .. = . . . - - ._ . __ ~ . _ .
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE .
******************************* Responsible Person: 04f30/97
- Trkid: CR 96-080
- Urgency: NO DUE DATE ASSIGNED
- Action Number: 1
- Work Priority: -100 ,
Activity Pending is: RECEIVE ASSIGNMENT
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
-Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1P-29 Fails IT Test Due To Pressure Oscillations As part of the restart commitment #23, a percentage of closed CRs were reviewed for screening and operability completeness. This CR was determined to be deficient. Review and closecut justification for any a/ Verify the adequacy dditional operability of concerns.
the screening l
----------DATES---------------------------------------------------- ----------
i Source Record: 02/23/96 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correct ion ****** 1 Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: 1 Action Create: 04/30/97 Action Closed: Orig Eval Due: Eval Done: Orig CA Due: Corr Act Done: j
----------PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
Responsible for Overall Action: NMS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: NMS l Issue Manager: InitiaQor: Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
_________-REFERENCES---------------------------------------------------------- I l TS 15.3.4 ,
-MISCELLANEOUS-------------------------------------------------------
! Originating Agency: System: AF i NRC Open Item Number: NRC Status:
-Related Outages:
l Engineering Work Type: None,Specified i Person Hours: Original Estimate = , Current Estimate = l Actual Hours = l I i i
CONDITION REPORT i CR 96-099 STATUS: UNIT: 2 SYSTEM: AF INITIATED: 03/01/96 -~"~~~ CLOSED: iMSS #: ~ OPEN ADMINISTRATOR: jINITIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER: i NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 0 : i l 2P-29 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Declared OOS Due To Governor Oscillations l
.DESCRIPT ON:
On 2 29/96 approximately 3 hours into the IT-09A Turbine This Driven Aux. Feed ater hump tesQ the governor started to oscillate. occurred during bqring stabliization for the first pump run of the year. Oscillations of approximately 40 psig were observed.at the cump discharge pressure indicator. The pump was then secured anB declared OOS Significance: Unit 2 remained in the 72 hour LCO for the aux feed pump being out of service. Actions taken: The pump was secured fire rounds were initiated, and a l work order tag #92569 was initiated,to effect repairs on the pump governor. STATUS UPDATE: (11/27/96 ) This CR is similar to CR 96-080. Work order tag 92569 was worked and the pump appeared to work correctly. It successfully passed the IT and was returned to service. The current efforts under CR 96-1411 are investigating the causes for the governor oscillations due to additional incidents seen on the two steam driven AFW pumps. Since , and
~
the immediate current CR 96 problem was resolved through the work 1411 is investigating the causes, thisorder CR can process, be closed out to the work performed and the efforts currently underway under CR 96-1411 SCREENED BY : DATE: 03/01/96 : N REGULATORY REPORTABLE..... : N TS VIOLATION.............. 10 CFR 21................. : N TS LCO.................... : Y < OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. : Y JCO REQUIRED... . ........ : N :' MSS REVIEW................ N SCAO...................... : N OPERABILITY DETFRMINATION. . COMITMENT . . . . ......... . : N SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: The AFW oump being out of service places Unit 2 in a 72 hour LCO, and the ffailure of this test makes the unit remain within the LCO. No
.reportability issues are associated with this situation, and the i operability aspect is being addressed by the MSS. l
REFERENCES:
I IT-09A i l TRENDING INFORMATION: WHEN--: NON-OUTAGE l FIRST QUARTER OF 1996 WHO : WHY : UNEXPECTED EQUIPMENT FAILURE WHAT-- : POST MAINTENANCE TESTING MECHANICAL PUMP RELATED
~~~
1
. UNIT 2 RESTART ISSUE i SYSTEM: AUXILIARY FEEDWATER j l
l ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE
~~ ~ ~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~ ~~~~ ~~ ~~~~i~~~~~ iUU~~~~~Rbbb5hb~ UbibhMbhT .....................................
l
l ACTION ITEM STATU'S REPORT PAGE 1 1 04/30/97 l oooooooooooooooooooooooooo*oooo Responsible Person: IIo Trkid: CR 96-099 o Urgency: NO DUE DATE ASSIGNED !O Action Number: 1
- Work Priority: -100
' ococoo************************* Activity Pending is: RECEIVE ASSIGNMENT
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
' 2P-29 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Declared OOS Due To Governor LOscillations(Unit 2 Restart Issue) l As part of the retart commitment #2 , a percentage of closed CRs were
- reviewed for screening and operabil ty completeness. This CR was
! determined to be deficient. Review verify the adequacy of the screening and the closecut justification to determine the possible existence of any additional operability concerns.
..___.----DATES-------------------- ------------------------------------------
Source Record: 03/01/96 ******* Eva luation ********* ****** Correction ****** Corr Act Due: Commitment: Eval Due: Action Create: 04/30/97 Orig Eval Due: Eval Done: Orig CA Due: Corr Act Done: Action Closed:
----------PEOPLE--------------
Responsible for Overall Action: NMS P.esponsible for Current Pending Activity: NMS Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
----UPDATE-------------------------------------------------------------- ----------REFERENCES---------------------
IT-09A
' ~~ ~~~~~~~ ~~
brigibbtin Ag n S stem 5' ~ N C Status: F i NRC Open I em Num er: Related Outages: Engineering Work Type: None.Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate == l Current Estimate = Actual Hours , l l l j l 1 l
0 CONDITION REPORT CR 96-119 i STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 2 SYSTEM: SW INITIATED: 03/06/96 CLOSED: MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: INITIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER: WUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 0 Service Water Flow Switch Routinely Found Out of Specification (Restart Issue) DESCRIPTION: During a review of CHAMPS data between 1987 and the present, it was discovered that HX-15D Containment Recirculation Heat Exghanger Low Flow Alarm switch ,(2FS-2902) had been found to be out of specification alternately high and low every time the switch was checked. The error ranged from 0.5% to 2.4%. Significance: This flow switch cannot be relied upon to perform its function. STATUS UPD TE: (03/11 96 - ) I+C Engineering conducted a indepth history review for this f ow switch. This problem was not detected earlier since it is PBNP common practice to only go back two years while reviewing machinery histo n. This particular flow switch was calibrated every two years, thus the problem was not easily detected by PBNP personnel. This flow switch is a Rochester Electronic t'me of bistable and is ' , in U1 and 4 in U2). currently utilized in eight applications at PBNPI+C Engineering reviewgd theother these materialbistables hisQory for(4 , and did not note any similar problems. This issue is.being closed out to t the work order that has been submitted to replace this flow switch. NO further action necessary. (03/12for/97operaoility CRs ) This CR has been reopened following a review of closed review in order to comply with NRC restart I i i commitment #22. K. Rathgaber - issue manager. SCREENED BY : DATE: 03/11/96 i
- REGULATORY REPORTABLE.....( ?
- N TS VIOLATION......... .. : N 10 CFR 21................. J: N TS LCO.............. N
~ OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. J: N JCO REQUIRED.............. . N 4 MSS REVIEW................ J: N SCAQ...................... - N OPERABILITY DETERMINATION. J: COMMITMENT................ : N , SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: 1 THis event was not a violation of any PBNP Technical Specification and is not a reportable event. This flow switch is non-QA and not a safety 4 related component and did not have an adverse effect on the operability of the service water-system. A work order has been submitted to replace this flow switch.
REFERENCES:
WO TAG 94271 TRENDING INFORMATION: WHEN--: NON-OUTAGE 1980 - 1989 1990 - 1999 WHO : WHY : CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS NOT THOROUGH OR WAS NOT TAKEN WHAT--: INSTRUMENTATION ELECTRICAL INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLOR PERIODIC CONTROL MAINTENANCE DEVICES CALIBRATION RELATED REWORK RELATED SYSTEM: SERVICE WATER
' 5401 - Periodic maintance (biennial calibration) did not detect this problem, just the symptom ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE 4
~
i a ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1
******************************* Responsible Person: 04/28/97 I t Trkid: CR 96-119
- Urgency: NOT DUE / IN CLOSEOUT l
- Action Number: 1
- Work Priority: 62 l
*o*****************+*********** 1 Activity Pending is: REVIEW EVALUATION ----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Service Water Flow Switch Routinely Found Out of Specification This CR has been reopened to address potential operability concerns following a review ot closed CRs for NRC restart commitment #22. During a review of CHAMPS data between 1987 and the present, it was discovered that HX-15D Containment Recirculation Heat Exchanger Low Flow Alarm switch J2FS-2902) had been found to be out of specification alternately high and low every time the switch was checked. The error ranged from 0.5% to 2.4%. Determine if the operability of the accident fan coolers is affected if the flow switch (2FS-2902) provides incorrect indication.
----------DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
Source Record: 03/06/96 ******* Evaluation ** ***** ****** Correction ****** Commitment: Eval Due: 04 97 Corr Act Due: Action Create: Action Closed: 03/12/97 Orig Eval Due: 04 Eval Done: 04 97 97 Orig CA Due: Corr Act Done:
----------PEOPLE- ------------------------------------------------------------
Responsible for Overall Action: NMS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: SEN Issug Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(03/12/97 1 Received Action into Group: NMS Responsible Person: Due Date: 04/15/97 (F1/12 i Set Work Priority to 62. Priority based on this issue , questio/97ning operability of CFC coolers. Since this issue was raised as a l part of the startup c9mmitments for unit 2 addressing concern for a : possible operability issue is a startup iss,ue.
-(03/25/97 ) Passed to for acceptance of work.
(04 Passed to or Verification. Ther/03/97 e is no operability concern with this flow switch being out of calibration by the small amount referenced in this CR. The flow switch is i for alarm only and provides no control functions. The operability of the l fan coolers is assured by the monthly Technical Specification surveillance tests TS-33+34 which sets the flow rate in the proper band by use of the fan cooler, outlet throttle valves. The actual low flow alarm setpoint is 770 gpm which is over 10% higher than the required minimum flow needs to be Therefore the(reference STPT 14.6 change documentation with Mike Rosseau).small error of less than 3% would not of had resoect to the flow switche's intended function of alerting the operatror if Yan cooler flow is low after an SI signal. This action item can be i
~
closed out. I recommend creating another action item to increase the l allowable setting band of the fan cooler flow swtiches '- since the current ' band appears to De unnecessarily tight. 3/25/97
----------REFERENCES---------------------------------------------------------- ----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
Originating Agency: S stem: SW NRC Open Item Number: N C Status: Related Outages: Engineering Work Type: None,Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = l Actual Hours = \ r I I
CONDITION REPORT T CR 96-131 ) i STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 0 SYSTEM: CC INITIATED: 03/07/96 CLOSED: ) MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: ! INITIATOR: .________ ISSUE MANAGER: l NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSEu ac11UNS: O j
' Diagnostic Testing of Component Cooling Water Surge Tank Vent I
JN'RIPTION: Unit 1 component cooling water surge tank vent valve was being i diagnostically tested on 3/7/96. This valve comprises part or a closed < system outside containment; thus has containment integrity implications. , The daily work list did not include a reference to TS 15.3.6. ( Such 1 references are imported from CHAMPS i. Significance: Daily work list did not reflect the reference to TS 15.3.6 ; i STATUS UPDATE: (03 ) This was determined not to be an adverse condition. A safe /27/96ty evaluation fser 95-010) to evaluate the opening of closed systems during periodic maintenance and it was determined that a dedicated operator is not required. The refgrgnce to TSs is not going to be added I because the closed systems are administratively controlled By OM 3.26. I The CIVs are in TSs and these require the use of dedicated operators in l order to operate them for t s ing. No further action required. , SCREENED BY : DATE: 03/15/96 ' REGULATORY REPORTABLE..... 1 TS VIOLATION.............. : N l 10 CFR 21................. OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. [.N
- N J: N TS LCO....................
JCO REQUIRED..............
+
N N MSS REVIEW................ OPERABILITY DETERMINATION. J:
):
N SCAQ........ ........ .... COM I TM ENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N
- N i
SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS; The situation of opening a closed system for a short period of time is OM 3.26 states that a dedicated operator is not not re wired adressed for this in TSs,tuation. si The concern of opening a closed system was addressed in the safety evaluation for the original procedure and it was proven that a dedicate 8 operator is not required if the system is only going to be opened for a short period of time. This is not reportable.
REFERENCES:
SER 95-010 OM 3.2f, TS 15.3.6 SEM 5.2 NRC OSTI COMMITMENT #23 l TRENDING INFORMATION: 1 WHEN--: NON-OUTAGE FIRST QUARTER OF 1996 WHO : WHY : NOT AN ADVERSE CONDITION WHAT~~~ : MECHANICAL AOV VALVE OPERATOR RELATED SYSTEM: COMPONENT COOLING WATER l ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE l ______________________________________ _____________________________________ l l j l l i i I
- ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE :
!.ee*****o*********************** , Responsible Person: 04/28/97 l t*Trkid: CR 96-131 Action Number: 1
- Work Priority:
Urgency: DUE IN 1-15 DAYS 32 r ******************************* Activity Pending is: EVALUATION NEEDED
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Diagnostic Testing of Component Cooling Water Surge Tank Vent l THIS CR IS BEING REOPENED AS A RESULT OF NRC OSTI COMMITMENT #23. t Unit 1 c9mponent cooling water surge tank vent valve was being , diagnostically tested on 3/7/96. This valve comprises part or a closed system outside containment; thus has containment integrit 3.6. The daily work list did not include a reference to TS 15.y implications. ( Such references are imported from CHAMPS ). A review of previously closed CRs identified this CR as being closed without sufficient justification. OM 3.26 states taht temporarily opening the CC surge tank vent has shown no significant impact on the PBNP tission product release probability. SER 95-010 states that a dedicated operator is not required for this operation. Neither reference, nor the CR, discuss the operability of the system during this activity. Review thi and determine if the current method of testing with the CC surge t- - duc open is acceptible.
----------DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
Source Record: 03/07/96 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** Commitment: Eval Due: 05/01/97 Corr Act Due: Action Create: 02/07/97
~
Orig Eval Due: 03/31/97 Eval Done: Orig CA Due: Corr Act Done: Action Closed:
----------PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
Responsible for Overall Action: NMS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: NMS Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE------------- ------------------------------------------------
(02/08/97 Received Action into Group: NMS Responsible Persop: Due Date: 03/31/97 (02/08/97 i) Set Work Priority to 32. Resolution of this question is a regulatory commitment. C9ncerns operability of CCW as a closed system when CCW surge tank vent is open. (03/13/97 Requested Due Date: 05/01/97 (04/01/97 Changed the Due Date from: 03/31/97 to 05/01/97 This item requires resolution of appropriate use of a dedicated operator for CC-17 ands requires more time tcnr research. This appears to be consistene with current Tech Spec allowance for a dedicated operator for CIV's. Due date extension to allow for completing review.
----------REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------------
NRC OSTI COMMITMENT #23
----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
Originating Agency: System: CC NRC Open Item Nuder: NRC Status: Related Outages: U2R22 i Engineering Work Type: None Specified
- Person Hours
- Original Estimate =
Current Estimate = ! Actual Hours = l
% CONDITION REPORT CR 96-182 i l STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 0 SYSTEM: DG INITIATED: 04/02/96 CLOSED:
MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: INITIATOR: __ ISSUE MANAGER: l MUMDER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 1 ! G-01 Failed To Start During The Performance of TS-81 ! DESCRIPTION- l During the performance of TS-81, "Emergenc G-01 tailed to start on the first attemot.y Diesel Generator Monthly," , l l Attachment A of TS-81 was ! performed and G-01 started on the secona attempt. The failure to start on the first start attempy is believed to be due to pinion abutment of ) the diesel. The " start failure" and " fuel pressure" alarms were received . during both start attempts l Significance: Cause of G-01 alarms is unknown. This is a repeat problem ' that has occurred previously on 2/17/96 and 3/4/96 STATUS PDATE: (04 29/,96 ) This CR is being closed out based upon the reviews, ana ysis and work that have been completed on this EDG (see above will description for details). The component engineer ( continue to monitor the EDG operating characteristics to11owing each operation of the EDG to determine if the corrective measures taken have been effective. No further measures are warranted at this time. (02 ) This CR has been reopened following a review of all clo/24/97 sed out CDa for operability concerns in order to comply with a NR commitment. i ue manager. SCREENED BY : _ .-. DATE: 04/02/96 i REGULATORY REPORTABLE..... : N TS VIOLATION.............. ): N 10 CFR 21................. : N TS LCO.................... J: N p: N OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS, : N JCO REQUIRED.............. MSS REVIEW................ : N SCAQ...................... J: N 1 OPERABILITY DETERMINATION. : COMMITMENT................ J: N l SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: This event was not a violation of any PBNP Technical Specification and I is not a reportable event. G-01 started following completion of Attachment A of TS-81 and was tested satisfactorily. G-01 was not declared inoperable based upon receiving these alarms. Review of the CHAMPS database revealed that this has been a repetitative problem since Feb 1996. A work order has been submitted to troubleshoot and repair the alarm problems. Concurrent with this an evaluation item is being issued to the component engineer for evaluation.
REFERENCES:
CR 96-114 WO TAG 93280 WO 9602631 CR 96-114 TRENDING INFORMATION: WHEN--: NON-OUTAGE SECOND QUARTER OF 1996 WHO : WHY : ROOT CAUSE UNKNOWN WHAT- : REGULATORY DOCUMENT - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION RELATED I SYSTEM: DIESEL GENERATOR ! ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE 2 -100 EVALUATION NEEDED 1
l
, ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 ************=****************=* Responsible Person: 04/28/97 Trk$d: CR 96-182 l'.********************************
Action Number: 1 Urgency: uuNE Work Priority: 31 Activity Pending is: DONE ! ----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------ G-01 Failed To Start During The Performance of TS-81 ! It appears that the " start failure " " fuel pressure" and "G-01 Emergency l l Deisel" alarms have/96 and 4/2/96).been received TS-81 (2/17/96 3/4 It isduring the last unclear threeapparent if the performances of oinion
- abutment is related to these events. Operations noted that during the l 2/17/96 performance that a pinion abutment problem occurred as well.
i
- CR 96-114 was initiated for the 3/4/96 event and it was concluded that the l cause of the start fa;iure alarm was due to the SFD1 and PFD1 relays time
! delay settings being off. No explanation for the fuel failure alarms was ! noted. Evaluate the G-01 alarm and TS-81 starting concerns. Determine root cause
- of the event (s) and identify any necessary corrective actions.
----------DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
Source Record: 04/02/96 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** Commitment: Eval Due: 04 30 96 Corr Act Due: , Action Create: 04/02/96 Orig Eval Due: 04 30 96 Orig CA Due: l Action Closed: 04/29/96' Eval Done: 04 25 96 Corr Act Done: ___.------PEOPLE-------------------------------------------------------------- Responsible for Overall Action: MPE Responsible for Current Pending Activity: Issue Manager: ! InitiaQor: Punchlist Administrator: ___..-----UPDATE-------------------------------------------------------------- (04/04/96 i ) Received Action into Group: MPE Responsible Person: Due Date: 04/30/96 (04/04/96 . Set Work Priority to 31. (04/24/96 Passed to for acceptance of work. (04/25 s noc experienced Passed to SCOTT PFAFF for Verification. l G-01 ha/96 a failure to start due to any of the alarms covered under CR 96-182. What this condition report is addressing is the alarms received and the reason for them. G-01 underwent its normal biannual overhaul during the week of 2/12-17. A fuel system pressure alarm : was receive prior.to this overhaul. A review of the fuel system was conducted to determine all the likely component faults that could cause this alarm. This was performed as part of RMP 9043 and WO 9601315. This maintenance included the fuel system valves and filters including the pressure relief / regulating valves, nothing was found. The pressure switch associated with alarm was calibrated and was not found out of calibration. Because all other indications on this engines fuel system were normal at all other times other then immediately on start it was decided to increase the alarm serpoint uE to 56# to eliminate the nuisance alarm. There have been reports of the these have been a combination of fuel transfer and fuel system. fuel alarms"i The fue transfer alarms will be corrected by the installation of improved limit switches on the EDG fuel oil sump tank. A pinion abutment' occurred on 2/17 following the overhaul this was ! considered the a random end of March eventaand reported no actions
" pinion were taken.
abutment". DuringA the subse 2/quent start at 12 overhaul the lower air motors were replaced as part of normal periodic replacement schedule. however after the No pinion2abutments were Because seen prior of to thethe overhaul,ly recent replaced overhaul were reported. this motors were replaced again to eliminate this as a possible cause of the start failure alarm. No other abnormal conditions were noted in the air system. On 3/5/96 the SFD1, PFD1 ES1 and VS1 relavs were cal checked per WO 9602631. These were suspected,to be the cause of the start failure alarms and wer calibrated All possible causes of the alarm have been investigated. Actions have l included calibrations of relays, readjustment of setpoints and replacement of suspect parts. No conclusive evidence was found to positively conclude i
. ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 2 04/28/97 that the source of the alarms has been found and corrected. Normal surveillance will continue. Actions will be taken based on the indications found. l 1 (04/29/96 PLA Closure of Item. < Engineering has taken aporopriatg measures to rectify the problems that l
~
have recenply been indentified with this EDG. MPE will continue to monitor the, operating characteristics of the EDG and make additional corrective actions based upon the results of the monthly EDG tests. Item closed.
REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------------
CR 96-114 Originating Agency:----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------hstem: S DG NRC Open Item Nuder: NRC Status: l Related Outages: Engineering Work Type: None,Cpecified Person Hours: Original EsQ1 mate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours = l l l l l
\
l l i e
)
i 4 l l 1 I i
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE '
******************************* Responsible Person: ,
04/28/97
/ Trkid: CR 96-182
- Urgency: NO DUE DATE ASSIGNED
- Action Number: 2
- Work Priority: -100 Activity Pending is: EVALUATION NEEDED
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------ -----------------
G-01 Failed To Start During The Performance of TS-81 This CR has been reopened following a review of closed CRs for operability concerns in order to comply with a NRC Commitment. During the performance of TS-81, " Emergency Diesel Generator Monthly," G-Oled to start on the first attempt. Attachment A of TS-81 was performed and Gtarted on the second attempt. The failure to start on the first start atQem believed to be due to pinion abutment of the diesel. The " start failure" auel pressure" alarms were received during both start attempts. This GR was closed without a cause determination, this leaves open the question of operability for G-01 and G-02. Provide sufficient Justification to allow for closure of this CR.
----------DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
Source Record: 04/02/96 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: Action Create: 02/24/97 Orig Eval Due: Eval Done: Orig CA Due: Corr Act Done: Action Closed: PEOPLE-------------------------------------------------------------- Responsible for Overall Action: BMS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: BMS Issue Manager: Initiator: 1 I Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(03/03/97 ) Received Action into Group: BMS Responsible Person: 1 l
----------REFERENCES---------------------------------------------------------- !
1
----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- -------------------------------- 1 Originating Agency: S stem: DG '
NRC Open Item Num er: N C Status: Related Outages: U2R22 Engineering Work Type: Evaluation Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours = l l l l l
CONDITION REPORT CR 96-207 STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 0 SYSTEM: DG INITIATED: 04/05/96 CLOSED: MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: l 1 INITIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER: NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 1 Chattering Field Brushes on G03 DESCRIPTION: Following inadvertent G03/G04 aut9-start it was observed that the field brushes on G03 were chattering while G03,was on its 11.5 min.. coastdown timer. Close observation during the coastdown revealed the west-most outboard slip ring appears to be slightly mora out-of-round as compared o $he inboard slip ring, The outboard slip ring shows slight ndication of electrolytic action which may be what is causing the uneven wear on the slip ring (and also the chatter) . Significance: This could result in a loss of excitation to G03 if this condition is allowed to continue over an extended period of time. Completed corrective actions: Submitted WO to inspect slip rings / brushes STATUS UPDATE: (11/07/96 All actions c mplete. CR closed. SCREENED BY : DATE: 04/08/96 I REGULATORY REPORTABLE..... : N TS VIOLATION..............( : N 10 CFR 21................. : N TS LCO.................... L : N OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. : N JCO REQUIRED.............. y : N MSS REVIEW................ : N SCAQ...................... ( : N OPERABILITY DETERMINATION. : COMMITMENT................t : N SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: We do not feel at this time that this condition is an operability concern for G03. This condition.could exist for quite a long time before significant damage occurred which would adversely impact G03. ; This is n,ot reportable and is not a nuclear safety issue. ! l
REFERENCES:
I G03 TECH MANUAL PBM 97-0200 I TRENDING INFORMATION: ,
'WHEN--: OUTAGE SECOND QUARTER OF 1996 l WHO :
WHY : PROBLEM WAS NOT ANTICIPATED WHEN DESIGNED WHAF: SYSTEM: DIESEL GENERATOR ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE 1 37 DONE 2 -100 ACTION NEEDED i i 1 I
l
. ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 i
******************************* Responsible Person:
, 04/28/97
% Trk:.d: CR 96-207
- Urgency: DONE
- Act:.on Nuder: 1
- Work Priority: 37 !
l 1 iActivity Pending is: DONE ] l i ! ----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------ l Chattering Field Brushes on G03 l l Evaluate the adequacy of the slip rings on the diesel generators. ! Recommend corrective actions that will address the potential operability ! concern. l - - - - - - - - - - DATE S - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ----------------------------------------------- iSource Record: 04/05/96 ***'+'* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** Corr Act Due: iCommitment: D, Due: iAction Create: 04/08/96 ' Evaf Done: Eval Due: Orig CA Due: Action Closed: 11/07/96 Corr Act Done:10/31/96
----------PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
, Responsible for Overall Action: MPE ! ! Responsible for Current Pending Activity: Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator: 1 i----------UPDATE-------------------------------------------------------------- , (04/25/96 ____, Received Action into Group: MPE jResponsible Person: (04/25/96 Set Work Priority to 37. , (10/25/96 Passed to for acceptance of work. (10 Passed to for Verification. i The/31/96 cause or the " bouncing" brusnes is the joint where the two halves of I the slip rings join. This can be stoned to produce a smooth transition. WO ! 9603913 was issued to correct this problem. Badger Electric was issp.ed a PO #100003509,to support this repair. It is planned for the G-03 1997 outage. This is not an operability issue. l 1 (11/07/96 --_) PLAClosed. 1 Closure of Item. I , Action complete.
----------REFERENCES--------------------------------------------------------..
G03 TECH MANUAL l
----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
Originating Agency: S stem: DG NRC Open Item Nuder: N C Status: , Related Outages: Engineering work Type: None,Specified Person Hours: Original Estimace = Current Estimate = Actual Hours = f i 1 l l 1
e ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 04/28/97
- Responsible Person:
- Trkid: CR 96-207
- Urgency: NO DUE DATE ASSIGNED
- . Action Number: 2
- Work Priority: -100 Activity Pending is: ACTION NEEDED
TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Chattering Field Brushes on G03 A review of previously closed CRs for potential operability issues flagged this CR. This CR was closed without identification of any permanent resolution. These are restart issues for Unit 2, 2/27/97. Although the cause of the problem is well documented and an appropriate fix is in the works, there is not statement about the acceptability of the problem or operability of the diesel.
-----DATES------------------------------ --------------------------------
Source Record: 04/05/96 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: Action Create: 02/27/97 Orig Eval Due: Orig CA Due: Action Closed: Eval Done: Corr Act Done:
PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
Responsible for Overall Action: BMS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: BMS Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(02/28/97 Received Action into Group: BMS Responsible Person: (03/18/97 Changed Responsible Person: From to l Changed Responsible Group: From (BMS) To (DB). Changed Responsible section: From (SEN) To (NES)..
REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------------
G03 TECH MANUAL PBM 97-0200 j
MISCELLANEOUS-------------------------------------------------------
Originating Agency: System: DG NRC Open Item Number: NRC Status: Related Outages: Engineering Work Type: None Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours = l l
E CONDITION REPORT
- . CR 96-265 STATUS
- OPEN UNIT: O SYSTEM: 4.16KV INITIATED: 04/17/96 CLOSED:
4 MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: i INITIATOR: . . ISSUE MANAGER:
! NUMBER OF OPEN ACT10NS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 0 1
i Main Feed Pump Breakers Fail to Operate During Testing DESCRIPTION: During the performance of ICP 5.55 the Main Feed Pump breakers would not closw. The indication lights were not illuminated, the contol was on and the control power fuses werg good. The breakers were tagged in the
' TEST' position. The DOS verified the breakers were properly placed in the test position. During the verification lights for on of the breakers began to work. process thewas The test indicating recommenced i
- and both breakers operated properly.
Significance: Equipment not operating as expected. ~ Actions: The test was completed sucessfully. Maintenance was contacted to alert them to the situation. These breakers are scheduled to be 4 worked and the contacts are checked during this maintenance. STATUS PDATE: 1 (04 26/96 A WO was written and the breaker was inspected the only i dro lem noted was some slight residue on the breaker stabs. It is believed that this residue preyented the control power from being i applied to the breaker. This is not a trend and no further action is i required. This CR is being closed and the information used for 4 historical data and trend identification. l (02/24/97 4 This CR has been reopened to address potential i operability concerns follow'ng review of closed CRs tor a NRC comm' ent. I SCREENED BY : DATE: 04/19/96 REGULATORY REPORTABLE..... : N TS VIOLATION.............. : N !~ 10 CFR 21................. : N TS LCO.................... : N OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. : N JCO REQUIRED.............. : N
- MSS REVIEW................ : N SCAQ...................... : N i OPERABILITY DETERMINATION. : COMMITMENT................ -
N SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: i The breakers functioned properly after the alignment was verified. The- . maintenance group will take a look at these breakers and verify they i operate properly. This is not a TS violation nor is it reportable. l I
REFERENCES:
l WO 9604382 I TRENDING INFORMATION: WHEN ~~: OUTAGE , l SECOND QUARTER OF 1996 ] - WHO : 3 WHY : UNEXPECTED EQUIPMENT FAILURE l i WHAT --: ELECTRICAL BREAKER RELATED i i ELECTRICAL FUSE RELATED l SYSTEM: TSYSTEDC4.16KVAC
, The residue on the fuse stabs was not predicatable, foreseen or expected for
- the equipment.
l ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE
---i~---:i66--~~~i0ii6ii6s~sii6i6-~~~~~~~~~~~-~~~~~~~~~~-~~~~~5i?i575-~
d 5 J 1
, ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 04/28/97 Responsible Person:
7 Trkid: CR 96-265
- Action Number: 1 Urgency: DUE IN 1-15 DAYS Work Priority: -100 Activity Pending is: EVALUATION NEEDED
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Main Feed Pump Breakers Fail to Operate During Testing This CR is being reopened due to a review of closed CRs for operability determination in order to comply with an NRC Commitment. During Qhe performance of ICP 5.55 the Main Feed Pump breakers would not cl The indication lights were not illuminated, the contol was on and the contower fuses were good. The breakers were tagged in thg ' TEST' pos4 tion. Th verified the breakers were procerIv,placed in the test position. During trification process the indicating lights for on of the breakers began to woThe test was recommenced and both breakers operated properly, Review this CR for root cause and to determine applicability to similar type breakers. _____.----DATES---------------------- ---------------------------------------- Source Record: 04/17/96 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** Commitment: Eval Due: 04/'30/97 Corr Act Due: Action Create: 02/24/97 Orig Eval Due: 04/01'97 Eval Done:
/ Orig CA Due:
Corr Act Done: Action Closed: ______.---PEOPLE-------------------------------------------------------------- Responsible for Overall Action: EIS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: EIS Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(02/28/97 .' Received Action into Group: EIS Responsible Person: ' Due Date: 04/01/97 (03/31/97 Requested Due Date: 04/30/97 Changed the Due Date from: 04 (03 te to allow time Upda/31/97 for close out processing /01/97 to 04/30/97 f04/26/97 Review of OI-35, Electrical Equipment Operation i instructions top racking a 4KV breaker into the test position,,section 5.3 I for the appropriate WEST breakers reveals there is no checking to see if i the action was completed electrica,lly. Physical position is relied upon I to determine if the breaker is indeed in the test position. Words like I
" gently" and " firmly" are included in the OI and in the CTM. These terms arg subject to interpretation by each individual and provide little guidance to an operator who infrequently racks breakers in and out. If this incident haa hapoened on only one breaker and on only one secondarycontact on that breaker I would be more concernea about connection failure. Since all control circuit function status lights and closing, were not operational on two separate breakers a,nd since one breaker's functions werespontaneously restored I would have to conclude i ;he secondary contacts were not completely engaged at the initial, racking in. The subsequent inspection by maintenance indicated no connection problem such as grease or burning or looseness of fit between the socket and the pins. The accumulation of a residual of material would be normal at the tip of the pins since that area is not wiped when being inserted.
l (04/26/97 i Passed to for acceptance of work.
----------REFERENCES---------------------------------------------------------- ----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
Originating Agencv: S stem: 4.16KV l NRC Open Item Number: N C Status: ! Related Outages: U2R22 , Engineering Work Type: None Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate = l t
- ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGF ".
Current Estimate = 04/28/97 e Actual Ho' Irs = 1 0 k
i CONDITION REPORT CR 96-432 STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 0 SYSTEM: SW INITIATED: 07/09/96 CT.n AED : i MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: ; INITIATOR: c___. _- ISSUE MANAGER: i NUMDER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 1 ! Service Water Valve SW-360 Is Hard To Operate Due To Stem Galling (Restart Issue) DESCRIPTION- l The outlet valve for the "B" Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger >
,( SW- 3 6 0 } is hard to operate due to galling of the valve stem. This valve l 1s required during RHR cooldown operations and in the EOPs when going on sump recirculation cooling.
Significance: Further valve degradation could lead to the inability to stroke this safety related valve. NOTE: This valve is a normally closed manual valve. Component Cooling Water temperature is normally maintained via temperature control valve SW-12B for this heat exchanger which bypasses SW-360. STATUS UPDATE: (07/09/96 Further discussion with the System Engineer ( has revealed that this valve is currently in an operable status and that a formal operability determination per PBF-1553 is not required. Operability of the valve will be verified periodically under IT-72, which requires this valve tg be stroked open and back shut. Currently Maintenance and Engineering are procurring the necessary parts to repair the galled valve stem. Engineering has recommended that this CR be closed out to the WO. (07/09/96 CR closed to submitted work order. . (03/12 This CR is being reopened following a review of closed CRs for/97operabilitv cnncarna in order to comply with NRC restart commitment #22. - issue manager. WO 9703109 has been initiated ~to replace the galled valve stem (work is currently pend'ng). SCREENED BY : DATE: 07/05/96 REGULATORY REPORTABLE..... : N TS VIOLATION.............. ).N 10 CFR 21................. : N TS LCO.................... J.N OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. ' : N JCO REQUIRED...... 4 ...... p: N MSS : N SCAQ...................... : N REVIEW................k OPERABILITY DETERMINATION. : N COMMITMENT................ . N SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: This condition is not a violation of any PBNP Technical Specification and is not a reportable condition. This valve has not been determined to be inoperable at this time. Multiple operation of this valve could lead to inability to stroke the valve but even should this valve fail in the closed position (its normal position as this valve is not normally utilizea) component cooling water temperature would still be maintained by TCV SW-12B which bp asses SW-360 and is utilized to control CC water PBNP Tecnnical Specifications require three CC water HXs temperature,t for dual uni operation. Currently all four CC water HXs are operable.IT-72 is performed quarterly on SW valves and requires that the valves be stroked open and clo(SW-360 sed. Thisis included) will enable operations to monitorthe operability of this valve. Discussion with System Engineering (J. Schroede r) has concluded that the valve is operable but requires repair that will be expidited under the referenced work order.
REFERENCES:
WO TAG 95450 TS 15.3.3.C IT-72 WO 9607068 WO 9703109 TRENDING INFORMATION: WHEN--'-: NON-OUTAGE THIRD QUARTER OF 1996 WHO : WHY : UNEXPECTED EQUIPMENT FAILURE WHAT~~: MECHANICAL RESTART ISSUEGLOBE VALVE RELATED SYSTEM: SERVICE WATER
a a 4 a---s , 24s .,a - - - --, b, ACTIONS pnl ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE
,"~~~{---- ,.g ----- - _____________,, ,_ _ ______
'~~~ "
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~-~~---
59 ACTION NEEDED os/os/97 i I I l l l l l 5
. ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 ******************************* Responsible Person: 04/28/97
- Urgency: DONE
.* Trkid: CR 96-432
- Action Number: 1
- Work Priority: -100 Activity Pending is: DONE
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Service Water Valve SW-360 Is Hard To Operate Due To Stem Galling This CR has been reopened following a review of closed CRs to address potential o erability concerns in order to comply with NRC restart commitment 22. The outlet valve for the "B" Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger JSW-360} is hard to operate due to galling of the valve stem. This valve is required during RHR gooldown operations and in the EOPs when going on sump recirculation cooling. Determine if there is any long term degradiation of this valves ability to perform its intended function with the galled stem (justify continued use until stem can be replaced under WO 9703109).
----------DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
Source Record: 07/02/96 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: Action Create: 03/12/97 Orig Eval Due: Orig CA Due: Action Closed: 04/09/97 Eval Done: 04/04/97 Corr Act Done:
----------PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
Responsible for Overall Action: NMS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(03/12/97 ) Received Action into Group: NMS Responsible Person: (04/04 Subsequ/97
) Passed to for Verification.
ent to this CR, the operator for SW-360 broke resulting in the valve being declared inoperable. At this time having this valve stem galled for the long term is not an aceptable co,ndition. This valve will be repaired prior to unit 1 restart. nother action item should be created to repair SW-360. This evaluation may be closed. (04 PLA Closure of Item. This/09/97 action item is being closed out. SW-360 has subsequently failed and ; repairs will be necessary. 1 1
----------REFERENCES---------------------------------------------------------- ----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- ------------ -------------------
Originating Agency: S stem: SW , NRC Open Item Nuder: N C Status: i 1 Related Outaces: Engineering Work Type: None,Specified l Person Hours: Original Estimate = 1 Current Estimate = l Actual Hours = l l l
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 I
******************************* Responsi.ble Person:
04/28/97 ,
- Trkid: CR 96-432
- Urgency: DUE IN 1-15 DAYS l
- Action Number: 2
- Work Priority: 59 l Activity Pending is: ACTION NEEDED ,
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------ l Service Water Valve SW-360 Is Hard To Operate Due To Stem Galling (Restart ]
Issue) The outleQ is valve foroperate hard to the "B" due Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger to galling of the valve stem. This valve l JSW-360 is requi) red during RHR gooldown operations and in the EOPs when going on ' sump recirculation cooling. l This valve has subsequently failed and has been declared inoperable. I Grouphead request for an action item to document the repair and failure ! l cause determination of thi.s valve. (NOTE: This is a RESTART issue).
----------DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
Source Record: 07/02/96 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: 05/05/'97 Action Create: 04/09/97 Orig Eval Due: Eval Done-Orig CA Due: Corr Act Done-05'05/97
/ l l
Action Closed: , ___.------PEOPLE-------------------------------------------------------------- Responsible for Overall Action: NMS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: NMS l Issue Manager: Initiator: l 3 Punchlist Administrator: l
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
1 (04/15/97 _. ! Received Action into Group: NMS - Responsible Person:
- - - ~--- -~~
Due Date: 05/05/97 (04/15/97 Set Work Priority to 59. l
----------REFERENCES---------------------------------------------------------- ----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
Originating Agency: System: SW NRC Open Item Number: NRC Status: Related Outages: U2R22 Engineering Work Type: None,Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours =
1 .
- CONDITION REPORT CR 96-725 <
STATUS: OPEN UNIT: O' SYSTEM:.DG- INITIATED: 09/06/96 CLOARD: MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: INITIATOR: S ISSUE MANAGER: NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 0 Work Plan Did Not Contain The' Appropriate Documentation DESCRIPTION: The G-04 turbo-charger oil low pressure switch was scheduled for j replacement during the G-04 outage. The work order associated with this j work did nog have~any documentation referencing a SOUG concern for this ' l pressure switch.-Prior to installation of the switch, an engineer notified I+C that a SQUG evaluation was required prior to using this switch on-G-04. Due to schedule concerns, this work activity was-cancelled. Significance; Potential for installation of a component that may not ! have been selsmically qualified. Poor work plan. STATUS UPDATE: (10
/16/96tneThis CR is being closed out. No violation occurred howe ver, potential for having a potentially inadquate qualified component in the G-04 EDG existed if the SQUG issue Had not been identified. The work in question was terminated and rescheduled for a -
later G-04 outage period. Discussion with engineering indicates that this pressure switch replacement need was laentitied approximately six months previous to this outage but the SQUG evaluation requirements were not properly identified in the work package and was not known to be a requirement by I+C. (10/16/96 This work has been resheduled and the appropiate SQUG documentation will be cgmpleted. WO 9508343 remains open tracking this work requirement. Individuals involved were made aware of the SQUG requirements and work planning expectations / requirements. Issue closed. SCREENED BY : . DATE: 09/10/96 REGULATORY REPORTABLE.....( : N TS VIOLATION..............( : N 10 CFR 21................. ; : N TS LCO..... .............. ( : N ' OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. ( .N JCO REQUIRED............. 1
- N MSS REVIEW............... 1 : N SCAO................. .... : N OPERABILITY DETERMINATION.( : N COMMITMENT................ : N SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS:
This conditoin was not a violation of any PBNP Technical Specification ' and is not reportable. This CR identifies a deficient work package concerning was scheduled the seismic adequacy for installation on ofG-04a re placemeng ' Just priorpressure switch that to installation of the pressure switch, it was realized by an engineer that the new switch was a SQUG concern and required evaluation prior to installation and return to service of the EDG. Due tg scheduling concerns and the need to restore G-04 the replacement of this pressure switch was cancelledand the old model was retained in use.The replacement switch is a "in-kind" l replacement with a higher setpoint. This fact that this switch was not replaced asscheduled does not affect the operability of G-04.
REFERENCES:
WO 9508343 I i TRENDING INFORMATION: l WHEN--: NON-OUTAGE THIRD UARTER OF 1996 i WHO : CIVIL SEISMIC ENGINEERING i NSSS M CHANICAL SYSTEMS ENGINEERING WHY : ACCOUNTABILITY OR RESPONSIBILITY WAS LESS THAN ADEQUATE WHAT~ : WORK CONTROLS RELATED ELECTRICAL INSTRUMENTATION OR CONTROL DEVICES ! RESTART ISSUE l SYSTEM: DIESEL GENERATOR ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE
~~~~i"~~~~ 166~~~~~kECU5Vb~A555GUEUUT~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
ACTION ITEM STATUS aaeORT PAGE .1 ooooooooooo*ooooooooooooooooooo Responsible Person.:
. 04/30/97 o Trkid: CR 96-725 o Urgency: NO DUE DATE ASSIGNED o Action Number: 1
- Work Priority: -100 ococoo*************************
Activity Pending is: RECEIVE ASSIGNMENT
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Work Plan Did Not Contain The Appropriate Documentation The G-04-turbo-charger oil low pressure switch was scheduled for replacement during the G-04 outage. The work order associated with this work did not have any documentation referencing a SQUG concern for this pressure switch. Prior to installation of the switch an engineer notified I+C that a SQUG evaluation was required prior to usin,g this switch on G-04. Due to schedule concerns, this work activity was cancelled. (THIS CR HAS BEEN REOPENED) This CR.has been flagged during the U2R22 NRC Restart issue review as a potential operability concern. Please review the original Condition Report to determine whether the operability determination documented is sufficient for this condition. Identify any necessary changes. (NOTE: U2 Restart Issue)
----------DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
Source Record: 09/06/96 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: Action Create: 04/30/97 Orig Eval Due: Eval Done: Orig CA Due: Corr Act Done: Action Closed: t ----------PEOPLE-------------------------------------------------------------- Responsible for Overall Action: BMS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: BMS Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE-------------------------------------------------------------- ----------REFERENCES---------------------------------------------------------- ......----MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
Originating Agency: S stem: DG . NRC Open Item Number: N C Status: l Related Outages: Engineering Work Type: None,Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours = l I I l
. - . - _ . . -- . . . . . - - - ~ , _ - - . - . - ._ _ - - . . - - . . _ - .
1 CONDITION REPORT l'
- CR 96-727 l
1 c STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 0 SYSTEM: DG INITIATED: 09/06/96 CLOSED: l I l MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: INITIATOR: ___ _ ISSUE MANAGER: . ! i NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 0 !. Paint Peeling Inside G03/G04 Air Intake Filters (Restart Issue) DESCRIPTION: Emeraency Diesel Generator air intake filters (F-139A and F-139B) ! painEed areas inside the filters are peeling badly. Significance: Paint chips could block intake or get further into system. ; STATUS PDATE: I (09 19/96 WO tag 96198 was written to repaint these filters. l Eng neering opinion-is that this is a housekeeping issue and not an operability concern (see attached Email with CR hard copy. (10 WOs 9610575 and 9610576 will address this CR. Report Clo/08/96 sed. (03/12/97 ) This CR has been reopened to address potential a review of closed CRs in order operability concerns to comply with NRC restart identified during#22. commitment . 1ssue manager. I PLA changed from ! -SCREENED BY : .DATE: 09/10/96
- l REGULATORY REPORTABLE..... ?: N TS VIOLATION............. 4 TS LCO....................(
- N '
10 CFR 21................. J:N JCO REQUIRED.............. h
- N N
l OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. J:N . , MSS REVIEW................ p:N SCAQ............. ........L : N 1 OPERABILITY DETERMINATION. J: COMMITMENT................t : N SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: l This report documents the degradation of painted areas around G03/G04. 1 l This does not affect plant operability ana is not reportable. )
~
REFERENCES:
TRENDING INFORMATION: WHEN-- : NON-OUTAGE ) , THIRD QUARTER OF 1996 l WHO :
- WHY : NOT AN ADVERSE CONDITION
! .WHAT : HOUSEKEEPING l SYSTEM: DIESEL GENERATOR I l ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE i l _ _---..-.....--..--.... --.... ...... .....---_.-_....--...._-............. 1 -100 EVALUATION NEEDED _______......... l l
1 i
. ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 1 04/28/97 Responsible Person: : I
~
- Trk:.d : CR 96-727- Urgency: NO DUE DATE ASSIGUED ;
'* Act:.on Number: 1
- Work Priority: -100 j Activity Pending is: EVALUATION NEEDED .
----------TITLE-AND' TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------ ; -: Paint Peeling Inside G03/G04 Air Intake Filters )
concerns ThisCRhasbeenreoSenedtoaddresspotentialoperab$litbRCrestart fol1 9wing =a review.o closed.CRs in order to comply with commitement #22. Emergency Diesel G9nerator air intake filters (F-139A and F-139B) painted areas inside.the filters are peeling badly. ,
- Datermine if-the condition of the oaint will affect the ability of G-01 we have had a start failure during testing due oto.fo/G-02 to startreign material in the (note :
diesel air start system). - - t Sour e Rec d b9/06/96 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ******'
-Comm tment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: '
Act$on Create: 03/12/97 Orig Eval Due: Orig CA Due: Action Closed: Eval Done: Corr Act Done:
----------PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
Responsible for Overall Action: BMS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: BMS Issue Manager
- Initiator:
.Punchlist Administrator: . ----------UPDATE-------------------------------------------------------------- -(03/17/97 Received Action .into Group: BMS Responsible' Person:
i
----------REFERENCES---------------------------------------------------------- ! --- ------MISCELLANEOUS----------- ---------- --------------------------------
Ori inating Agency: S stem: DG l NRC Open Item Number: N C Status: ;
-Related Outages: i Engineering Work Type: None Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate = i Current' Estimate =
Actual Hours = l l
__. _ ._ _ .. _ - -. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _.. - _ . . - _ _ _ . _ __m -. l- CONDITION REPORT i CR 96-809 l-STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 0 SYSTEM: SW INITIATED: 09/14/96 CLOSED: I MSS #:
~
ADMINISTRATOR: INITIATOR: ) ISSUE MANAGER: ' NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: U Excessive Seal Leakage on P-32C Service Water Pump DESCRIPTION: i Service water pump P-32C exhibited excessive packing leakage. During pump packing adjustmeng per WO 9610105 one of the packing nuts fell apart. This resulted in the packing working out of the packing gland and packing leakage increasing dramatically. Significance: Service water pump taken out of service.
~
l
. Corrective actions: Coordinated with operation to immediately turn off ,
P-32C an additional work plan was developed to repair / replace the packin,g on P-32C. Bogh packing nuts were replaced coordinated with ops to run P-32C and packing was lubricated with Rykon,#2 grease and motor current was monitored and found steady @ 285 amps. STATUS UPDATE: (12/11 /96the packing running While attempting to adjust the packing with the pump adjust bolt was cracked then broke and the gland follower released and control secured the pu,mp. The bolt was replaced the packing adjusted. This CR is closed out to WO 9610105. SCREENED BY : - DATE: 09/17/96 REGULATORY REPORTABLE.....( : N TS VIOLATION.............. N) : N 10 CFR 21................. ( : N TS LCO.................... : N OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. ( : N JCO REQUIRED.............. : N MSS REVIEW................ i
- N SCAQ......................
- N OPERABILITY DETERMINATION.( : N COMMITMENT................ : N ,
SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: Redundac there was no Three SW pumps were available. loss of function as required Thisbyisournot TSs.yconsidered was reduced abut reportable incident per out TSs. Four SW pumps were operable two from each train with all valves and piping necessary to perform the designed safety func,tions.
REFERENCES:
WO 9610105 TRENDING INFORMATION: WHEN--: NON-OUTAGE 1990 - 1999 WHO : WHY : PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE FOR EQUIPMENT WAS INADEQUATE WHAT--: MECHANICAL PUMP RELATED RESTART ISSUE SYSTEM: SERVICE WATER ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE
~ ~~~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~~~ ~
~~~~{~~~~~ ioo~~~~~RbCbiVb EEUEbbMbbT
. = - - - - . - . - _ . -- - --. - . _.
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1
******************************* Responsible Person: 04/30/97 t
i **Trkid: CR 96-809 1 Action Number: Urgency: NO DUE DATE ASSIGNED Work Priority: -100 Activity Pending is: RECEIVE ASSIGNMENT
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Excessive Seal Leakage on P-32C Service Water Pump l As part of the restart commitment #23, a percentage of closed CR were ' reviewed for screening and operability c9mpletness. This CR was determined toissue be deficient. be addressed Reviewon a/verfly the adequac5. of the screening. Should this more generic level _____.----DATES------------------------------------------------------------- Source Record: 09/14/96 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** , Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: Action Create: 04/30/97 Action Closed: Orig Eval EvaA Done: Due: Orig CA Due: Corr Act Done: ______.---PEOPLE-------------------------------------------------------------- Responsible for Overall Action: NMS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: NMS Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE-------------------------------------------------------------- ----------REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------------
WO 9610105
----------MISCELLANEOUS-------------------------------------------------------
Originating Agency: System: SW NRC Open Item Number: NRC Status: Related Outages: Engineering Work Type: None,Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate = 1 Current Estimate = Actual Hours = I I l I l t t I-
CONDITION REPORT CR 96-827 s_ ! STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 1 SYSTEM: SW INITIATED: 09/13/96 CLOSED: MSS #: -ADMINISTRATOR: INITIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER: EUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSEU ACTIONS: 0 Wrong Schedule Piping Installed In Service Water System , DESCRIPTION: A shorg section of 2 inch cavigv fan cooler piping Japproximately 3 feet) in containment was identified as schedule 40 instead of senedule 80 piping as called out by the piping specification. Significance: The original pipe wall thickness of small-bore, service watgr piping in containment may be less than originally specified by design. NOTE: This situation was originally identified as uniform thinning of this section of piping by CR,96-698, The Service Water inspegtion orogram has performed extensive radiography tg monitor for olpe Be radation and to evaluate system acceptability. The use of schedule 40' pi ing has been determined to be isolated to thts region (between 1S -701B and HX-30B). STATUS UPDATE: (09/17/96 This issue is being closed out '_o the actions being taken
-under CR 96-698. CR 96-698 will be revised to reflect these new findings. No further actions necessary under this condition report.
Issue closed. This CR has been reopened following review of closed CRs
.f02/24/97 tor operability concerns in order to comply with an NRC commitment.
SCREEMED BY : ? DATE: 09/17/96 REGULATORY REPUxTAeLd.....( : N TS VIOLATION..............( ?: N 10 CFR 21 ................ g : N TS LCO................... ( J:: NN OPERABILIIY IMPACT PER TS. ( : N JCO REQUIRED.............. L MSS REVIEW................ : N SCAO...................... ( : N OPERABILITY DETERMINATION.(h : COMR I TMENT . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . L : N l SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: This and is condition is not a violation not reogrtable, of any PBNP A previously Technical condition-identified Sp(ecificationsee CR 96-698) stated that this section of piping had experienced uniform, pipe wall thickness thinning. Further evaluation by the ISI engineering ( has goncluded that in fact this apparent thinning is due to scneaule 40 piping being installed in this region vice schedule 80 piping, Evaluation by the engineer has determined that there is sutficient pipe wall thickness (in excess of minimum pipe wall thickness) ana that SW system integrity is not an issue. Action item #1 of CR 96-698 will be amended to reflect these new findings. This section of piping will be replaced with schedule 80 piping. The SW system will continue to be inspected and radiographed under the SW Inspection Program.
REFERENCES:
CR 96-698 NRC GL 89-13 ! SPRING 1996 SW INSPECTION RPT TRENDING INFORMATION: ' WHEN--: OUTAGE l 1970 - 1979 WHO : WHY : DESIGN WAS NOT TO SPECIFICATIONS l WHAT
- MECHANICAL PIPING RELATED SYSTEM: SERVICE WATER ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE 1 31 EVALUATION NEEDED ___________________._________________
05/15/97 I
a ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1
******************************* Responsible Person: 04/28/97 F Trkid: CR 96-827 *' Urgency: DUE IN 16-30 DAYS
- Action Number: 1
- Work Priority: 31 t
Activity Pending is: EVALUATION NEEDED
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Wrong Schedule Piping Installed In Service Water System This CR has been reopened following a review of closed CRs for operability determination review in order to comply with an NRC Commitment. A short section of 2 inch cavity fan cooler piping (approximately 3 feet) itainment was identified as schedule 40 instead ot schedule 80 piping as calut by the piping specification. Provide sufficient justification for the closecut of this item pending long term corrective action. _________. DATES-------- ------------------------------------------------------ Source Record: 09/13/96 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** Commitment: Eval Due: 05/15/97 Corr Act Due: Action Create: 02/24/97 Orig Eval Due: 05/15/97 Eval Done: Orig CA Due: Corr Act Done: Action Closed: PEOPLE-------------------------------------------------------------- Responsible for Overall Action: NMS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: NMS Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(04/01/97 ..._, Received Action into Group: NMS 4 Responsible Person: Due Date: 05/15/97 l (04/01/97 Set Work Priority to 31. ; 1 1
----------REFERENCES------------------------------------------------- --------
l
----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- -------------------------------- !
I Originating Agency: S stem: SW NRC Open Item Nuder: N C Status: Related Outages: U2R22 Engineering Work Type: Evaluation ; Person Hours: Original Estimate = l Current Estimate = Actual Hours =
' CONDITION REPORT i CR 96-829
\
STATUS: OPEN UNIT: O SYSTEM: SW INITIATED: 09/17/96 CLOSED: MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: INITIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER: NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 1 Significant Wall Thinning Identified On Service Water Tubing l DESCRIPTION- ' ressor ServiceWaterradiographyoftheK-3AServiceWaterAirComkhinningdue Aftercooler Heat Exchancer (HX-50A} shows significant wall f to internal corrosion. This was originally identified in the Spring of i 1991 and confirmed to exist in the Spring of 1993. Degradation has ; conQinued such that the design wall thickness for the service water ! piping will be reached within one year. This heat exchanger and the 1 i aftercoolers for the other air compressors also exhibit blockage due to nodule buildup. Significance: Potential for exceeding minimum wall thickness for service water piping in the air compressor room. NOTE: MR 93-005 was initiated to address this condition. STATUS UPDATE: (09/17/96 ') This CR was discussed with the Modifications Engineering group and it has been determined to close this CR ouQ to the two existing modifications (.R M 93-005 and MR 92-042). This CR is being used to upgrade the priority of these modifications. No further actions are necessary. Closed. (02 /24/97ed out ) This CR has been reopened followinn a review of all clos CRs for operability concerns. - issue manage . SCREENED BY : ; DATE: 09/16/96 REGULATORY REPORTABLE..... ): N TS VIOLATION.............. TS LCO................. .. N N 10 CFR 21.. .............. J:N OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. J:N JCO REQUIRED..... .. ... . N MSS REVIEW................ JJ:.NN SCAQ...................... COMMITMENT... ........ ..
- N N
OPERABILITY DETERMINATION. - SUPPORTING This conditionDETERMINATIONS: is not a violation of any PBNP Technical Specification and is not reportable. These heat exchangers are non-QA and non-safety related components, however failure of this service water piping could have a serious impact on pla,nt operation. Mod Request 93-005 nas been initiated to replace all the air compressor after coolers (HX-50A/B adn HX-49A/B).
REFERENCES:
MR 93-005 TRENDING INFORMATION: WHEN--: NON-OUTAGE 1991 WHO : MODIFICATIONS ENGINEERING WHY : CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS NOT YET IMPLEMENTED OR INSTALLED COMMUNICATIONS WHAT- : MECHANICAL MECHANICAL HEAT PIPING EXCHANGER RELATED RELATED MECHANICAL CORROSION OR EROSION RELATED . SYSTEM: SERVICE WATER 5402 - Mod Request was initiated in 1993, but with lower priority 4000 - condition of piping was not appropriately communicated previously, recent evaluation by M. Legreve identified severity. ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE 2 -100 ACTION NEEDED 08 97 ; I
l 1
. ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 04/28/97 l ******************************* Responsible Person: I % Trkid: CR 96-829
- Urgency: DONE Work Priority: 38
- Action Number: 1 e+*****************************
Activity Pending is: DONE
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Significant Wall Thinning Identified on Service Water Tubing This CR has been reopened following a review of closed CRs for operability concerns. Service Water Exchanger Aftercooeat radiograp(HX-50A)hy of the K-3A shows Service Water significant wallAir Compressor thinning due to internal corr. This was originally identified in the Spring of 1991 and ! confirm 9d to ext the Spring of 1993. Degradation has continued such that the design wall thss for the service water piping will be reached within one year. This heat nger and the aftercoolers for the other air compressors also exhibit blockae to nodule buildup. It has been noted that a failure of this piping could cause serious impact on plant operation. Document the o pending the installation of MR 93 perability005 of the existing conditionand MR 92-045 to replace the piping.
----------DATES-------------------- -------- ---------------------------------
Source Record: 09/12/96 ******* Eva luation ** ***** ****** Correction ****** Commitment: Eval Due: 04 15 97 Corr Act Due: Action Create: 02 24 97 Orig Eval Due: 04 15 97 Orig CA Due: Action Closed: 04 03 97 Eval Done: 03 30 97 Corr Act Done:
----------PEOPLE--------------------------------- ----------------------------
Responsnble for Overall Action: NMS Responsnble for Current Pending Activity: Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Adm,inistrator: _____-----UPDATE--------------------------------- ---------------------------- (03/08/97 ) Received Action into Group: NMS Responsible eerson: Due Date: 04/15/97 (03/08/97 Set Work Priority to 38. (03/28/97 ) An' operability determination was written and approved by an SRO ( and the DCS ) on 3/13/97. The completed annumenr. was tnen placed in the Work Control Center CR basket according to
. At the presnt time the completed document cannot be found 1 by regulatory services personnel. I have a copy of the operability i determination and plan to have it reveiwed and approved again and will :
then make a copy or the approved document to pass on for closecut of this I action item. l I (03/28/97 Passed to for acceptance of work. (03 Passed to for Verification. , The/30/97 original operability aeterminaciun was lose A new ooerability and on 3/28797 and
~~
determination was signed by is included in the closecut uveumentaciun. . In summary, the corrosion concern is with the shell side of the K-3A I service air compressor aftercooler. The corrosion is limited to localized 1 pitting type corrosion. The pitting is judged not to be a significant concern since at the worst it could result in a pinhole leak. A pinhole leak would not affect Service Water system operabiliv. Flooding or spray The H l affects were not considered for replacement in 1997,significant concerns.The ope ability evaluation conc ludes /Xsthat are olanned there is not a concern as long as the H Xs are actually replaced in 1997. This l action item may be closed out wit another action created for installation
~
for this Mod and
- of MR 93-005.
should be assigneu unAo avuton is the resoonsible engineer3/28/97
~
item. , ' (04/03a/97ction isPLA This Closure of Item. being closed. The Operability Determination for this issue l has been completed and the long term corrective action will be the installation of MR 93-015 in 1997. No further action necessary. l
!. ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1
******************************* Responsible Person: n4/28/97
- Trkid: CR 96-829
- Urgency: DUE IN 61-120 DAYS
- Action Number: 2
- Work Priority: -100 i *******************************
Activity Pending is: ACTION NEEDED
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Significant Wall Thinning Identified On Service Water Tubing This action item is being initiated in support of the Prompt Operability Determination completed for the K-3A compressor SW aftercooler heat ' exchanger. The POD for this condition states that the heat exchanger will be operable until the heat exchanger can be replaced under MR 93-005 prior i to the end of 1997. If this modification is not completed prior to the end of 1997, a new Operability Determination will be necessary or the i compressor will be declared inoperable.
----------DATES---- ----------------------------------------------------------
Source Record: 09/12 /96 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: 08/01/97 i Action Create: 04/03/97 Orig Eval Due: Eval Done: Orig CA Due: Corr Act Done: 08/01/97 Action Closed:
----------PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
Responsible for Overall Actign: MEG , Responsible for Current Pending Activity: MEG Issu9 Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
i (04/04/97 ) Received Action into Group: MEG Responsible Person:
~~ "
Due Date: 08/01/97
-------_--REFERENCES---------------------------------------------------- -----
MR 93-005
----------MISCELLANEOUS-- ----------------------------------------------------
Originating Agency: System:- SW NRC Open Item Number: NRC Status: Related Outages: Engineering Work Type: Modification Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours = I l l
.- . - _ _ _ _ - - . _ __. _ . m . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ ~ - . . _ _ _ .._
CONDITION REPORT ! CR 96-850 , STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 0 SYSTEM: AF INITIATED: 09/17/96 --" CLOSED: MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: ISSUE MANAGER: INITIATOR: NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSEU ACTIONS: 1 Operability Determination Needed For Issue Discussed In SER 96-028 DESCRIPTION: , A receng review Evaluation by (SER)the Report , OSRC"50.59 96-028 Release subcommittee identified of Dedicated Operator Safety for P-38A Motor Driven Auxillary Feedwater Pump Discharge Valve AF-4012 To control Discharge Flow", as having several discrepancies. After further it was determined that the SER was not the proper mechanism dicsussions,he to addvess t issues identified, and that the explanation in the SER more am repriately belonaed in an Operability Determination. This is becaus6 the identified p6tential for a P-38A pump trip produces only a slight degradation in the AFW system design response, and thq corrective actions in place are sufficient to declare operability at this time. Signif cance: s for the SER 96-028 operab lity callDeficiencies on P-38A, Improper in the reasoninYogy methodo for documenting operab lity. , STATUS UPDATE: (10/01/,96 . i All action has been completed. The Operability Determination for Cr 96-264 has been completed and included in the close out package. No further ac ions are required and the CR may be closed out. i SCREENED BY : DATE: 09/19/96 N REGULATORY REPORTABLE..... : N TS VIOLATION.............. - 10 CFR 21................. : N TS LCO........ ...... .. : N OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. : N JCO REQUIRED....... .. . N MSS REVIEW................ : N SCAQ.................. .. : N i OPERABILITY DETERMINATION. : Y COMMITMENT........ ..... . : N SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: The issue is one of the proper methodology to document operability of the AFW pumo with the dedicated operator removed. The reasoning has apparently been established adequately within the SER, however needs to be placed in an Operability Determination. The OER group will,be developing this Operability Determination with inputs from the referenced material. Thus, no safety equipment is believed inoperable ' at this time, and no reportable issues are believed to exist
REFERENCES:
SER 96-028 SER 96-023 SER 96-022 SER 96-025 ' SER 96-027 CR 96-264 l PBTP-043 SMP 1183 & 1184 TRENDING INFORMATION: l WHEN~~: NON-OUTAGE THIRD QUARTER OF 1996 I I WHO - OPERATIONS i NSSS MECHANICAL SYSTEMS ENGINEERING l i WHY : INDEPENDENT DESIGN REVIEW WAS LESS THAN ADEQUATE I INADEQUATE COMMUNICATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS (SPAC) ! WHAT-- : REGULATORY i MECHANICALDOCUMENTSGATE VALVE RELATED l RESTART ISSUE j SYSTEM: AUXILIARY FEEDWATER i
' ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE 2 -100 RECEIVE ASSIGNMENT
- l. '
4 2
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1
******************************* Responsible Person: 04/28/97
- Trkid: CR 96-850
- Urgency: DOME
- Action Number: 1
- Work Priority: -100 Activity Pending is: DONE
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Operability Determination Needed For Issue Discussed In SER 96-028 Develop an operability determination iustifying the use of operator actions to control AFW flow from P-38A, and, it necessary, reestablish flow if the pump should trip on overcurrent 4
----------DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
Source Record: 09/17/96 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ** *** Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: 10 96 Action Create: 09/19/96 Orig Eval Due: Orig CA Due: 10 96 Action Closed: 10/01/96 i Eval Done: Corr Act Done:09 96 l PEOPLE-------------------------------------------------------------- Responsible for Overall Action: OER Responsible for Current Pending Activity: Isgue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator: UPDATE-------------------------------------------------------------- (09/24/96 ) Received Action into Group: OER i 4 Responsible Person: Due Date: 10/04/96 ' ! (09/26/96 ) Passed to ' for acceptance of work. 1 (09/30/95 Passed to for Verification. Operability Determination has been completed and placed in the DSS , turnover manual in control. See copy of Operability Determination for CR l 96-264 attached to hardcopy of closecut package. This item can be closed, j (10/01/96 ) PLA Closure of Item. Operability Determination for the information contained within SER 96-28, l See documented copy and CR 96-284,dition attached to Co Report.has been completed and approved. No further actions are required and the CR may be closed out. _____-----REFERENCES---------------------------------------------------------- SER 96-028 SER 96-023 . SER 96-022 SER 96-025 1 SER 96-027 CR 96-264 i PBTP-043 SMP 1183 & 1184
----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
Originating Agency: S stem: AF NRC Open Item Numer: N C Status: Related Outages: Engineering Work Type: None,Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours =
l ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 l
' ******************************* Responsible Person:
. 04/30/97
** Trk4d: CR 96-850 Action Number: 2 Urgency: NO DUE DATE ASSIGNED Work Priority: -100 Activity Pending is: RECEIVE ASSIGNMENT
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
l Operability Determination Needed For Issue Discussed In SEP 96-028 As part of the restart. commitment #23, a percentage of closed CRs were f reviewed for screening and operability completeness. This CR was determined to be deficignt. Review I and closecut justification for this/ verify CR tothe adequacyany of th screening determine outstanding operability concerns. 1
-----DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
Sour e Record: 09/17/96 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** Comm tment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: Action Create: 04/30/97 Orig Eval Due: Eval Done: Orig CA Due: Corr Act Done: Action Closed:
----------PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
Responsible for Overall Action: RES Responsible for Current Pending Activity: RES Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
-.--------REFERENCES----------------------------------- ----------------------
SER 96-028 SER 96-023 SER 96-022 SER 96-025 SER 96-027 CR 96-264
-PBTP-043 SMP 1183 & 1184
----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
Originating Agency: S stem: AF NRC Open Item Number: N C Status: Related Outages: Engineering Work Type: None,Specified Person Hourr: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours = l l
_ .. . -- -- -. . .. . - - .=. CONDITION REPORT CR 96-964 e , STATUS: CLOSED UNIT: 0 SYSTEM: SW INITIATED: 10/02/96 CLOSED: 04/09/97 l MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: ' l INITIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER: NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 0 NUMBER OF CLOSEU AUT1UN6: 1 Service Water Supply Piping Elbow Wall Thinning I l l DESCRIPTION:The Service Water supply pi t9 the "Deconn Area" (old spent fuel ! poolheatexchangersupply)pinbibitslocalizedpittinginexcessof ex 50%
)
through wall. The location of this thinning is upstream of the isolation l l valve and thus cannot be isolated from the West service Water header. l Extensive sediment is also present at this location. Significance: Potential for minimum wall thickness to be exceeded which could result in an unisolable leak to the PAB. l NOTE: This region of piping has undergone UT examination te determine
- the extent of the damage. The minimum wall thickness was measured to be 0.09" (which correlates to 68% throu pipe The existine,hickness for thickness is greater than the 0.056"gh wall).minimum t
- design wall t ,
this portion of piping. Since Qhis thinning has occurred in a elbow region the percentage wall thinning is greater than 68% because the nominal wall thickness for the elbow was in excess of the 0.28" nominal dimension for the piping. STATUS UP TE: (10/04 96 ) This Condition Reoort is being closed out to MR 96-053. MR 96- 53 scope has been expanded to replace the degraded SW piping elbow during,U2R22. Previous analysis of this portion of SW piping led to the c eation of MR 96-053. The Design Engineer requested additional analysis inspection of this section of SW piping in order to identify angich (w this CR docunEntaddi ional
). areas Issue/ regions closedof the SW piping that required replacement A conv of.this information has been forwarded to the Design Engineer (02 This CR has been reopened following.a review of all clos /24/97 ed out CRs for operability concerns. -
1ssue manager. 104/09 actions i This CR has been closed to the actions completed. No rurther/97 warranted. SCREENED BY : DATE: 10/03/96 . N REGULATORY REPORTABLE.....( : N TS VIOLATION... ....... . / 10 CFR 21................. : N TS LCO................... . N OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS.( : N JCO REQUIRED......... ... - N MSS REVIEW................L : N SCAQ............ ......... : N N OPERABILITY DETERMINATION. - COMMITMENT............ ... - SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: This condition is not a violation of any PBNP Technical S ecification and is not reportable. The design minimum wall thickness or this , portion of Sr piping has n9t been exceeded by the erosion corrosion in ' the elbow region of this pleing. The design criteria call for minimum wall thickness of 0.056", the existing worst case area is currently at 0.09". REFERENCES SPRI95 043/090/B/3 MR 96-053 NPM 97 0084 , TRENDING INFORMATION: WHEN --: NON-OUTAGE l FOURTH QUARTER OF 1996 I WHO : WHY -- : NATURAL PHENOMENON i WHAT--~ : MECHANICAL PIPING RELATED
- MECHANICAL CORROSION OR EROSION RELATED SYSTEM: SERVICE WATER i
I ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE l l
, ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE ~
l
******************************* Responsible Person:
04/28/97
*I Action Trkid: CR 96-964 Number: 1 Urgency: vuNE Work Priority: 59 Activity Pending is: DONE ----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------- ----------------------------------
Service Water Supply Piping Elbow Wall Thinning ) 1 This CR has been reopened following a review of closed CRs for operability concerns. The Service Water supply piping to the "Deconn Area" (old spent fuel pool hxchanger supplv exhibits localized pitting in excess of 50% through wall. ocation of)this thinning is upstream of the isolation valve and thus cannotsolated from the West Service Water header. Extensive sediment is also prest this location. This CR was previously closed stating that a modification is in place to replace the affected elbow and that further analysis of this section of piping would be completed. However the results of these inspections is not documented and it has not been, concluded whether the mechanism for the wall thinning mighq be applicable to other portions of the SW system. Provide justification / documentation for closure or corrective action. ____.-----DATES-----------------------------------------------------------,--- Source Record: 10/02/96 ******* Evaluation ** ***** ****** Correction ****** Commitment: Eval Due: 04 15 97 Corr Act Due: Act$on Create: 02 24 97 Action Closed: 04 09 97 Orig Eval Due: 04 15 97 Eval Done: 04 04 97 Orig CA Due: Corr Act Done: _____.---PEOPLE-------------------------------------------------------------- Responsible for Overall Action: NMS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
i (03/13/97 ) Received Action into Group: NMS Due Date: 04/15/97
~ ~ ~ ~ "
Responsible Person: (03/13/97 ) Set Work Prigrity to 59. Priority based on potential operability issue and generic concern for SW piping integrity. Closecut of this concern is a startup issue. (03/25/97 Passed to for acceptance of work. (04 Passed to for Verification. l The/04/97 pinhole leak was due to pitting corrosion, b9 lieved to be caused by Microbiolgically Influenced Corrosion (MIC). This type of corrosion is applicable to the entire Service Water System. It most notably attacks I stagnant and intermittent flow areas. Other instances of these pinhole I leaRs have occured in the past. However, none of these pinhole leaks have ca.used the SW piping to be functionally incperable. The pitting cgrrosion is localized and has not affected the seismic integrity or the piping. i' Also, the small leakage which occurs from a pinhole type leak does not impact the flow capacity of the SW system nor does it present flooding l concerns. The service water ISI program monitors piping locations for wall thinning and concentrates on the areas of the system that are most ! susceptible to MIC. This generic concern is not considered to be an operability issue for the SW system based on past leaks in the system and
- the SW inspection program indicates thet pinhole type leaks woul6 occur.
l More substantial leaks, pipe cracking or rupture has not occurred in the l past and is not exoected in the future. SW piping leaks are being addressed in a number of wa The SW system has been classified as a(1) under the Maintenance Rule,ys.one of tne reasons being the pinhole leaks whigh have occured in the system. Goals and action plans related to the piping leaks have been established 97-0084), There is no current operability concern with(reference Memo i NPM item may be closed out. the SW
, 3p/ ping integrity. This action 25/97 (04 Passed to for Final Close Out.
The/07/97closeouQ d)ocumentation resolves all geustions I had when re-opening the CR. This adequately closes the concerns. t
. ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 2 04/28/97 (04/09/97 This PLA Closure of Item.
item has)been completed and verified by the Issue Manager. No further actions necessary.
------_---REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------------
NPM 97-0084
----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
Originating Agency: S stem: SW 1 NRC Open Item Nu@er: N C Status: Related Outages: U2R22 Engineering Work Type: Evaluation Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours = t f I I i 4 4 i
s
., CONDITION REPORT CR 96-974 STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 1 SYSTEM: SW INITIATED: 10/03/96 CLOSED:
MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: INITIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER: NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 0 -Containment Accident Fan Motor Cooling Concern (Restart Issue) DESCRIPTION: SER 96-057 changed the methgdology used to throttle the service water flow t9 the containment accident fan coolers. Previous to this SER, Operations would throttle flow to the containment accident fan motor cooler during containment inspections to approximately 40 gpm. If the flow meter is found to be out of service (see CR 96-973), then the throttle valve is set to 3 Following the implemetation/4ofturn SERopen 96-057, to ensurethe throttleadequate flow. to the position accident fan cooler was changed however the throttle valve position for the motor cooler has not bee,n changed. Significance: Potential for insufficient cooling flow to the "D" accident fan cooler motor. STATUS' UPDATE: h0/08/96 Discussion of this concern with the System Engineer these revealled that the minimum service water flow reautrements to motors only-requires 10 gpm. The crevious throttle valve setting 3 turn open) provided 40 gpm flow. The decrease in should not provide l(es/4 s than the 10 gpm required flow. (10/16/96 This condition was evaluated by the Evaluations and it has been concluded Engineering Group that this concern is not an aaverse concition. A review of the computer modeling runs under Calc 96-0117 Rev 1 shows that the flow rates throught the accident fan motor cooler coils were in excess of 20 gpm (10 gpm is the minimum specified and typical results for both units were 24 to 44 gpm Based upon these findings EEG has concluded that the existing yalv)e position settings are acce,ptible and that this does not have an adverse affect on the operation or any safety related equipment. Issue closed. , (03/12/97 Reopened following review for operability concerns to Identified as Issue meet NRC restart commitment #22. Manager. SCREENED BY : DATE: 10/04/96 REGULATORY REPORTABLE..... : N TS VIOLATION..............(Y ): N 10 CFR 21................. : N TS LCO....................( J: N OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS, : N JCO REQUIRED..............( J: N MSS REVIEW................ : N SCAQ...................... ; J: N OPERABILITY DETERMINATION. : COMMITMENT................L J: N SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: Requires further eval.
REFERENCES:
CR 96-973 PC-24 TRENDING INFORMATION: WHEN-- : NON-OUTAGE 1996 WHO : WH'r : NOT AN ADVERSE CONDITION WHAT : SYSTEM: SERVICE WATER . ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo Responsible Person: 04/28/97 o Trkid: CR 96-974 o Urgency: NOT DUE / IN CLOSEOUT o Action Number: 1
- Work Priority: 59 000o0c*************************
Activity Pending is: ACTION VERIFICATION
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Containment Accident Fan Motor Cooling Concern SER 96-057 changed the methodology used to throttle the service water flow to the containment accident fan goolers. Previous to this SER Operations would throttle flow to the containment accident fan motor cooier during containment inspections to approximately 40 gpm. If the flow meter is found to be out of service (see CR 96-973 then the throttle valve is set to 3/4 turn open to ensure adequate flow. ) hollowing the implemetation of SER 96-057 the throttle position to the accident tan cooler was changed however, the throttle valve position for the motor cooler was not changed. Following review of all glosed CRs as part of NRC restart committment #22 for operability issues, it was concluded that this CR would be reopened to address the following issue: Setpoint Document 14.6 needs to be revised c- reflect these valve position changes.
----------DATES-------------------------------------------------- ------------
Sourge Record: 10/03/96 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ** *** Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: 04 15 97 Act$on Create: Action Closed: 03/12/97 Orig Eval Due: Eval Done: Orig CA Due: Corr Act Done:04 03 97 04 15 97
..______.-PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
Responsible for Overall Action: NMS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: SEN Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Adm'inistrator:
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(03/13/97 ) Received Action into Group: NMS Responsible Person: Due Date: 04/15/97 (03/13 questio/97 Set Work Priority to 59. Priority based on operability n for closed CR. If not an operability issure probability is much Iower. Priority is also based on ensuring this is no,t a restart issue. I (03/28/97 Passed to for acceptance of work. i (04/03/97 ) Passed to for Verification, Action item 91 determined that the specified valve position of 3/4 Turn
- open is still appropriate. The required flow is listed in the Comp (onent Instruction Manual tor the Containment Accident Fan Motor Coolers i.e.
Westinghouse 00517) as 10 gpm. The flow is set by PC-24 Unit 1 or Unit 2 between 20 - 40 gpm or with the, outlet throttle valve $/4 of a turn open if the flow indicator is not worxing properly. The throttle valve position or flowrate are not listed in the Setpoint Document and do not need to be according to the Setpoint Document Change Coordinator Mike l Rosseau. This type of information is not placed in the Setoo4nt document ! the information on the required minimum flow and on the method of checking, i and-setting the actual flow is already in the appropriate locations (i.e.
- CIM 00517 and PC-24 Ul+U2). It is PBNP practice to document throttle
! valve settings in procedures and checklists, rather than in the setpoint document. This action may be closed.
----------REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------- ----
--------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
l -Originating Agency: S stem: SW NRC Open Item Nueer: N C Status: Related Outages: Engineering work Type: None Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours = r i
. . _ _ . ._ .. - -.. _. -- - .. . ~.. . . _ - , , , ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 2 04/28/97 !
4 d i
----------REFERENCES---------------------------------------------------------- '
i MR 93-015
----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- -------------------------------- ' Originating Agency:
System: SW NRC O'cen Item' Related Outages: Nuder: U2R22 NRC Status: Engineering Work Type: Evaluation Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours = J e } 4 4 Y ? d
CONDITION REPORT -
- CR 96-1230 e-STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 0 SYSTEM: SW INITIATED: 10/28/96 CLOSED:
MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: INITIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER: i NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 0 Relief Valves Not Installed Per Code Requirements (restart Issue) DESCRIPTION-The relief valves, SW-4438 and SW-4440, for the PAB Battery Room Coolers (HX-105A/B) are not installed per the requirements of ASME Section III. The ASME code requires relief valves to be installed in a vertical pos$tionhorizontal(upright). The two valves in question are currently installed ly. Significance: ASME Section III code violation. NOTE: Horizontally installed relief valves will lift as required, but may not reseat properly. STATUS PDATE: (10 30/96 This CR is being closed out to the submitted work orders tha have been submitted to reposition the valves. No further action required. (03/12/97 CR reopened to,ad. dress potential operability concern for NRC restart issue #22. - 1ssue manager.
' SCREENED BY : . DATE: 10/30/96 REGULATORY REPORTABLE..... N): N TS VIOLATION.............. : N 10 CFR 21................. : N TS LCO................... : N OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. : N JCO REQUIRED.............. : N MSS REVIEW................ : N SCAQ......... ............ : N OPERABILITY DETERMINATION. : N COMMITMENT................ : N SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS:
This condition is not a violation of any PBNP Technical Specification and is not reportable. These valves are QA scope and safety related, however, the the fact that these valves have been installed horizontally will not preclude these valves from lifting at the required pressure. This installation is contrary to the installation requirements of ASME Section III and could result in the valves not croperly reseating after having lifted. In the event of this happening the valves could be reseated manually if necessary.
REFERENCES:
WO 9611940 WO 9611941 -! WO 96941 TRENDING INFORMATION: ' WHEN--: NON-OUTAGE 1995 WHO : WHY : PROCEDURE PROVIDED LESS THAN ADEQUATE TECHNICAL DETAILS WHAT- : MECHANICAL PERIODIC MAINTENANCE INSTALLATION ERROR + REWORK RELATED MECHANICAL RELIEF VALVE RELATED SYSTEM: SERVICE WATER 1206 - work plan did not address ASME Sect III r'equirements for installation ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE
! , ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 i ***********************"******* 04/28/97 Responsible Person: Trkid: CR 96-1230
- Urgency: PAST DUE 1-30 DAYS w[ Action Number:
1
- Work Priority: 59
****eo*************************
Activity Pending is: EVALUATION OVERDUE
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Relief Valves Not Installed Per Code Requirements This CR has been reopened following a review of closed CRs for operability concerns in order to address NRC restart issue #22. f valves, SW-4438 and SW-4440, for the PAB Battery Room Coolers (HX-105A are not installed per the requirements of ASME SecQion III. The relie/B)d The ASME co e requires relief valves to be installed in a vertical position (upri The two valves in question are currently installed horizontally. ght). This CR did not adequately address the affects that the installation position of these valves has on the functionality of the Service Water system. Provide sufficient justification for acceptance of the existing configuration until the reliefs are properly installed.
----------DATES--------------------------------------'*-------------
Source Record: 10/28/96 ******* Evaluation ********* Corr ***** Correct ion ******---------- Commitment: Eval Due: 04/15/97 Act Due: Action Create: 03/12/97 Orig Eval Due: -04/15/97 Eval Done: Orig CA Due: Corr Act Done: Action Closed:
----------PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
Responsible for Overall Action: NMS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: NMS Issug Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(03/12/97 ) Received Action into Group: NMS Due Date: 04/15/97
~ ---- ~
Responsible Person: (03 ) Set Work Priority to 59. Priority is based on question of adqu/12/97acy,of the existing operability determination for SR components. Also, since this issue was raised as a part of a startup commitment, determining whether Qhere is an outstanding operability issue is also a startup issue for unit 2.
----------REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------------
WO 9611940 WO 96941 ________.-MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- -------------------------------- Originating Agency: S stem: SW NRC Open Item Nueer: N C Status: Related Outages: Engineering work Type: None,Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours =
CONDITION REPORT CR 96-1301
.(
STATUS: OPEN UNIT: O SYSTEM: SW INITIATED: 11/02/96 CLOSED: MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: INITIATOR: - ISSUE MANAGER: NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: . 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 0 Oil Level Drop During Service Water Pump Return To Service Testing DESCRIPTION: On 11/1/96, during a return to service test run of the P-32A Service the oil level steadily dropped in the si htglass to almost l Water out ofPumpbt sig low. When the pum the oi$ level disappeared.
- Upon removal of the fill plug,p was securedthe oil level returned to normal Significance: Increased the time in an LCO to resolve the problem with pump oil level, Unnecessary shifting of pumps causing transients an
! syst, ems /, components, potential to operate equipment without the proper indications. Corrective actigns taken: Maintenance personnel discovere the metering plug bent, and it had paint chips on it. These were cleaned off and the plug straightened. The top vent line for the sightglass was also found partially plugged, this was cleaned as well. STATUS UPDATE: (11/05 ) The situation was corrected by Maintenance inspections and cle/96 anups. Further maintenance of this nature will contain QC l holdpoints for post maintenance testing. No further actions are believed necessary at this time and the CR may be closed out. SCREENED BY : DATE: 11/05 /9 REGULATORY REPORTABLE..... ( : N TS VIOLATION.6 ............ . N 10 CFR 21................. L : N TS LCO.................... : Y OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. s : N JCO REQUIRED....... ...... : N MSS REVIEW................ ( : N SCAQ.................. ... : N OPERABILITY DETERMINATION.t : N COMMITMENT................ : N SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: The plant was in a VLCO at the time to repair the service water pump, thus the es indication for TS LCO. This was caused by not prcviding adequate C for the post maintenance testing. This did not cause the plant to e immediately concerned for operability, laced since back time into was still available under the LCO, however the pump being p service in this manner could have, caused a concern because of the
-current issue regarding the amount of service water needed for adequately containment fanthiscooler flow,it and the amount of pumps needed Un 2 was in a shutdown mode not to operate the units. In case i requiring the limitation onm service, water pumps as when operating. !
Therefore, no operability concern, existed here, and the situation was l gorrected, prior to LCO time expiring. Therefore, no reportability issues exist here either
REFERENCES:
TRENDING INFORMATION: WHEN--: FOURTH QUARTER OF 1996 NON-OUTAGE WHO : MECH AND ELEC MAINTENANCE WHY : NO QUALITY CONTROL PROCEDURE HOLD POINT WAS SPECIFIED FOREIGN MATERIAL EXCLUSION DURING WORK WAS INADEQUATE IMMEDIATE SUPERVISION PROVIDED INADEQUATE WORK PACKAGE WHAT--: MECHANICAL COR.RECTIVE MAINTENANCE POST MAINTENANCE TESTING MECHANICAL PUMP RELATED SEDIMENT /NON-FOREIGN DEBRIS IN EQUIPMENT WORK CONTROLS RELATED RESTART ISSUE SYSTEM: SERVICE WATER ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE t 1 -100 RECEIVE ASSIGNMENT
. ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 '
- Responsible Person:
04/30/97 / Trkid: CR 96-1301
- Urgency: NO DUE DATE ASSIGNED
- Action Number: 1
- Work Priority: -100 Activity Pending is: RECEIVE ASSIGNMENT
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Oil Level Drop During Service Water Pump Return To Service Testing i As part of the restart commitment #23, a percentage of closed CRs were reviewgd for screening and operability completeness. This CR was determined to be deficient. Review and the closecut justification to de/ verify terminethethe adequacy existence of of theany screening additional operability concerns. i (per P. Walker /K. Rathgaber)
----------DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
Sourge Record: 11/02/96 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: Action Create: Action Closed: 04/30/97 Orig Eval Due: Eval Done: Orig CA Due: Corr Act Done:
----------PEOPLE-------------------- ----------------i ------------------------
Responsible for Overall Action: MEM Responsible for Current Pending Activity: MEM Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
___.-___,-REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------------
----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
Originating Agency: S stem: SW NRC Open Item Number: N C Status: Related Outages: Engineering Work Type: None,Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate = l Current E3timate = l Actual Hours = l 1
CONDITION REPORT CR 96-1322 i STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 0 SYSTEM: 4.16KV INITIATED: 10/31/96 CLOSED: MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: INITIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER: MUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 0 Breaker Internal Wiring Not As Specified In Drawing ) DESCRIPTION: Breaker (A52-3210F) internal wiring is not as specified in the drawings. The ground wire from the segondary side of the control was connected to the wrong side of the overload contact.pwer This transformer was discovered as part of the post maintenance testing for the Control Power Transformer upgrade. These wires are internal to the bucket and were not moved as part of this evolution. This condition existed prior to the upgrade. i Significance: Plant configuration does not match drawings. Completed corrective actions: The wires were switched to match the drawings. The results of the post maintenance testing were satisfactory. ! STATUS UPDATE: 4 (12 ) This condition was corrected when it was identified. j The/11/96 plant a.o not matgh the drawings; the drawin CR closed.g were correct in this case. No further actions n c ssary. SCREENED BY : . DATE: 11/07/96 l REGULATORY REPORTABLE..... : N TS-VIOLATION.............. : N - 10 CFR 21................. : N TS LCO.................... : N
- OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. : N JCO REQUIRED.............. : N i MSS REVIEW................ : N SCAO...................... .N i OPERABILITY DETERMINATION. : N COMITMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N !
- ' SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS
- !
This report documents another instance of plant configuration not l 1 matching the drawings. This has not presented a problem with Qhe !
! operation of the valve; however, it was not wired internally like other l MOV breaker buckets. !
REFERENCES:
4 WEST DWG. 499B466 SH 861A PBM 97-0200 TRENDING INFORMATION: WHEN -- : NON-OUTAGE
- FOURTH QUARTER OF 1996 !
WHO - i WHY : DESIGN WAS NOT TO SPECIFICATIONS WHAT--: POST MAINTENANCE TESTING ELECTRICAL WIRING RELATED DRAWING RELATED > SYSTEM: TSYSTEDC4.16KVAC ; l ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE
----{-~~- :----~~-~((gjfy-- gj-{- gjfg ------~~~~~---------------~~~~~,3{~~--
4
i
, . ACTION ITEM-STATUS REPORT PAGE : 1 l coooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo Responsible Person: 04/28/97 i 6 Trkid: CR 96-1322 o Urgency: NOT DUE / IN CLOSEOUT 0 Action Number: 1 .
- Work Priority: -100 00000c*************************
Activity Pending is: ACTION VERIFICATION
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Breaker Internal Wiring Not As Specified In Drawing A review of previously closed CRs for notential operability issues flagged this CR, This CR was closed without iBentifigation of any permanent resolution. These.are restart issues for Unit 2, 2/27/97. The:CR documents that the wiring in question was corrected, it dges not address the possible applicability to other breakers. Evaluate similar 1 safety related breakers for this potential problem. ]
----------DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
- Source Record: 10/31/96 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** - Correction ****** l Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: 03 31 97 Act$on
. Action Closed:
Create: 02/27/97 Orig Eval Due: Eval Done: Orig CA Due: 03 31 97 Corr Act Done:03 18 97
----------PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
I Responsible for Overall Action: EIS LResponsible for Current Pending Activity: OER Issue Manager: . Initiator: . Punchlist Administrator: ) i
----------UPDATE---------------------------------------- ---------------------
(02/28/97 ) Received Action into Group: EIS : Responsible Person: Due Date: 03/31/97 (03/18/97 [ Passed to for acceptance of work. (03/18 Passed to . for Verification. As docu/97 mented in CR 96-1322 the wirina discrepancy was. discovered during , post-maintenance testing following conErol power transformer replacement. Control power transformers for all safety-related motor control center . cubicles similar to the one in.which the wiring discrepancy was discovered are bging. replaced. Therefore since normal post-maintenance testing will i identify similar wiring discrep,ancies, there isApproximately no need to initiate 60 further inspections for the subject cubicles. transformers have been replaced, with no further wiring discrepancies , noted Since the wirin any-circuit components,g aiscrepancy does not degrade the operability ofthere is no need to expecite the exist $ng transformer replacementprogram. No further action is required. ;
-This item should be closed 1
---+------REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------------
WES! DWG. 499B466 SH 861A
.---------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- -------------------------------- . Originating Agencv: System: 4.16KV 4 . NRC Open Item Nuder: NRC Status: I
- Related Outages:
Engineering Work Type: Evaluation , Person Hours: Original Estimate =.
. Current Estimate =
Actual Hours = l l: f l l i T" - - - - ' T-" ww-T wi- e- -T***e --- ye- e g w -. p .mg.-ui
i CONDITION REPORT CR 96-1410 l l STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 0 SYSTEM: AF INITIATED: 11/~1/96 CLOSED: ! MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: l INITIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER: NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS.: 0 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Discharge Check Valve Operability DESCRIPTION: Maintenance WO 9609066 to inspect and maintain AF-100 P-38B discharge ' check system valve is a periodic was returned PM callup to service on w/05/ 11 as performed
- 96. on 11/04/96. The The maintenance group identified a seat leakage test requirement on '
PBF-9085 as a post maintenance test of the work Derformed on AF-100. l The test was not performed. The system returned to service. There was no documentation or evaluation on the need to perform a seat leakage test. Significance: No documentation that a seat leakage test is not required prior to returning AF-110 to service, No apparent consultation with member the commi(s)tmentof return-to at the service interim NRC Enforcement review team which is contrary to Conference. Corrective actions: Operability determination 96-1410- was completed on 11/16/96. Will be discussed at the BOD meeting. i STATUS UPDATE: The operability determination was completed and is attached to the original CR. discussed the importance and aariousness of not adhereing to commitments at the BOD meeting. ! commented that he.was at the BOD meeting and he felt the importance or cnis issue was adequately addressed. (12 ) The operability determination for the auxiliary feedwater che/02/96ck valves is complete and filed with the original CR. The concerns , of documenting any changes to Post Maintenance Testing was discussed at , the BOD meeting. SCREENED BY . DATE: 11/22/96 i REGULATORY REPORTABLE..... : N TS VIOLATION..............( [N 10 CFR 21................. : N TS LCO................... ( J: NN 1 OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS, : N JCO REQUIRED.............. t MSS REVIEW................ - N SCAQ.................... . ( )?: N OPERABILITY DETERMINATION. . Y COMMITMENT................( )- N SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS-SER91-116wasachaneinoperatingphilosopyliminatedtheFeratenotunction in that we o of i with the discharge va ves sh~ut. This reduces e 1 back leakage through these discharge check va ve. The seat leakage l test was specified as an additional post maintenance test, the other two ! tests performed are adequate to determine valve operability and there fore discharge flow path operability.,This concern did not affect the 9perability of any safety-related equipment function,,or system. This is not a reportable issue per our Technical, Specifications or other regulatory commitments.Per POD 96-1410: AF-110 does not have a specified seat leakage criQeria per ASM<E SEction XI, it is tested for full stroke only. SEeam binding of the pump due to seat leakage through the valve has been a concern in the past this problem was eliminated when the discharge MOV's ,(AF-4020 + AF-4621) were modified to be shut rather-than open. Shutting the discharge MOV's eliminated the steam binding problems and alleviated the seat leakage criQeria for the discharge check valve.The change in operating condition was Justified and documented in SER 91-116. Theretore testing for seat leakage of the discahrge check valve is not required to determine operability of the valve.The seat leakage test was specified as an additional post maintenance test the other two tests performed are adequate to determing valve o,perability and therefore discharge flow pathe operability. AF-110 was adequately returned to service afeter inspection consequently there is,not question of operability of the discharge flow path of P-38B. (this was submitted by
REFERENCES:
IT 10 SER 91-116
. TRENDING INFORMATION: .WHEN -~
- FOURTH QUARTER OF 1996 OUTAGE
1 l
. WHO : OPERATIONS .
WHY : ACCOUNTABILITY OR RESPONSIBILITY WAS LESS THAN ADEQUATE
. WHAT-- : POST MAINTENANCE TESTING MECHANICAL CHECK VALVE RELATED ,
RESTART ISSUE l , SYSTEM: AUXILIARY FEEDWATER I l l 1 i ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE l
- .-------------------------------------- - - - ---------------------- ----------- l l 1 -100 RECEIVE ASSIGNMENT l-f I i
1 4 l i. l. l I 1. I J l l-l i l i l l ?: + 2 h n-I J l I o i. k e , a 1 -. m ,-, - . , -
1 ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 '
******************************* Responsible Person:
04/30/97 ,
- Trkid: CR 96-1410
- Urgency: NO DUE DATE ASSIGNED i
- Action Number: 1
- Work Priority: -100 i
************++***************** l Activity Pending is: RECEIVE ASSIGNMENT ----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Discharge Check Valve Operability i As parQ of our Restart commitment #23 a 20% review of operability and ; scr9enings of closed CR was completed,. The review identified this CR as deficiencioes in that area. Review / verify the operability and screening of this CR.
----------DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
Source Record: 11/21/96 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: Action Create: 04/30/97 Orig Eval Due: Eval Done: Orig CA Due: Corr Act Done: Action Closed: PEOPLE-------------------------------------------------------------- Responsible for Overall Action: BMS I . Responsible for Current Pending Activity: BMS ; Issue Manager: i Initiator: ' Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE--------------- ---------------------------------------------- ;
I
----------REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------------
~
IT 10 SER 91-116
----------MISCELLANEOUS------------------------------------------------------- l Originating Agency: System: AF NRC Open Item Numer- NRC Status:
Related Outages: Engineering Work Type: None,Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours = ! 1
. _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ . - _ . _ _
4 !' CONDITION REPORT
- CR 96-1689 .
[* ! ' STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 0 SYSTEM: DG INITIATED: 12/12/96 CLOSED:
- MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR:
INITIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER: NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 0 l-l Failed.RedundantAirStartTest l' DESCRIPTION: " Wh11d, conducting a Redundant starting systems test (RMP-110B) on G-01, ' the air start system malfunctioned. After both start pushbottons were
. depressed the north set of air motors engaged and attempted to start G01 as expected. Since the fuel racks were disengaged to prevent an 3 actual. start GQ1 coasted down as expected which caused a " Start- !
' Failure" cond,ition as expected. Next, both north and south set of L .
l' air-start moQors engaged to start G01 and they cranked the engine over 1 L for the specified time period as expected. After this period the north pair-of air-start motors disengaced but the south pair of air start > I motors continued to operate which was not expected. The south air start i motors continued to crank Gol until the air bank pressure dropped near zero psig (approximately 1 minute vs the normal 5 seconds) . Also the : south air motor's pinions stayed engaged with the engine bull gear until about the same time as the motors stopped operating due to air pressure i not being sufficient to drive them any more. ! Significance: G01 redundant start system not operating. properly. Potential equipment damage , Corrective Actions: Depressed both engine stop pushbuttons, this did not each air bank stop valve was stopshut the and air thestart air motorsbetween from operating,he the engine and t air banks was vented to atmosphere which caused the south side air start motors pinions to disengage. Wo_ tag # 98080 submitted. RMP 110B aborted at step 4.8. ; STATUS UPDATE: . (12 ) Work, plan .9613605 investigate and found that all the
. rela vs. /12/96 operated during the test as expecQed. The root cause to the problem was a stuck seloniod valve. It is suspected that debris in the -
lines caused the valve to stick open supplying air longer than the timed ! out 5 second. The second two work plans referenced in the CR are to
' blowdown the air start lines of botn G01 and G02. This will be leted' prior-to repeating / completing RMP 110B and G01 will be PMT compedpriortoreturningto tes ervice SCREENED BY : DATE: 12/12/96 REGULATORY REPORTABLE..... Y : N TS VIOLATION.......... ... N L10 CFR 21................. Y : N TS LCO............ ....... : N- '
OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. Y : N JCO REQUIRED.............. .N l MSS REVIEW................ Y : N SCAQ...................... ; N OPERABILITY DETERMINATION. Y : Y COM ITMENT . . . . . . . . . . .... : N SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS:
-G01 was out of. service at the time of this test. The malfunction of the air start system did not affect the operability of safety related equipment because G01 was OOS. This is not considered reportable per out TS.
Per the operability determination. The affected start air motors would attempt to continue engine cranking. The prescribed starting sequgnce-may startnot air occur was as per FSAR exhausted or 8.2,i] unt however,bris the de cleared.the engine could If thecrank until engine i does not turn on the first bank and the-first bank dones notdisengage, j then Qhe second bank will attempt to crank as per FSAR 8.2.Operatin experience has shown that successful engine starts can be obtained g1f. l start air motr pinions fail to disengage. l
REFERENCES:
WO TAG 98080 - RMP 110B WORK PLANS: 9613605, 9613638, 9613637. CR 95-305 CR 96-921 : CR 96-947' PBM 97-0200 TRENDING'INFORMATION:
'WHEN---: EVENT DATE UNKNOWN NON-OUTAGE 'WHO :
WHY : INADEQUATE CORRECTIVE ACTION CAUSED RECURRENCE WHATZ: MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
1 FOREIGN MATERIAL EXCLUSION i MECHANIC L SOLENOID VALVE OPERATOR RELATED
- SEDIMENT NON-FOREIGN DEBRIS IN EQUIPMENT l SYSTEM: DIESEL G NERATOR j Dirt and teflon tape in the air start lines of G01.
ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE ~~~~i-~~~~~_i66-~~~~i65'i6h~ hie 656~~~~~~ ~~~~~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ I l i
. ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT FAG ~ 1 i '******************************* Responsible Person:
04728/97 I c* Trk$d: CR 96-1689 Action Number: 1 Urgency: NO DUE DATE ASSIGNED Work Priority: -100 i
******************************* l Activity Pending is: ACTION NEEDED ----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Failed Redundant Air Start Test A review of previously closed CRs for potential operability issues flagged , this CR, This CR was closed without identification of any permanent resolution. These are restart issues for Unit 2, 2/27/97. This CR noQes a failure of the redundant start systems for G-01. The documentation describes the failure seguence but only speculates about the cause. The corrective action was to blow down the air start line (to ; clear out debris that could cause the solenoid to stick), but does not i be comin This leaves identify where the potential open the question about debris mightpotential problems with G 02.g from. The failure that but without occurred the root cause,would itnotishave prevented not clear a dieseldebr that similar start,is might not have identifying prevented a start. Identify the root cause if possible. , l
----------DATES--------------------------------------------------------------- i Source
, Commitment: Record: 12/12/96 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** ' Eval Due: Corr Act Due: Action Create: Action Closed: 02/27/97 Orig Eval Due: Eval Done: Orig CA Due: j Corr Act Done: 1 1 4 PEOPLE-------------------------------------------------------------- Responsible for Overall Action: BMS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: BMS Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(03/03/97
) Received Action into Group: BMS l Respcnsible Person: i ----------REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------------
WO TAG 98080 RMP 110B WORK PLANS: 9613605, 9613638, 9613637. CR 95-305 CR 96-921 CR 96-947 PBM 97-0200
----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
Originating Agency: S stem: DG NRC Open Item Nuder: N C Status: Related Outages: Engineering Work Type: None Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours =
._ . _ . . . _ _ __ --. __.__m _ ___ _ __ . _ _ _ . - - _
CONDITION REPORT i CR 97-0060 l l STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 1 SYSTEM: IA INITIATED: 01/08/97 CLOSED: MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: - . INITIATOR: . . . . . ISSUE MANAGER: .
)
NUMBER OF OPEN ACTICNS:_ ..... 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACT1UNS: U l Instrument Air Tubing Discovered Kinked DESCRIPTION: l During the performance of IT-110, " Instrument Air Valve Quarterly TesQ" it was noticed that a 3/8 inch Instrument Air copper tubing to the Uni ' 1 ConQainmenQ Instrument Air Header vent (IA-1181) upstream of containment isolation valve IA-3047. Significance; Potential instrument air leak on supply line to a containment isolation valve. NOTE: The kinked line is not leaking at this time. STATUS UPD TE: < (01/09 97 This CR is being closed out to the Work Order submitted l to rep aced the kinked tubing. No further actions warranted. Issue closea. SCREENED BY : DATE: 01/09/97 REGULATORY REPORTABLE..... ?: N TS VIOLATION..... ........ TS LCO..................
- N 10 CFR-21................. J:N . . N i OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. J: N JCO REQUIRED...... ....... : N l MSS REVIEW................ p: N SCAO................ ..... : N OPERABILITY DETERMINATION. ): N COM I TMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : N ,
SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: 1 This condition is not a violation of any PBNP Technical Specification ' and is not recortable. The line in cuestion is not QA scope and is not safety relateB. The line currently does not have any leaks in it and the 1 containment isolation valve will fail closed if a loss of instrument air were to occur. Failure of this line would result in a loss of one of the two Instrument Air supplies to containment. ; i
REFERENCES:
i WO TAG 107804 WO 9700273. ) WO 9700273 > TRENDING INFORMATION: WHEN : NON-OUTAGE WHO - : WHY : QUALITY CONTROL WAS LESS THAN ADEQUATE WHAT-- : INSTALLATION MECHANICAL AOV ERROR VALVE OPERATOR RELATED ! UNIT 1 RESTART ISSUE i SYSTEM: INSTRUMENT AIR l ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE : 1 -100 RECEIVE ASSIGNMENT i
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1
******************************* Responsible Person:
v4/30/97
- Trkid: CR 97-0060
- Urgency: NO DUE DATE ASSIGNED
- Action Number: 1
- Work Priority: -100 Activity Pending is: RECEIVE ASSIGNMENT
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Instrument Air Tubing Discovered Kinked During the performance of IT-110, " Instrument Air Valve Quarterly Test" it was noticed that a 3/8 inch Instrument Air copper tubing to the Unit 1 Containment Instrument Air Header vent (IA-1181) upstream of containment isolation valve IA-3047. This CR has been reopened following a review of closed CRs for potential operability concerns (for U2R22 Restart Commitment #23) , Review the, original CR operability screening tg determine whether this
. screening is sufficient. The Work Order for this congern is still pending.
Determine if any additional justification for operability is required. , NOTE: This is a Unit 1 Restart Issue.
----------DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
T Source Record: 01/08/97 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: Action Action Closed: Create: 04/30/97 Orig Eval Due: Eval Done: Orig CA Due: Corr Act Done: 1 j PEOPLE-------------------------------------------------------------- Responsible for Overall Action: BMS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: BMS Issue Mana Initiator:ger: 1 Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPD'TE--------------------------------------------------------------
A l l 1 l ________--REFERENCES---------------------------------------------------------- WO 9700273
~ ~ ~ ~ ~' ~~ ~~ ~~
bhigin$ tin Ag S stbm$ II NRC Open I em Num er: N C Status: Related Outages: Engineering work Type: None,Specified i Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours = , i I
.-~ -- . .. ~ ~ - - . - - . - . . _ - ~ . - ~ . - - . _ - . - .
CONDITION REPORT CR 95-079 STATUS: CLOSED UNIT: O SYSTEM: INITIATED: 02/11/95 CLOSED: 02/13/96 MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: INITIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER: NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 0 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 1 Cold Weather Concerns In Emergency Diesel Generator Building DESCRIPT ON: On 2 11 the temperature in the G-04 room fell to about 40 degF and the ube/95,l oi temperature fell to 89 degF. The outside air temperature , was -8 degF and wind speed was about 20 mph from the west. All four 1 room heating units were running but were unable to maintain temperature. Attempts by Ooerations to install portable heatin were unsuccessful since the installed receptacles,gwhich unitsare in the different room i l from those in the rest of the plant, are not compatible with the i portable heating units. Maintenance personnel were called in to chan the receptacles and to install hercullte above the backdraft dampers.ge The space above the dampers was allowing large amounts of outside air to enter the room. Room temperatures returned to normal after these actions were taken. An additional problem was Fire Water piping below the backdraft dampers fcund at 34 degF. The piping was wrapped with Kaowool. STATUS UPDATE:
) THis CR is being closed out to the actions taken under i(02/13/96 tem #1. No further action necessary.
SCREENED BY : DATE: 02/13/95 REGULATORY KEFUMTABLE..... : N TS VIOLATION.............. . N 10 CFR 21................. : N TS LCO.................. . : N OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. : N JCO REQUIRED.............. : N MSS REVIEW................ : N- SCAQ.................... .. : N OPERABILITY DETERMINATION. - COMMITMENT...... . . ... : N SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: Corrective actions were taken to maintain G-04 room and lube oil temperatu'res above those required to maintain diesel operability. Consequently, no LCO's were entered and Tech Specs were not violated.
REFERENCES:
DCS 3.1.17 ECR 95-036 ECR 96-004 WO 9505412 WO 9505436 i TRENDING INFORMATION: WHEN-- : NON-OUTAGE FIRST QUARTER OF 1995 WHO : CONTRACTORS WHY : DESIGN SPECIFICATION WAS LESS THAN ADEQUATE WHAT-- : MECHANICAL HEAT EXCHANGER RELATED MODIFICATION RELATED . SYSTEM: DIESEL GENERATOR CON - initial UE+C design and associated calc were inadequate for a west wind ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PENSON DUE DATE
...................................... ........s............................
I ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo*o Responsible Person: 04/28/97 - 1 o Trkid: CR 95-079 o Urgency: DONE ; ic Action Number: 1
- Work Priority: -100 1 ocoQoC*************************
l i j Activity.Pending is: DONE j l ----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------ i
- Cold Weather Concerns In Emergency Diesel Generator Building Evaluation: Evaluate in accordance with NP 5.3.1 attachment D as follows:
The evaluation of a CR shall include the following: , 1
- 1. A determinaQion as to the apparent cause(s) of the event or condition The evaluation shall also include to the extent possible l consideration of the events or circumstances that led to the event or condition.
When this information is available, it shall be included in the : evaluation report to assist in the prevention of recurrence.
- 2. A determination if additional immediate or interim corrective actions should be taken to prevent degradation of the situation until permanent corrective action is completed.
RES and the group responsible shall be notified of this action recommendation as soon as possible to expedite the action. ;
- 3. A determination of long-term corrective action (s) and action (s) require d to prevent reccurrance of the event or condition. If no such actions are identified, provide the basis for that determination.
- 4. NPBU group responsible for each action item.
Responsible group heads shall be consulted for concurrence
----------DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
Source Record; 02/11/95 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** Commitment: Eval Due: 02 01 96 Corr Act Due: Action Create: 02 13 95 Orig Eval Due: 10 27 95 Orig CA Due: Action Closed: 02 13 96 Eval Done: 01 29 96 Corr Act Done:
-------PEOPLE--------------------- ----------------------------------------
Responsible for Overall Action: Responsible for Current Pending Activity: Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(02/18/95 ) Received Action into Group: MPE Responsible verson: (03/07/95 Changed the Due Date from: << BLANK >> to 10/27/95 (10/24/95 Requested Due Date: 01/01/96 (10/29 reviewedChanged the Due Date from: 10 the UE+C calculation for the/27/95 to 02/01/96 ventilation system in the We-have/95 EDG building, This-calculation does not properly model the conditions seen during the winter months with a west wind. The calculation concludes that
'the heating-system is adequate for the room / engine however in reality it has been demonstrated that it has insufficient capacity to maintain the room / engine at the minimum required temperature. The iaentified problem is the gap at-the top of the louvers on the west wall. This gap will be closed with a reverse acting. damper. These are expected to be onsite in l Dec of 1995 and I desire to maintain this item open until after l completion oE the installation of the louvers. The RE for the louver i installation is I i
(01/29/96 ') Passed to for acceptance of work. (01/29/96 Passed to for Verification.
- 1) This CR doc)uments cola weather concerns in the Emergency diesel 1
l Generator building. Specificallv it was written regarding the EDG rooms ! themselves and not the entire b'ilding. u Currently Qhere is another CR, CR I 95-627 addressing the same concerns for the mechanical equipment room. i l
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 2 04 This CR will confined to the EDG rooms while CR 95-627 will address the /28/97 1 other portions of hte building, a) The main concern was the inability to maintain the engine temperature at the minimum 85 F re quired for a fast start. This occurred during the 1994-95 winter months. During the 1995-96 winter months PBNP has not experienced any problems maintaining G-03 or - G-04 in an operable status due to temperature. b) Between this winter and l .last, magnetic latches have been installed on thelouvers located on the west walls of either rooms. This is documented by ECR 95-36. There is a ; noticable decrease in air leakage past the louvers due to these latches. l This air leakage was the largest contributor to the inability to maintain i engine temperature. c) WO's 9505412 + 9505436 were written to correct l leakage noted at the lube oil cooler flanges. During correction of this, ! .it was noted that the oil coolers were partially plugged. This decraded l the performance of the " keep warm" system. The blockagewas removed and the l system performance improved, this is considered a minor contributor to the ! i problem, d) As a reaction to the immediate problem a temporary modification was installed to block the open space,above the main louvers. l I 'This space is approximately l'x12'. The tempgrary modification was removed 'in march of 1995 and was not reinstalled during the current winter months 1996. While at the time it was felt that the opening was a major contributor go the problem it has since (not installed this year) been oroven-that it was not. This space was provided to provide a path to allow Yor rapid pressure-equalization between the room and outside in the event ie, of a rapidwill louvers decressurization be installed near in the 1996building,he currentlyinstallation t istornado. Reyerse acting controlled under ECR 96-004. 2 UE+C 6704-001-C-013 rev. 2. Thi)s calculation is deficientTbe buildingis ventilation currentlycalculation is under revision. The calculation wil 1 be included under CR 95-627 when complete. 3) The corrective actions taken thus far have corrected the immediate problems as demostrated during this winter. Additional louvers will be installed when available. These will reduce the heating loses and provide additional margin. 4 The apparent cause was a deficient design proyided by UE+C. Corrective) actions are being incorpgrated into the revised design with empirical data being used to contirm the adequacy of the corrective actions. 5) As of this date sufficient corrective actions have been taken to eliminate the stated problem of this CR. Further actions will be taken as betterments. No other action is required under -this CR. revie/96w of) PLA A(02/13 Closure ofactions the corrective Item. taken to prevent recurrence of this type of event appear to be adeguate, Magnetic latches have been added to the metal louvers of the new EDG building to prevent the influx of cold air.,The effectiveness of this design change appears to be adecuate PBNP has ex considering the severe cold weather thatDuring these periods of extreme cold, perienced during Janthe EDG and Feb 1996. was capable of maintaining temperatures above 85F thereby maintaining the EDGs in an operable condition. The UE+C calculation that was discovered to be inadeauate has also been revised. Discussion with the EDG Project Team indicatesthat it is believed that this probl9 m has been rectirlea, although additional design changes are still in the works for
-1996 Qo improve the wintertime habitability of the EDG building. This CR is being closed out based upon the actions taken. ----------REFERENCES-------------------- -------------------------------------
DCS 3.1.17 ECR 95-036 ECR 96-004 WO 9505412 WO 9505436'
----------MISCELLANEOUS-------------------------------------------------------
Originating Agency: System: NRC Open Item Number: NRC Status: Related Outages: Engineering work Type:l Person Hours: Estimate =None,Specified Origina Current Estimate = Actual Hours =
CONDITION REPORT CR 95-155 l STATUS: CLOSED UNIT: 0 r SYSTEM: INITIATED: 03/13/95 CLOSED: 03/15/97 , MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: ; INITIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER: . i NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 0 NUMBER OF CLOSEU ACTIONS: 2 i Potential SBLOCA Licensing Basis Safety Analysis Discrepancy DESCRIPTION: The current SBLOCA licensing basis safety analysis assumes that the turbine driven AFN pumo starts on A01/A02 bus undervoltage. However a single failure (loss oY bus A01 or A02 DC control power) could preven,t l actuation of the turbine driven AFW pump on undervoltage on A01 or A02. ! This actuation signal is not recognized as a safety grade signal, l therefore it should not be used in the SBLOCA analysis. l Nonconformance report N-90-181 identified the potential failure in the l A01/A02 undervoltage start circuit for the turbine driven AFW pump. However, N-90-181 was closed to N-90-214 prior to recognizing the above concern. N-90-214 identified a similar concern with the underfrequency RCP breaker trip circuit which at that time was used as the primary protection for the RCP bus underfrequency event in the Loss of Flow analysis ' Significance: Reanalysis of the SBLOCA event without assuming turbine driven AFW pump start on A01/A02 buc undervoltage could potentially yield more limiting results. The transient analysis Correctiveactionsc$mpletedorinprogress: group has been consu ting with Westinghouse to identify potential needed actions. In the meantime, Westinghouse has performed an evaluation which is contained in the draft version of the Module 15 Accident Analysis i Basis Document (AABD) for the SBLOCA. This analysis was performed assuming ng AFW flow based on the A01/A02 bus undervoltage pump start not occurring. This resulted in additonal penalties in the accident analysis forPCT Peak Cladding (PQT), such that the overall calculated will now be Temb)eratureThis 104 F. is within the limits established by the NRC for PCT, which are set forth in 10 CFR 50.46.
.Temperature Paragraph (b)ll) of 10 CFR 50.46 specifies that Peak Cladding shall not exceed 2200 e thus PBNP safety analysis is still within limits. The final version of this AABD is to be issued within the next 2-3 weeks.
An action item will to requirements in be needed (a) paragraph to rep (3)(ort ii)theOf change in PCT to the NRC due 10 CFR 50.46. STATUS UPDATE: (03/30 All actions for this issue have been satisfactorily comple/95ted and)the CR may be closed. _(03/15
) The evaluation points out that this trip is non-safety grade a/97 nd will not affect th9 accident analyses. Therefore, all action tor the CR are complete and it is considered closed.
SCREENED BY : __ DATE: 03/15/95 REGULATORY REPORTABLE.....( ?: Y TS VIOLATION..... ........ .N 10 CFR 21.................( J: M TS LCO.................... - N OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. L J: N JCO REQUIRED.. .... ...... : N MSS REVIEW................ 9 OPERABILITY DETERMINATION.t J: J: N SCAQ.................. ... COMMITMENT...... ....... .
- N
- Y SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: Report on the This is a regulatory reportable istue per 10 CFR 50.46.
change in Peak CladSing Temperature, required to the NRC within 30 days of the change identification. It .s not classified as a SCAQ because Westinghouse analysis has shown the calculated PCT without assuming AFW flow to be well within the 10 CFR 50.46 limits for PCT. Therefore no operability concerns are deemed to exist.
REFERENCES:
FSAR SBLOCA SAFETYU ANALYSIS 10 CFR 50.46 WEST. AABD MODULE 15 - SBLOCA TRENDING INFORMATION: WHEN-- : NON-OUTAGE FIRST QUARTER OF 1995 WHO .-NUCLEAR-FUEL SERVICES WHY . DESIGN SPECIFICATION WAS LESS THAN ADEQUATE
WHAT : REGULATORY DOCUMENT - FSAR RELATED SYSTEM: AUXILIARY FEEDWATER Action is being taken to report to the NRC on our new penalties associated with-cpeak centerline temperature. No design limits were violated as a result of this new penalty / temperature calculation. ACTIONS PRI ' ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE-PERSON DUE DATE
- 2. -100 DONE 03/31/97 I
i I t t I l l
. l 1
i i i
_ . - - - - . ~ .- -- . . . ... .- .. ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 04/28/97
******************************* Responsible Person: _
- Trkid: CR 95-155
- Urgency: Dune
- Action Number: 1
- Work Priority: -100 a
Activity Pending is: DONE ASSOCIATED WITH A COMMITMENT
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION---------------------------- ---------- --
Potential SBLOCA Licensing Basis Safety Analysis Discrepancy . Develop and submit reoort to the NRC detailing the changes in Peak , Cladding Temperature for the rc-evaluated FSM. SBLOCA accident analysis ' per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.46. _________. DATES-------------------- ------------------------------------------ Source Record: 03/13/95 ******* Eva luation ********* ****** Correction ****** Corr Act Due: 3 Commitment: Eval Due: ! Action Create: 03/15/95- Orig CA Due:
- Orig Eval Due:
Action Closed: 03'30'95 / / Eval Done: Corr Act Done:03/29/95
----------PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
_ Responsible for Overall Action: NFS *
- - ib sponsible for Current Pending Activity:
Iseue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Adn iaistrator: 4
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(03/20/95 ) Receivad Action into Group: NFS Responsible Person: 5 (03/23/95 ) Changed Responsible Pers.c i. : From to i . (03 i Letter NPL 95-0144 issued on 3/27/95 addresses errors and chan/28/95ges in the ECCS model for 1994. These errors / changes included 213 deg F penalty for'the Loss of Aux. Feedwater saf ty9 analysis. There is no plan Lor eanalysis of the ECCS models at this time. (03/28/95 Passed to for acceptance of work. (03/29/95 . ) Passed to . . for Verification. Letter NPL 95-0144 issued on 3/ 2'// 95. See update field for additional' information. (03 The/30/95NPL t)addresses PLA Closure of Item. the-new penalties associated with the change in AFDW Lflow assumptions to PCT. It also fulfills the CFR requirements for filing the letter with the NRC. Therefore all actions associated with this CR are completed and the CR may be closed.
.....___.. REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------------
FSAR SBLOCA SAFETYU ANALYSIS 10 CFR 50.46 WEST. AABD MODULE 15 - SBLOCA
----------MISCELLANEOUS-------------------------------------------------------
Originating Agency: Syctem: NRC Open Item Number: NRC Status: Related Outaces: Engineering Work Type: None,Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate == l Current Estimate < Actual Hours = i
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1
******************************* Responsible Person:
04/28/97
- Trkid: CR 95-155
- Urgency: DONE 2
- Work Priority: -100 Action N. umber:
Activity Pending is: DONE ASSOCIATED WITH A COMMITMENT
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Potential SBLOCA Licensing Basis Safety Analysis Discrepancy Technical Specification Table 15.3.5.3 states that the minimum channels to ' trip.is 1/each bus. 10 CFR 50 Appendix A " General Desian Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants" states that there needs to be enoGgh redundancy in the safety system to allow it to perform its function assuming a single failure. A single failure of control power to A01 or A02 could lead to the pump not starting. This needs to be evaluated tc determine overall Unit operability ander these conditions. Perform the evaluation to determine operabilloty under the conditions decribed in the CR and above and make recommendations as necessary. ___..------DATES---------------------------------------------------- ---------- Source Record: 03/13/95 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correct ion ****** i Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: 03 31 97 Action Create: 02 14 97 Orig Eval Due: Orig CA Due: 03 31 97 Action Closed: 03 15 97 Eval Done: Corr Act Done:02 28 97 PEOPLE-------------------------------------------------------------- Responsible for Overall Action: EIS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE--------------------------- ------------------------ --------
i (02/19/97 I) Received Action inte 4vSup: EIS Due Date: 03/31/97 Responsible Person: (02/19/97 ) Passed to for acceptance of work. (02/28 ) Passed to for Verification. As desc/97 ribed in the parent tor this CR the start of the Turbine Driven AFW pump based upon undervoltage to the, 4kV buses (A01 + A02) is not considered to be safety grade, As such it is not single failure proof and does not meet redundancy requirements for design criteria of safety related systems. The parent did that TDAF start on UV could nc ilyze this situation and determined taken credit for on accident analyses. Thereforetf 'dditional analyses , even without art of the TDAFW pump, performed which showed thatacceptable accident gonditions w still met aim 'e 9BUP safety analysis was still within limits. There is no operability <a q yith having these channels being non-saf ety grade and not meeting sing. tallure criteria since the accident analyses do not take credit for their actuation. This action item may be closed, with no further action or evaluation required. 1 (03/15/97 ) PLA Closure of Item. The evaluation shc a that no operability issues exist for this CR. The
.ndervoltage trip or _he TDAFW is non-safety grade and will not affect the I ccident analyses. Thus, no further actions are required and the CR is considered closed. l l
----------REFERENCES a-------------------------------------- -----------------
1' FSAR SBLOCA SAFETYU ANALYSIS 10 CFR 50.46 WEST. AABD MODULE 15 - SBLOCA ____.-----MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- -------------------------------- 1 Originating Acancy: S stem: NRC Open Item' Number: N C Status: Related Outages: Engineering hork Type: Evaluation Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours =
1 CONDITION REPORT CR 95-321 ! STATUS: CLOSED UNIT: 0 SYSTEM: INITIATED: 06/02/95 CLOSED: 04/03/97 l MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: ! INITIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER: ' NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 0 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 1 l Relief Valve, SW-2949, Failed During Periodic Testing (Restart Issue) ; DESCRIPTION: Relief Valve SW-2549 scent fuel pool HX-13A shell side relief, failed l during periodic code, (ABME OM-1-1981) testing. The valve was removed > for testing under WO 933148 The valv9 inlet and valve outlet ports _ , were observed to be severely blocked with sediment and corrosion ; products upon removal from HX-13A. During set pressure testin performed on site the valve ,(100 psia nameplate set pressure)g failed to j open with up to 260 psig applied at the inlet port. The valve was
- replaced with a new, pretested spare. l l
Significance: SW-2950 is located on the shell side I of SFP HX-13B. An identical Being of the valve, same design an,d style, and having : t l experienced the same sqrvice conditions, it is reasonable to expect that this valve may also fall to open. ; I (
; STATUS UPDATE:
(06/05/95 Track and trend.
) No additional corrective actions.
l (03/12/97 ) This CR was reopened following a review of closed CRs for ' ' l 9perability concerns to meet NRC restart commitment #22. - { j issue manager, l (04 ) This item was reopened for additional justification. The ! valv/03/97 es in question were re l further action necessary. placed (see work orders for details). No I s e closed. I SCRCENED BY : DATE: 06/05/95 TS VIOLATION., REGULATORY REPORTABLE... . : N ........... : N 10 CFR 21-................ . N TS LCO....... ... .. ..... : N
- OPFRABILITY IMPACT PER TS. N JCO REQUIRED........... .. ,
- N
$hhRA L 5 5R$ 1UN OM IiS5 .llll~ll'lllll' .
' SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: This c9ndition is not a TS violation and does not affect plant operability. Both relief valves serve two functions: rovide protection against thermal expansion of 1 Thereliefvalves$dtheservicewatersideoftheheat-exchangerbe fluid skellsnS'whilethespent shou isolated fuel cooling side is in operation; 2}de si in the event of a tube rupture.Th9 relief valves provide protection for the heat exchanger shell I l The likelihood that SW-2950 will fail to function on demand should NOT be considered to impact HX-13B operability for the following reasons: l
- 1) Protection against thermal expansion of shell side fluid is provided by procedure. OP-8A " Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Water Systgm Operatica,"
requires that service, waten: cooling be. established to a given heat i exchanger as an initial condition prior to placing the heat exchanger in l operation. ; L 2) A tube rupture does not pose a' credible threat to the shell side of ! heat P-12A+B exchanger have adue to the fact maximum that shutoff s tbent fuelpoolcoolinkpumps head I at does not exceed 3 psig, The shell side of the heat exchanger is designed to withstand 150 psig. SW-2950 is scheduled for replacement under WO 933149 with a spare that ; is currently on order. l
REFERENCES:
WO 933148 WO 933149 hME b -1981 1'TREL ING INFORMATION: WHEN ~~: NON-OUTAGE SECOND QUARTER OF 1995 WHO :
..g m --.
. . ~ . . - . . - . . . . - . . - . - . . ~ . . .. . . . . . - ~ . - . . . - - - - . . . ,
i WHY : ' UNEXPECTED EQUIPMENT FAILURE
'WHAT : MECHANIC L RELIEF VALVE RELATED SEDIMENT ON-FOREIGN DEBRIS.IN EQUIPMENT
~'~
j SYSTEM: SERVICE ATER i l l ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE .j
---------------------------- g g---
t I r i t . i )
'l i
)
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?
9 1 I l I I
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 : 04/28/97 4 .******************************* Responsible Person:
- Trk$d: CR 95-321 1
- Action Number:
Urgency: voNE Work Priority: 6 l ******************************* Activity.Pending is: DONE .
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------ .
l l Relief Valve, SW-2949, Failed.During Periodic Testing This CR has been reopened following a review of closed CRs to address
- potential operability issues in order to comply with NRC restart
- commitment #22.
spent Relief duringValve SW-2949,(ASME OM-1-1981} fuel pool HX-13A The shell side wasrelief, failedfor s periodic code testing valve removed testing under WO 933148. The valve inleQ and.. valve outlet ports were . observed to be severely blocked with sediment and corrosion products uoon removal from HX-13A. During set pressure testing performed on site the valve (100 psig nameplate set pressure) failed to open with up to 200 psig applied at the inlet port. The valve was replaced with a new, pretested spare. Justify the operabili?y of the SFP Heat Exchanger considering the amount ofsediment and corrosion products found in the valve ports.
----------DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
Source-Record: 06/02/95 ******* Evaluation ******** ****** Correction ****** Commitment: Eval Due: 04 30 97 Corr Act Due: Action Create: 03 12 97 Orig Eval Due: 04 30 97 Orig CA Due:
' Action Closed: 04 03 97 Eval Done: 03 24 97 Corr Act Done:
__..___.--PEOPLE-------------------------------------------------------------- Responsible for Overall Action: PRE Responsible for Current Pending Activity: Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
...-------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(03/14/97 ) Received Action into Group: PRE Responsible Person: Due Date: '04/30/97 L(03/14/97 ) Set Work Priority to 6. (03/21/97 i Passed to for acceptance of work. (03 l Passed to for Verification. The/24/97shell-side relief valves on the SFP heat exchangers have been replacedunder WO's 933148 and 933149. WO 933148 replaced SW-2949 after testing revealed that it would not stroke at 200% of its setpoint. This work was completed 6/1/1995. WO 933149 replaced SW-2950 with a spare. This work was completed on 10/4/1996. The old relief valve was then pressure tested under WO 9513560.It failed to stroke at 120% of its setpoint and was therefore discarded. All action items associated with this condition report have been completed.No further action or evaluation is theretore required.
~(04/03/97 Passed to for Final Close Out.
The response is acc ntable. The oriainal CR closecut did not document the WO that the relief 4 21ve was reolaced by. This WO number is included above, therefore the issue is closed. (04/03/97 ) PLA Closure of Item. This action has been completed. No further work necessary.
.- . . _ - . . . ~ - - . - ., - . . - - . =- .. . ..
i ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 2 04/28/97 l t - - - - - - - - - -REFERENCES---------------------------------------------------------- __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- -------------------------------- (Originating Agency: S stem: !NRC Open Item Number: N C Status: lRelated Outages: ! Engineering Work Type: None,Specified l Person Hours: Original Estimate == ! Current Estimate l Actual Hours = l e t i l i . i h l l l l l l i l I i 4 l i l l l i 4 1 i l l 4
1 CONDITION REPORT CR 95-331 !. STATUS: CLOSED UNIT: 2 SYSTEM: INITIATED: 06/12/95 CLOSED: 07/16/96
- ' MSS #
- ADMINISTTATOR:
i-INITIATOR: ISSUE MANAOER: l NUMBER OF OPEN' ACTIONS: -0 NUMBER OF CLOSEu ntfIONS: 5 l Unit 2 Containment Accident Fan Cooler 2HX-15A Does Not Pass Surveillance Test DESCRIPTION: During testing of the Unit 2 containment accident fan coolers per TS-34, the required servi ce water - flow rate could not be obtained through cooler 2HX-15A. The technical specification test requires 1200 gpm in order to achieve 1000 gpm to each fan cooler (FSAR requirement for cooler flow during an accident senario). Only 1185 gom could be achieved through 2HX-15A, and thus the cooler was declared out of service by the DSS, which resulted in placing Unit 2 in a 48 hour LCO per Technical Specification 15.3.3.B.2.a.
-Significance: With flow less than'1200 gpm as noted by the TS-34 test flow could be degraded to below the FSAR stated value of 1000 gpm under, worst case DBA conditions.
Corrective agtions already completed or in progress: 1. Attempted various service water lineups in order to achieve ghe required tlow rate 2. JCO 95-05 was written and MSS approved in order to allow exit of tbe LCO, 3. Woprk plans are being created to flush the system STATUS UPDATE: (07/16/96 No further ) All actigns have been completed for this condition actions are believed necessary at this time and the Report. ! CR may be closed out. SCREENED BY : . i DATE: 06/15/95 REGULATORY REPORTABLE.... 4 : N TS VIOLATION.............. ): N 10 CFR 21.................. : N TS LCO................ ... J: Y OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. (( : N JCO REQUIRED.............. i: Y MSS REVIEW................ ( . Y S CA O . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i. N OPERABILITY DETERMINATION.s : COM I TMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . >: N
~-SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: i The above items are marked yes because this situation put Unit 2 outside ;
the acceptance criterion af the PBNP technical specifications, and caused the entrance of a 48 hour LCO. JCO 95-05 was written and MSS reviewed and approved on 06/12/95. in order to allow for LCO departure
REFERENCES:
T.S. 15.3.3.B.2.A TS-34 JCO 95-05 CR 96-026 #4 TRENDING INFORMATION: WHEN--: SECOND NON-OUTAGE QUARTER OF 1995 WHO : . . WHY : PROBLEM WAS NOT ANTICIPATED WHEN DESIGNED WHAT--: REGULATORY REGULATORYDOCUMENT DOCUMENT- FSAR RELATED
- TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION RELATED l MECHANICAL HEAT EXCHANGER RELATED l SYSTEM: CONTAINMENT COOLING H AND V SERVICE WATER This CR is being coded as a design problem since the testing performed identified discrepancies between th9 tested data and original installation
' design. features. These are also being addressed vic CR 96-026 and other work being performed to resolve the-service water flow capability issues.
ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSILLE PERSON DUE DATE i 2 34 DONE 03/27/96 l' 3 -100 DONE I 4 -100 DONE 12/08/95 l 5 -100 DONE 07/15/96 l l L_ _ _ , .-. - - - . - -_- ._. _ _
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 ocoo*oooooooooo*ooooooooooooooo Responsible Person: 04/28/97 o Trkid: CR 95-331 o Urgency: DONE o Action Number: 1
- Work Priority: 34 090000************************* ,
Activity Pending is: DONE
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Unit 2 Containment Accident Fan Cooler 2HX-15A Does Not Pass Surveillance Test Review the test methodology utilized in TS-33 and TS-34 to ensure that actual pressures at the fan cooler supply lines are utilized to determine necessary service water flowrates. Maxe recommendations as appropriate. (This will require the use of the service water flow model to develop a table or figure showing required flow as a function of supply pressure, and a modification may be needed for installation of appropriate pressure instrumentation.) (Discussed with on 7/17/95)
...____..-DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
Source Record: 06/12/95 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ** *** Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: 04 24 96 Action Create: 07 18 95 Orig Eval Due: Orig CA Due: 10 25 95 Action Closed: 04 03 96 Eval Done: Corr Act Done:04 03 96
----------PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
Responsible for Overal) Action: EEG Responsible for Current Pending Activity: Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(07 ) Set Work Priorit y- to 34. Initial assianment ni oriority base /19/95d on discussions between (07/20/95 ) Received Action into Group: EEG l Responsible Person: (07/24/95 Item has been received. A due date will be assigned soon. (07/31/95 Requested Due Date: 10/25/95 (08/01/95 Changed the Due Date from: << BLANK >> to 10/25/95 ! Initial due date. (09/21 Due da/95 Changed the Due Date from: 10/25/95 to 02/28/96 which te being extended as a result of the extension for Action is to be comoleted as input for this item, and because of the trans #2,fer to (09/21/95 Changed Responsible Person: From to (02/12/96 Requested Due Date: 04/24/96
'(02/13/96 Changed the Due Date from: 02 i
l Action item 2 of this CR is currently schedule /28/96 to 04/24/96d for completion 3/27/96. j completion of action item 2 is required for evaluation of this item. (04/03/96 It has been recommended that the actions associated with
> this item be rolled into action item no. 4 of CR 96-026 (which is a SCAQ
! CR concerning service watgr flow adequacies). Looking at the two items,he
. it is believed that this is appropriate. No actions will be lost, but t 4 actions associated with this item essentially are required to be performed i as part of the CR 96-026 #4 resolution also, and it makes sense to combine the two items under the higher priority tracking item. Therefore, the actions' associated with this action item are being transferred to CR 96-026 #4 and this tracking item is considered closed to the SCAQ item.
' (04/03/96
) PLA Closure of Item.
Actions associated with this item are being transferred for completion into a combined action item tracked under CR 96-026 #4. See 4/3/96 u date for explanation of the action transfer and closure justification for his item.
. . _ . . . . . _ _ . - . - . - _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . . - _ _ . _ _ . . _ . _ _ . _ . . _ - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . m.___._....
l--_ . _ i ACTION' ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 2 l L 04/28/97- . \ i i ! l ..--.-----REFERENCES---------------------------------------------------------- l'T.S. 15.3.3.B,2..A TS-34 ' JCO 35-05 CR 96-026 #4 ,
----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- ---------- ---------------------
EOriginating Agency: S stem:. , NRC Open Item Number: N C Status: i l .Related-Qutages: , f
. Engineering' Work Type: None,Specified -
Person Hours: Original Estimate = . Current Estimate = i Actual Hours = , l t I l l l l i t 4 I i l l t i I l l (- .
i l ACTION ITEM SThiUS REPORT PAGE 1 i t -ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo 04/28/97 Responsible Person: ' o Trkid: CR 95-331 o Urgency: UUNE o Action Number: 2
- Work Priority: 34 cocooo*************************
Activity Pending is: DONE
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Unit 2 Containment Accident Fan Cooler 2HX-15A Does Not Pass Surveillance Test Evaluate the 1000 gpm Containment Fan Cooler Service Water flow requirement contained in the FSAR to determine the possibility of lowering t the value if appropriate. If the 1000 opm requirement can be changed, evaluate the possible lowering of the TS 1200 gpm flow requirement needed during test conditions accordingly. (Calculation N-94-065 identified that 920 gpm service water flow for lake temperatures to 75 degrees F, design basis temperature, may be all that is actually needed.) (Discussed with on 7/17/95) ____.-----DATES--------------------------------------------------------------- Source Record: 06/12/95 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ** *** Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: 03 27 95 Act$on Create: 07 18 95 Action Closed: 04 11 96 Orig Eval Due: Eval Done: Orig CA Due: 09 27 95 Corr Act Done:03 15 96 _________-PEOPLE-------------------------------------------------------------- Responsible for.Overall Action: EEG Responsible for Current Pending Activity: Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator: UPDATE-------------------------------------------------------------- (07 ) Set Work Priority to 34. Initial assignment of nriority [ based/19/95
~ ' -
on conversations between (07/20/95 ) Received Action into Group: EEG Responsible Person: (07/26/95 Requested Due Date: 09/27/95 (07/27/95 Changed the Due Date from: << BLANF >> to 09/27/95 (09/21/95 Requested Due Date: 01/31/96 (09/21/95 Changed the Due Date from: 09 Initial evaluation of the 1000 gpm flow requir/27/95 ement to 01/31/96 has identified a This issue will be investigated notential for boiling in the CFC s. further and significantly increases the scope of this assignment. (01/24/96 _ _ , Requested Due Date: 02/28/96 (01/24/96 Work is progressing Changed the Due Date from: 01 on the potential boiling c/31/96 to identified 03/27/96 in the oncerns first extension request. Revisions to the WATER model input deck have been completed and are in the review process. These revisions included incorporating the latest radiographic inspection results from the service water inspection program as well as updating the model to address over-predicting pressure drops in the Unit 1 containment fan cooler circuit for HX-15A. (02/27/96 This action item requests an evaluation of the 1000 gpm ! . Containment Fan Cooler (CFC) service water flow rate contained in the l FSAR and to determine the posaibility of lowing the value if appropriate. i This, action item -lso noted that Calculation N-94-065 identified that a i service required water f3 rate of 920 gpm at 75 degrees F is all that is l Winconsin Electric letter VPNPD-96-005 in response to NRC Safety i Inspection report 95-11 states that tbe 1000 gpm flow rate value listed I in FSAR 6.3.2 is the nom,inal flow rate through each fan cooler. It further l states that the 1000 gpm is not a design basis value,it is only a nominal flow rate based on the design of the service water system. The FSAR accident analysis design basis for the Containment Fan Coolers is that one
. . - - - - .. - ~ - - - - . - - - - . - - _ .
ACTION' ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 2 I l train 01/28/97 i gontain(ment attwo coolers)conditions accident can remove(assumes a total of two 100 congainment million Btu /hrcoolers from inocerable due to single active failure) The containment integrity i analyses are based on this heat removal capability, not on a certain flow rate through the cooler units. ,.The design basis heat removal rate 100 millign Btu /hr) for a train of containment coolers can be achieved (with varying combinations of service factor. For example service water flow rate, and heat exchanger fouling water temperature AIRCOOL a computer program for determining the performance caoability of air, to water heat exchangers, predicts a heat removal rate of at least 50 million Btu operating at containment design conditio/hr ns with for athe containment following fan cooler service l water temperature, service water flow, and heat exchanger tube side fouling: ! 1 SW Inlet SW Flow Tube side ' Temperature gpm Fouling ) 75 1000 0.0013 75 920 0.0011 75 851 0.0010
-AsJshown above, the nominal values of 75 degree F service water, 1000 gpm of service water flow, and a tube side fouling factor of 0.001 are not independent limits that define the ability of the containment fan coolers to transfer 50 million Btu /hr. t
Pursuant to GL-89-13. Wisconsin Electric instituted a series of tests : inspections, analyses and maintenance to ensure that safety-related beat exchangers could trans,fer their design basis heat load. One of phese steps included the initiation of a perfgrmance test procedure (Periodic Check PC-56) . to calculate a representative cogler's touling f actor and predict
-its performance under design basis conditions. PC-56 was initiated as a
. qualitative method to trend containment cooler performance and verify its ' capacityto removethenominal heatload. However as identified in Inspection 'Report 95-11,d conditions an instrumentour testing experience inaccuracies have to date bas provenconclusive, not providgd that test high confidence reliable test results. Wisconsin Electric is currently evaluating,the feasibility of improving test accuracy to provide higher ' confidence and reliability of test results. (02/27/96 ) Passed to a for acceptaice of work. ,
- .(02/28/96 Returned to for additional work.
I(03/14/96 i Passed to for acceptance of work. (03/15/96 ! Passed to for Verification. As stated above, Wisconsin Electric is currently evaluating the i
-feasibility of improving containment fan cooler test accuracy to provide i l higher confidence and reliability of test results, Use of service water flow rates between 920 and 1000 gpm result in a higher margin for heat
! exchanger fouling factor. However, as stated above the 1000 gpm value ! listed in the FSAR is not considered to be an indep,endent design value.
'Therefore, must consider other factors such as heat. determination of aexchangerfouling service water flowrate factor for systemand analysis service water temperature. Licensing) has reviewed the FSAR and has isentifie8 sections that discuss design capabilities of the
-containment fan coolers. In light of the position that nominal containment I fan cooler parameters such as 1000 cpr and 0.001 fouling) are not
! considered to be independent li(mits that define containment fan cooler operability, Licensing has agreed to accept an additional NUTRK item under - i this CR to revise the FSAR.to clarify this position. l TS 33 and 34 flow requirements mentioned in the CR will be addressed as j part of the resolution of CR 96-026#4. In conjunction with the issuance of an additional action item for this CR, for. Licensing to revise the FSAR, work on this action item is complete. I (04 .) PLA Clo9ure nf Item. The/11/96 package sent by - has been reviewed and verified to address the issues contained in this action item. The recommendation that an additional action item be creatcd and sent to Licensing to clarify the PBNP FSAR position on containment cooler operability based on FSAR desian No further actions are nacessary for this iEem limits has besn completed. and it is considerea closed. 1
._ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . . . . . _ _ . _ . . . _ _ _ . . _ _ , _ . _ . _ . . ._..___m . - ...__ _ _.
~ ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT . PAGE' 3 04/28/97 -
i . ! ----------REFERENCES---------------------------------------------------------- T.S. 15'. 3 . 3 . B . 2 . A . TS-34 . l'JCO 95-05
----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
Originating Agency: S stem: r NRC Open Item Number': N C Status: ;
.Related Outages:
Engineering. Work Type: None,Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate = , . Current Estimate = l- Actual Hours = k p t h L 8 I l l 1 1 I i I ; ! I I i l l , i l i i
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo Responsible Person: 04/28/97
- o Trkid
- CR 95-331 o Urgency: DONE o Action Number: 3
- Work Priority: -100 ioooooo*******k*****************
i Activity Pending is: DONE
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Unit 2 Containment Accident Fan Cooler 2HX-15A Does Not Pass Surveillance Test , Develop / implement adidance for operators to follow in the event of high lake water temperatures, such that service water system loads can be met. (Discussed with _ on 7/19/95)
----------DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
Source Record: 06/12/95 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: Action Create: 07/20/95 Orig Eval Due: Orig CA Due: Action Closed: 02/28/96 Eval Done: Corr Act Done:02/27/96
----------PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
Responsible for Overall Action: OPS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: Issue Manager: , Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE---- ---------------------------------------------------------
! (01/16/96 -) Received Action into Group: OPS ~~~~~~ Responsible Person: i (02/27/96- ) Passed to for Verification. revision 9 issued 10-30-95, has section 6 OI-70, Service Water Operation "High Lake Temperature Operatio,ns". There are action steps for SW temperatures at >= 70F, >=75F to <=77F and >77F to <83F. Each section j describes specific steps for operators to take. CLOSED. ; I(02/28/96 ) PLA Closure of Item. LThe procedure has been changed to reflect actions needed for high lake . ' water and service water temperatures. No further actions are concerned l lfor this item and it is considered closed. ; I
..-____.--REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------------
,T.S. 15.3.3.B.2.A TS-34 lJCO 95-05 l
----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- -------------------------------- 1 Originating Agency: S stem:
NRC Open Item Number: N C Status: Related Qutages: Engineering Work Type: None Specified i Person Hours: Original Estimate = ! Current Estimate = l Actual Hours = 1 1 k l i i a a 1 l
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 coo *ooooooooooooooooooooooooooo Responsible Person: 04/28/97 o Trkid: CR 95-331' o Urgency: DONE 4
- Work Priority: -100 o Action Number:
00000e************************* Activity Pending is: DONE i
-TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Unit 2 Containment Accident Fan Cooler 2HX-15A Does Not Pass Surveillance I Test l 1 Perform radiographic examinations of the Unit 2 service water piping to 4 the containment Ian coolers. l (Confirmed with via E-mail on 7/20/95) 1
----------DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
Source Record: 06/12/95 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: 12 95 Action Create: 07 20 95 Orig Eval Due: Orig CA Due: 12 95 Action Closed: 12 07 95 Eval Done: Corr Act Done:11 95
.___-.----PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
Responsible for Overall Action: PPE Responsible for Current Pending Activity.: Issue Mana Initiator:ger: Punchlist Administrator:
... .___-. UPDATE------------------------------- ------------------------------
(07/21/95 ) Received Action into Group: PPE ~ Responsible Person: (07/21/95 ) Changed the Due Date from: << BLANK >> to 12/08/95 (11/11/95 ) Passed to . for acceptance of work. (11/13/95 ) Passed to for Verification. Radiographic examinations of the Unit 2 service water oiping for the containment fan coolers does not show any significant blockage due to Please reference the Fall 1995 eervice Water either nodules ISE Outage or sediment,fic Report for speci blockage values. These values indicate that blockage of the service water piping was not the cause of the failure of the surveillance test done on 2HX-015A. A boroscope examination of the cooling coila of'2HX-015B was also completed. The results from this exam also indicate no internal tube blockage is present. This action item may be closed out based on the NDE results presented above. , (12/07/95 ) PLA Closure of Item. All actions for the inspection have been completed satisfactorily. Latest update shows no blockage of the service water lines. This action has been completed and is considered closed. i
----------REFERENCES---------------------------------------------------------- <
T.S. 15.3.3.B.2.A TS-34 JCO 95-05 Originating Agency:----------MISCELLANEOUS--------------------- S hstem: WRC Open-Item Number: NRC Status: Related Outages: i Engineering Work Type: None,Specified 1 Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours = l i
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1
-******************************* Responsible Person: 04/28/97
- Trkid: CR 95-331
- Urgency: DONE
-* Action Number: 5
- Work Priority: -100 Activity Pending'is: DONE ;
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------ ----------------------
Unit 2 Containment-Accident Fan Cooler 2HX-15A Does Not Pass Surveillance Test Clarify the NPBU position concerning nominal containment fan cooler parameters listed in the PBNP FSAR Tsuch as 1000 gpm and 0.001 fouling tactor), as not being considered to be independent limits that define containment fan cooler operability. Revise the FSAR as appropriate. DATES--------------------------------------------------------------- 1 Source Record: 06/12/95 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ** *** I Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: 07 15 96 Action Create: 04/11/96 Oria Eval'Due: Eval Done: Orig CA Due: 07 15 96 1 Action Closed: 07/16/96 Corr Act Done:07 08 96 1
----------PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
Responsible for Overall Action: LRE Responsible for Current Pending Activity: Issue Manager: Initiator: ' Punchlist Administrator: ____.-----UPDATE-------------------------------------------------------------- (04/12/96 ) Received Action into Group: LRE Responsible Person: (04/12/96 ) A revision has been included in the June 1996 revision package to clarify the " nominal" nature of these containment cooler parameters. This revisionalso states the containment cooler design requirements in terms of a train's capability to remove 100 million Btu /hr. The NRC was notified of these pending changes in VPNPD-96-005. These changes will be evident on FSAR pages 6.3-3 and 6.3-5. The FSAR revision will be issued by the end ofJune 1996. (04/12/96 .) Requested Due Date: 07/15/96 (04/22 } Changed the Due Date from: << BLANK >> to 07/15/96 New due/96 date is tied to the scheduled issuance of the 1996 revision to the FSAR, with two weeks of margin to update NUTRK. (07/01/96 .) Passed to for acceptance of work. l (07 FSAR Sections 6.3 and 14.3.4 have been updated to reflect the/01/96 nominal heat transfer and fouling factor values related to performance , requirements. Reference FSAR Revision 6/96. (07/08/96 , Passed to for Verification. FSAR Section 6.3 has been updated to address the nominal heat transfer 4 1 reWiremente of the containment fan coolers. Reference FSAR Revisien l 6/96. 1 (07 . PLA Closure of Item. The/16/96 .. changes to Section 6.3 of the FSAR have been verified to include the nominal values for the containment fan coolers and their heat removal i rates. Based on this revision, this action has been completed and the 1 item may be closed out. ) l I
----------REFERENCES---------------------------------------------------------- l T.S. 15.3.3.B.2.A TS-34 !
JCO 95-05 CR 96-026 #4 i l
.____---MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- -------------------------------- i Originating Agency: S stem:
NRC Open Item Number: N C Status: ' Related Outages: Engineering Work Type: None,Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = i
_. . . _ . ~ .-- ~ . . . _ . . _ . . . _ - . . . _ . . _ _ . _ . . . - _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ - . . . _ . . - - , _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . - _ _ _ ACTION ITEM. STATUS REPORT PAGE 2 04/28/97 LActual-Hours = t l l l 1 e l 5 l 1 0
)
i 1 l 1 1 1
.i 4
1 l i 1 l- l I i 1 i I I i I i f i l i 1
- l. I I
1 CONDITION' REPORT CR 95-440 STATUS: CLOSED. UNIT: 'O SYSTEM: GT INITIATED: 08/3t/95 CLOSED: 09/27/95 MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: ~~~
- INITIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER:
NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 0 NUMBER OF CLOSED AUT1Und: 1 H52-G05 S-Switch Linkage Overtravel DESCRIPTION: On 8/31/95 it was discovered that the H52-G05 S-switch linkage had experienced overtravel. This can lead to misalignment in the linkage and can prevent the S-switches from operating during subsequent breake,r operations. Significance: This situation can'cause G-05 to trip on a reverse power ' condition following an automatic grid.sychronization. Corrective rgalign the action S-switch completed: linkage,1)) 2Unforeseen WO 9509467 WO completed attached on 8/3Q/95ontothe an extension linkage rail to prevent overtravel, G-05 is back in service. STATUS PDATE: (09 27/95 per ormed and) . All action to inform Westinghouse of this issue have been Westinghouse will be investigating further fixes to the situation. No further PBNP actions are required and the CR may be closed. SCREENED BY : DATE: 09/05/95 REGULATORY REPORTABLE..... N) : N TS VIOLATION.............. . N , 10 CFR 21................. : N TS LCO.................... : N OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. : N JCO REQUIRED.............. . N MSS REVIEW................ : N SCAQ............... ...... : N > OPERABILITY DETERMINATION. - COMMITMENT................ : N , SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: The gas turbine s-switch linkage was repaired and'no affect was seen on safety of the plant. G-05 is an augmented quality component, thus not reliea upbn for safety related operation for plant accident recovery. No technical specification was violated since the gas turbine was in service, and does not provide a safety related function.
REFERENCES:
WO 9509467 i TRENDING INFORMATION: ! WHEN~--: NON-OUTAGE THIRD QUARTER OF 1995 t WHO . WHY UNEXPECTED' EQUIPMENT FAILURE PROBLEM WAS NOT ANTICIPATED WHEN DESIGNED WHAT--. ELECTRICAL INSTRUMENTATION OR CONTROL DEVICES ELECTRICAL BREAKER RELATED SYSTEM: GAS TURBINE ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS PESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE i
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 ooooooooooooooooooooooooo*ooooo Responsible Person: 04/28/97 o Trkid: CR 95-440 o Urgency: DONE
- Work Priority: 12
- Action Number: 1 00*o00*************************
Activity.Pending is: DONE
----------TITLE 1AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
H52-G05 S-Switch Linkage Overtravel ith the S-switch linkage Inform and investigate Westinghouse potential of the modifications on G-05,le overtrav issue. (Agreed to situation occurring w/ during conversation resolutions with . to on the 9 /5/95)
----------DATES----
Source Record: 08/31 /95----------------------------------------------------------
******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ** ***
Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: 09 30 95 Action Create: 09 05 95 Orig Eval Due: Orig CA Due: 09 30 95 Action Closed: 09 27 95 Eval Done: Corr Act Done:09 26 95
----------PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
Responsible for Overall Action: MPE Responsible for Current Pending Activity: Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator: , _......---UPDATE---------------------------------------------------- ---------
,(09/12/95 r 4
it's possible)coneeauencas on 9/7/95. Westinghouse was informed oftook the nroblem we were having and the Westinghouse field engineer ( ) out to see the 11nxage arrangement and repairs that had to be made to make the linkage more reliable, agreed that our solution to the problem was workable and agreed to intorm ' the vaccum breaker group of the problem. This NUTRK item was created to zdocument that. Westinghouse had been informed and agreed with our solution. No further. action is required. (09/12/95, ), Set Work Priority to 12. Input work prioity per
- conversation with on 9712/95.
(09/20/95 Received Action into Group: MPE Responsible Person:
"'~
Due Date: 09/30/95 (09/26/95 Passed to for acceptance of work. (09/26 /95 house has been informed of the situation and has agreed to further Westing Passed to for Verification. investigate. The brqaker installed in G-05 will not ce arfected by any changes made by Westinghouse. See CR95-421 for options to address any further problgms on the G-05 output breaker. No turther action under this item are required. (09/27/95 PLA Closure of Item. All action to inform Westinghouse of the situation have been performed. Westinghouse will be investigating the situation for further resolution. No further actions required and the item may be closed. (02/27/97 ) (- . This CR was questioned by Duke Engineering during review of restart committents. Their question indicated that action item 1 noted that we should contact Westinghouse but it was not clear what Wgstinghouse recommended or what we had done, to fix the mechanical problem with the breaker. We did a field fix to correct what we percieved to be thg problem ('WO 9509467). A Wgstinghouse expert was brouaht in to let him review He our ag2 red corrective action.and inform him of potential generic problems. to the acceptability of our fix. We have NO OTHER breakers of this type in the plant (per ). Based on the above, I feel this CR is acceptably closed. 1 l
....._ _. _ __ m. _ . _ _ . . . _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ . . _ _ _ . . .
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 2 .' 04/28 /97
----------REFERENCES------------------------------------- -------------------- .
- WO 9509467
._.--------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- -------------- ---------------- -
~ Originating Agency: S stem: GT NRC Open-Item Number: N C Status: Related-Qutages: Engineering Work' Type: None Specified
' Person Hours: Original Estimate = ,
Current Estimate = - Actual Hours = i 1 i 4 t i 4 i I e i l i i i t
l CONDITION REPORT l CR 95-452 STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 0 SYSTEM: SW INITIATED: 09/13/95 CLOSED: , MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR INXTIATOR: . ISSUE MANAGER:
.. NUMBER OF OPEN AUT10NS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 2 Spurious Failure Of Service Water Isolation Valve SW-LW-061 (Functional Failure, Possibly a Maintenance Prventable Function Failure, MPFF)
I DESCRIPTION: . During the pe:l:formance of IT-72, LW-61 would not shut when the control switch was placed in the closed cosition. LW-62 was placed in the closedposi tinn. Then LW-61 would shut. A review of the wiring diagrams did not reveal any interlocks that would prevent LW-61 from shutting. Another tect was performed on LW-61 with LW-62 open and the l valve shut (responded as expected). j The significance: The potential exist for the valve to be OOS causing i entry into a 48 hour LCO per TS 15.3.3.D.2.c. Corrective Actions were to cycle the valve per IT-72 as documented on PBF-2059. No WO was issued because the problem could not be duplicated. i STATUS UPDATE: I ! 09/13/95 - Spurious failure entered for documentation and tracking. Station logs indicat d : hat IT-72 was completed on 9/9/95, no LCOs were entered SCREENED BY : DATE: 09/13/95 l REGULATORY REPORTABLE.....( : N TS VIOLATION.............. ).N 10 CFR 21................. ( : N TS LCO...... ............. J: N OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. ( : N JCO REQUIRED. ............ J:N . MSS REVIEW................ : N SCAQ....... ....... ...... I l i l OPERABILITY DETERMINATION.(( : COMITMENT . . . . ....... ... .
): NN l SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS;
! The spurious degradation of function (valve failed to shut with the ! switch placed in the closed position) could not be duplicated. No ! physical degradation of the component was observed, There was no violation or our TS. Without being able to reproduce the problem there was no affect on operability. This CR is being entered to document and trend this type of event.
REFERENCES:
l SW-LW-61 TS 15.3.3.D.2.C lTREMDINGINFORMATION: t WHEM--: NON-OUTAGE I THIRD QUARTER OF 1995 l WHO : WHY : UNEXPECTED EQUIPMENT FAILURE WHAT--: MECHANICAL ELECTRICAL VALVE RELATED INSTRUMENTATION OR CONTROL DEVICES MAINTENANCE PREVENTABLE FUNCTIONAL FAILURE l SYSTEM: SERVICE WATER ! Spurious failure. ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE 1 22 DONE 02 97 2 -100 DONE 04 97 3 -100 ACTION NEEDED 06 97 9 i 4 e
- - . - - = . _ . - .- . - - - - .
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1
******************************* Responsible Person: . . . . . _ _ _ . .
04/28/97
** Trk$d: CR 95-452 1 Action Number:
Urgency: DONE Work Priority: 22 Activity Pending is: DONE
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------ i Spurious Failure Of Service Water Isolation Valve SW-LW-061 This is considered a Functional Failure.
Determine if this is a Maintenance Preventable Functional Failure. Update the appropriate database (MERLIN) Describe / Document preventative actions / measures to prevent recurrence.
----------DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
Source Record: 09/13/95 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: 02 97 Action Create: 02/07/97 Orig Eval Due: Orig CA Due: 02 97 ; Action Closed: 02/22/97 Eval Done: Corr Act Done:02 97 i
----------PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
\
Responsible for Overall Action: NMS i Responsible for Current Pending Activity: Issue Mana Initiator:ger: . 1 Punchlist Administrator: j 1
----------UPDATE-------------------------------------------------------------- ;
1 (02/08/97 1 Received Action into Group: NMS l Due Date: 02/18/97
~ '
Responsible Person: (02/08/97 Set Work Priority to 22. MPFF screening required to comply with Maintenance rule (10CFR 50.65) (02/17/97 Passed to for acceptance of work. (02 Passed to for Verification. The/17/97 failure of SW-LW-061 Service Water Supply To Blowdown Systems, which occured in September 1995 was reviewed and determined to be a functional failure that was not maintenance preventable. The most likely cause is considered to be a malfunction of the solenoid valve. The failure could not be repeated. The valve has been stroked successfully during the guarterly stroke tests per IT-72 since the failure occured. The stroke times recorded for the valves over the past 2 years were reviewed and there was no evidence of a degrading trend. Based on the number of successful strokes since the tailure, the valve is considered reliable at this point. The failure will be classified as an "F" in the MERLIN database. Based on discussions with the AOV program engineer this one time failure for which the cause cannot be positively determined does not necessitate the need fora periodic solenoid valve veolacament callup. This action item may be closed at this time. 2/17/97 (02 ) PLA Closure of Item. The/22/97 failure of this selonoid valve was determined not to be a maintenance preventable failure. It was properly coded in MFRLIN.
----------REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------------
SW-LW-61 TS 15.3.3.D.2.C !----------MISCELLANEOUS------------>--------- -------------------------------- Originating Agency: S stem: SW NRC Open Item Nuder: N C Status: Related Outages: Engineering work Type: None,Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate = , Current Estimate = Actual Hours =
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 ,
******************************* Responsible Person: 04/28/97
- Trk:.d : CR 95-452
- Urgency: DONE
- Act:.on Number: 2
- Work Priority: -100
' Activity Pending is: DONE
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Spurious Failure Of Servige Water Isolation Valve SW-LW-061 (Functional Failure, Possibly a Maintenance Prventable Function Failure, MPFF) SW-LW-061 failed to operate when demanded to close for a test. After realigning another SW valve the test was tried again adn the valve performed satisfactorily. The failure could not be reproduced. This valve is designed to close on safeguards actuation. Because the root cause of the failure was not determined or corrected this leaves the operability of th9 valve in question. Evaluate and document the operability of this valve to perform it safety function with reasonable assurance or reliability.
----------DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
Source Record: 09/13/95 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ** *** Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: 04 01 97 Action Create: 02 13 97 Orig Eval Due: Orig CA Due: 04 01 97 Action Closed: 04 07 97 Eval Done: Corr Act Done:04 03 97
----------PEOPLE---------------------------------------------- ---------------
Responsible for Overall Action: NMS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: Issuq Manager: InitiaQor: Punchlist Administrator: ________.-UPDATE-------------------------------------------------------------- (02/17 duplia/97 ) This failure was a one time event that could not be cted The most likely causq is considered to be a malfucniton of the solenoid valve. Since this failure in September 1995 the valve has been stroked successfully each time the quarterly stroke test is performed per IT-72. The stroke times over the last 2 years were reviewed and no degrading trend could be identified. Based on the successful stroke tests since the failure, the valve is considerd to have demonstrated its reliability and no current operability concern exists. This action itme may be closed out. An additional action item shall be created to determine and establish a PM : callup to inspect and refrubish the solnoid valve periodically if 2/17/97 considered necessary. i (02/17/97 The need for a periodic PM callup on the solenoid valve was discussed with the AOV program engineer. Periodic replacement of the solenoid valveis not considerd to be warranted due Qo this one time failure for which the root cause could not be positively determined. If i i anoQher failure wereto occura more detailed investigation and corective ! 2/17/97 actions would be requried. , (03/12/97 Received Action into Group: NMS Responsible Person: Due Date: 04/01/97 l (03/21/97 __ This action item may be closed out as previously recommended. Action item #1 addressed the MPFF review of this failure.
. 3/21/97 (03/25/97 Passed to for acceptance of vork.
(04 Passed to for Verification. Clos e/03/97 action item as described above. (04/07/97 PLA Closure of Item. An action item was created to determine if a PM to rebuild or refurbish these solenoid valves is necessary.
.. . - .~ .. - . . . . . .. .- ._ .- . . ~ . . . . . .
! ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 2 l 04/28/97
----------REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------------
< SW-LW-61 TS 15.3.3.D.2.C l
----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
I Originating Agency: S rtem: SW l NRC Open Item Nuder: N C Status: Related Qutages: Engineering Work Type: None,Specified i Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours = i l
ACTION. ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 sococonococococoeeooeeeeeeeeo*o* 04/28/97 Responsible Person: 7 !
-o , Trk:.d : CR 95-452'
- Urgency: DUE IN 31-60 DAYS :
0 Act:.on Nudar: 3 *- Work Priority: -100 ! oouuco*************************
- Activity Pending is: ACTION NEEDED ,
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------- - --------
l S (FurioysFailureOfServieWaterIsolationValveSW-LW-061PossfblyaMaintenancePrventableFunctionFailure, unctional railure, I
'MPFF) ; Determine and establish a PM, if it is recognized that this is necessary, cellup to inspect and refrubish the solnoid valve periodically. ---- -----DATES---- ----------------------------------------------------------
Sourco Record: 09/13 /95 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** t
-Commitment: E"al Due: Corr Act Due: 06/01/97 ! 'Act4on Create: 04/07/97 v'tig Eval Due: Orig CA Due: 06/01/97 i Action Closed: Eval Done: Corr Act Done. , ' ------- -PEOPLE------------- ------------------------------------------------
R3rponeible for Ov(ra?1 Action: NMS RD; ons.ble for Cur"ert Pending Activity: NMS Ics 7 Manager: Ini iator: i
~ Punchlist' Administrator: L t
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
. I (04/22/ 7 ) Received Action into Group: NMS RSCpons ble Person: Due Date: 06/01/97 e
______.__. REFERENCES---------------------------------------------------------- :
- SW-LW-61 TS 15.3.3.D.2.C l
......___. MIS'CELLANEOUS----------------------System: -------------------------------- t
- Originating Agency: SW
NRC Open Item Numer: NRC Status: i R31ated Qutages: l Enginnering Work: Type: None,Specified ' Psrcon Hours: Original Esg1 mate = Current Estimate = j Actual Hours = > i i I i 1 i
)
l 4 4 l I l l
. _ ._ __ m _ _ _ _ _ _
CONDITION REPORT' . CR 95-493 STATUS: OPEN MSS #: UNIT: 0 SYSTEM: DG INITIATED: 10/06/95 CT.OSED : ADMINISTRATOR: INITIATOR: . . . _ _ ISSUE MANAGER: s NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACT10Nb: U
' G-03 Fails To Start During Attempt To Run In Exercise DESCRIPTION:
While to start on theattempting control switch to run did G-02not in exercise start the per WO #9510206,d.goin$e diesel as expecte T solenoid was heard to activate but the air motors did not engage. A subsequent restart attempt worked properly. Significance: Although G-02 is OOS it did not start as expected. l (Note: In exercise the diesel will, attempt to start on one air bank only, not the air bank sequencing that normally takes place during an auto start). Corrective actions completed: The diesel was secured locally after the ! start failure A second attempt was made and the diesel started as expected. STATUS UPD TEt (10/09 95
') This CR is being submitted for tracking, purposes since taere Qes not appear to be any further corrective actions to take at tais point in time. It is suspected that the air start motor pinions ,
failed, (i.e gearing was meeting land on land) the first to engage attempt.properly,tuation The si could not be reproduced during twoduring subsequent restart attempts, and the diesel start as expected. Since ' 1s the case the CR has been entered for trackin this,ble possi future occurrences of this type of problem.g reasons No further foractions are necessary at this time and the CR 1s being closed out. SCREENED BY : DATE: 10/09/95 REGULATORY REPORTABLE..... : N TS VIOLATION.............. : N r 10 CFR 21................. : N TS LCO.......... ......... : N . OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. : N JCO REQUIRED.............. : N f MSS REVIEW................ : N SCAQ................ . .. . N OPERABILITY DETFRMINATION. : COMMITMENT.. .....-..... .. . N SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: Even though the diesel failed to start in exercise it was already OOS due to the diesel generator tie in modification. therefore, lure. no , reportability or operability issue existed on this start fai
REFERENCES:
WO 9510206 TRENDING INFORMATION: , WHEN--: NON-OUTAGE THIRD QUARTER OF 1995 WHO : WHY : NOT AN ADVERSE CONDITION WHAT : MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT RELATED SYSTEM: DIESEL GENERATOR ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE
~~~~i-~~~~~i66-~~~~ Evil 6i@i6h~ HEE 6E6~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
id
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1
******************************* Responsible Person:
04/28/97
- Trkid: CR 95-493
- Urgency: NO DUE DATE ASSIGNED
- Action Number: 1
- Work Priority: -100
.e*****************************
Activity Pending is: EVALUATION NEEDED '
TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
G-02 Fails To Start During Attempt To Run In Exercise The original CR closed gut the issue referring to possible pinion abutment and the fact that the diesel was OOS at the time and that the diesel startgd when chegked a second and third time. It has been identified that this is a recurring problem and a good root caus9 has not vet been determined. Not knowing the root cause of the original failure leads to questions about future start attempts. Thergfore it is necessary to evaluate the reasons /causes for these recurring fa,ilures, and make recommendations as necessary to prevent further recurrence.
-----DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
Sour e Record: 10/05/95 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** Comm tment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: Action Create: 02/14/97 Action Closed: Orig Eval Due: Eval Done: Orig CA Due: Corr Act Done:
----------PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
Respons$ble for Overall Action: BMS
- Responsible for Current Pending Activity: BMS Issue Manager: i Initiator:
Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE-------------------------------------------------------------
(02/18/97 ..... Received Action into Group: BMS Responsible Person: ________.-REFERENCES---------------------------------------------------------- ' WO 9510206
----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
Originating Agency: S stem: DG NRC Open Item Nuder: N C Status: Related Qutages: Engineering Work Type: Evaluation Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours =
CONDITION REFORT CR 95-597 STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 0 SYSTEM: DG INITIATED: 11/21/95 CLOSED:
. MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR:
INITIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER: NUMBER.0F OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 0 ! G-02 Declared OOS Per TS-82 DESCRIPTION: During TS-82 G-02 emergency diesel generator monthly test, the G-02 > ready to load light came on at approximately 800 rpm. When the field ! was flashed voltage was less than 3744 volt'. s Per TS-82 G-02 was i' declared OOS. The significance; The emergency power source to 2A05 safeguards bus entered LCO. ! i Corrective actions: Normally ready to load light comes on at about 870 rpm. A dirty contact on the relay was determined to be the cause of the premature field flash. The dirty contact was cleaned, G-02 was tested and returned to service. STATUS UPDATE-(11 i corrected and the/29/95 equipment was Thereturned cause oftothis service. problemThe wasfailed identified, function caused, entry into an LCO, but within th guidlines of our TSs. , I SCREENED BY : DATE: 11/29/95 I REGULATORY REPORTABLE..... : N TS VIOLATION.............. : N I 10 CFR 21................. : N TS LCO.................... : N j OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. ,
- N JCO REQUIRED........... .. : N <
MSS REVIEW................ 4 : N SCAQ....... .............. : N OPERABILITY DETERMINATION.t : COMMITMENT.......... ..... : N SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: Pgr Qhe direcQions of TS-82 G-02 was delared ouQ of service. This is within the guidlines of our TS. It is not considered a reportable , incident of safety related e not gutsideTheoperabilithhecauseoftheprobfuipmentwasaffectedbut of our TSs. em a dirty contact was considered an isolated incident. Once the causg o,f the,oroblem was, i l discovered and corrected the EDG was tested satisfactorily and returned to service. 1 i REFERENCES. TS-82 l TRENDING INFORMATION: WHEM- : NON-OUTAGE FOURTH QUARTER OF 1995 WHO : WHY : UNEXPECTED EQUIPMENT FAILURE , WHAT- : ELECTRICAL INSTRUMENTATION OR CONTROL DEVICES SYSTER: DIESEL GENERATOR ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE
~~ ~~~^~ ~~~~~'~~~ ~ ~~~
~~~
~~~~i-~~~~:io6--~~~ Cii6s~UiEb D~ !
l l i i I n -
- - - . - . - -.=_ -. _ _ _ _ . , - _
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1
******************************* Responsible Person: 04/28/97
- Trkid: CR 95-597
- Urgency: NO DUE DATE ASSIGNED
- Work Priority: -100
*-Action Number: 1 Activity Pending is: ACTION NEEDED ----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
- G-02 Declared OOS Per TS-82 G-02 field flashed early. The closecut stated that the fiel closing contacts were dirty. The contacts were cleaned, but no root cause was
, determined for the dirty contacts and generic implications were not addressed. This could be an issue for G-01. Evaluate for generic concerns. ----------DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
Source Record: 11/21/95 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: Action Create: 02/13/97 Orig Eval Due: Eval Done: Orig CA Due: Corr Act Done: Action Closed: r
----------PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
Responsible for Overall Action: BMS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: BMS Issue Manager:
- Initiator:
, Punchlist Administrator: i , ----------UPDATE-------------------------------------------------------------- (02/13/97 ) P.eceived Action into Group: BMS Responsible Person: r ----------REFERENCES---------------------------------------------------------- i TS-82
----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
i Originating Agency: S stem: DG l NRC Open Item Number: N C Status: 1 Related Qutages: l 4 Engineering work Type: None,Specified Person Hours: Original Esq1 mate = Current Estimate =
- Actual Hours =
1 l 1 I k I I I
. - ~ . ~ . . - . - . - . - - . . - - - . - . - _ , - - . - - - _ - - . - . . . . . - . - . - - -
CONDITION REPORT CR 96-231 i STATUS: CLOSED UNIT: 1 SYSTEM: 4.16KV INITIATED: 04/Ow/96 ri,nqFD : ' 02/27/97 MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR:
-INITIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER: ' NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 0 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 2 Safety Related Protective Relay Setpoint Was Out of Tolerance Low DESCRIPTIO : .
On 4/9 96 during the performance of 3RMP 9056-3 Calibration and Testing of Safety Related Protective Relays A01/A02, relay 273/A01 as fgund setpoint was out of tolerance low, ie. in the non-conservative - direction. As found setting is 86.46V; TSs required setting > or = to I 89.15V. l Significance: Technical Spegification setpoint found out of tolerance in the non-conservative. direction. , 1 Corrective' action: Relay 273 i The last calibration record fo/A01 r was thisadjusted to the relay was required-setting.4/6/95). examineQ (U1R22, I The relay was in tolerance and no adjustment was required. l t , STATUS UPDATE (04/25 and rep /96 The relay was replaced and a WO issued to trouble shoot air tne out of tolerance relay prior to returning it to stock.
^
(02/27 for fa/97ilure analysis. Relays was replaced and the bad relay was sent to vendor , SCREENED BY : DATE: 04/10/96 ! REGULATORY REPORTABLE..... : N TS VIOLATION.............. : N l 10 CFR 21................. : N TS LCO..................... : N OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. : N JCO REQUIRED.............. : N l MSS REVIEW................ : N SCAQ..................... : N ! OPERABILITY DETERMINATION. : COMMITMENT....... ........ : N , SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS:. :j Per TS table 15.3-2 item 14, there are a total of two channels ong channel will cause a trip, and minimum operable channels requir,ed is : one With only one relay out of tolerance the TS requirement is i satisfied. Only one functional channel is,reauired. The safety related
. protective undervoltage relay was able to perform it function within TS tolerances (one channel was in spec). There was no loss of system !
function. Reactor over temperature and oyer power setpoints were ! una'fected by the out of tolgrance condition of one channel of ! un; cvoltage protection. This is not considered reportable per our TSs. j
REFERENCES:
1RMP 9056-3 TS 15.2.3 ; TS TABLE 15.3.5-2 ITEM 14 WO TAG 94226 : WO 9603996 l TRENDING INFORMATION: WHEN-~' : 1996 ; OUTAGE I WHO- : WHY : ROOT CAUSE UNKNOWN ,
'WHAT : ELECTRICAL BREAKER RELATED i SYSTEM: 4.16 KVAC ELECTRICAL j The out-of tolerance relay was replaced. A WO was issued to investigate the !
cause of the identified condition and to correct it prior to returning the out i of- tolerance relay to stock. l ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE ;
.2 -100 DONE 02/28/97
~- -
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 cocoooooooooooooooooooooooooo** Responsible Person: 04/28/97 0 Trkid: CR 96-231
- Urgency: DONE o Action Number: 1
- Work Priority: -100 ooooo**************************
Activity Pending is: DONE
TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Safety Related Protective Relay Setpoint Was Out of Tolerance Low Consider replacing relay or checking setpoint at shortened interval.
DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
Source Record: 04/09/96 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ** *** Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: 04 24 96 Action Create: 04 10 96 Orig Eval Due: Orig CA Due: 04 24 96 Action Closed: 04 25 96 Eval Done: Corr Act Done:04 25 96 PEOPLE-------------------------------------------------------------- Responsible for Overall Action: EPE Responsible for Current Pending Activity: Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
UPDATE----~----------------------------------------------------------
(04/10/96 ) Received Action into Group: EPE
' ' ' ~ ~
Responsible Person: (04/22/96 Requested Due Date: 04/24/96 (04 Changed the Due Date from: << BLANK >> to 04/24/96 Rela has ybeen /22 273/96
/A01 was replaced by 4/15/96, reference WO 9603996. Another WO initiated to troubleshoot and repair the out-of-tolerance relay for return to stock. WO Tag 94226. This CR may be closed (04/25/96 Passed to for Verification.
(04 25 96 - PLA Closure of Item. 04 24 96 Relav 273/A01 was replaced by 4/15/96 reference WO 9603996. Another WO has been initiated to troubleshoot and repair out-of-tolerance relay for return to stock. WO Tag 94226. (04 i Work was completed prior to due date. I thought that I had clo/25/96 sed this CR out on 4/22 - my mistake. (12 } This item closed to a WO due to as found setpoint being l abov/17/96 e the minimum of 75%. As found setpoint determined to be 75.65%. _____.----REFERENCES---------------------------------------------------------- 1RMP 9056-3 TS 15.2.3 TF TABLE 15.3.5-2 ITEM 14 WO TAG 94226 WO 9603996 i ..______--MISCELLANEOUS------------------------------------------------------- encv: System: 4.16KV Originating NRC Open Item Ag'Nunber: NRC Status: Related Outages: Engineering Work Type: None,Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate = 4 Current Estimate = l Actual Hours = i l 1
__ ___ - _ _ ~ _ __ - __ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _-__.___ _. _ __ __ . l l ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 ooooooooooooooooooooooo*ooooooo 04/28/97 Responsible Person: o o Trkid: CR 96-231 2 o Action Number:
- Urgency: DUNE Work Priority: -100 l00000c*************************
Activity Pending is: DONE
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION-------------- ---------------------------
Safety Related Protective Relay Setpoint Was Out or Tolerance Low The corrective actions in action item #1 discuss a safety related l protective relay 273/A01 that was found with an out of spec setpoint. The > l relay was replaced and a WO was issued to correct the relay before ' l returning it to stock. The WO to troulgshoot and correct the bad relav could noE be tracked in CHAMPS. There is a potential that this relay has been returned to stock or reinstalled elsewhere without correctivg actions. Please evaluate tc ensure that the bad relay was dealt with properly. ,
----------DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
Sourge Record: 04/09/96 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ** *** Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: 02 28 97 LAction Create: 02/13/97 Orig Eval Due: Orig CA Due: 02 28 97 l Action Closed: 02/27/97 '?al Done: Corr Act Done:02 25 97
----------PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
Responsible for Overall Action: OER Responsible for Current Pending Activity: Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(02/13/97 Issued to Group: RES D,1scussed with his date. Agreed to close pending iput from < WO 9604448 was written to troubleshoot + repair the relay removed from 273/A-01. IMPACT PR #10008705 has been submitted to return $he relay to ABB for , repair + refurbishment. I'll reset the WO, place it in the " awaiting
. parts" status + put the impact PR # on it. Thia is considered sufficient .
to close out the bad relay CR. (02/17/97 ) Received Action into Group: OER Responsible Person: Due Date: 02/28/97 (02/22/97 Passed to for acceptance of work. (02 Passed to for Verifigation. The/25/97 protectiveconcern of this action item is enac a defective relay may have been returned to stock or/ bad used safety in another related application at PBNP. There was no WO to track the BAD relay. Per conversation and E-Mails with WO 9604448 is tracking / documenting the troublesnooting anu zepair of this BAD relay. IMPACT PR #10008705 has been submitted to return the relay to ABB for reapir and refurbishment. This action item may be closed to the WO and PR identified above.
-(02/27/97 PLA Closure of Item.
it was not put back in The relay in question is being tracked by a WO stock, it was sent to the vendor for failure an,alysis.
----------REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------------
, 1RMP 9056-3 TS 15.2.3 TS TABLE 15.3.5-2 ITEM 14 WO TAG 94226 WO 9603996 j .---------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- ----------- -------------------- l Originating Agency: S stem: 4.16KV l NRC Open Item Number: N C Status: Related Outages: Engineering Work Type: None,Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate =
, . . - - - - . . - . . - . - . . ~ . - , ~ - - - . - . - - - . . -- . . - -
. ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 2' i 04/28/97 ;
. Actual Hours = !
l 1 1 I 4 4-I ]
. i i I 1
4 t J
+
J t 1 1 4 1 - 1: r t k ' i I b. I e t ~ i f d i ! i l e e ( , I i ! i t t t 1 , u i 4 i ( J I k a l J i i + 4 i 4 .I 4 3 I - i i 1 i
- - - - - u....,, --
, , .. ..--,.-%. ..,w .._. ...-- ..-.m~, . -- -. ,. -. e-. -,c,-.-,--m- --- -,, ,.,. . . - , - - . ,
CONDITION REPORT CR 96-285 STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 0 SYSTEM: DG INITIATED: 04/21/96 CLOSED:
! MSS #: .
ADMINISTRATOR: INITIATOR: .__..__l ISSUE MANAGER: NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: o i Failure of G-01 Diesel Generator Govenor DESCRIPTION; G-01 fai led TS-81. Electrical load was decreased to 200 KW from 2500 KW in approximately 5 seconds. The o with no response from the govenor.perator Upon further then attempted to raise investigation theload . govenor would only increase load but would not decrease Ioad.
- Significance
- G01 OOS. 7 day LCO on both units.
- 1 Actions: An unforseen WO was written and the Govenor was repaired.
G-01 was tested and returned to service. j STATUS UPD TE: (04/24 96 i The digsel was secured and a WO was written to troubl shoot andregairthefailedgovenor. The govenor was repaired i j under WO 9604377. o further action required (05/01/97 This CR has been reopened to address potential l operability concerns for G- 2 following CR review for Restart Item #23. 4
- SCREENED BY : DATE: 04/24/96 REGULATORY REPUxramon.....( : N TS VIOLATION.............. : N 10 CFR 21................. : N TS LCO.................... : Y }
OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS.(L : Y JCO REQUIRED............. : N = MSS REVIEW................ : N SCAQ................. .... : N i OPERABILITY DETERMINATION.(L : N COMMITMENT................ : N - SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS:
! The G-01 diesel was declared OOS and a 7 day LCO was entered. The govenor was repaired within the time of the LCO and the diesel returned to service. This is not a TS violation nor is it a reportable event,// NOTE: (SAP 4/30/,97) This CR screening is being updated following additional review of this CR as cart of the U2R22 Restart Item #23. I Following discovery of this problem G-01 was declared out of service I and the appropriate TS LCO (7 da L60), action was entered into. An emerger. Work Order (WO 9604377)ywas initiated to trouble shoot and reca2r the EDG. Troubleshooting revealed that a motor open winding was I bad and was preventing the EDG governor from decreasing load. The bad governor
! completing wasTS-B1) replaced waswith thespare performea governor,lyFollowing satisfactori and the LCD repairs, the PMT exited. This
, is not considered an operability concern for G-01 and the failure is not a generic concern to be considered for G-02.
REFERENCES:
1 TS-81 WO 9604377 r TRENDING INFORMATION:
- WHEN--
- OUTAGE a
SECOND QUARTER OF 1996 WHO : WHY . UNEXPECTED EQUIPMENT FAILURE l WHAT : MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT RELATED ., SYSTEM: DIESEL GENERATOR ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~ ~~~~~~~ ~~ ~ ~~
; ~~~~[~~~~~ {66~~~~'kECbihb kE55UhME T~
i d 4 m ,
. . _ - . _ - . . .. - ~ - - - _ - _ - _. -- .- .-
l ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 ' ******************************* Responsible Person: 05/01/97
- Trkid: CR 96-285
- Urgency: NO DUE DATE ASSIGNED
- Action Number: 1
- Work Priority: -100 l
l Activity Pending is: RECEIVE ASSIGNMENT l
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
! Failure of G-01 Diesel Generator Govenor lG-01 failgd TS-81. Electrical load was decreased to 200 KW from 2500 KW l in approximately 5 seconds. The o , with no response from the govenor.perator then attempted to raise loadUpon further investigation the goven t would only increase load but would not decrease load. 1 t This condicion however, reviewwas oftroubleshot,Restartcorrected this CR for Item #23 and successfully it was determined retestedtbat this concern did not adequately consider the operability of G-02. Review this condition and determine whether the problem identified in the parent Condition Report presents a generic operability concern for G-02.
----------DATES---- ----------------------------------------------------------
Source Record: 04/21 /96 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** i Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: Action Create: 05/01/97 Orig Eval Due: Eval Done: Orig CA Due: Corr Act Done: Action Closed: __--------PEOPLE-------------------------------------------------------------- Responsible for Overall Actign: BMS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: BMS Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator: r ____-___--UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
----------REFERENCES---------------------------------------------------------- ..--------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
Originating Agency: S stem: DG NRC Open Item Number: N C Status: Related Outages: Engineering Work Type: None,Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate = 1 Current Estimate = Actual Hours = l i
. _ _ - _ . - _ - - . - - ~ ~ - . _ . - -- - - . __ - ..-
) CONDITION REPORT , CR 96-567 INITIATED: 08/17/96 STATUS: CLOSED UNIT: 0 SISTEM: SW PT.nSED : 12/13/96 ' MSS 4
#: ADMINISTRATOR:
INITIATOR: . _ . . . - _ . - ISSUE MANAGER: NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 0 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 1 Excessive _ Leakage On SFP Heat E4 changer Service Water Outlet Valve DESCRIPTION: The SFP Heat Exhanger (HX-13B) service water outlet valve isolation valve (SW-2930B) has excessive leakage. The exact guantity of leakage is ! undetermined. While trying to isolate the heat exchanger for , maintenance it was discovered that with normal service water system pressure, the heat exchanger could not be depressurized. Significance: SW-2930B is required to automatigally isolate SW flow to HX-13B on a service water isolation signal. This valve is also required i to be shut in the event of high lake water temperature per JCO 95-05-01. TS 15.3.3.D.1.b states that "all necessary valves, interlocks and piping required for the functioning of the SW system during accident canditions . are also operable." ! NOTE: HX-13B has been isolated .'nd declared OOS by shutting the service water valve upstream of SW-29308. STATUS UPDATE. (12/10/96 . The Operability Determination for this CR was completed in coniuncticn with CR 96-604 which detailed the discrepancy with valve I SW-2930A. The Operability Determination was completed and approved on 8/27/96. See ori inal of CR 96-604 for Operability Determination coveringbothSWg930AandSW-2930B (12 The leaking butterfly valve in the Service Water system has/13/96been repaired by Maintenance. The other actions (Operability Determination JCO review etc) were not completed and the child record addressed until the SW valve had been repaired CR 96-604 (similiar problem, but on the other SFP HX outlet MOV) did have an Operability Determination completed on it for both SFP HXs. Closed 4 i During Duke Engineering review of restart issue
#( 23 ,02/27/97it was noted that the closecut of this CR did not give a clear status. WO's 9609261 and 9608520 worked both of these valves to 1 completion. This should cl s any outstanding. questions, i SCREENED BY : DATE: 08/20/96 REGULATORY REPORTABLE..... : N TS VIOLATION.............. .: 1.
10 CFR 21................. : N TS LCO............ . ..... : N OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS, . Y JCO REQUIRED.............. : N MSS REVIEW................ : N SCAQ..................... : N OPERABILITY ')ETERMINATION. : Y COMMITMENT................ . N SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: This condition was not a violation of any PBNP Technical Specification and is not reportable. HX-13B was isolated by shutting the SW valve upstream of SW-2930B thereby securing SW flow to this HX. Therefore the inability of the service water system to be properly isolated following a service water isolation signal and the concerns of TS 15.3,3.D have been addressed. An additional evaluaqion of the current configuration will be completed by System Engireering to determine if an operability determination is justified and if revision of JCO 95-05-01 is 1 warranted.See CR 96-604 for Operability Determination. ! 1
REFERENCES:
TS 15.3.3.D OI-70 JCO 95-05-01 WO TAG 98679 TS 15.3.3.D.1 TRENDING INFORMATION: l I WHEN--: NON-OUTAGE THIRD QUARTER OF 1996 WHO : WHY : UNEXPECTED EQUIPMENT FAILURE i WHAT : MECHANICAL BUTTERFLY VALVE / DAMPER RELATED SYSTEM: SERVICE WATER : l ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE l
.aM. 4m..a 4 a 4 4 M 4++. d = e A4 31A s ia.4.4_AWm_p.4.1.=A.h,s%JgaM4--*b.4.. e54acAin J 2ca. Ah m.6 4 hende4 Jt e . h =T eJS,43#4 %.Ve+ Q .d M4 -s A e de.4J_. 34 .4 .,.M. 4.4,.W.. m 4 ..-4 p.4-. afha.4-.
- i. 1 32 DONE n
1 4 4 1 1 4 f J f 1 1 4 4 4 s i l I 4 A i. f 1, l I I 1 l l' 1 e 1 ! N
')
4 't l Th' q l l l 4
+
4 4 l l 1
'1 i' .
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- I 4
1 4 4 1 d* 4 e 6 a 1 4 d* h. I e i l
- 1. l 3
2 4 1
)
l l 1 1 1 1
- . m - - - , ,r- ,
I ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 i
******************************* Responsible Person: .
04/28/97 ;
*-Trkid: CR 96-567 *- Urgency: DONE
- Action Number: 1
- Work Priority: 32 Activity Pending is: DONE
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------ ; . Excessive Leakage On SFP Heat Exchanger Service Water Outlet Valve This CR documents the potential for SW-2930B to inadequately isolate i HX-13B if called upon following the initiation of a service water isolation signal or if required to be shut due to high lake water r temperature see JCO 95-05-01 or OI-70). Currently SW flow to HX-13B has been secured (by shutting the SW valve upstream of SW-2930B (HX-13B is
. OOS). l l Evaluate the following: (1) Document that current plant configuration meets the rgquirements of TS I 15.3.3.D by performing an operability determination (utilize PBF-1553 in FORMS directory on the G drive). , ! (2) Determine if JCO 95-05-01 requires revision. ,
,(3 ) . Quantif y the amount of the leakage past SW-2930B and evaluate the i Impact on the Service Water system it HX-13B is aligned for normal
- operation. ,
----------DATES---------------------------------------------------- ----------
Source Record: 08/17/96 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Cerrect ion ****** I Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act. Due : Action Create: 08/20/96 Orig Eval Due: Orig CA Due: Action Closed: 12/13/96 Eval Done: 12/07/96 Corr Act Done: !
...._____. PEOPLE----------------------------- ----------------- --------------
Responsible for Overall Action: SE Responsible for Current Pending Activity: i Issue Manager: i Initiator: Punchlist Administrator: , ____.-----UPDATE--------------------- ---------------------------------------- SE Res9onsible Person: I (09/03 ) Set Work Priority to 32. This CR guestions the opgrability of the/96SW to SFP cooling due to leakage throuah the SW MOV's. Th:us has been partially addressed by shutting the uo sfream isolation for HX-13B. The priority is driven by the operability Betermination and NRC concern i for the quality of past operabi~1ity determinations for SW. ; (12/04/96 Passed to for acceptance of work,
~(12/07/96 $
Passed to for Verification. An operability determination was completed at the time the condition reportwas submitted. Since this time the valve has been repaired and is leak tight. Since the valve is now leak t ight there is no need for any i further evaluation or revison of operability justifications. This action
' item may be closed out. SW-02930B was repaired via WO#9608520.
.2/4/96 (12 THis/13/96 ) PLAicem
. action Closure of Item.
is beino closed out without the action item being completed as requested. No action was taken by the Responsible group until r after the deficient equipment problem was corrected by maintenance. This type of action is deemed unacceptable and does not comply with the i requirements and expectations of the Condition Reporting System. Item closed. l (03/05/97 ) This condition for SW-2930B is considered to be a It is identical to the maintenance preventable fucntional failure (MPFF).
- actions condition of SW-2930A to prevent recurrence identified are being in QR 96-604. byThe completed necessary corrective CR 96-604 and CR 96-872. The MTN rule database (MRLIN) will be updated by the SW system engineer 3/5/97
ACTION ITEM STATU3 REPORT PAGE 2 l' 04/28/97
-------REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------------
(.TS 15.3.3.D.1 JCO 95-05-01 01-70
----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
Originating Agency: S stem: SW NRC Open Item Number: N C Status: Related Outages: Engineering Work' Type: None,Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate =
~ Current Estimate =
j' Actual Hours = l I l l t F l I 1 1 i l I
1 CONDITION REPORT CR 96-642 , STATUS: CLOSED UNIT: 'O SYSTEM: SW INITIATED: 08/27/96 CLOSED: 04/07/97 l l MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: t INITIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER: _ __ l NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 0 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 1 G-02 Raw Water Cooling Valve Failed to Open ; DESCRIPTION-During(herformance valve SW-2838) failed.to of TS-82 open(G-02 monthlyontesting) as required a diesel the start. raw water cooling i Significance: Loss of cooling to G-02. Corrective actions: G-02 was secured. G-01 was aligned to 2A05 IAW OI-35A. i STATUS PDATE: i (09 lem/96with oro 01 WO 9606340 was com the valve operation.pleted. The WO was to diagnose the Per discussion with 1
. some minor air, leaks in the air tubing up to tne regulator wer '
round. Nothing in the internals of the valve indicated why it failed to open. The valve was manually operated prior to this diagnostic investigation. When no problem was discovered the valve was tested with the AOV test rig and I+C also preformed a redundant valve diagnostic . , test. No root cause to this isolated incident. l (04/07 this p/97 .. Increased Preventative Maintenance is believed to correct roblem. Reference CR 95-149. , SCREENED BY : DATE: 08/28/96 REGULATORY REPORTABLE..... ?: N TS VIOLATION..............( ?: N 10 CFR 21................. J: N TS LCO....................f, J: N OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. J: N JCO REQUIRED.............. L J: N : MSS REVIEW................ L J: N SCAQ..................... ; J: N ' OPERABILITY DETERMINATION.L J. COMMITMENT....... .. ... .L /: N I i ! SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: OI-35A, alignmentStandby Emergency diesel testing Power and Alignment,LCOs associated involved for placing oneprovides guidance for break diesel in, service for another. With G-02 secured this procedure was i used to align emergency power in accordance with ISs. Safety related equipment was secured in accordance with our TSs. Safety : related function was maintained. This is not considered a reportable l incident per our TSs.
REFERENCES:
TS 15,3,7 OI-35A DCS 3.1.17 WO 9606340 CR 95-149 TRENDING INFORMATION: WHEN---: THIRD NON-OUTAGE QUARTER OF 1996 WHO :
.WHY : PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE WAS LESS THAN ADEQUATE WHAT : MECHANICAL AOV VALVE OPERATOR RELATED MECHANIC L VALVE RELATED SEDIMENT NON-FOREIGN DEBRIS IN EQUIPMENT SYSTEM: SERVICE ATER
! is believed to be the cause of this valve stigking. The PM Sediment is scheduled build on upa 2 year cycle to clean the valve. CR 95-149 will up this cleaning maintenance to every 9 months. This should prevent recurrence of the i AOV failing to open. l i ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE l l i
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1 i
******************************* Responsib.'.e Person: 04/28/97
- Urgency: DONE
- Trksd: CR 96-642
- Act:.on Number: 1
- Work Priority: 59 1
Activity Pending is: DONE
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
G-02 Raw Water Cooling Valve Failed to Open i SW outlet from the G02 diesel cooler failed to open on engine start. The
. valve was checked and cleaned, but a firm root cause was not found. The i valve has a history of not opening upon demand. A design change is in t place to open and leave this valve permanently open, but it is waiting for completion by maintenance. Evaluate this as an outstanding operability question. ----------DATES------------------------ --------------------------------------
, Source Record: 08/27/96 ******* Evaluat ion ********* ****** Correction ** *** , Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: 04 15 97 ~f Action Create: 02 13 97 Orig Eval Due: Eval Done: Orig CA Due: 04 15 97 Corr Act Done:04 03 97 Action Closed: 04 07 97 4.----------PEOPLE------- ------------------------------------------------------
- i. Responsible for Overall Actign: NMS .
Responsible for Current Pending Activity: Issuq Manager: Initiator: I Punchlist Administrator: i ----------UPDATE-------------------------------------------------------------- ! (03/04/97 ) Received Action into Group: NMS Due Date: 04/15/97
- Responsible Person
(03/04/97 Set Work Priority to 59. (03/24/97 Passed to for acceptance of work. for Verification. l (04/03/97 uetermination ' Op.erability Passed to or tne vdAves was performed with CR 97-0782. SW-2838 failed to~ stroke in August 1996. The failure occured 13 months from the time of the prvious cleaning. Based on history annual cleaning prevents the valves from sticking. SW-2939 w s last cleaned 13 months ago. This valve was clean 9d on the week of 3 10/97. It is believed that continued cleaning will maintain the operabil ty of the valve. The change of the callup from 2 years to 9 nonths is being done under CR 95-149 action 1. (04/07/97 ) PLA Closure of 'Atem. By increasing preventative maintenance from 2 years to 9 months is believed to prevent recurrence of this problem. This valve was cleaned on the week of 3/10/97. It is believed that . continued cleaning will maintain the operability of the valve. The change ! . of the callup from 2 years to 9 months is being done under CR 95-149 l action 1.
---REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------------
j TS 15, ,7 OI-35A 4 DCS 3. .17 WO 9606340 CR 95-149
----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
Originating Agency: S stem: SW i NRC Open IEem Number: N C Status: Related Outages: Engineering Work Type: None,Specified Person Hours: Original EsQ1 mate = . Current Estimate = 4 Actual Hours = j
j CONDITION REPORT CR 96-740 i
?
STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 0 SYSTEM: 4.16KV INITIATED: 09/09/96 CLOSED: I
; MSS i #: ADMINISTRATOR:
INITIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER:
- NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS
- 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 0 4.16KV Breaker Maintenance DESCRIPTION: !
'; During the performance of RMP 9353 "ABB 5-HK-350 4.16KV Breaker RouQine ' , Maintenance ' on 1A52-86 and 2A52-95 circuit breakers the as found main
- contact resistance readings-were found to be considerably higher than j expected and above the stated acceptance criteria. '
1
. Significance: Potential ABB breaker generic issue. Potentially . Inadegaute routine maintenance periodicity.
. STATUS UPDATE: J (09/20 Enginee/96
) Following additional discussion with Maintenance and ring personnel it has been concluded that the present 1 + 2A-06 i'
buses are too new to accurately determine if the existing maintenance
] . periodicity is inadequate. It has been recommended that this issue be
- i. closed.out and that Maintenance would monitor the equipment performance !
of these new breakers (via CHAMPS) to determine if an increase in 4 preventive maintenance is necessary. Issue closed as being adverse, but cause unknown. 1 (05/01/97 -. . This CR has been reopened in response,to potential
; operability concerns follow'ng review for a NRC commitment. , SCREENED BY : DATE: 09/10/96 REGULATORY REPORTABLE.....( : N TS VIOLATION..............( : N
? 10 CFR 21................. L : N TS LCO.................... ( : N OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. h : N JCO REQUIRED.............. ( : N
- MSS REVIEW................
- N SCAQ...................... ( : N 4
; OPERABILITY DETERMINATION.(( : COMMITMENT. ........-......t : N SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS:
This condition is not a' violation of any PBNP Technical Specification i, and is not reportable. The as-found con 8ition of the main contact i' resistance was significantly higher than expected. This CR was initiated as a potential gengric issue for ABB 4,16KV~ circuit breakers (inadequate i maintenance periodicity). This issue will be forwarded to site
! engineering tor evaluation. The breaker contacts were cleaned and 4
post-maintenance checks showed that the breakers were operable following the maintenance.
REFERENCES:
1 RMP 9353 WO 9608569 TRENDING INFORMATION: WHEN --: NON-OUTAGE THIRD QUARTER OF 1996 WHO : i WHY : ROOT-CAUSE UNKNOWN l WHAT--: ELECTRICAL PERIODIC MAINTENANCE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE ELECTRICAL BREAKER RELATED
- SYSTEM
- 4.16 KVAC ELECTRICAL !
' ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE
~~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~~ ~ ~
_ ~~~~i'~~~~:i66~~~~~R5C55V5~AbbEGhk5bT i j' i i i
- - ~ ,
ACTION ITEM STATbS REPORT PAGE 1
******************************* Responsible Person: 05/01/97 ** Trkid: CR 96-740 1 Action Number:
Urgency: NO DUE DATE ASSIGNED Work Priority: -100 Activity Pending is: RECEIVE ASSIGNMENT
~~--------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION--------------------- -------------------- ;
4.16KV Breaker Maintenance r During the performance of RMP "ABB 5-HK-350 4.16KV Breaker Routine Maintenance ' on 1A52-86 and 9353 2A52-95 circuit breakers the as-found main ' contact resistance readings were found to be considerably higher than i expected and above the stated acceptance criteria. This CR has been reopened to address potential operability concerns identified during a CR review for U2R22 Restart Commitments. Evaluate this condition to determine whether any potential operability concerns exist. Document the acceptability of the actions completed under the RMP. (NOTE: This is a Unit restart issue.)
----------DATES--------------------------------------------------------------- i Source Record: 09/09/96 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ******
Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: i Action Create: 05/01/97 Orig Eval Due: Orig CA Due: Action Closed: Eval Done: Corr Act Done:
----------PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
Responsible for Overall Action: EIS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: EIS ; Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
1 1
) ----------REFERENCES---------------------------------------------------------- l 1 ----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
Originating Agency: System: 4.16KV < NRC Open Item Number: NRC Status: Related Outages: Engineering Work Type: None,Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours = l 1 l i ' t { l i 1
- . - . _ . . . . .. - . _-.-, - .- - - __... .. .. .. -. ~
CONDITION REPORT
- CR 96-1327 ;
STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 0 SYSTEM: AF INITIATED: 11/04/96 CLOSED: MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: INITIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER: NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 0 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Is Operating Close to Its Design Differential
. Pressure DESCRIPTION:
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump P-38A was tested per IT-10 on 10-29-96. The measured differential pressure at 200 gpm was-1188 psid. The design value for differential pressure per dratt calculation 96-0244 is 1186 psid. S4gnificance: P-38A js operating close to its calculated design t L ditferential pressure. , l Completed corrective actions: discharge pressure gauge PI-4011 Initiated a WO tothe and verified ca41brate mini-recir(c P-38A) line was isolated while testing the pump at 200 gpm. STATUS 12 UPD4TE: ) Per the following information from the RE, this CR can b(e c/20/ losed: 96 P-38A does operate close to the pump curve, which is but the 4nstrumentation is not as accurate as it needs to be. good, The instrumentation will be uograded as identified in ENR 96-208, Please list this informationin the close out of this CR, then I believe it to be adequate for close out. Scott (12/20/96 ) Per the com e ts in the update field this CR is cl s d. DATE: 11/08/96 , SCREENED BY : REGULATORY REPORTABLE..... : N TS VIOLATION..... ...... . N 10 CFR 21................. : N TS LCO................... : N ' OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. : N JCO REQUIRED....... ...... N MSS REVIEW................ : N SCAO...................... - N COM I TMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l OPERABILITY DETERMINATION. : N : N SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: This report documents the possibility to exceed our design differential , pressure on P-38A Auxiliary feedwater pump. The work order will calibrate the discharge pressure gauge to remedy this situation. This does not affect plant operability and it does not meet any reportability criteria.
REFERENCES:
IT-10 DATED 10L29-96 DRAFT CALC. 96-0244 WO 9612089 TRENDING INFORMATION: WHEN--: OUTAGE FOURTH QUARTER OF 1996 WHO : WHY : EQUIPMENT RELIABILITY WAS LESS THAN ADEQUATE WHA F : ELECTRICAL INSTRUMENTATION OR CONTROL DEVICES SYSTEM: AUXILIARY FEEDWATER
. ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1
- Responsible Person: _
04/28/97
- Trkid: CR 96-1327
- Urgency: NOT DUE / IN CLOSEOUT
- Action Number: 1
- Work Priority: 38 Activity Pending is: REVIEW EVALUATION
TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Is Operating Close to Its Design Differential Pressure THIS CR WAS REVIEWED AS A PART OF NRC OSTI COMMITMENT ITEM #23 AND IT WAS RECOMMENDED THAT THIS ACTION ITEM BE INITIATED: Auxiliary Feedwater Pump P-38A was tested per IT-10 on 10-29-96. The measured differential pressure at 200 gpm was 1188 psid.. The design value for differential pressure per draft calculation 96-0244 is 1186 psid. Concern here is that any drop in bus frequency or pump performance will result in the P38A being below it's minimum pressure requirements. The reasonable assurance that this pump will remain in an operable condition is being westioned. Provide sutficient justification tilat the P38A pump is fully functional.
DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
Source Record: 11/04/96 ******* Evaluation ** ***** ****** Correction ****** Commitment: Eval Due: 04 97 Corr Act Due: Action Create: 02/10/97 Orig Eval Due: 03 Eval Done: 04 97 97 Orig CA Due: Action Closed: Corr Act Done:
PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
Responsible for Overall Action: NMS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: OER Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(02/13/97 Received Action into Group: NMS Responsible Person: Due Date: 03/05/97 I (02 Set Work Priority to 38. This issue needs to be adequately addr/3 3/97to ensure no o essed Resolution required before startup.perability issue continues to exist. ; (03/06/97 Recommendations are being made to transfer this condition report, action item to the auxiliary feedwater system engineer. A new due date will be required. (03 Changed Res ged Responsible Group ponsible Person: From ( to > Chan/08/97 From (NMS) To (BMS).. Respons1011ity transferrgd to system engineer to address system performance concerns. Scope of issue is whether AFP performance at less than 60 HZ is credible or within design and licensing basis, and whether there is adeauate margin in the performance of the AFP s to ensure that degradation is detected before the pump is inoperable. (03/08 97 Changed the Due Date from: 03/05 97 to 04/02/97 ed to allow adequate time to revie assumptions and Due da e chang' indeitify any operability concerns. Possible unit 2 restart concern. (04 Changed Res From to ged Responsible Group:ponsible Chan/04/97 Person: From (BMS) To (NMS).. (04/04 te provide
) Changed the Due Date from: 04 Due da/97 time for new system engineer /02/97 to 04/25/97 to evaluate this issue and provide resolution.
(04/23/97 Passed to for acceptance of work. (04/26 Previou/97s Passed to for Verification. pump performance testing shows no sign of pump degredation. The pump has nistorically operated close to its design curve. It has been identified that the pump instrumentation accuracy needs to be improved (EWR 96-208) WO 9700083 will replace PI-4011 to Thebusfrequencyissueisbeingresolvedbythebrovidebetteraccuracy. modification and does not need to be considered as/G governor replacementa potential problem for
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 2 i 04/28/97 P-38A performance. The existing t9 sting is adeauate to trend any pump performance problems, this action item can be cIosed. i
----------REFERENCES---------------------------------------------------------- , ----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
! Originating Agency: S stem: AF . I NRC Ocen Item Nu eer: N C Status: ' Relathd Outages: . l Engineering Work Type: None Specified ! ! Person Hours: Original Estimate = ' Current Estimate = ' Actual Hours =8 7 i h I I l l l
e i CONDITION. REPORT l CR.96-1435 l l STATUS: CLOSED UNIT: 2 SYSTEM: AF INITIATED: 11/1R/96 CLOSED: 03/04/97 l MSS.#: ADMINISTRATOR: 1
- INITIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER: ' NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 0 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 1 -Hairline Indications Noted On Seat Of 2MS-2020 !
DESCRIPTION; l Durin internal inspections of 2ME-2020, Auxiliary Feedwater Pemp. Steam < Suppl Valve to determine the causes for seat leakage, two hairline 1 indications w,ere noted on the valve seat. A Dye Penetrant test was ; performed on the seat which revealed 5 indications on the seat. These indications appear to be too deep to gring out. Significance: Inability of 2MS-2020 to provide steam isolation from the Aux Feed Pump, possible foreign material in the AFW pump turbine. 1
-Corrective actions: Work order in p2 ace to repair the valve as necessary.
STATUS UPD TE: (11/20 96 The valve will be weld overlaved and machined to a new This work is currently seating surface under. Work order 9606518. , underway and will be completed far in advance of the unit 2 restart. l Therefore this CR can be closed out and work allowed to be tracked under the, work order. J (03 ) All evaluations and actions for this CR have been adeq/04/97uately completed. No fur her actions are required and the CR is ' closed. SCREENED BY : DATE: 11/20/96 REGULATORY REPORTABLE..... : N TS VIOLATION.............. : N 10 CFR 21................. OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS.
- N
- N TS LCO....................i JCO REQUIRED.............. L L : N
- N
~555R$BYL5ft'6stiRAisAti6s.: lN SOM0itAist:.'::':::::':.'i
. lN SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS: !
This condition does not:present any immediate operability concerns for Unit 2 since the Unit is currently shutdown for refueling and steam generator replacement. However this does constitute a unit startup issue and will need resolution, rior to the unit restart. The valve is bing,repairedundertheworkorer$ationshaveoccurred.No 9 rocess. reportable issues exist since-no technical specification vio
REFERENCES:
WO 9606518 i TRENDING'INFORMATION: WHEN : FOURTH QUARTER OF 1996
~~
i NON-OUTAGE t WHO : MECH AND ELEC MAINTENANCE WHY : ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS (SPAC) WERE CONFUSING OR INCOMPLETE ! WHAT-- : MECHANICAL MECHANICAL GLOBE CORROSION VALVE ORRELATED EROSION RELATED SYSTEM: AUXILIARY FEEDWATER 5103 - This was selected to show that the practice of overtorqueing the valves-caused the seat cragking. This was clearly an inappropriate implementation of a maintenance practice ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE b a
, ,.g. .m.- - - - - - - - -
+e
a ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1
. ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo 04/28/97 Responsible Person:
o Trkid: CR 96-1435 o Urgency: DONE -
. 0 Action Number: 1
- Work Priority: -100
; doccoO*************************
2 Activity Pending is: DONE
- ----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
4 Hairline Indications Noted On Seat Of 2MS-2020 There was no root cause determined for the hairline crack found on the Unit 2 valve seat. This calls into question the operability of the
-equivalent valve on Unit 1. Therefore evaluate the operability of the 7' Unit 1 steam supply to the Turbine Driv,en Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and if there may be any damage to the seat similar to that found on Unit 2.
! ----------DATES---- ---- ------------------------------ ---------------------- i Source Record: 11/18 /96 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: 4 ' Action Create: 02/14/97 Orig Eval Due: Orig CA Due: Action Closed: 03/04/97 Eval Done: 02/24/97 Corr Act Done: __...___.-PEOPLE-------------------------------------------------------------- l Responsible for Overall Action: BMS 4 Responsible for Current Pending Activity: Issue Manager: .__ 9 Initiator:
, Punchlist Administrator:
j ----------UPDATE-------------------------------------------------------------- (02/21/97 ) Received Action into Group: BMS ~-~~~
; Responsible Person: .'~ ~~
(02/24/97 i Passed to for acceptance of work. (02 Passed to I ~~ for Verification. The/24/97 Unit 2 Main Steam Supply valves co 2P-29 (TDAFP) have had a history of leakage, therefore were overhauled during U2R22. During the overhaul ! itwas discovered that valve 2MS-2019 had radial cracks in the s9ating area ofthe valve. This valve was cut out and sent offsite to a qualified vendor to refurbish the seat area of the valve. The valve was returned andreinstalled in the steam line. The root cause of the cracks is due to the fact that when the valve was found to be leaking, the plug was over torqued into the seat to try and eliminate the leakage. This was a common practice for this valve, but will no longer be employed. The Unit 1 valves do not exhibit any signs of leakage therefore no need to open the valves to investigate possible seat area cracks. Also the valves have 4 not:under cone the same over torqueing that the Unit 2 valves. Radial cracks in Ehe seat area are indicative of over toraueing a plug into the '- valve for the seat. Based upon this information the source' of the radial cracks Unit 2 valves is known, and the fact that the Unit i valves are , not leakingand have not under cone over torqueing there is no reason to ! investi i valves for similar damage as found in the Unit 2 valves. gate the UnitThis CR can be closed out without further action. , (03 PLA Closure of Item. The/04/97overtorqueing of the valves has been eliminated from the Maintenance and operations pratices. Unit 1 valuer are not exhibiting the same characteristics for leakage, therefore, do not need to be opened. Unit 1 valves have not been subjected to overtorqueing as have the Unit 2 valves. Therefore and the Unit 1 valves being declared as, based on the actions taken, ion for the above reasons,d no not needing further evaluat further actions are needed for this CR and it is considered close . s
. ,..___.. REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------------
- WO 9606518
~ ~~ ! bhiginatin gn S stem $ kF NRC Open I em Num er: N C Status:
Related Outages: Engineering Work Type: Evaluation d Person Hours: Original Espimate = Current Estimate = Actual. Hours =
5 i i CONDITION REPORT ; CR 96-1772 j' t ! STATUS:-CLOSED UNIT: 2 SYSTEM: CC INITIATED: 12/17/96 CLOSED: 12/26/96 i MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: INITIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER: i NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: ._ 0 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 0 i Lack of-penetration at root weld of Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger Relief
- 3. valve ta11 piece (Startup Issue)
! DESCRIPTION: Lack of penetration exists at root weld of 2CC-768 (Excess Letdown Heat i Exchanger Relief) tailpiece. See Westinghouse 11DE029, SH2 and Bech P-249, SH2. I Significance: Weld contains defect ard is not per code (ASME B31.1) NOTES: I i 1. This defect noted/ discovered via radiographic exams (RTs) of l . Component Cooling piping per CR,96-1109, Component Cooling leak root cause determination. Code does not require RTs on socket welds. 2 Section of pipe not normally pressure retaining or containing fluid. Corrective Actions: Work Order Initiation Tag # 99207 submitted for . weld defect repair. ! (THIS CONDITION REPORT IS A STARTUP ISSUE FOR UNIT 2) STATUS UPDATE: (12/26/96 Condition report closed to Work Order # 9613897. SCREENED BY : DATE: 12/23/96 REGULATORY REPORTABLE..... 10 CFR 21................. N N TS VIOLATION..............( TS LCO................ ... ( N N OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. : N JCO REQUIRED.............. h : N MSS REVIEW.~...... ......... : N SCAQ...................-... 4 : N > OPERABILITY DETERMINATION. : N COMMITMENT............... 4, : N
' SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS:
This-issue is not a re plant operating mode. portability or operability (THIS IS A STARTUP ISSUE) concern for the current
REFERENCES:
ASME B31.1, POWER PIPING WEST 11DE029, SH2 BECH P-249, SH2 TRENDING INFORMATION: WHEN__: WHO : 1970 - 1979- , WHY : QUALITY CONTROL INSPECTION INSTRUCTIONS WERE INADEQUATE ) WHAT- : MECHANICAL PIPING RELATED : INSTALLATION ERROR UNIT 2 RESTART ISSUE SYSTEM: COMPONENT COOLING WATER 1 1 1 i
CONDITION REPORT CR 96-1839 l l STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 0 SYSTEM: AF INITIATED: 12/20/96 CLOSED: ) MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR: ' INITIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER: NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 2 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 0 Use of a Level 3 dedicated operator for Auxiliary Feedwater when pressure control valves are in manual questioned DESCRIPTION: Temporary Information Tag 96-141 states a level 3 dedicated operator is to be used if the pressure control valves PC-4012 or PC-4019 are placed to manual. During filling operations these valves ar9 used for Ilow control. When no flow is r9 quired, they are shut. This does not allow flow to the operating unit if a signal to fill is received, without i operator action. A level 3 dedicated operator is not required to be at tne controls. Significance: Level 3 dedicated operatgr being used for an action is related to an automatic safeguard runction as stated in OM-3.26. OM-3.26 states this should not be related to an automatice safeguards function. STATUS UPD TE: (01/07 97 (01/07/97 Closed to CR 96-1798. Condition reports CR 96-179 , CR 96-1798 and CR 96-1839 are all concerned with which level of dedicated watch stander is required when AFW controller P-38A or P-38B is operated in manual outside of an LCO. The corrective actions for CR 96-1798 resolve the concerns of all these condition reports. This condition report reopened in response to a 20% Condition Report Review (NRC Commitment). The review raised the concern that the elecpric driven AFW pumps would not function procerly during an auto initiation if their pressure controllers were in' auto but not set to the normal standby seting of 1200 psi. This condition should then require the use at a aedicated watchstander, as required when the pressure controlle.rs are taken to ma u 1. SCREENED BY : DATE: 01/03/97 REGULATORY REPORTABLE.....( 10 CFR 21................. q N N TS VIOLATION........ TS LCO....................( ..... ): N l
): N OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. ( : N JCO REQUIRED..............( ): N MSS REVIEW................
OPERABILITY DETERMINATION.(t N N SCAQ......................(( COMMITMENT................L J: N
): N SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS:
This does not appear to be a reportability or operability concern at this time.
REFERENCES:
l OM-3.26 TEMP. INFORMATION TAG 96-141 l GENERIC LETTER 91-18 OM 3.26 TRENDING INFORMATION: ! WHEN--: FOURTH OUTAGE QUARTER OF 1996 WHO : OPERATIONS WHY : INADEQUATE STANDARDS POLICIES, OR ADMIN CONTROLS (SPAC) WHA'I~ : OPERATIONAL STATUS CONTROL SYSTEM: AUXILIARY FEEDWATER 4 ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE ~~~~i~~~~~~io6~~~~~5VELUETibb bbbbbb
~b5/b5/97~
2 -100 EVALUATION NEEDED a w i v -
1 ACTION ITEM STATLS REPORT PAGE 1
******************************* Responsible Person: _
04/28/97
- Trk:.d: CR 96-1839
- Urgency: DUE IN 1-15 DAYS i
- Act:.on Number: 1
- Work Priority: -100 1
******************************* l i
Activity Pending is: EVALUATION NEEDED
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION--------------- '------------------------- l Use of a Level 3 dedicated operator for Auxiliary Feedwater when pressure I control valves are in manual questioned )
Evaluate if the current use of a dedicated operator per OM 3.26 when the ressure p(when not controller for the electric driven AFW pumps are taken to manual in an LCO condition) is in accordance with Generic Letter 91-18. l {Also evaluate if the use of a dedicated operator must also be extended to when the pressure controller for the electric driven AFW pumps is in AUTO with the contoller set at a value other than normal standoy setting (1200 PSI).} NOTE: This condition report also related to CR 97-1797 and CR 97-1798.
----------DATES--------------------------------------------------------------- 1 Sourge Record: 12/20/96 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** i Commitment: Eval Due: 05/01/97 Corr Act Due:
Action Create: Action Closed: 02/10/97 Orig Eval Due: 05/01/97 Eval Done: Orig CA Due: Corr Act Done: i PEOPLE---------------------------------------------- --------------- Responsible for Overall Action: LRE Responsible for Current Pending Activity: LRE ' Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(02/25/97 Received Action into Group: LRE i Due Date: 05/01/97
~
Responsible Person: ! ' I
----------REFERENCES---------------------------------------------------------- l
____------MISCELLANEOUS- -------------------- -------------------------------- 1 Originating Agency: S stem: AF 1 NRC Open Item Number: N C Status: ' Related Qutages: Engineering Work Type: Evaluation Person Hours: Original Estimate = l Current Estimate = 1 Actual Hours = 1; 1 l J
ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1
' ' ******************************* Responsible Person: . . . _
09/28/97 '
- Trkid: CR 96-1839
- Urgency: NO DUE DATE ASSIGNED
- Action Number: 2
- Work Priority: -100 1 3
Activity Pending is: EVALUATION NEEDED
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------ )
Use of a Level 3 dedicated operator for Auxiliary Feedwater when pressure I control valves are in manual questioned Evaluate changing the information taa on PC-4012 and PC-4019 (Temp. Info Tag 96-141) to not only require a dedicated operator when the pressure J controllers are taken to manual but also when the controller is in automatig)and (1200 psi . its setting is set to value other than the standby setting
----------DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
Source Record: 12/20/96 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ****** Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: Act4on Create: 02/10/97 Action Closed: Orig Eval Due: Eval Done: Orig CA Due: Corr Act Done:
----------PEOPLE--------------------------------------------------------------
Recponsible for Overall Action: OPS Responsible for Current Pending Activity: OPS Issue Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator:
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(03/10/97 Received Action into Group: OPS Responsible Person: (03/10/97 ) Passed to for Verification. Per CMG this item may be closed. Tne Temp Information tag will remain in place until the EDG governor modification is complete which is expected in May. The controller in manual is sufficient for the temp info tag. Having the controller set at any value other than 1200 psi is basically a non-issue. If the controller is in manual the dedicated operator is required reguardless of the setting. CLOS $D (03 ) Returned to for additional work. The/10/97 corrective action was incorrectly written. It was corrected on 3/10/95. Issue that needs to be resolved is if a dedicated operator is required when the controlloer is in AUTOMATIC at pressure setting of other than 1200 psi.
----------REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------------
GENERIC LETTER 91-18 OM 3.26
----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
Originating Agency: S stem: AF NRC Open Item Number: N C Status: Related Outages: Engineering hork Type: Information Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours =
l i POINT BEACH IJNIT 2 RESTART COMMITMENT INDEPENDENT REVIEW RESULTS l I Commitment ID Number 23 i Commitment Description [ Review 20% of the Condition Reports closed since January 1,1995 which are associated with PSA safety significant systems for degraded equipment operability issues to ensure that we have adequately ; identified and dispositioned operability issues. This commitment applies to all Condition Reports, not ; simply those applicable to Unit 1. The scope of this review will be examining the identified documents for accuracy and compliance with requirements, per the criteria in the above paragraph. Should this review identify either generic issues or significant discrepancies which could negatively impact reactor safety, the scope of the review will , be expanded. Where discrepancies are identified, appropriate corrective and preventive actions will be l taken commensurate with their safety significance. { The Restart Issues Coordinator will work with the Responsible Person to ensure the sampling ! methodology creates a 20% population which is both random and representative of the entire l population. I l Review Methodoloev i t Review overall list of Condition Reports (CRs) associated with PSA safety significant systems, and list f of 20% population reviewed by WE. l [ Review 1/2 of the Condition Reports in the 20% population reviewed by WE, concentrating on CRs j that may result in degradation of major equipment. i
' Review an identical number of Condition Reports that were not in the 20% population reviewed by WE, concentrating on CRs that may result in degradation of major equipment. l I
Discuss results of WE reviews with Responsible Person. Review the WE assessment documentation and any Condition Reports generated or other corrective actions required. After WE expansion of review scope to 100%, reviewed the remaining closed Condition Reports for the PSA safety significant systems. l l Page 1 of 8
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l . ! POINT BEACH UNIT 2 RESTART COMMITMENT l INDEPENDENT REVIEW RESULTS Commitment ID Number 23 j Review Results I A. Reviewed the following list of Condition Reports: System WE Sample Other Gas Turbine 95-421 95-357 Instrument Air 95-642 95-242 96-1836 96-274
' Emergency Diesel Generator 95-234 95-079 95-298 96-114 96-725 96-182 Service Water 95-331 95-178 95-452 96-119 95.I87 96-628 96 761 96-964 96-974 Auxiliary Feedwater 95-155 95-205 96-545 96-282
- 96-850 96-1435 4.16 KV AC Power 95-233 95-416 95-504 96-325 96-231 96-557 Component Cooling Water 96-131 96-134 95-243 95-487 Page 2 of 8
]
e . __ .- -. .- . _ - ._ - POINT BEACH UNIT 2 RESTART COMMITMENT INDEPENDENT REVIEW RESULTS Commitment ID Number 23 B. Review results are as follows, regarding potential equipment operability issues: CR 95-155 For the recommendation to verify that other Chapter 14 analyses do not have a similar concern, there was a hand-written note in the file that it does not appear to affect any other analysis. The verification that other Chapter 14 analyses are not affected should be verified as a part of the formal CR closecut. Action #2 was added to address this issue, and has been adequately closed. No further action required. CR 96-850 This CR did not have a clear resolution path. SER 96-028 deleted the requirement for the dedicated operator for AF-4012 during ORT-3A, then this was evaluated with Operability Determination 96-264. The SER also referenced 4 other SERs (96-022,96-023,96-025, and 96-027).
- SER 96 023 invoked the requirement for the dedicated operator for PBTP-043, but this requirement was not added to PBTP-043.
- Three documents prepared in the same timeframe (SER 96-023,96-028, and PBTP-043) had different requirements, with the Operability Determination in the CR closure providing the final determination.
- With these multiple documents, they should be consolidated to ensure conflicting l requirements do not result. This is especially true for the 50.59s. SER 96-022 should have been updated rather than generating SER 96-028.
- The recommendation in CR 96-850 states that "an operability evaluation is only acceptable for an interim period, and if the deficiency can not be corrected in a timely manner, a 50.59 must be performed to determine if a USQ exists" The basis for this
. administrative difference between the need for an operability determination and/or a 50.59 is not clear. These two evaluations complement each other and don't appear to be exclusive of the other based on a sense of how long the condition will persist.
. The conclusions of SER 96-023 to assign a dedicated operator to ensure P-38A can be controlled or restored quickly following a diesel loading at high frequency, is appropriate as an interim measure to compensate for the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) speed control problem for the AFW ramp. However, the SER does not address other safety-related pumps / motors that could be overloaded as a result of high frequency.
Page 3 of 8
q.- .. I b POINT BEACH UNIT 2 RESTART COMMITMENT INDEPENDENT REVIEW RESULTS I - Commitment ID Number 23 i 5
, CR 96-850 (Cont'd)
The conclusions of SER 96-028 to remove the dedicated operator based on the assurance that
- the same timing and response will be provided by the control operator as a result of training j j and EOP changes does not seem appropriate. Even though the needed controls are in the i control room, the responsibilities of the control operator during a transient requiring the EDG j to power P-38A should not be compounded. Credit for operator actions from the control room ;
in less than 10 minutes due to known equipment problems seems inappropriate without a i
- dedicated operator.
- l
}" FSAR Section 12.4.1 " Written Practices" is referr,nced in SER 96-028 in the statement:
" Operator actions provided in 'the emergency operating procedure set are required to mitigate [
the consequences of an accident as stated in FSAR 12.4.1." This interpretation of FSAR i
- 12.4.1 does not seem consistent wit!4 the FSAR w 3rding. These procedures are required and i they will mitigate the consequences of an accident. However, in the concept of defense in depth, they should not replace or negate the need te have the required protective equipment i operable at the time of the transient. If P-38A is kncwn to trip, restarting the pump with a i dedicated operator seems reasonable and adds little risk in the short term. To rely on operator j
{' a'ction in the near term 'without a dedicated operator does not appear to be supported by this l 3 FSAR section. ' Operability Determination 96-624, attached to the condition report, concludes that the probability of an occurrence of an accident is not affected by the release of the dedicated , operator and that P-38A is considered operable. This may not be the case since the P 38A ' pump may be in a degraded con <'.ition from the original design assumptions. NUREG 737, Item II.E.1.1, required evaluation of AFW reliability among other AFW issues. It has been previous regulatory practice to a.ccept some form of dedicated operators to compensate for degraded conditions of AFW reliability. Recommendations:
- 1. Review PBNP response to NUREG 737, Item II.E.1.1, " Auxiliary Feedwater Evaluation". Ensure the current assessment of the degraded reliability of P-38A is consistent with the licensing commitments made for the PBNP AFW system.
- 2. . Restore the dedicated operator for P-38A in the short term.
- 3. Resolve the root cause of the P-38A tripping (high frequency) in the near term.
- 4. Evaluate the reliability of the other safety-related motors which would experience the high frequency condition when initially powered from G-01 and G-02.
Condition Report 97-0415 was initiated to address these issues from the CR 96-850 review. ; CR 97-0415 was later closed to OSRC Meeting #56 Action Item #1. In the interim, the l dedicated operator has been reinstated based on discussions with WE personnel. ) Page 4 of 8 i 'i r d .[ -
A y 9 a -n4 A h 4 - - - ,a + ,S..s.-- s u:- - - - J J., s-I (' l POINT BEACH UNIT 2 RESTART COMMITMENT , l MDEPENDENT REVIEW RESULTS l- Commitment ID Number 23 , CR 96-850 (Cont'd) CRs 96-850 and 97-0415 that addressed these issues have been closed, and a new Condition Report (97-1210) was generated to address the 4 issues noted above. This CR should be noted as a Restart Issue. CR 95-079 The short-term corrective actions were adequate. The long-term action plan is appropriate, but the status of the work can not be determined from the CR, which v as closed 2/13/96. In discussions with the Responsible Engineer, these modifications have been completed for G-04, but not for G-03. The CR implies that the modifications were to be completed in 1996. Since the majority of the cold weather for this winter is over, the short-term conective actions appear to have been adequate, therefore, equipment operability is felt to be acceptable. However, this example illustrates the problem of closing a C u based on a long-term plan which provides no means to track completion of corrective actions. CR 96 974 STP 14.6 needs to be updated for the new ranges noted in SER 96-057. CR was re-opened and then closed, but the update of STP 14.6 as described in SER 96-057 has not been done. I C. Reviewed results of 20% WE review. Concurred with WE review results, which is to re-open 14 CRs that could potentially affect equipment operability. This review was very conservative in nature. If it was in doubt, the CR was re-opened. Based on the results of the 20% WE review, the sample was increased to 100%. Again, this was a conservative decision. l D. Reviewed the WE 100% review results. l i Reviewed the additional reviews performed by WE. Again, the decision to re-open closed CRs was generally conservative in nature. Concur with the 29 CRs to re-open. E. Performed an independent review of remaining CRs. In rLition to the CRs opened by WE, the following items were noted that could affect equipment operability. CR 95-083 Not clear that should have been closed. Only addresses course of action, not completion. WO Tag that was used to close CR (73063) was not found in CHAMPS. CR was re-opened. CR 95-496 Not clear that repair was made or problem resolved. Page 5 of 8
POINT BEACH UNIT 2 RESTART CO5f5flT5fENT i INDEPEhDENT REVIEW RESULTS j t Commitment ID Number 23 CR 96-1410 Not clear that should have been closed. Operability status should be in the CR closecut. CR 95-440 Closure discusses informing Westinghouse, but no follow-up from Westinghouse on any other long-term action required. Also reviewed CR 95- ; 421. CR was re-opened. , CR 96-1230 Relief valves not installed properly. The referenced Work Orders have not ! been issued yet. Operability needs to be addressed with this relief valve l configuration in the interim until they are ir. stalled properly. Action #1 was added to address this issue. i l CR 95-321 Could not find referenced Work Order to detennine if work has been ; completed. Action #1 was added, and has since b en adequately closed. No further action required. ; CR 96-033 Could not determine if heat exchanger is repaired. Action #1 was added to ! address this issue. CR 96-119 CR closed to Work Order, but Work Order not issued yet. Action #1 was added to address this issue. I CR 96-432 CR closed to Work Order, but Work Order not issued yet. Action #1 was added to address this issue. CR 96-567 Closure status not clear in initial review. Action #1 was re-opened, but CR + (parent document) shows it as being closed. ! CR 96-725 The impact of delaying replacement of the pressure switch is not addressed. l CR 96-333 Closed CR to Work Order 11/95. Work Order has not been issued. Action #2 was added to address this issue. CR 96-727 Not clear if work has been completed. By only reviewing the CR, it is not possible to address the severity of this problem. It should have been addressed in the CR about the severity of the peeling paint on the filters and the operability impact. Action #1 was added to address this issue. i F. Items noted in E. above address potential equipment operability concerns. Other concerns that are more aAninistrative/ programmatic in nature are discussed below: l CR 96-282 The deficiency in the procedures (IT-290B and IT-295B) was properly , updated. Basis for 50.59 screening is weak. ! Page 6 of 8
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- POINT BEACH UNIT 2 RESTART COMMITMENT INDEPENDENT REVIEW RESULTS I
; Commitment ID Number 23 i n l 1 CR 96-131 Screening adequate. However, the CHAMPS update is not addressed. Also, !
reviewed SER 95-010. CHAMPS should be updated as recommended in CR. ;
- Action #1 was added to address this issue.
1 : J ! CR 96-134 It is noted that a team has been formed to review closed systems. However, it is not clear if there has been any action on this task. i CR 95 357 While not considered an operability issue, the CR does not adequately show ' { closure, only that drawing updates will be done and a Work Order has been written to remove the sump pump from the Ready to Start circuitry.
! l General: Many CRs are closed to Work Orders or other documents, or to a long-term plan. While closing to another CR to prevent redundancy is appropriate, <
closing to a Work Order, or other means which are not tracked for closure, is
- not felt to be appropriate. This will be addressed in more detail in the !
j independent review of Restart Commitment #32. ! 3 J i
; Recomm'endations l
CR 96-850 Recommendations:
]
! 1. Review PBNP response to NUREG 737, Item II.E.1.1, " Auxiliary Feedwater Evaluation" Ensure the current assessment of the degraded reliability of P-38A is consistent with the licensing commitments made for the PBNP AFW system.
- 2. Restore the dedicated operator for P-38A in the short term.
, 3. Resolve the root cause of the P-38A tripping (high frequency) in the near term. $ 4. Evaluate the reliability of the other safety-related motors which would experience the high
- frequency condition when initially powered from G-01 and G-02.
i These operability issues from CR 96-850 need to be addressed prior to Unit 2 restart. CR 96-850 and CR 97-0415 were closed, snd a new Condition Report (97-1210) was generated to address these issues. This CR should be noted as a Restart Issue. l
; i Page 7 of 8 I J
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I POINT BEACH UNIT 2 RESTART COMMITMENT INDEPENDENT REVIEW RESULTS i Commitment ID Number 23 ] CRs Remainine to be Evaluated for Operabilitv: I l CR 95-079 CR 95-496
- ! ~ CR 96-1410 CR 96-725
?- CR 96-974 (STP 14.6 needs to be updated per SER 96-057) I 1 I These CRs need to be evaluated for operability prior to Unit 2 restart. . i ! I i . CRs Recommended bv WE to be Evaluated for Operability ] ! CR 96-134 CR 96-1772 (Not re-opened but noted as a Restart Issue) l; ' CR 96-099 CR 96-080 . CR 96-1312 CR 96-285 I ' CR 95-036 CR 96-1301 ! CR 96-809 CR 96-070 i b CR 97-0060 CR 96-740 CR 96-1387 CR 95-331 j CR 96-761 CR 95-421 ! These CRs need to be evaluated for operability prior to Unit 2 restart. ! 1 . i Other: ; I The following items are not restart or equipment operability issues, but should be resolved: 4- 1 CR 96-282 Basis for 50.59 screening is weak. 1 CR 96-131. CHAMPS should be updated as recommended in CR. 4 CR 96-134 Clarify action on team formed to review closed systems. e CR 95-357 Track drawing updates to be done and the performance of Work Order to remove the sump pump from the Ready to Start circuitry. I i ii Reviewer: 5-l-47
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i i Page 8 of 8 l
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~. __ _. __ _ . _ m
. -a ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGF 1 05/03/97
*********** ******************** Responsible Person: -
- Trkid: U2H22 RESTART
- Urgency: DONE
- Action Number. 32 Work Priority: 99 Activity Pending is: DONE ASSOCIATED WITH A COMMITMENT
----------TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION------------------------------------------
Unit 2 Refueling 22 Startup Commitments Implement interim improvements for the condition reporting progess, based on a review of assessments and identified recommendations for improving the process.
----------DATES---------------------------------------------------------------
Source Record: 01/10/97 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ** *** Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: 04 15 97 Action Create: Action Closed: 05 03 97 01 13 97 Orig Eval Due: Eval Done: Orig CA Due: 02 13 97 Corr Act Done:04 15 97 PEOPLE-------------------------------------------------------------- Responsible for Overall Action: RES __ . Responsible for Current Pending Activity: Issug Manager: Initiator: Punchlist Administrator: i
----------UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(02/11/97 Requested Due Date: 03/10/97 (02 Changed the Due Date from: 02 This/11/97 item will continue until we are leaving c/13/97 old shutdown to 03/10/97 since we intend to evaluate continuous improvements in the corrective action area. Since the date for leaving cold shutdown has been changed to 3/10/97 the due date of this item should be set accordingly. (03/11/97 ^ Changed the Due Date from: 03/10/97 to 03/31/97 (03/31/97 Changed the Due Date from: 03/31 This item has .been changed to coincide with the n/97 ew to 04/15/97 action corrective program process accessment completion which is due on 4 On that same date an action plan for corrective action program /15/97. improvement is also due. (04 . Passed to .....s for Verification. The/15/97 process assessment of the corrective action program is complete as of this date and the action plan for implementation of the recommendations is complete. Action items for the action plan will be issued. (05 _, Passed to __... for Final Close Out. Rev/02/97iewed documentation. This item is ready to be closed. (05/03/97 ) PLA Clopure of Item.
----------REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------------
----------MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- --------------------------------
Originating Agency: S stem: XX NRC Open Item Number: N C Status: Related Outages: U2R22 Engineering Work Type: None,Specified Person Hours: Original Estimate = Current Estimate = Actual Hours = 4
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